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PART III.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

TURKISH WAR.

236

December 1912.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Turkish War.

Part III.

[51209] No. 1.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 465.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, November* 30, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 410 of 28th November to Berlin and my telegram No. 459 of 29th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is very pleased at the language which you held to German Ambassador and at step which you have taken at Berlin.

He said that it would be difficult for the Russian Government to take the initiative in putting forward the proposal in question as alternative to Servian demand for a port, and that he would prefer to allow Austria to state her views first at the meeting of the Ambassadors, and we could then consider our reply. He would be ready to propose that Albania should be confined as far as possible to coast regions; that no Power should have a privileged position in it; that it should be placed under the suzerainty of the Sultan, with preferably a Turkish prince or governor; that the ports should be neutralised; that the commerce of all nations should be on an equal footing. Russia could not, however, in the first instance, oppose Servian claim.

The essential thing was that Servia should acquire under an international guarantee full liberty to import and export whatever she liked unreservedly, including munitions of war. In war time Austria could seize latter as contraband if at sea in the Adriatic, but not if it was already in port. Russia must insist on the substance, but would yield on the form, as the question of a port under Servian sovereignty was not one in which Russian interests were so engaged as to justify, if taken by itself, her going to war. He said that the port with which Servia was to be connected by railway must be Durazzo.

His Excellency observed that he did not know how Servia or public opinion in Russia would view such a settlement, but he would try and impress on former that it was really much more advantageous to her than if she were to have a port of her own, as latter would always be point which Austria could seize at any moment she chose.

[51202] No. 2.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 696.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December* 1, 1912.

OTTOMAN delegates leave for the front to-day with protocol said to be on the following lines:—

1. Armistice for fifteen days.
2. Both armies to maintain their present positions.
3. Neither side to fortify or to dispatch troops or war material. Adrianople and Scutari to be provisioned in daily instalments.

(Sent to Sophia, Belgrade, and Athens.)

[51203] No. 3.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 697.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 1, 1912.*

PORTE informs me that Mr. Angus Hamilton, correspondent of Central News, has been taken prisoner by Bulgarians, and is at present at Kirk Kilisse.

[51211] No. 4.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, December 1, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 299 of 30th November.

I received verbal message to that effect from the Greek Government on 27th November, and immediately communicated it through wireless telegraphy through His Majesty's ship "Hussar" to the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean fleet, who replied that none of His Majesty's ships have approached entrance to Dardanelles by day or by night.

Greek torpedo-boat destroyers are patrolling that neighbourhood, and one of them exchanged shots with fort Sedil Bahr in the early morning of 27th November.

[51224] No. 5.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, December 1, 1912.*

I TRIED to sound Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday as to the object of General Konrad's visit to Bucharest, but I could not acquire anything from him.

This morning I learn from a well-informed source that the Roumanian Government are becoming anxious with regard to the attitude of Bulgaria in the matter of compensation to Roumania. M. Danef is putting off his visit to Bucharest under various pleas, and it is believed in Roumania that Bulgaria is holding back from making proposals for compensation until she knows how much Turkish territory she will be able to retain. My informant said that Roumania might find it necessary to take strong measures to force Bulgaria to show her hand. He said that he had reason to believe that Roumanian Government had sounded Austro-Hungarian Government as to their views, and that autograph letter from the Emperor to the King deals with this point.

[51213] No. 6.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, December 1, 1912.*

PRIME Minister, to whom I read a translation of your telegram No. 126 of 29th November, took note and requested me to thank you.

He said that in order to secure complete commercial independence it was essential for Servia to possess a port in her own territory. If any of the other schemes suggested were adopted Austria would find means to obstruct and cause Servian commerce constant difficulties. He enquired why, if Austria had no other designs, she should object to Servia possessing even a purely commercial port. Servia would have her hands full for years to come with her new territories, and it was absurd to suppose

that she would be weaving schemes against Austria. Servia was desirous of living on friendly terms with Austria, but whenever advances came from that quarter they implied dependency. He was willing to leave the matter in the hands of Europe, and if Europe decided against Servia it would be an injustice, but she would have to submit.

Meanwhile he would use every effort to avoid causing irritation to Austria. He regretted that his name had been attached to the communication in the "Times," but he could not publicly withdraw or modify it, as this would cause danger of resentment and excitement here.

[51215] No. 7.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, December 1, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 26 of 30th November.

A communiqué appears in to-day's Government organs designed to allay apprehensions aroused by sudden visit of inspector-general of Austro-Hungarian army. Communiqué describes visit as a fresh echo of friendly relations between Austria and Roumania, and expresses surprise that it should have aroused anxiety, there being no grounds for the apprehension that it denotes any aggravation of the present international crisis.

Inspector-general left for Vienna last night. During his visit he had interviews with the principal Roumanian military authorities.

[51038] No. 8.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1085.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 1, 1912.*

A REPORT reaches me that Turks are disposed to think that some rectifications of frontier and reforms in Macedonia are terms on which peace may reasonably be concluded. If the military situation is what it is presumed to be and Turkish army has no chance of ultimate success, you should, if approached by Turkish Government, point out that much greater sacrifice than these will be necessary to secure peace, and that these proposals will not afford even a basis of discussion with the allies. If your colleagues are similarly instructed, you should, if they do so, volunteer this advice in a friendly and unofficial manner.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 413; Paris, No. 762; and St. Petersburgh, No. 1315.)

[51038] No. 9.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 414.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 1, 1912.*

MY telegram to Constantinople No. 1085 of to-day: Peace negotiations.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[51229] No. 10.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 969.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 17, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of letters which I have received from M. de La Boulinière and Sir Adam Block, president and British delegate respectively on the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt, begging me to take steps for safeguarding the interests of the bondholders in the area now devastated by the war. I have explained to M. de La Boulinière, in a letter of which I have also the honour to enclose a copy, that I am powerless to communicate with His Majesty's consular officers in the theatre of war, and have therefore referred his communication to you.

The action of the Russian consul-general at Salonica in bringing the matter to the notice of the military authorities there in his quality of protector of Greek interests would seem to indicate that the consular officers of the other Powers are not recognised by the military authorities, and that the Greek representative made this communication on their behalf and at their instigation, since Russia is not represented on the Council of the Debt.

From your telegram No. 1031 of the 16th November I gather that you are prepared to take action for the eventual safeguarding of the interests of the bondholders, but in present circumstances I am powerless to take any action here for their immediate protection.

I have, &c,
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 10.

President of Council of Administration of Ottoman Public Debt to Sir G. Lowther.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Constantinople, le 2 (15) novembre, 1912.*

EN raison de la marche des événements qui se produisent actuellement en Turquie, et des conséquences qui pourraient en découler, notre conseil a jugé opportun de faire établir un relevé des encaissements opérés par l'Administration de la Dette publique dans les provinces d'Europe (circonscription d'Andrinople, de Durazzo, de Salonique et de Monastir).

Ce relevé, qui fait l'objet des deux tableaux que j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-joint, indique les montants perçus par la Dette publique dans lesdits bache-mudiriets, au cours des cinq derniers exercices (1323–1327).

Il en ressort que la moyenne annuelle des encaissements de la Dette publique dans la région considérée s'élève aux chiffres suivants :—

1. REVENUS concédés par le Décret de Mouharrem (non compris le Monopole du Tabac géré par la Régie cointéressée et pour lequel des Renseignements seront donnés ultérieurement par cette Société).

(*a.*) RECETTES perçues par les Agences de la Dette publique (Tableau 1).

	£ T.
Bache-mudiriet d'Andrinople	85,645·77
" de Durazzo	76,035·92
" de Salonique	519,906·47
" de Monastir	31,426·73
Total	713,014·89

(*b.*) SEL vendu par les Soins des Sociétés des Chemins de Fer (Tableau 2).

	£ T.
Chemins de Fer orientaux	9,149·40
Chemin de Fer Salonique–Monastir	28,036·19
" Jonction Salonique–Constantinople	11,804·98
Total	48,990·57
Total du chapitre des revenus concédés	762,005·46

2. REVENUS perçus pour le Compte de Tiers.

Services.	Andrinople.	Durazzo.	Salonique.	Monastir.	Totaux.
	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.
Emprunt 4 per cent, 1903 (Pièces converti)	28,688·01	8,496·21	44,709·76	10,134·29	92,028·27
Chemin de Fer Salonique–Monastir.	..	..	137,479·01	78,553·88	216,033·79
" Jonction Salonique–Constantinople	19,300·59	..	174,471·49	..	193,772·08
Emprunt 5 pour cent, 1896 ..	..	..	41,151·82	..	41,151·82
" 4 " 1901–5 ..	963·92	..	15,912·58	16,503·69	33,380·19
" 4 " 1905 ..	1,052·74	..	18,379·45	5,224·79	24,656·98
Totaux	50,005·26	8,496·21	432,105·01	110,416·65	601,023·13

En laissant de côté les revenus perçus pour le Malié (dîmes et hissèi-iané), le total des sommes perçues par la Dette publique dans les vilayets de Roumélie pour son compte, ou pour le compte de tiers, s'élève ainsi à £ T. 762,005·46, plus £ T. 601,023·13, soit £ T. 1,363,028·59, sauf une revision plus minutieuse et plus exacte qu'il y aurait lieu de faire au moment opportun.

Il vous appartient, M. l'Ambassadeur, d'apprécier dans quelle mesure et dans quelles conditions votre action peut s'exercer en faveur des intérêts confiés à la Dette, dès qu'un arrangement définitif sera envisagé par les Puissances, d'accord avec la Turquie et les Etats balkaniques. S'il vous semblait possible, dès à présent, de signaler aux agents consulaires anglais dans les territoires occupés par les quatre Puissances balkaniques le caractère international de notre administration, en les invitant à faire auprès des autorités militaires les réserves qui vous paraîtraient justifiées, le Conseil de la Dette vous en serait très reconnaissant.

La demande de médiation officiellement formulée auprès des Grandes Puissances par la Turquie et les négociations directes qui semblent avoir été engagées par le Gouvernement Impérial avec la Bulgarie m'ont amené à faire sans plus de retard cet appel à votre bienveillant appui.

Veuillez, &c.
Le Président du Conseil,
J. DE LA BOULINIÈRE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 10.

Tableau 1.—Revenus perçus en Turquie d'Europe par la Dette publique ottomane.

Désignation des Revenus.	Bache-Mudiriet d'Andrinople.				
	Exercice 1323.	Exercice 1324.	Exercice 1325.	Exercice 1326.	Exercice 1327.
Revenus concédés par Décret de Moukharrem.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.
Sel	16,185·32	10,665·07	11,095·10	14,160·29	21,802·33
Spiritueux—					
Resmi-miri	23,836·84	19,493·92	21,088·06	24,949·46	29,561·57
Béyié	3,472·06	3,438·35	3,390·83	3,158·20	3,628·35
Timbre	10,696·16	11,062·79	12,160·70	13,116·37	14,154·58
„ à surcharge	1,754·08	1,609·78	1,608·54	1,811·94	2,054·16
Pêcheries	4,150·96	3,437·80	3,567·87	1,604·49	1,113·17
Soie	56·17	152·34	227·19	239·36	214·36
Dîme de Tabacs	3,148·00	2,357·00	3,482·00	2,930·00	7,186·00
Surtaxe douanière	8,579·08	16,875·65	24,031·56	24,604·09	33,157·94
Amendes	200·85	138·82	167·46	292·25	232·58
Recettes hors budget	846·12	871·93	1,162·37	712·94	1,205·09
Recouvrement sur débets	95·94	242·95	49·45	128·54	262·39
Total	73,021·58	70,346·40	81,971·13	88,316·93	114,572·82
Revenus pour Compte de l'Emprunt 4 pour Cent, 1903, avec Garanties spéciales.					
Pêcheries	750·35	783·43	1,037·97	1,047·08	963·61
Droit sur peaux	104·12	165·89	128·17	98·96	182·44
Permis d'éponge	..	..	..	..	..
„ de chasse	174·85	159·35	280·89	251·21	302·72
„ de pêche	51·30	46·94	42·88	36·76	41·35
Soies	26,833·36	22,745·30	29,964·80	21,714·18	25,955·33
Timbre à surcharge	1,754·08	1,609·78	1,608·54	1,811·94	2,054·16
Tumbéki	20·65	18·40	22·28	20·04	14·00
Recettes hors budget	..	..	..	..	..
Amendes	139·92	49·22	43·20	230·92	235·72
Total	29,822·63	25,578·31	33,078·73	25,211·09	29,749·33
Revenus pour Compte des divers Emprunts et Garanties kilométriques (Dîmes).					
Chemin de Fer Salonique–Monastir ..	..	..	..	..	..
„ Jonction Salonique–Constantinople	13,444·20	21,882·55	17,153·34	20,715·38	23,307·48
Emprunt 5 pour cent, 1896 ..	..	..	..	..	..
„ 4 „ 1901–5 ..	672·08	1,094·12	857·09	1,033·98	1,162·34
„ 1905 Tedjhizat-Askérié ..	825·21	1,382·35	861·82	1,032·01	1,162·34
Dîmes Malié	..	..	..	..	..
Total	14,941·49	24,359·02	18,872·25	22,781·37	25,632·16
Revenus pour Compte du Malié.					
Hissé-Iané sur la dîme des tabacs et de la soie	3,533·53	2,968·13	3,906·23	2,848·46	3,567·31
Hissé-Iané sur la dîme des céréales..	..	..	..	3,096·03	3,487·04
Total	3,533·53	2,968·13	3,906·23	5,944·49	7,054·35
Total des revenus	121,319·23	123,251·86	137,828·34	142,253·88	177,008·66
Frais généraux	12,835·38	11,539·53	10,797·58	11,881·23	17,489·60
Total des revenus nets	108,483·85	111,712·33	127,030·76	130,372·65	159,519·06

Désignation des Revenus.	Bache-Mudiriet de Durazzo.				
	Exercice 1323.	Exercice 1324.	Exercice 1325.	Exercice 1326.	Exercice 1327.
Revenus concédés par Décret de Moukharrem.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.
Sel	38,139·59	32,615·25	35·603·47	37,695·67	37,241·98
Spiritueux—					
Resmi-miri	9,065·17	8,009·36	7,976·58	9,307,24	10,904·45
Béyié	1,012·88	1,063·69	1,064·37	1,078·02	1,125·65
Timbre	5,576·38	5,557·80	5,991·52	6,787·80	5,847·27
„ à surcharge	790·24	706·82	711·31	816·83	574·80
Pêcheries	..	..	..	..	..
Soie	..	..	..	..	..
Dîme de Tabacs	..	..	..	139·00	..
Surtaxe douanière	15,158·06	22,817·82	23,257·57	26,685·44	27,352·76
Amendes	105·00	105·42	116·95	73·31	49·95
Recettes hors budget	201·03	148·87	110·51	70·74	30·36
Recouvrement sur débets	132·87	32·45	22·49	15·37	92·02
Total	70,278·22	71,052·48	72,854·77	82,675·42	83,318,74
Revenus pour Compte de l'Emprunt 4 pour Cent, 1903, avec Garanties spéciales.					
Pêcheries	6,339·69	6,344·94	7,564·77	6,602·12	9,614·43
Droit sur peaux	103·18	108·93	101·95	98·13	97·86
Permis d'éponge	70·00	12·00	64·00	96·00	12·00
„ de chasse	72·66	59·06	83·72	212·32	121·24
„ de pêche	79·81	32·50	67·77	80·67	90·00
Soies	75·40	80·62	90·14	80·52	69·36
Timbre à surcharge	790·24	706·81	711·31	816·83	574·80
Tumbéki	0·50	0·50	0·50	0·50	0·50
Recettes hors budget	2·90	3·75	33·30	..	..
Amendes	16·54	3·53	16·36	16·98	13·51
Total	7,610·92	7,402·64	8,783·82	8,010·97	10,692·72
Revenus pour Compte des divers Emprunts et Garanties kilométriques (Dîmes).					
Chemin de Fer Salonique–Monastir ..	..	..	..	..	..
„ Jonction Salonique–Constantinople	..	..	..	..	..
Emprunt 5 pour cent, 1896 ..	..	..	..	..	..
„ 4 „ 1901–5 ..	..	..	..	..	..
„ 1905 Tedjhizat-Askérié ..	..	..	..	..	..
Dîmes Malié	..	..	..	..	..
Total	..	..	..	..	..
Revenus pour Compte du Malié.					
Hissé-Iané sur la dîme des tabacs et de la soie	9·80	10·48	11·65	10·41	9·26
Hissé-Iané sur la dîme des céréales..	..	..	..	..	..
Total	9·80	10·48	11·65	10·41	9·29
Total des revenus	77,898·94	78·465·60	81,600·24	90,726·80	94,020·72
Frais généraux	13,315·68	16,829·23	11,771·72	12,106·50	13,869·62
Total des revenus nets	64,583,26	61,636·37	69,828·52	78,620·30	80,151·10

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Désignation des Revenus.	Bache-Mudiriet de Saloniqua. Exercice 1323.	Exercice 1324.	Exercice 1325.	Exercice 1326.	Exercice 1327.
Revenus concédés par Décret de Moukharrem.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.
Sel	101,833·68	80,891·22	72,801·40	88,842·78	61,198·64
Spiritueux—					
Resmi-iniri	68,915·47	62,946·19	67,021·86	71,617·80	85,911·76
Béyié	8,656·82	9,001·17	9,024·60	9,175·87	9.700·19
Timbre	41,213·67	42,680·17	50,065·22	52,637·53	57,627·75
„ à surcharge	5,633·74	5,550·13	5,825·32	6,228·78	6,278·98
Pêcheries	..	..	..	..	..
Soie	1,380·01	1,195·59	1,524·03	1,296·86	972·89
Dîme de tabacs	121,825·00	142,452·00	156,710·00	200,224·00	279,989·00
Surtaxe douanière	66,919·84	119,667·48	132,104·81	145·950·99	138,988·38
Amendes	530·37	741·31	601·82	867·89	693·57
Recettes hors budget	2,083·08	2,500·01	503·49	554·85	476·04
Recouvrement sur débets	795·18	669·93	476·20	839·38	228·41
Total	419,823·46	468,245·80	496,658·75	572,768·73	642,065·61
Revenus, pour Compte de l'Emprunt 4 pour Cent, 1903, avec Garanties spéciales.					
Pêcheries	3,631·91	3,448·23	3,359·56	3,343·64	3,392·30
Droit sur peaux	250·85	328·63	273·18	249·15	381·41
Permis d'éponge	108·00	256·00	178·00	79·00	128·00
„ de chasse	586·64	579·82	753·23	1,580·61	1,039·27
„ de pêche	243·80	251·66	263·52	238·01	256·48
Soies	44,633·05	26,761·02	37,533·24	30,633·42	27,183·17
Timbre à surcharge	5,633·74	5,550·13	5,825·32	6,228·78	6,278·98
Tumbéki	14·65	9·27	15·15	25·28	21·65
Recettes hors budget	26·35	..	..	..	..
Amendes	518·62	306·79	294·97	591·39	240·93
Total	55,649·61	37,491·55	48,516·17	42,969·28	38,922·19
Revenus pour Compte des divers Emprunts et Garanties kilométriques (Dîmes).					
Chemin de Fer Salonique–Monastir ..	120,467·22	133,112·10	148,592·96	135,380·50	149,840·78
„ Jonction Salonique–Constantinople	144,598·46	176,663·58	182,282·43	185,063·47	183·749·54
Emprunt 5 pour cent, 1896 ..	41,059·08	41,160·86	41,200·00	41,169·59	41,169·59
„ „ „ 1901–5 ..	13,445·55	15,792·11	16,808·49	16,511·24	17,005·54
„ 1905, Tedjhizat-Askérié .	16,997·55	20,277·01	21,344·11	16,273·07	17,005·54
Dîmes Malié	3,688·10	5,979·12	5,170·61	10,361·23	7,509·00
Total	340,255·96	392,984·78	415,398·60	404,759·10	416,285·99
Revenus pour Compte du Malié.					
Hissédi-lané sur la dîme des tabacs et de la soie	6,295·67	3,815·51	5,241·04	4,379·66	4,440·52
Hissédi-lané sur la dîme des céréales..	..	..	..	48,181·20	50,561·37
Total	6,295·67	3,815·51	5,241·01	52,560·86	55,001·89
Total des revenus	821,934·70	902,537·64	965,814·56	1,073,027·97	1,152,275·68
Frais généraux	45,280·69	32,445·06	38,958·47	36,677·50	41,576·35
Total des revenus nets	776,654·01	870,092·58	926,856·09	1,036,350·47	1,110,699·33

Désignation des Revenus.	Bache-Mudiriet de Monastir. Exercice 1323.	Exercice 1324.	Exercice 1325.	Exercice 1326.	Exercice 1327.
Revenus concédés par Décret de Moukharrem.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.
Sel	..	..	..	..	..
Spiritueux—					
Resmi-iniri	10,780·95	11,677·76	14,388·45	14,972·46	14,184·32
Béyié	2,589·66	2,686·80	2,686·56	2,745·95	2,908·19
Timbre	10,952,60	10,393·97	11,911·96	13,464·21	13,201·11
„ à surcharge	2,353·56	2,097·45	2,248·14	2,212·17	2,319·37
Pêcheries	..	..	..	..	..
Soie	..	..	..	..	..
Dîme de tabacs	470·00	371·00	930·00	835·00	1,104·00
Surtaxe douanière	..	..	..	..	..
Amendes	158·75	191·19	213·61	222·31	160·76
Recettes hors budget	474·74	521·75	163·23	54·57	41·23
Recouvrement sur débets	43·86	30·43	16·61	15·58	53·45
Total	27,804·12	27,976·35	32,558·53	34,522·25	34,272·43
Revenus pour Compte de l'Emprunt 4 pour Cent, 1903, avec Garanties spéciales.					
Pêcheries	4,448·18	5,217·09	5,250·91	5,201·16	5,201·77
Droit sur peaux	114·78	150·26	115·74	130·66	186·43
Permis d'éponge	..	..	..	..	..
„ de chasse	211·04	220·85	326·31	749·41	593·37
„ de pêche	73·57	75·92	78·91	77·96	72·79
Soies	2,187·44	1,646·97	2,292·34	2,292·14	2,274·26
Timbre à surcharge	2,353·56	2,097·45	2,248·14	2,212·17	2,319·37
Tumbéki	3·88	4·63	3·63	1·00	4·73
Recettes hors budget	2·33	3·50	1·75	3·21	3·50
Amendes	17·71	12·06	16·79	50·34	83·58
Total	9,447·42	9,428·73	10,334·49	10,661·05	10,739·80
Revenus pour Compte des divers Emprunts et Garanties kilométriques (Dîmes).					
Chemin de Fer Salonique–Monastir ..	63,277·03	69,919·90	78,201·37	82,454·42	98,316·71
„ Jonction Salonique–Constantinople	..	..	..	..	..
Emprunt 5 pour cent, 1896 ..	..	..	..	..	..
„ „ „ 1901–5 ..	16,694·35	16,239·91	16,612·18	15,504·07	17,407·97
„ 1905, Tedjhizat-Askérié ..	4,849·36	5,423·77	5,880·57	4,465·86	5,504·43
Dîmes Malié	68·38	68·11	65·93	166·84	63·15
Total	84,889·11	91,711·69	100,760·05	102,591·19	121,892·26
Revenus pour Compte du Malié.					
Hissédi-lané sur la dîme des tabacs et de la soie	282·99	213·44	297·13	268·63	310·08
Hissédi-lané sur la dîme des céréales..	..	..	..	12,284·46	16,525·87
Total	282·99	213·44	297·13	12,573·09	16,835·95
Total des revenus	122,423·64	129,330·21	143,950·20	160,347·58	183,800·44
Frais généraux	8,101·19	7,536·44	7,959,53	7,312·98	7,437·59
Total des revenus nets	114,322·45	121,793·77	135,990·67	153,034·60	176,362·86

Tableau 2.—Recettes et Dépenses du Sel vendu par les soins des Sociétés des Chemins de Fer de la Turquie d'Europe pendant les cinq dernières Années 1323–1327.

Exercices.	Chemins de Fer orientaux.				Chemin de Fer Salonique-Monastir.				Chemin de Fer Salonique-Dédéagatch.		
	Recettes.	Dépenses.	Recettes nettes.	Recettes.	Dépenses.	Recettes nettes.	Recettes.	Dépenses.	Recettes nettes.
	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.
1323	6,537·21	594·45	5,942·76	15,525·30	3,171·63	12,353·67	8,955·90	...	8,955·90
1324	8,004·56	2,445·66	5,558·90	20,972·68	7,315·23	13,657·45	11,184·58	1,996·84	9,187·74
1325	7,787·03	2,260·34	5,526·69	29,447·18	10,100·90	19,346·28	12,366·91	2,142·54	10,224·37
1326	11,178·15	2,667·70	8,510·45	30,402·58	9,857·00	20,545·58	10,718·35	1,862·71	8,855·64
1327	12,240·06	3,175·04	9,065·02	43,833·22	12,593·97	31,239·25	15,799·20	3,572·95	12,226·25

Enclosure 3 in No. 10.

Sir A. Block to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 16, 1912.

WITH reference to the letter addressed to you yesterday in the name of the Council of Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt by the president of the council, M. de La Boulinière, I have the honour to enclose, for your information, an advance copy of a *procès-verbal* of the meeting of the council held on the 14th instant. From a perusal of this document your Excellency will learn that the Council of Foreign Bondholders in London has already addressed His Majesty's Government with a view to the protection of the interests of British bondholders in Turkey, and other syndicates have taken similar action.

I trust that your Excellency will afford us your powerful support. It is for your Excellency to decide whether you are able to instruct the British consular agents in Macedonia and Thrace to recommend to the armies of occupation the respect of the bondholders' rights. The Russian consulate-general in Salonica has already taken this step, as you will perceive from the text of the enclosed *procès-verbal*, and I have reason to state that the Russian Ambassador as approved the action of his consul-general. This is the more remarkable as Russia is not represented in our council.

But the special request I have to make on behalf of the British bondholders is that, should the occasion arise, when the final decision shall be taken with regard to Turkish territories that may pass under the domination of other States, those States should be called upon to pay a contributive part of the Ottoman Debt, the exact amount of which will be settled by ulterior negotiation.

I have informed the Council of Foreign Bondholders of the representations the delegates of the bondholders have made respectively to their embassies, and asked Lord Avebury to support my action with His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
ADAM BLOCK,
Delegate of the British Bondholders.

Enclosure 4 in No. 10.

Extract from Procès-verbal of Private Meeting held November 1 (14), 1912.

Présents:

M. J. de La Boulinière, *Président.*
Sir Adam Block.
M. R. Pritsch.
M. A. Nias.

M. L. Pissard, *Directeur général*, assiste à la séance.

M. LE PRÉSIDENT donne lecture au conseil de la lettre suivante, qu'il a reçue de M. le président du syndicat français:—

"Mon cher M. de La Boulinière, "*Paris, le 6 novembre*, 1912.

"J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre lettre du 30 octobre, par laquelle vous me remettez copie de la note que vous avez adressée à l'Ambassade de France pour lui donner connaissance de l'entente intervenue entre le Conseil de la Dette et le Ministère des Finances au sujet des dîmes de la Roumélie.

"Ainsi que je vous l'écrivais le 31 octobre, nous avons eu hier une réunion du Syndicat des Porteurs français, au cours de laquelle nous avons envisagé les mesures qu'il pourrait être éventuellement nécessaire de prendre pour la sauvegarde des intérêts français engagés en Turquie.

"Nous avons décidé, en présence de la gravité des événements, d'appeler la très sérieuse attention de notre Gouvernement sur l'importance de ces intérêts et de solliciter sa protection éventuelle en vue d'empêcher toute atteinte aux droits des porteurs.

"J'avise de cette décision les syndicats étrangers, afin qu'ils puissent, de leur côté, agir auprès de leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

"Veuillez trouver sous ce pli le procès-verbal de cette réunion et agréer, &c.

"Le Président du Syndicat des
"Porteurs français de Fonds ottomans,
"R. HOTTINGUER."

M. de La Boulinière donne également connaissance au conseil d'une seconde lettre, en date du 9 novembre, 1912, de M. le président du syndicat français, par laquelle ce dernier lui transmet copie d'un télégramme de M. Bleichroeder annonçant que les démarches dont il s'agit ont déjà été entreprises par ses soins auprès du Gouvernement allemand.

M. le président communique ensuite au conseil copie du télégramme suivant, qui a été adressé au Gouvernement britannique par le syndicat anglais et dont Sir Adam Block lui a donné communication :—

"The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, "*November* 7, 1912.

"Sir,

"In view of the alarming situation which prevails in the Ottoman Empire, the Council of Foreign Bondholders deem it their duty to request the protection of His Majesty's Government in the event of any attempt being made to interfere with the rights of the British holders of Turkish bonds.

"I have, &c.
"JAMES P. COOPER."

M. de La Boulinière expose enfin que, conformément à la demande du syndicat français, il a fait établir un projet de lettre destinée aux Ambassadeurs en résidence à Constantinople pour leur demander de vouloir bien intervenir auprès de leurs Gouvernements respectifs en vue de la sauvegarde des intérêts de la Dette publique.

Cette lettre, à laquelle le conseil apporte quelques modifications de détail, est ainsi conçue :—

"M. l'Ambassadeur, "*Constantinople, le* 2 (15) *novembre*, 1912.

"En raison de la marche des événements qui se produisent actuellement en Turquie et des conséquences qui pourraient en découler, notre conseil a jugé opportun de faire établir un relevé des encaissements opérés par l'Administration de la Dette publique dans les provinces d'Europe (circonscriptions d'Andrinople, de Durazzo, de Salonique et de Monastir).

"Ce relevé, qui fait l'objet des deux tableaux que j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-joint, indique les montants perçus par la Dette publique dans lesdits bache-mudiriets, au cours des cinq derniers exercices (1323–1327).

"Il en ressort que la moyenne annuelle des encaissements de la Dette publique dans la région considérée s'élève aux chiffres suivants :—

"1. Revenus concédés par le décret de Mouharrem (non compris le Monopole du Tabac géré par la Régie intéressée et pour lequel des renseignements seront donnés ultérieurement par cette société) :—

"(*a.*) Recettes perçues par les agences de la Dette publique (Tableau 1) :

	£ T.
Bache-mudiriet d'Andrinople	85,645·77
" de Durazzo	76,035·92
" de Salonique	519,906·47
" de Monastir	31,426·73
Total	713,014·89

"(*b.*) Sel vendu par les soins des sociétés de chemins de fer (Tableau 2) :

	£ T.
Chemins de Fer orientaux	9,149·80
" Salonique–Monastir	28,036·19
" Jonction Salonique–Constantinople	11,804·98
Total	48,990·57
Total du chapitre des revenus concédés	762,005·46

"2. Revenus perçus pour le compte de tiers :—

Services.	Andrinople.	Durazzo.	Salonique.	Monastir.	Totaux.
	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.
Emprunt 4 pour cent, 1903 (Pêcheries converti)	28,680·01	8,496·21	44,769·76	10,134·29	92,628·27
Chemin de Fer Salonique–Monastir ..	..	..	137,479·91	78,553·88	216,033·79
Chemin de Fer Jonction Salonique–Constantinople	19,300·59	..	174,471·49	..	193,772·08
Emprunt 5 pour cent, 1896 ..	..	..	41,151·82	..	41,151·82
" 4 " 1901–5 ..	963·92	..	15,912·58	16,503·69	33,380·19
" 4 " 1905 ..	1,052·74	..	18,379·45	5,224·79	24,656·98
Totaux	50,005·26	8,496·21	432,105·01	110,416·65	601,023·13

"En laissant de côté les revenus perçus pour le Malié (dîmes et hissé-iané), le total des sommes perçues par la Dette publique dans les vilayets de Roumélie, pour son compte ou pour le compte de tiers, s'élève ainsi à £ T. 762,005·46, plus £ T. 601,023·13, soit £ T. 1,363,028·59, sauf une revision plus minutieuse et plus exacte qu'il y aurait lieu de faire au moment opportun.

"Il vous appartient, M. l'Ambassadeur, d'apprécier dans quelle mesure et dans quelles conditions votre action peut s'exercer en faveur des intérêts confiés à la Dette dès qu'un arrangement définitif sera envisagé par les Puissances, d'accord avec la Turquie et les États balkaniques. S'il vous semblait possible, dès à présent, de signaler à vos agents consulaires dans les territoires occupés par les quatre Puissances balkaniques le caractère international de notre administration, en les invitant à faire auprès des autorités militaires les réserves qui vous paraîtraient justifiées, le conseil de la Dette vous en serait très reconnaissant.

"La demande de médiation officiellement formulée auprès des Grandes Puissances par la Turquie et les négociations directes qui semblent avoir été engagées par le Gouvernement Impérial avec la Bulgarie m'ont amené à faire sans plus de retard cet appel à votre bienveillant appui.

"Veuillez, &c.
"Le Président du Conseil,
"M. DE LA BOULINIÈRE."

D'autre part, sur la demande de M. le président, M. le directeur général donne lecture au conseil de la lettre ci-dessous reproduite, qu'il a reçue de l'inspecteur en chef du bache-mudiriet de Salonique :—

"M. le Directeur général, "*Salonique, le* 27 *octobre* (9 *novembre*), 1912.

"J'ai l'honneur de vous informer qu'à la suite de la reddition de la ville de Salonique à l'armée hellène, qui a eu lieu ce matin, le consulat général de Russie nous a délivré une lettre, dont copie ci-jointe, pour être présentée aux commandants de la susdite armée, déclarant que les intérêts de la Dette publique ottomane sont sous la protection des Grandes Puissances.

"Veuillez, &c.
"L'Inspecteur en chef,
"THOMASSIAN."

Voici le texte de la lettre du consulat général de Russie :—

"*Consulat général Impérial de Russie, Salonique,*
"*le* 26 *octobre*, 1912.

"Le consulat général Impérial de Russie à Salonique, chargé des intérêts hellènes en cette ville, a l'honneur de prévenir les honorables commandants de l'armée hellène que la Dette publique ottomane est une institution nationale se trouvant sous la protection et la responsabilité des Grandes Puissances.

"Le Consul général,
"A. BELAÏEW."

Le conseil, particulièrement satisfait de l'intervention spontanée de la Russie en faveur des intérêts de la Dette publique, prend note des communications ci-dessus rapportées, prie M. le président d'envoyer, sous sa signature, aux Ambassadeurs résidant à Constantinople et dont les nationalités sont représentées au Conseil de la Dette publique, la lettre préparée à leur intention, et décide qu'une copie de cette lettre sera remise, avec une lettre d'accompagnement de M. le président, à M. l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Constantinople.

Le conseil décide enfin d'adresser aux syndicats le télégramme suivant :—

"En raison des circonstances actuelles, conseil a décidé, dans séance d'aujourd'hui, de signaler à vigilance des Ambassadeurs situation en Roumélie des revenus qui lui sont confiés.

"Nous vous serons obligés faire démarches analogues auprès votre Gouvernement.

"LA BOULINIÈRE."

Enclosure 5 in No. 10.

Sir G. Lowther to President of Council of Administration of Ottoman Public Debt.

M. le Président, *Constantinople, le 17 novembre*, 1912.

JE m'empresse d'accuser réception de la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser en date du 2 (15) novembre et par laquelle vous me priez de signaler, dès à présent, aux agents consulaires anglais dans les territoires occupés par les quatre Puissances balkaniques le caractère international de l'Administration de la Dette.

Je regrette qu'à cause de l'impossibilité de communiquer avec les consuls désignés je ne suis pas à même de me conformer au désir exprimé dans votre lettre, mais j'ai transmis à mon Gouvernement copie de votre lettre et de son annexe et je ne manquerai pas de vous communiquer à temps opportun la réponse de Sir E. Grey aussitôt que celle-ci me parviendra.

Veuillez, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[51330] No. 11.

Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 161.)
Sir, *Stockholm, November 26*, 1912.

IT may be of interest to record that, although the official German press organ insists on the falsity of the alarming rumours recently circulated as to the imminence of war, the telegrams and telephone messages emanating from Berlin which are published in the Swedish press are of a highly alarmist character. The two newspapers which are under direct German influence, the "Svenska Dagblad" and the "Dagens Nyheter," both insist on the warlike intentions of both Russia and Austria, and on the determination of Germany, though her intentions are most pacific, to stand by her ally in all eventualities.

This fact may be of interest in view of the similar attitude which appears to be taken by that part of the Viennese press which is inspired from Berlin.

It is also noticeable that public opinion in this country in the Court, military, and journalistic circles, which are in direct dependence upon the same circles in Germany, appears to be very strongly anti-Slav in sympathy and to assume as a self-evident fact that the pretensions of Servia must be forcibly suppressed in the interests of "Germanic culture" and the maintenance of Teutonic prestige.

I have, &c.
CECIL SPRING-RICE.

[51319] No. 12.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 132.)
Sir, *Sophia, November 27*, 1912.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 182 of the 26th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note that I have to-day addressed to the Bulgarian Government with regard to the intentions of Great Britain as regards the holders of Turkish bonds.

This note is in the same terms as that addressed to the Bulgarian Government by the French Minister on the 19th instant.

I have, &c.
H. G. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 12.

Note communicated to Bulgarian Government.

D'ORDRE de son Gouvernement, le Ministre d'Angleterre est chargé d'attirer l'attention du Gouvernement Royal sur le fait que les créanciers étrangers sont intéressés dans les emprunts émis par l'Empire ottoman, et même les emprunts garantis par des affectations sur les divers revenus de la Turquie, et que le Gouvernement britannique est prêt à faire valoir ces intérêts en ce qui concerne les revenus de la Turquie d'Europe.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique fait, en outre, réserve de tous droits moraux et matériels qui ont été reconnus à la Grande-Bretagne, à ses nationaux ou protégés par le Gouvernement ottoman.

Sophia, le 14 (27) *novembre*, 1912.

[51248] No. 13.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 347. Confidential.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, November 27*, 1912.

IN my despatch No. 334 of the 13th instant I commented on the change which had come over the spirit of the Russian Foreign Office and on the conciliatory attitude adopted by M. Sazonof in his handling of the question of a Servian Adriatic port. The situation had become considerably less strained. The Austrian Ambassador had, indeed, informed me that, from a conversation which he had had with the president of the council, he had reason to hope that the Russian Government would be satisfied were Servia to be given access to the Adriatic by means of an international railway and a free port. This *détente*, however, was not destined to last. Before a week had elapsed M. Sazonof once more returned to the charge, and, with one of those sudden *volte-face* to which he has accustomed us, insisted that Servia must be allowed to acquire San Giovanni di Medua as an unfortified commercial port, together with a strip of territory connecting it with some point on the Servian frontier.

His Excellency impressed this view strongly on the Austrian and German Ambassadors. In conversation with myself, he expressed the hope that His Majesty's Government would use all their influence with the Austrian Government to induce them to consent to a settlement on the above lines. While promising to inform you of what he had said, I pointed out that the Austrian Government would never listen to us unless we could give them a definite assurance that the Servians would, in return, renounce all further territorial claims in Albania, and I enquired whether his Excellency would be prepared to tell the Servians that unless they accepted unreservedly what was offered them he would leave them to their fate. M. Sazonof replied that, whatever he might tell them privately, he could not make such a declaration *urbi et orbi*. Subsequently, however, he said that, were the Austrian Government to make the concession asked of them, he would tell the Servians that they had nothing more to hope for, and would use all his influence to induce them to abandon their more ambitious pretensions.

It is symptomatic of the serious view which his Excellency took of the situation at this moment that he should have, for the first time since the war broke out, enquired what His Majesty's Government would do were Austria to attack Servia. I replied that this was a question which I could not answer without instructions. Much would, no doubt, depend on the nature of the attack and on the circumstances which had provoked it; and nothing could, in my opinion, be more provocative than the manner in which Servia was at present defying Austria by demanding the partition of Albania between herself and Greece.

In a subsequent conversation, M. Sazonof informed me that he was instructing Count Benckendorff to speak to you on the subject of Albania. Austria, he said, could not create an autonomous Albanian province, in which Austrian and Italian influence were to be supreme, out of what had hitherto been an integral part of the Turkish Empire, without the consent of England, France, and Russia. We were all three signatories of the Treaty of Berlin, and, if we consented to meet Austria's wishes in this matter, we should be making a very great concession. She must therefore be given clearly to understand that she must do something for us in return, and that, if she made difficulties about the Servian port, we should also make difficulties when the question of the delimitation of Albania came up for discussion.

While M. Sazonof was holding this language, rumours were rife of serious military preparations and even of a projected mobilisation of the Russian army. Both my Austrian and German colleagues were very uneasy in their minds, as they believed that, though it might be premature to speak of mobilisation, active measures were being taken to have everything in readiness should the order to mobilise be given. They both attributed M. Sazonof's sudden change of front to chauvinistic influences brought to bear on the Emperor by the Grand Duke Nicolas Nicolaievitch and others, who had been staying with His Majesty at Spala. Whether this was the case or not, I am unable to say; but it is an undoubted fact that since the Emperor has returned to Tsarskoe Selo, where His Majesty is in immediate touch with his Ministers, M. Sazonof has once more lowered his tone and taken a calmer view of the international situation.

We welcomed the suggestion, made by M. Poincaré to the Austrian and German Ambassadors at Paris, that Servia should be given a strip of territory running along the future Montenegrin frontier, together with a commercial port either at San Giovanni di Medua or Alessio, and, on learning that this solution would be inacceptable to Austria, he merely remarked that it would be necessary to find another. He, about the same time, informed the Servian Minister, who had consulted him as to the future attitude of his Government, that the object which Servia must keep in view was her economic emancipation, but that the means by which this end was to be attained was a question which she must leave in the hands of the Great Powers. He also telegraphed in the above sense to the Russian Minister at Belgrade.

The solution which M. Sazonof had in his mind was the neutralisation of all the Albanian ports under an international guarantee. This, together with an international railway giving her access to one or more of these ports, on the administration of which she would be represented, would, he thought, place Servian commerce on an equal footing with that of any other country. His Excellency told me that he contemplated putting forward a proposal in the above sense, and added that he thought that the time had come when the Ambassadors at Paris should be authorised by their respective Governments to meet and discuss questions, such as that of Servian access to the Adriatic, Albania, the Ægean Islands, Mount Athos, &c., without, however, dealing with the conditions of peace, which should be left to stand over till after the war was over.

From the views thus expressed by M. Sazonof, as well as from the language held to the Austrian Ambassador by the Emperor, of which I reported in my telegram No. 452 of the 26th instant, it would appear that the situation has considerably improved during the past few days. Though public opinion is still strongly anti-Austrian and though, judging by past experience, it would be hazardous to preclude the possibility of the resumption by Russia of an uncompromising attitude on the questions at issue, both the Emperor and the Russian Government are undoubtedly anxious to avoid being dragged into a European war. Apart altogether from the question whether the Russian army is ready to confront the forces which Austria and Germany can put in the field and apart from the Emperor's well-known love of peace, both His Majesty and his Government must be aware that any reverse to the Russian arms would awake all the elements of unrest, that for the moment lie

dormant within the Empire, and even bring the country face to face with a second revolution.

There are, however, other factors to be reckoned with besides Russia. Austria, in spite of the conciliatory disposition which she has shown on many points connected with the eventual settlement of the Balkan question, has taken up such an irreconcilable attitude with regard to a Servian port on the Adriatic, even when it was proposed that that port should have a purely commercial character and that the strip of territory, by which Servia was to have access to it, should run along the Montenegrin frontier, that she is suspected of wishing to satisfy her *amour-propre* at Russia's expense. This, however, is a satisfaction which Russia is not at present in a mood to give her. Servia, on the other hand, may, by persisting in a provocative attitude, become engaged in war with Austria, and Russia will then be inevitably drawn into the conflict.

That M. Sazonof does not feel sure of Servia is evidenced by the language which he held to me when, in accordance with your instructions, I pressed him to give effect to his proposal for a meeting of the Ambassadors at Paris. He was not, he said, sure whether it would not after all be better to postpone this meeting till after peace had been signed, as he doubted whether Servia would accept the settlement which he had suggested.

He could not therefore give me an answer till he had had time to think over what it was best to do.

Whatever encouragements M. Sazonof may originally have given Servia, I believe that he has of late done all he possibly can to induce her to leave the question of her access to the Adriatic in the hands of the Powers. It is possible, however, that he may have so committed himself in the past that he cannot now counteract the effect of the assurances which he gave when he thought that Austrian opposition could be overcome without an appeal to arms.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[52357] No. 14.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 994 A.)

Sir *Constantinople, November 25, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 507 of the 5th instant in which you ask that reports may be furnished from time to time, for communication to the Committee of Imperial Defence, on the effects of the present war on the national life of the Ottoman Empire. In accordance with your instructions I have addressed a circular to His Majesty's consular officers requesting them to supply such information of the nature desired as they may be able to obtain in their various districts. At the same time I must point out that the consular districts chiefly affected are at present entirely cut off from Constantinople, and that it is at least doubtful whether a large proportion of them will remain under this embassy at the conclusion of the war.

In my despatches No. 882 of the 20th October, No. 910 of the 28th October, and No. 963 of the 15th instant, I have already touched upon some of the points mentioned in the list of headings forwarded by the Committee of Imperial Defence, and I would venture to suggest that copies of these despatches might be furnished to the committee.

Pending the receipt of fuller and more general information it may not be without interest to run through the list furnished by the committee and give rough impressions on some of the items enumerated, more especially from the point of view of the capital, which, both from its geographical position and cosmopolitan character, is affected by the war in a different degree and in a different way from other towns in the Ottoman Empire.

1. The interruption of commerce trade and business in Constantinople itself has been less thorough than one would have expected. This is largely due to the fact that Constantinople does not depend to any appreciable extent on its "hinterland." Its trade is essentially maritime and is carried mostly in neutral bottoms, so that it has never been entirely suspended. Shipping, and especially British shipping, has been frightened away by high insurance rates and war risks, and business on a large scale is

at a standstill, but small trading does not seem so far to have been affected by the war and the ordinary necessaries of life have scarcely risen in price. At one time a bread famine was feared, and on one or two occasions the contents of the bread-shops were commandeered in order to supply the large numbers of wounded who were brought in without any previous provision being made for them, but large quantities of flour have been imported from Trebizond and other Black Sea ports, and measures have been taken by the authorities to prevent any artificial increase in the price of bread. Fish has rarely been more plentiful or cheaper and there has been a constant supply of excellent vegetables, which are grown in the near neighbourhood of the town and even within the town itself. The meat supply has also been well maintained, and there is no scarcity of dairy produce, eggs, fowls, &c. This fortunate state of things is due to the fact that Constantinople draws its ordinary supplies chiefly from the immediately surrounding country and the Asiatic shore, while such necessaries as grain and petroleum come in freely from the Black Sea. Even in normal times there is never any large importation of foodstuffs by rail from the European side, but it remains to be seen what effect will be produced by the nearer approach of the enemy to the capital. On the other hand, supplies coming in by sea from the Dardanelles side have been considerably affected, and coal, for instance, is now at famine price.

Communications.

2. Ordinary railway communication with Europe has been entirely cut off, as far as the general public is concerned, since the first mobilisation order was issued. The Anatolian Railway was also monopolised for military purposes for a time, but is now open again to general traffic.

The mails for Europe are sent by the Roumanian line of steamers which leave for Constanza three times a-week and perform the journey in about twelve hours Ordinary passenger traffic by sea with Marseilles, Trieste, Alexandria, Smyrna, the Pireus, and the Black Sea ports has been maintained as usual by the Khedivial Mail Line, the Messageries maritimes, the Paquet Line, and the Austrian Lloyd.

The postal and telegraph service with Turkey in Europe is now suspended altogether and was very irregular from the date of the mobilisation order. On the 24th October the telegraph office refused to receive official cypher messages for consular officers in Roumelia, though it was not officially intimated till the 30th October that the despatch of such messages was prohibited.

The war has, I think, made little appreciable difference in postal and telegraphic communication with Turkey in Asia, which is always slow and irregular, the cables cut by the Italians in the Turco-Italian war have not yet been repaired, and telegraphic communication with Red Sea ports such as Jeddah and Hodeida is still interrupted.

3. No "moratorium" has yet been declared. I am requesting the commercial attaché to this embassy to furnish me with a separate report on the general effects of the war on finance.

Response to Mobilisation.

4. In my despatches referred to above I have already reported that the response to mobilisation has not as a rule been willing. The attitude of the Christians needs no explanation, and the plea of the Arabs that European matters do not concern them is natural enough. There have been volunteers among fanatical Moslems, but on the whole enthusiasm to serve has certainly not been marked. I think this has been largely due to the great demands for military service made on the Ottoman peoples during the last few years. Tripoli, the Yemen, and Albania have kept large numbers of troops in the field for a long time past, and agricultural and private interests have consequently suffered. The people had had their fill of war and even a campaign against the infidel was powerless to rouse enthusiasm. (See also Colonel Tyrrell's despatch No. 88 forwarded in my despatch No. 955 of the 12th November.)

Reservists residing (serving) Abroad.

5. The arrangements for calling to the colours reservists residing abroad do not appear to be very complete, but the numbers of such reservists are probably not very large. His Majesty's Embassy occasionally receives applications from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to warn Turkish subjects residing in Cyprus and Crete that they are required to present themselves for military service. In many cases it is found impossible

to trace the whereabouts of the individual named, and in others His Majesty's representative in the countries to which application is made notifies the embassy that the person has been duly warned. In both cases the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is informed in due course of the result and nothing more is heard of the matter. Whether the reservist presents himself or not does not transpire. I am requesting the military attaché to this embassy to furnish a more detailed report on this question.

Enforced Requisition.

6. Enforced requisition has been largely resorted to in Constantinople in the matter of transport and at the outset of the war stores of coal were commandeered, among them those in possession of certain British firms, but as the authorities paid good prices no objection was raised. Horses, pack-ponies, bullocks, buffaloes, and waggons were taken over in very large numbers, being taken at what was apparently a pretty fair valuation against promise of repayment in the event of their not being restored after the conclusion of military operations.

The whole stock of horses of the tramway company was commandeered at an early stage of the proceedings, and the service has been entirely suspended for several weeks. At first all horses were liable to seizure unless the man in charge could produce a paper signed by the Mobilisation Transport Committee. It was found, however, that this plan led to trickery and evasion, and a later stage all owners of horses had to send in their animals to the nearest branch of the committee for inspection; those which were required were promptly seized, while those which it was decided to exempt were furnished with a wire circlet which was fixed round their necks with a lead seal marked with the Government stamp. Foreigners and natives alike were required to submit to this procedure, and many diplomats found it convenient to comply with it as it saved their carriages from being stopped in the streets by the soldiers and taken off to the nearest military post, as had frequently occurred under the previous arrangement. The requisition caused a good deal of discontent, and attempts at evasion were numerous. It did not, however, upset the ordinary transport arrangements of the town as much as might have been expected, owing to the local custom of entrusting much of the carrying to the "hamals," or porters, who are accustomed to handling very heavy weights. From the Dardanelles and from ports on the Sea of Marmara such as Rodosto I hear that the requisition of all means of transport has caused wide-spread distress and an almost total cessation of agricultural operations.

7. The problem of an alteration in the existing social and civil position of individuals in consequence of mobilisation can scarcely be said to exist here, certainly not among Moslems. It may have occurred in the case of Ottoman Greeks, but no case has been brought to my notice.

8. In Constantinople itself no increase of crime has so far been observable, and the general orderliness of the population has been quite remarkable.

9. Martial law was proclaimed on the 7th October and it was announced that all citizens must be inside their houses by 10 o'clock, an hour which was subsequently extended to 2 A.M. in the case of Pera and Galata. Since the revolution of 1908 and 1909 Constantinople has become accustomed to martial law, which seems to make but little difference to the life of the community. Small bands of soldiers patrol the streets, and from time to time there are rumours that individuals attempting to stir up trouble in Stamboul have been seized and summarily shot. Newspapers are frequently suspended or suppressed, and of late the Government has made free use of martial law for political purposes, having arrested all the leading members of the Committee of Union and Progress.

10. I am requesting the military attaché to furnish a separate report under this heading.

11. In Constantinople the call to arms does not appear to have greatly affected the professional class, which is largely composed of Christians who have presumably either purchased exemption or otherwise evaded their military service. The class of artizans and labourers, on the other hand, has been largely depleted, and there is great difficulty in getting any manual work done, a state of things which had already made itself felt owing to the expulsion of Italians during the war with Italy.

12. The question of women taking the place of men in professional or other employments can scarcely be said to arise here.

13. A few cases of lack of discipline among the troops departing for the front have been brought to my notice, but these have been exceedingly rare. At San Stefano, where for weeks past thousands of Asiatic troops have been passing through in

circumstances of hunger, neglect, and discomfort, which would have tried any army in the world, the general verdict is that their conduct has been admirable. One Greek inn-keeper was murdered in a brawl; but, apart from this, no authenticated case of any misbehaviour on the part of the troops at San Stefano has been brought to my notice, and in the capital they have been uniformly quiet and well-behaved.

Restrictions on the Press.

14. The restrictions on the press as to the dissemination of war news were modelled somewhat on the Japanese plan and were very strict in theory, but in practice they have been carried out in an erratic and slipshod manner, and have only proved irritating without being effective.

Local Press.—Correspondents of the local press, both Turkish and foreign, were given passes for the front, and were at first allowed to publish anything which had passed the press censors at the various places in the area of hostilities.

In the second week of hostilities stricter regulations were issued, and editors were required to submit articles containing unfavourable news or criticism of operations to a further censorship at the Ministry of War. The only papers in the capital which published such articles were the organs of the Committee of Union and Progress—the "Tanin" and the "Jeune Turc." For disregarding the order the "Tanin" was suppressed, while the "Jeune Turc" took warning and ceased its criticisms.

On the other hand, the record of apocryphal victories published in other newspapers eventually became so fantastic that the Ministry of War was obliged to warn the press that any paper publishing accounts of non-existent victories would be suppressed or otherwise punished.

Foreign Press.—The grievances of the foreign correspondents have been well ventilated in the British press. They were required to give an undertaking that they would not leave the Turkish camp during the continuance of hostilities, their correspondence had to be sent in the French language, they were allowed to see little or nothing, and their personal liberty was very much restricted. These severe regulations proved of very little effect, and the correspondents soon revolted and made such arrangements as they could. The existence of the foreign post offices enabled them to defy the censor, and they also established a system of sending press telegrams to Constanza and dispatching them uncensored from there.

Censorship.

15. Press telegrams for abroad which had passed the censor at the front were subjected to a further censorship at the office of dispatch in Constantinople. For this purpose military officers were stationed at the telegraph offices. The system was worked in a vexatious manner, correspondents being merely informed several hours after the dispatch of their messages that so many words must be deleted if they wished the message sent. The passage objected to was not specified and the only option left to the sender was to accept the deletion, without knowing what it was, or withdraw hismessage altogether.

Wireless.—The general public has no means of sending wireless telegrams from here, but on the arrival of the foreign warships in the harbour the Turkish Government quickly complained that their wireless operations were interfering with the working of their own station, which was in communication with Adrianople and with the Turkish warships in the Black Sea and the Marmara. An arrangement was arrived at whereby the foreign warships undertook not to use their apparatus except during a stated period of the night, and a very restricted time was apportioned to the ships of each nationality.

Telephones and Private Letters.—There is no public telephone system in Constantinople, and the few private wires in existence merely connect different Government offices.

It is unlikely that any attempt has been made to censor private letters. The great mass of the army is illiterate, and the Oriental conception of a letter is in any case of a nature to render private correspondence practically innocuous.

Transmission of Official Intelligence from the Front.

16. I believe there is now telephonic communication between the Tchatalja lines and the Sublime Porte, but I am told that in the earlier stages of the war the system of communication in the lines was either non-existent or broke down completely.

I am assured that in the Lule Burgas–Visa operations the only means of communication between the two ends of the Turkish line were by telegraph through Constantinople.

Reception of War News.

17. Since the beginning of the military operations the news published in the papers of the capital has been absolutely unreliable. News of Turkish victories has been given almost daily, and even the foreign local press has abstained from recording any Turkish reverse, and has confined itself to noting that the armies were retreating in perfect order to take up more suitable positions in accordance with strategic requirements.

The result has been that in Pera the arrival of newspapers from abroad has been eagerly awaited, and on post days the shops selling them have been besieged by eager crowds. The highly coloured accounts of victories referred to above deceived nobody, and as there has so far been no really favourable news to give, and news of reverses has only been allowed to leak out gradually, there has been little occasion for popular demonstrations. Add to this that the Turk is essentially undemonstrative, while the Ottoman Christian is too prudent to exhibit his feelings.

18. The only member of the reigning house who has been engaged in the military operations was Prince Abdul Halim Effendi, a son of the late Sultan Abdul Hamid.

Shortly after the outbreak of the war the Sultan held a review of troops leaving for the front, but all eye-witnesses agreed that there was no enthusiasm, and that his reception was chilly. The Heir-Apparent recently proceeded to the front to encourage the troops, but beyond officially inspired paragraphs in the newspapers little news was heard of this exploit.

Soldiers returning from the Front.

19. There is no doubt that large numbers of men have returned from the front without authority, and the spectacle of worn-out, ragged, and starved men, limping into Constantinople has been one of the saddest episodes of the last week. At first one heard of many deserters being shot, but of late the military authorities at Tchatalja seem rather to have encouraged the "trek" of the wreckage of the army from Lule Burgas, Visa, &c. These men are not fit for fighting, and the attempt to round them up has apparently been abandoned.

20. The question of prostitutes at the front has not arisen on the Turkish side in the present war. Even if it had been usual for women to accompany a Moslem army, their existence at the front in the actual circumstances would have been impossible.

21. The Turkish troops have had to do without the barest necessities of life, so that there has been no question of sending them gifts or comforts, but the Moslem population has done its utmost to help the refugees and to succour the wounded. As in everything else, there has been great lack of organisation, but no lack of good-will. Since the establishment of the forces in the Tchatalja lines, however, some attempt has been made to send out small comforts to the troops, and the Sultan has set the example by distributing quantities of cigarettes.

22. As in the case of the Italian war, customs duties on goods from the "enemy" countries have be raised to 100 per cent. *ad valorem*, but otherwise there have been no restrictions on trade or financial transactions with "enemy" subjects.

Export of grain and fodder, cattle and sheep has been forbidden from all ports in the Sea of Marmara, Black Sea, Ægean Islands, and Mediterranean. No adequate notice of this prohibition was given, and it led to several complaints from British subjects who interests were injuriously affected.

23. There is no Government guarantee against the loss of trading vessels or cargoes.

Treatment of "Aliens."

24. In spite of the apprehension caused in many places by the religious character of the war, the treatment of foreigners has so far been uniformly good. The Turkish Government and Turkish newspapers pride themselves on the fact, and not unjustifiably, for even foreigners of "enemy" nationality, save in the theatre of war, have been allowed to remain in the country in peace. (See my despatch No. 963 of the 15th November.) The only exception which has been brought to my notice is the expulsion of Greek subjects from the European shore of the Dardanelles, mentioned in my despatch above referred to.

During the earlier stages of the war, "enemy" subjects leaving for their countries

with the presumed object of joining the colours were required to pay their arrears of taxes. The sums demanded, especially in the case of rich Greeks, were often very heavy and were probably far in excess of the amounts legally due.

25. On the whole, the direct influence of the war on the life of Constantinople seems to be remarkably small. To all outward appearances the ordinary life in the streets goes on much as usual. It is in its indirect effects that the war has so far told on the capital, and these are far more moral than material. There is a general feeling of apprehension—apprehension among the Christians of massacres by the Moslems, apprehension among the Moslems of the entry of the Bulgars, apprehension among both of the irruption of a defeated Turkish army. Add to this the terror inspired by the dread of cholera and other epidemic diseases, the large influx of refugee peasants, and the enormous numbers of sick and wounded soldiers that are constantly being brought into the city, and the wonder is that Pera especially with its constitutional liability to panic, still goes about its ordinary affairs. At one moment I think there can be little doubt that the Christian population secretly looked forward to the coming of the Bulgars, but at present I believe that both Christians and Moslems will be very much relieved if both armies can be kept outside.

The above are merely impressions on the points raised by the Committee of Imperial Defence as seen from Constantinople, but I hope, on the return of the military attaché from the front, and on the receipt of the reports asked for from His Majesty's consular officers, to be able to give the information required in a more detailed and more ordered form.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[51230] No. 15.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2, 1912.)

(No. 1002.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 27, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 654 of the 19th instant I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Vice-Consul Matthews, reporting on the state of affairs at Adana.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 15.

Vice-Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 45.)

Sir, *Adana, November 19, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 44 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency the following report on the state of affairs here.

A public meeting was held on the 13th instant, at which patriotic speeches were made and a decision was taken to enrol volunteers. I understand that orders were received about the 13th instant to forward to Constantinople any available ammunition, but none has been sent as there is none to send. I am informed that the Nizam battalions and the best of the redif battalions quartered near Tarsus have been sent to Constantinople. A force of about 1,000 cavalry returning to Aleppo was ordered back from Missis and passed through here for Ulu Kishla on the 15th instant. Two battalions of Aintab redifs who arrived here recently from Ghiulek Boghaz are under orders to proceed to Ulu Kishla. The Karaissalu redif battalion, which left Adana for Karaissalu about a week ago, will, it is stated, now be sent to the front. There is still a force of three redif battalions at Ghiulek Boghaz, near Tarsus. I have not yet learned the decision of the commission sent to enquire into the reported outbreak of cholera among the troops passing through Adana. Dr. Haas, director of the local Anglo-American hospital, is of opinion that the mortality among these troops, which was not high, was due to exposure and lack of food. Had cholera existed among the large force concentrated in the neighbourhood of Tarsus the number of deaths would have been very great.

Hajin.—It was reported on the 16th instant that Rejebian had been released and had returned to Hajin, and that the tension there had been lessened. The vali informed me yesterday that Rejebian had been taken to Albistan, but he was unable to inform me how his release had been effected. The president of the Hajin correctional court, who was stated by the Armenians to have instigated Rejebian's abduction, had been recalled from his post. I would add that Hajin is in no immediate danger, even should disorders occur. Like Deurtyol, it escaped in 1909, and also like Deurtyol, it is capable of sustaining a siege of a month or two.

Tarsus.—A panic reigns at Tarsus at present owing to the effect produced by an inflammatory anti-Christian article published in the Turkish newspaper "Tarsus," of the 15th November, the editor of which is Muezzin-zadeh Mohammed Tahir. All the Christians who could afford the expense have left for Mersina. The vali assured me yesterday that he had sent strict orders to the kaimakam of Tarsus to be vigilant and prevent disorder.

Local Situation.—The local situation has not improved during the past week, and the Christians are very nervous. I called on the vali yesterday afternoon and had a long conversation with him. He informed me that he had summoned a meeting of Moslem and Christian notables for this afternoon to discuss measures to calm the population. The danger lies among the lower classes. The Moslem notables do not desire a massacre, but their influence over the rabble is not what it was prior to the restoration of the constitution. The vali stated that Kurban Bairam was to be celebrated on one day only (to-morrow), and that drinking shops were to be closed at sunset.

The fact that Kiamil Pasha is Grand Vizier is sufficient to reassure foreigners, who, with the exception of the Germans and Greeks, are not particularly apprehensive. Hostilities between Turkey and Greece and recent occurrences on the Bagdad line account for the exception. A Greek employé of the Bagdad Railway Company was robbed and killed at Dorak some three weeks ago. A dispute has occurred between the company and some 150 of its labourers on the construction works at Deurtyol on the Alexandretta branch. The vali explained to me yesterday that the labourers were persuaded that they were being cheated out of their stipulated pay. He mentioned the matter to me, as he feared that it might be exaggerated by the Germans. Last night a cavass of the German consulate was stabbed in the face and badly wounded by a private enemy. I mention this incident because of the importance attached to it by the Armenians, who are in consequence much more nervous to-day than yesterday. This morning's train to Mersina was crowded with Armenians fleeing from Adana. Much of the panic now manifested among the Christians is due to their experience of three years ago. It would, however, be idle to deny that the approach of the Bulgarians to the capital and the fall of Salonica have caused a revival of fanaticism.

I am informed that a French man-of-war is to be sent to Mersina, and I venture respectfully to submit to your Excellency that it is desirable that one of His Majesty's ships should be sent to Mersina, in order that British interests may be protected and British prestige adequately maintained.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[51233] No. 16.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 1005.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 28, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a despatch which has been received from His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem, reporting on the arrival at Jaffa of His Majesty's ship "Prometheus."

The telegram to which Mr. McGregor refers in the first paragraph of his despatch was one in which he had urged that, in view of local conditions existing at Jaffa, it would be preferable to send a war-ship of non-British nationality.

This telegram was, however, only received at this embassy after the "Prometheus" had already been dispatched.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 16.

Consul McGregor to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 91.)
Sir, *Jerusalem, November* 16, 1912.

WITH reference to Mr. Hough's despatch No. 88 of the 12th instant, copy of which was sent directly to your Excellency, and to my telegram No. 21 of the 13th instant on the subject of Mr. Hough's request for the sending of a war-ship to Jaffa, I have the honour to report that His Majesty's ship "Promotheus" arrived at Jaffa from Beirout on the 18th instant.

The officer in command of the "Promethens," who spent yesterday at Jerusalem, and had an interview with the governor, informs me that he had not ascertained the existence of conditions rendering the presence of a war-ship necessary, and, on making enquiry of the consuls-general here, I have learned that, except for a certain amount of depression and anxiety among the Moslem population caused by the rumours of Turkish disasters, no abnormal symptoms had been observed by their vice-consuls at Jaffa.

The Christian population, on the other hand, is excessively timorous, and the persistence with which rumours of an impending occupation by Great Britain have been circulated tends to create a feeling of anxiety which an untoward incident might, in the absence of due vigilance and firmness on the part of the authorities, cause to degenerate into a panic. I have, however, spoken earnestly to the governor on the subject, and his Excellency, while pledging his word that there is no prospect of any serious disturbances at Jaffa, has undertaken to proclaim martial law on the occurrence of the slightest incident.

While accepting these assurances for what they are worth, I do not mean to say that the visit of a foreign war-ship to Jaffa is not desirable, and I have informed both Commander Luxmoore and His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout that there ought, in my opinion, to be a ship within call, say, at Port Said or Beirout; but, for the reasons stated in my telegram above referred to, I should deprecate the continued presence of a British war-ship alone at Jaffa, as being likely to create an impression presumably not desired by His Majesty's Government.

It is now a week since the rumoured arrival of a detachment of bluejackets caused a large crowd to assemble at the railway station here, and it is generally believed that a similar event will take place to-day. Moreover, it is declared that a large body of Anglo-Egyptian troops is camped on the frontier, and Sir William Willcocks, who spent two days here last weeks, was almost universally believed to be the general in command.

At Jerusalem itself, the Moslem population, however, betrays no signs of anti-Christian feeling, nor have I heard the slightest apprehension expressed by any foreign resident, while the British mission at Hebron informs me that it feels perfectly safe, although the population is one of the most fanatical in Palestine.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

[51338] No. 17.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received December 2.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, November* 29, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams, dated the 29th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 17.

Consul-General Barnham to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Smyrna, November* 29, 1912.

"GRANATIERE" (Italian) arrived Smyrna.

Enclosure 2 in No. 17.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *November* 29, 1912.

YOUR No. 682. You should keep "Inflexible" for the present at Besika, but "Yarmouth" and "Dartmouth" may exchange stations.

[51453] No. 18.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 204. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, December* 2, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 199, Secret, of the 29th instant, I received a visit yesterday from the Prime Minister, who entered into a discussion on the general situation, alluding especially to the trouble caused to his Government by the Greek Government, who insist upon complete territorial arrangement being agreed on prior to the conclusion of peace negotiations. Moreover, they insist on their retention of Salonica, and press for an immediate decision of the question. M. Gueshof affirmed that King Ferdinand would never agree to Greece's retention of Salonica.

His Excellency further informed me that the Bulgarian Minister at Berlin had learnt from the German Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was a possibility of the Ambassadors of the Great Powers in London being instructed to discuss with His Majesty's Secretary of State the most urgent questions in connection with the future settlement, as, for instance, Servian access to the Adriatic, the question of the Dardanelles, the arrangements for safeguarding the interests of the bondholders, and the question of the independence of Albania.

M. Gueshof stated that he had nothing further to add to his previous remarks regarding Servian access to the Adriatic.

[51450] No. 19.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 205. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December* 2, 1912.

MY telegram No. 203 of 30th November.

Vienna Correspondence Bureau communicated certain news from Constantinople respecting the conclusion of an armistice yesterday. Prime Minister telegraphed to head-quarters, and he has been informed that the news is false.

Meeting which should have taken place yesterday was adjourned until to-day at 3 o'clock, because the Greek representative was still without instructions.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[51457] No. 20.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 206.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, December* 2, 1912.

MY telegram No. 204.

The following is very confidential:—

The action of the Greek Government has caused the Bulgarian Government such dissatisfaction that the latter will, it appears, probably be more inclined to accept easier terms than they originally suggested for the conclusion of peace.

A report has reached the ears of the Bulgarian Government to the effect that the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs had used derogatory terms in regard to the conduct of the war by Bulgaria in conversation with responsible persons in Athens, including the foreign representatives.

[51474] No. 21.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 207.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, December 2, 1912.*

THE allies have decided to demand war indemnity from Ottoman Government, amount of which has not yet been fixed.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[51266] No. 22.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 698.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 2, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Dardanelles, dated 1st December :—

"'Assar-i-Tewfik,' both ex-German ships, and four torpedo-boat destroyers have arrived."

[51362] No. 23.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 699.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, December 2, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consular officers, Adrianople, dated 30th November :—

"Bombardment of town assumes alarming proportions, causing numerous casualties and fires. Situation of foreign communities is very critical; shell fallen on Greek consulate, where Russian consulate had been transferred.—SAMSON, HERZFELD, CUINET, KLEMEKE."

[51466] No. 24.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 700.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 2, 1912.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 200 of 29th November.

Minister for Foreign Affairs professes to look on action of Ismail Kemal Bey regarding Albania as prejudicial to interests of Turkish Government, inasmuch as it excludes all idea of Ottoman character of its future status.

(Sent to Sophia, Athens, and Belgrade.)

[51467] No. 25.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 701.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 2, 1912.*

THE second Austrian war-ship left this evening to join squadron.

[51468] No. 26.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 702.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 2, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 696 of 1st December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs states that delay in signature of armistice was caused by Greek delegate insisting upon surrender of Janina and on permission for Greek ships to pass out from Black Sea.

The Porte unable to agree to former, but have allowed latter.

Period of armistice is unlimited, and peace negotiations will take place at some more convenient centre than Chataldja owing to alleged delay in communicating from there with the Balkan capitals.

(Sent to Athens and Sophia.)

[51451] No. 27.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, December 2, 1912.*

LAST paragraph of your despatch No. 30 of 21st November.

Please refer to my telegram No. 56 of 11th November.

[51452] No. 28.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 96.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, December 2, 1912.*

AUSTRIAN military attaché informed me yesterday that, as far as he could ascertain, Servians had made no preparations as they pretend to have done to resist an Austrian attack. No troops have as yet been brought north.

[51475] No. 29.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 170.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, December 2, 1912.*

ACCORDING to press reports, following is gist of Chancellor's speech to-day :—

Germany's economic interests entitle her to co-operate in settlement of affairs in Balkans. After enlarging upon advantage of Great Powers putting forward their claims and reserves jointly, he said that with this object exchange of views was taking place between the Governments, about which he could say no more at present, except that it was being conducted in the most conciliatory spirit and offered every prospect of success. Demands of the Powers could of course not be formulated in detail until proposals of belligerents were known. Should insoluble differences arise meanwhile, it would be for Powers directly interested in each individual case to assert their claims. This applied also to Germany's allies. If, however, in asserting their interests they were, contrary to expectation, attacked by a third party and their existence was thereby threatened, Germany would then have to stand by them true to her duty as an ally, and would have to fight in order to safeguard her own position in Europe and in defence of her own future and security. He said that all Powers were anxious to preserve Turkey as an important economic and political factor, and had no designs on her territory.

[51478] No. 30.

Consul-General Spence to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Trieste, December 2, 1912.*

TROOPS continue to embark at Trieste for South Dalmatia, destination Herzegovina, Bosnia; 11,000 last two nights, more to-night. Opinion is that Austria is preparing another *coup de main*.

[51183] No. 31.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 37.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 2, 1912.*

THE Servian chargé d'affaires informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 27th November that Semlin had practically been turned into a military camp, and that all the barges had been prepared for transport of troops, if need be.

In the course of conversation M. Grouitch referred to the Adriatic port question, and said that the whole Servian nation were determined to obtain access to the sea through Servian territory and to a Servian port. They would accept nothing less, and would fight, even alone, on this point. Neutral or neutralised ports could never be accepted. Sir A. Nicolson did not discuss the question.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[51560] No. 32.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 87.)

Sir, *Canea, Crete, November 22, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the "Official Gazette" of the 19th instant contains a decree, dated the 14th November, of M. Dragoumis, the "Governor-General" of Crete, describing new postage stamps to be used for postal correspondence in Crete itself and between Crete and foreign countries. These stamps appear to be similar in every respect to those in use in Greece, with the exception that they will be surcharged with the words "Greek Administration," which the decree explains are to facilitate the calculation of the revenue derived from them.

A further announcement will be made fixing the date on which the new stamps will come into use.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[51513] No. 33.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 189.)

Sir, *Athens, November 26, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of a report which I received yesterday from the British military attaché with the Greek field forces, with the request that it might be transmitted to the Director of Military Operations, War Office.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 33.

Report by Major Cunliffe Owen.

THE military attachés accredited to the Greek Government left Athens on the morning of the 11th instant in the steam-ship "Mykali" (an armed transport manned by men of the Greek navy) for Salonica.

The latter place was reached on the afternoon of the 13th after a long wait off Karabuna; we were then piloted through the two lines of observation and contact mines, the passage through which required some caution. On the Karabuna forts the Greek flag was hoisted, the capitulation of these forts being included in the general terms for the surrender of the Salonica army.

At Salonica there were assembled the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 7th Greek divisions, together with three Bulgarian brigades, which had come in viâ Novrokop and Serres. Already there were signs of friction between the Greek and Bulgarian authorities, and, for the first two days of the occupation, order was badly maintained. Much pillaging ensued, and the Greek administrator found it difficult to

restrain the Bulgarian bands which (including that of Sandansky) had accompanied the regular troops.

After passing the night on the ship, we left by train on the morning of the 14th with the head-quarters staff of the commander-in-chief (His Royal Highness the Crown Prince).

Topsin Bridge having been partially demolished by the Turks, trains were changed there, and the Vardar was crossed by a temporary foot bridge. Vertekop was then reached in the evening, where head-quarters remain to-day, the 15th.

General Situation.

The 5th Greek division, after a reverse near Sorovich, has retired to Kozani.

The 1st and 7th divisions have been left at Salonica, where, in a camp near Karabuna, the Turkish prisoners remain. The cavalry brigade, for political reasons, has gone to Serres. The main Greek army is now advancing towards Ostrovo, the 6th division in front near Vodena, the 4th just left Vertekop, the 3rd behind the 4th; it is believed that the 2nd is also allotted to this army, but its position is uncertain.

As regards the Turks, five battalions with some cavalry are at Ostrovo, three divisions between that place and Monastir.

Notes on the Greek Organisation.

The Greeks have, in all, formed eight divisions, the peace number of four being thus doubled.

Nos. 1 to 5 first crossed the frontier in the main army to Elassona; No. 7 advanced viâ Katerina, joining the main army by Gida. No. 6 followed the first five.

The Epirus division is mixed and unnumbered; 7,000 Cretan volunteers and two battalions of "Garibaldians" are also added, the bulk of the former in the Epirus direction, one battalion of the latter in Katerina, the other still in Athens. Another division still remains in Athens also.

Infantry.—Three regiments, each of three battalions, form a division, there being no intermediate brigade organisation: twenty-one regiments in all. The later organisations and the Cretans, "Garibaldians," &c., are only armed with the Gras rifle.

I am told that in the recent engagements fire was opened at 900 metres, fixed sights being used at 300 metres. At Janitza (Yeniji Vardar) the 4th division got within 300 metres of the Turks without being observed, and opened fire at that range. The infantry marching has been excellent, 25 to 30 kilom. being covered frequently. The rapidity of the marching may be gathered from the fact that Salonica was occupied twenty-two days after the commencement of hostilities, two large battles (at the pass north of Elassona and at Janitza) and minor engagements being fought meanwhile.

Artillery.—The field batteries number thirty-six, but three were left behind at Larissa for want of horses. As it is, the batteries have half their horses requisitioned. Six batteries go to a division, but, where the roads make it advisable, mountain batteries are allotted in lieu. The field batteries have 4 guns, 13 waggons, 2 four-horse and 6 two-horse carts. The mountain batteries (of the same calibre projectile as the field) have 6 mules to the gun-carriage; 2 mules (carrying 24 rounds) as first ammunition supply.

Three of the mountain batteries are in Epirus, six with the main army, allotted as above indicated.

The mountain gun is a shielded Q.F.

In the recent engagements, fire was opened at 4,000 metres, and at first from covered positions.

The Turkish army proved innocuous, and caused no damage, hence the Greek batteries frequently took up open positions from the start, and frequently supported the infantry in the fight at 400 metres range.

The machine-guns (four per regiment—Schwarzlos Austrian pattern) have been used singly or in pairs, or in groups of four. They are under the direct command of the regimental commander.

Supply, Transport, and Medical.—Food ran short for two or three days at a time during the advance from Elassona to Salonica, but now the army is well supplied with both bread and meat.

The small transport animals, used more for pack than draught, are of great endurance.

Sickness has not been serious, but the organisation of the French military mission in this respect has not been satisfactory, nor are the sanitary arrangements good.

The weather, previously very rainy, has now turned fine and dry.

Head-quarters should move to-morrow to Vodena, and the army will endeavour to secure possession of the pass west of that town.

I will write details later as to the surrender at Salonica and Hassan Taschin's force.

F. CUNLIFFE OWEN.

Vertekop, November 15, 1912.

[51514] No. 34.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 190.)

Sir, *Athens, November* 27, 1912.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of a report from the British military attaché with the Greek field forces, giving details of the advance from Salonica towards Monastir.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 34.

Report from British Military Attaché with the Greek Field Forces.

No. 3.) *Vertekop (Station), November* 16, 1912.

IN continuation of my No. 2, it is the 2nd division which was left at Salonica, not the 1st; while only one cavalry regiment went to Serres.

The march forward of the 6th division has been directed to the west of the Vertekop–Vodena road, the other three divisions (3rd, 4th, and 1st) following the road.

One cavalry regiment is on the right flank.

Cannonading has continued for a couple of hours this morning in the Vodena direction, but head-quarters have not yet moved forward.

Service of Communications.—The Greeks have no field telegraph or field telephone. Optical signalling by helio and lamp is employed, but apart from two sets of portable Marconi the only other means of communication between the army units is by orderlies. The telegraph on the railway line is working from Vodena back to Salonica, but there is no communication yet with the 5th division at Kozani, or with the Servian force supposed to be pressing the Turks north of Monastir.

Vladova (Station), November 18, 1912.

On the morning of the 17th the situation was as follows:—

Fourth division had advanced to Gramatik, south-west of Vodena.

Sixth and 1st divisions on the main road from Vodena west and had gained the defile after slight resistance, with a loss of twenty to thirty killed and wounded.

Third division on the right of the defile.

Cavalry at Samar.

The Turks were at Ostrovo, Droska, and Nisia, with main force believed to be at Florina.

Communication has been made with the Servian force which was advancing slowly.

The 5th division had been attacked by the Turks south of Kailar, but had driven back the attack and captured two guns.

On the evening of the 17th the 6th division had gained Ostrovo and was deploying to the right; the 3rd division had moved just east of Oslop. The 1st was at Vladova. The 4th was advancing towards the direction of Sorovich to connect with the 5th.

Head-quarters moved to Vodena on the 17th and to Vladovo on the 18th.

Cavalry.—The distribution of the Greek cavalry was at the first:—

Cavalry Brigade of two regiments with two (Maxim) machine-guns, and the other regiment split up for divisional cavalry.

During the present advance to the west the cavalry brigade has, as already mentioned, been broken up, one regiment going to Serres and one regiment acting independently on the right of the advance now proceeding.

Further details as to the action of the cavalry during the Elassona–Salonica advance have been gathered and will be communicated later, as also details of the battle of Janitsa (Yenidje–Vardar) and other engagements.

The weather is again extremely wet and the discomfort is excessive.

The entrance of the Crown Prince into Vodena yesterday was accompanied by great enthusiasm, the population of 15,000 containing 9,000 Greeks.

F. CUNLIFFE OWEN.

[51515] No. 35.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 191.)

Sir, *Athens, November* 28, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch from the British delegate on the International Commission, supplementing the report on the financial situation forwarded in my despatch No. 157 of the 24th ultimo.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 35.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.

(No. 12.) *International Financial Commission, Athens, November* 27, 1912.

Sir,

DETAILS of the supplementary credits voted by the Chamber last month have now been published, from which it is possible to control and correct the figures given in my despatch No. 10 of the 24th ultimo.

The totals are—

	£
Ministry of War	1,676,000
Ministry of Marine	434,017
National Fleet Fund	748,000
Various	157,404
	£3,015,421

Of the above, 400,000*l.* is in payment, when the war is over, for animals, carts, &c., requisitioned, and 668,000*l.* payment for the four destroyers bought of Messrs. Cammell, Laird and Co.

The estimated deficit at the end of the year will therefore amount, in round figures, to not less than 1,500,000*l.*, of which approximately 3,000,000*l.* will be met out of the surplus of 1911 and 1910.

Treasury bonds have already been issued up to the full limit of 10,000,000 authorised by the Law of Control, and the rate of interest on them has been raised to 5 per cent.

That the Government may already be almost at the end of their resources is shown by the desire to obtain money in America, reported in Sir F. Elliot's despatch No. 182 of the 10th instant, and also by a request addressed to the commission to advance a portion of the surplus of the assigned revenues at an earlier date than usual, a request which has not been acceded to, the commission judging it imprudent to reduce the margin over payments shortly due on account of the December and January coupons and redemption.

To what extent the National Bank has yet come to the assistance of the Government is not known, but as the bank has recently received successive authorisations to increase its note issue up to a total of 100,000,000 dr. under the conditions of the law of the 19th March, 1910, *i.e.*, with the obligation to sell gold or exchange to a corresponding amount at not more than ½ per cent. premium, it is probable that a part of the additional issue has been or will be advanced to the Government.

The issue has not affected exchange, which continues at or about par.

It is stated that the reserves of the bank have recently been increased by a deposit

of 1,000,000*l.*, advanced by French capitalists to the Banque d'Athènes to enable it to tide over immediate difficulties, and the latter bank has now declared, as all the other large banks have already done, that it will not avail itself of the moratorium decreed by the Government, but will continue to allow deposits to be withdrawn and to pay interest on them.

It is this 1,000,000*l.*, apparently, which will, in part at least, form the reserve against the last issue by the National Bank of 25,000,000 dr. paper money, authorised by an agreement signed on the 6th instant.

A patriotic loan for 200,000*l.*, under the same conditions as in the case of that raised in 1885, viz., not bearing interest and repayable by annual drawings, is being issued in the United States of America.

I have, &c.
HENRY BEAUMONT.

[51489] No. 36.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 94.)

Sir, *Belgrade, November 28, 1912.*

M. DE HARTWIG came to see me yesterday evening. He said he had spent the morning with M. Pasitch counselling moderation of the Servian demands on the coast of Albania. The Prime Minister, he thought, was inclined to be reasonable, but felt powerless against the ambitions of the military party.

I gave M. de Hartwig a copy of the "Times" of the 25th instant containing M. Pasitch's appeal to England, and I said that, judging by this, it was not clear in what respect M. Pasitch's ideas could fall short of those of the military party; that when M. Pasitch had done with it there would be very little left of North Albania. I also called M. de Hartwig's attention to the historical statement in the same number of the "Times" regarding the distribution of races and the territory which should consequently be constituted into Albania. I said that very probably the Austrian conception of Albania would be somewhat on these lines. He replied that possibly Servia might be induced to give way about Durazzo if another port were found for her, but that the Bulgarians would never permit the inclusion of Lake Ochrida, which was one of the cradles of the Bulgarian race, within a new Albania, and that altogether it would be found quite impossible to reconcile the various claims. He pitied those who would have to undergo the task.

Speaking of the advice which has latterly been given to Servia not to raise issues separately and prematurely with Austria-Hungary, M. de Hartwig dwelt with insistence on what he described as the evident anxiety of the *Entente* Powers that Servia should not come to terms with Austria separately. I told him that this was not exactly the construction which I placed upon the message which I had conveyed from His Majesty's Government to the Servian Government. I understood this to be that it would be unwise for Servia to provoke a quarrel with Austria-Hungary now regarding any special claim, since her claims would be sure of sympathetic consideration, and would have a better prospect of a favourable issue in the general settlement which must follow the war.

M. de Hartwig's insistence in reverting to this point several times during our conversation struck me as somewhat strange, and it has occurred to me that possibly he may be apprehensive lest the Servians, not seeing themselves sufficiently backed from St. Petersburgh, may be listening to Austrian proposals. In such an event M. de Hartwig would, of course, wish to tell them that the *Entente* Powers disapprove of any separate arrangement whatever. Personally I have not as yet detected any symptom of a leaning towards Austria. Russian influence at Belgrade for the time being appears altogether paramount.

Whether in the interests of peace in Europe it is desirable it should remain so seems open to question. So long as Russian influence predominates in Servia, so long will there be discord between Austria and Servia, and so long will peace be menaced by anti-Austrian propaganda and intrigue and by ferment in the Austrian Slav provinces. On the other hand, should Austria succeed in arriving at a good understanding with Servia and supplanting Russian influence with her own at Belgrade—though the certainty of the ultimate struggle between Austria and the Slav populations may not be affected—she may yet be able to stave off for some time to come the peril which besets her from them at present, and the chances of peace will consequently be prolonged. At

the same time, it is probable that a good understanding between Austria and Servia would be accompanied by the gradual extension of Austrian influence to Salonica, and by economic arrangements with the Balkan States, which might not be altogether to the advantage of other Powers.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[51490] No. 37.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 95.)

Sir, *Belgrade, November 30, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith extracts from Servian newspapers, amongst others the Government organ "Samouprava," which were handed to me yesterday by the Austrian Minister to show the provocation to which the monarchy is subjected at the hands of the Servian press. M. d'Ugron spoke with great bitterness on this subject, as also on the treatment which had been accorded to the Austrian consuls by the military authorities and of the general attitude in Servia towards Austria-Hungary. He said that he feared that at any moment Count Berchtold's patience might give out and there would be disaster.

The position of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servia must indeed at the present moment be most trying, for, notwithstanding the declaration of Austrian views concerning Albania and the ports on the Albanian littoral, Servia has not only not desisted from the occupation of these localities, but has appointed civil authorities for their administration, which must be construed as an intention of permanent occupation, whilst no opportunity is lost both in the press and by other means of hurling insult and defiance at the monarchy. The officials of the Government of course maintain that they are unable to restrain the press, which now reflects the real feeling in the country, but I venture to say that, if the Government were willing to make the effort, they could do much to influence the press and diminish the tension.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 37.

Translation of Extracts from Servian Press.

"*Samouprava*" (*Government Organ*), *November* 14, 1912.

At that time (1881) Austria-Hungary would not be satisfied with the advantages she was obtaining, but desired to exploit these still further by exacting certain stipulations which not only ruined many Servian exporters and caused great discontent in the nation, but caused the abdication of one King and caused the tragic end of another, King Alexander. . . . . We are fully justified in putting this question, because we have never been remiss in our treaty obligations. The same cannot be said of Austria-Hungary.

"*Politica*," *November* 25.

At the demonstration in Agram one of the regiments ordered out refused to obey orders and to fire on the demonstrators. A number of the soldiers were taken to Esseg and shot. The streets of Agram are said to have run with blood . . . . ; these are some of the signs which show the reason why Austria-Hungary is afraid.

"*Mali Journal*," *November* 25.

In Agram there were great demonstrations, in which officers took part. In the streets there were cries of "Long live the King of the Croatians, Peter the First!" "Down with Austria!" "Down with that offal named Cuvaj!" The military which was sent for refused to fire, and it was not until the Hungarian regiments arrived that the demonstrators were dispersed.

"Mali Journal," November 26.

Servia shall have all she has conquered. She has taken neither Alessio nor San Giovanni di Medua. She has taken Durazzo for herself, and it is her intention to keep this Old Servian harbour. Even if the whole Austrian fleet should appear to drive us out we shall not move without energetic resistance.

"Pravda," November 25.

Count Aehrenthal has no personality of his own; when he embarked upon a policy of expansion he was only acting as the tool of the Heir Presumptive, who wished, by pursuing a policy of aggression, to become prominent in the eye of the public as future ruler and conqueror. . . . . Count Berchtold has no individuality. He is an imitation of Count Aehrenthal and Count Goluchowsky, an untalented diplomat who pretends to be talented.

[51483] No. 38.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 97.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, December 2, 1912.*

AUSTRIAN military preparations are causing considerable uneasiness here and are construed as an intention on the part of Austria presently, when she is quite ready, to make use of military pressure to extort guarantee that Servia will adopt a policy in future in conformity with Austrian interests and wishes.

Under-Secretary of State takes a most gloomy view of the situation. He argues that, as both Austria and Servia have acquiesced in suggestion to leave discussion of Adriatic question for later settlement, and as there has consequently been a diplomatic lull for some days, the Austrian mobilisation should also have ceased, and if this has not been the case there must be some other motive.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that, should war break out, there is such feeling and ferment in Austrian Slav provinces that a revolution would probably break out simultaneously.

I said that I thought that the preparations were to a great extent precautionary, but Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was not at all satisfied with this explanation.

Our messenger to Budapest, who returned this morning, reports that all stations for two hours up the line from the Servian frontier are under military guards.

[51687] No. 39.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 98.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, December 3, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 93 of 30th November: Chatalja negotiations.

I find that the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was rather previous with his information. Servian Government are occupied in choosing delegates; they will await further news before sending them.

[51688] No. 40.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 99.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, December 3, 1912.*

RUSSIAN Minister, whom I have just seen, agrees with me that there is nothing in the situation between Austria and Servia at the present moment to justify continuance of Austrian military preparations. On the contrary, the conduct of the Servian Government appears as inoffensive as possible under the circumstances. He attributes Austrian activity largely to dangerous unrest in Slav provinces. He says that recently one regiment refused to obey orders, and that on another occasion nine officers, Serbs

or Croatians, who were attempting to desert, were caught and shot. It is impossible for me to verify this information, but there are many rumours of the sort current here now, and the extraordinary precautions taken by Austria in the neighbourhood of Servian frontier would appear to lend them some colour.

A further explanation which the Russian Minister suggested was that, should Servia ultimately prove reasonable regarding the Adriatic port question, Austria thinks to enhance her prestige in the Balkans by making it appear that she has intimidated both Russia and Servia by military pressure.

In the conversation which I have recently had with the Prime Minister, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and my Russian colleague, I gathered that, while Russia and Servia are counting upon troubles in the Austrian Slav provinces, Austria counts upon [group undecypherable] troubles in Poland and Little Russia.

(Sent to Vienna.)

[51683] No. 41.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 208. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 3, 1912.*

ARMISTICE.

My telegram No. 205 of 2nd December.

At yesterday's meeting Bulgarian representatives presented their final conditions for an armistice to Ottoman delegates.

Conditions are as follows:—

1. Troops of belligerents to maintain present positions.
2. Allies to be allowed to revictual their troops by Adrianople station and by Black Sea. (This means raising of Turkish blockade of Black Sea ports.)
3. Negotiations for peace must be begun within a week.

Ottoman delegates asked for twenty-four hours to communicate these conditions to Constantinople and to obtain instructions. They promised to give a reply to-day at 4 o'clock.

Ottoman delegates proposed London as suitable capital for discussing the peace negotiations.

Other allies seem to think that Greek Government may refuse to agree to armistice as they do not appear willing to raise Ægean blockade, but in this case three remaining members of league will sign armistice, and Greek Government would then all the same take part in peace negotiations.

King of Bulgarians, accompanied by Bulgarian Minister of Finance, left for Chatalja this morning.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[51684] No. 42.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 209. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, December 3, 1912.*

A SUGGESTION has been made by the Greek Government to the Bulgarian Government that the delimitation of any points of dispute regarding the new frontiers between Bulgaria and Greece should be submitted to the Powers of the Triple *Entente*, who should be asked to act as arbitrators.

M. Teodorof, Bulgarian Minister of Finance, has received instructions to ascertain how the King of Bulgaria views this proposal.

The future of Salonica is the only crucial point upon which the arbitrators will probably be asked to decide. The Bulgarians will probably, it seems, accept the above proposal.

Above is secret.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[51685] No. 43.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 210.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, December 3, 1912.*

BELGRADE telegram of 30th November.

Governments of Servia and Montenegro have chosen delegates to negotiate conditions of peace as follows:—

For Servia: M. Novakovitch, ex-President of Council, and M. Nicolitch, President of Chamber.

For Montenegro: MM. Standchkovitch, Voukoltitch, and Popovitch

Bulgarian delegates have not yet been chosen.

I do not gather that delegates are leaving for Chataldja; they will meet at the capital which is eventually chosen for peace negotiations.

(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

[51686] No. 44.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 211. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, December 3, 1912.*

SERVIAN access to the sea.

See my telegram No. 201, Secret, of the 30th ultimo.

The Servian Minister in Vienna has been informed by Count Berchtold, according to news received by me here, that he hoped that before the conclusion of peace some arrangement would be reached between the two countries.

No progress in the negotiations, beyond what I reported to you in my telegram above quoted, has been made as far as this capital is concerned.

I earnestly hope that no mention may be made to the Government of Austria-Hungary of these negotiations, as the information is very secret.

[51669] No. 45.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 703.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 3, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1084 of 30th November; Ottoman Bank.

My French colleague has received no instructions, and tells me that he thinks that it is more likely that [group undecypherable: ? directors] will address themselves directly to the Governments occupying the towns in question.

[51671] No. 46.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 704.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 3, 1912.*

MILITARY attaché, having returned yesterday, states that Turkish army in Chatalja lines is now in good condition and full of confidence. Though peace would doubtless be welcomed by many, this sentiment is not displayed, and officers see no reason why unfavourable terms should be accepted, and state that the army is now capable of not merely defending the lines, but of taking the offensive and driving the Bulgarians over their frontier. It is difficult to give any estimate of the numbers, but Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks 150,000 infantry and 300 guns now in position, though he mentions figures with greatest reserve. Cholera has practically ceased.

Both Turks and Bulgarians continue to entrench their positions, and each side seems to be preparing to await attack.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside's telegram No. 195 of 29th November.

German and Austrian Governments are only so far aiding Turkey in dispatching guns by allowing Creuzot guns to come through their countries. Can obtain no evidence of arrival here of German artillerymen.

[51672] No. 47.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 705.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 3, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 698 of 2nd December.

Greater part of the Ottoman fleet is now at the Dardanelles.

[51666] No. 48.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 181.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 3, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for the Director of Military Operations:—

"Military preparations continue. His Majesty's consul-general at Trieste reports 11,000 men embarked for Bosnia and Herzegovina on 30th November and 1st December, and that more were expected on 2nd December. Further drafts from Prague leave for Bosnia to-day. Bulgarian military attaché told me that he quite expects some military action to be taken against Servia within a few days, as the preparations in Bosnia, &c., are nearing completion.

"As regards Galicia, although drafts for battalions in Bosnia have been sent, Galicia battalion themselves have not moved. On the other hand, other battalions from other corps have been sent there, so that total number of units is large though total effective strength is proportionately low. This procedure will in some measure compensate for disturbance in organisation which has taken place, as, on general mobilisation, reservists will be sent to units already in the zone of deployment. Russian military attaché describes it as 'une vraie concentration lente.'"

[51690] No. 49.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 182.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, December 3, 1912.*

TURKISH Ambassador tells me that he has heard from Grand Vizier that an armistice will be signed shortly as soon as consent of Greek Government has been received, and that ten days afterwards plenipotentiaries for negotiating the peace will meet in some European city. He thinks that Budapest may be selected as offering easy railway communication with Constantinople and Balkan capitals.

[51689] No. 50.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, December 3, 1912.*

VIENNA telegram No. 180 of 1st December.

I doubt whether Austrian general's mission had any direct connection with postponement of M. Danef's visit. Ministry for Foreign Affairs gives out that autograph letter conveyed the Emperor's condolences on the death of Countess of Flanders.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw to-day, evidently had no anxiety regarding delay of M. Danef's visit. He reminded me that the proposal for visit had come from Bulgaria and not from Roumania, and said that Bulgarian Minister had informed

Russian Government that the visit must be postponed for a few days owing to M. Danef's being engaged in the armistice negotiations.

Bulgarian Minister tells me he thinks that M. Danef may be expected at end of the week, although he could not speak with certainty.

[51667] No. 51.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 3.)

(No. 161.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Canea, Crete, December 3, 1912.*

PUBLIC here appear convinced that the King of Greece will shortly visit Crete and that Greek troops will accompany him. I can obtain no official confirmation of this report, which is, however, very persistent.

[51209] No. 52.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1320.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 3, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 465 of 30th November.

I have said to Russian Ambassador that Albania will have to be larger than a mere strip of coast line, but that what Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs says in third paragraph about a Servian port seems to me to be on right lines, and that we would support it in a consultation or conference. I did not pledge myself to Durazzo unless that is the port to which an international railway could best be made.

[51211] No. 53.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 301.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 3, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 122 of 1st December.

Was the warning as to foreign vessels limited to war vessels, and merchant-vessels not included? It is of importance that this point should be cleared up.

[52073] No. 54.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 590.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 3, 1912.*

THE French Ambassador asked me to-day what was my opinion of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech.

I replied that my first impression of the speech was that it was a pity, and I feared that the effect would not be good. I had regarded Germany, France, and England as being in the same position; to none of them was the question of a Servian port a matter of much interest or worth a war; any of them might be dragged into a war if Russia and Austria went to war; and therefore they should all desire to make Russia and Austria as moderate as possible. But Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech was open to the construction that Germany would support Austria in anything which she demanded, whatever the merits might be. This would not tend to make Austria moderate; and its effect in Russia would not be moderating either.

M. Cambon said that his opinion was the same. What Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg had said seemed menacing, and might give the impression that the events of 1909 were to be repeated. If they were repeated, neither the Emperor of Russia nor Russian public opinion would endure the situation, and it was a grave mistake to think otherwise. The speech was also contrary to what we had agreed upon: that the Powers should all try to find a solution of difficult points after the war was over.

I pointed out that it was possible that parts of the speech had not been quite correctly reported; it contained a sentence to the effect that, if difficulties existed or

arose between one or more of the Great Powers and one or more of the belligerents it would be much easier for the Great Powers to give effect to their demands if they acted in common. I said that this sentence was all right. It expressed the view on which we had all been acting, that the Powers should keep in touch.

After looking at the passage, the French Ambassador said that there were inconsistencies in the speech.

I observed that I could hardly believe that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg had intended to convey the impression that he would support Austria under all circumstances, whatever her demands might be, though parts of his speech were open to this construction.

M. Cambon said that all would have been well if he had simply said that, if Austria was attacked, Germany would come to her assistance. But he had said much more than this.

I said that I had asked the German Ambassador to come to see me to-morrow, that I might give him my impression of the speech after reflection; but my first impression was the one which I had stated to M. Cambon.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[51993] No. 55.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 78.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 3, 1912.*

THE Greek Minister came to-day to tell me that the terms of armistice proposed by Turkey were to last till peace was concluded. They comprised the revictualling of Turkish fortresses, of such units of Turkish troops as were still in Macedonia, and indeed of any number of Turks who might be collected into a unit. The Greek blockade was to be raised and, generally, Turkey was to be free to transport supplies wherever she liked. This meant that she would be able to re-establish her forces, and therefore the Greek Government were opposed to these terms. I said I was always glad to have information, but I asked the Minister what his exact object was in making this communication to me as I was not one of the allies.

He replied that he thought the attitude of Greece had been rather misrepresented, and he wished it to be understood.

I said that the terms of armistice, as he described them to me, seemed rather more favourable to Turkey than I had thought from what I had previously heard of them; but I could not give advice or express an opinion as to accepting or rejecting them. Whether the allies should accept them would, presumably, depend upon the military and strategic position, of which they alone were the judges.

The Greek Minister then asked me about the proposed consultation of Ambassadors, and whether it would deal with Albania and the Ægean islands.

I answered that a consultation of Ambassadors was merely a more convenient means for continuing the exchange of views between the Powers. Over a great part of the field covered by the terms of peace the Great Powers would presumably have nothing to say; but certain points, such as the Ægean islands, where it was desirable that no great naval Power should become established; Albania; and Servian access to the Adriatic, would require some discussion by the Great Powers.

The Minister did not see any objection in principle to an autonomous Albania, provided that its limits were not too large.

With regard to Servian access to the Adriatic, I found that he had advised the Servian chargé d'affaires that Servia should be content with what she could get now, feeling that, if things went well, the privileges which she obtained now would be enlarged at some future time.

I said that Servia must have an economic outlet, but there was more than one way of obtaining that; and, if in substance she could obtain commercial access to the Adriatic, she would be very unwise to go to war with Austria about a port, and risk the sanjak and everything else which now seemed assured to her.

The Minister said that he was quite of this opinion.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[51707] No. 56.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 1007.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 29, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch, from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna reporting action of the local authorities against the Committee of Union and Progress.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 56.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 139.)

Sir, *Smyrna, November* 26, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that within the last few days the authorities have arrested the leading members of the Committee of Union and Progress having first closed their clubs and seized their archives.

It appears that members of the committee have been visiting Magnesia and other parts of the vilayet preaching the abolition of the Khalifate and the establishment of a republic.

The persons arrested are Talaat Bey formerly inspector-general of the committee, Fuad (a Khoja), Said Bey, president of the committee, and a Cretan named Rashid.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[51708] No. 57.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 1008.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 29, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 984 of the 21st instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout reporting on the continued feeling of uneasiness in the town and vilayet of Beirout.

A copy of Mr. Cumberbatch's despatch No. 62 of the 18th October, 1911 was forwarded to you in my despatch No. 758 of the 29th October, 1911.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 57.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 78.)

Sir, *Beirout, November* 21, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 76, Confidential, of the 14th November on the situation in Beirout, caused by the unsettled state of things in the country in general, I have the honour to state that everything is keeping quiet at Beirout where, however, the pro-Anglo-Egyptian and anti-French agitation is spreading.

Every precaution is being taken by the Governor-General and the military commandant against disorders arising, and they appear most anxious to show their determination to prevent any outbreak for fear of providing a pretext for foreign intervention, suggested in their minds by the presence of the foreign war-ships in these waters.

The scanty and generally unreliable news from the seat of war and the possible consequences to Turkey of the campaign, are eagerly discussed by the public, but so far the Moslem newspapers of Beirout have refrained from publishing inflammatory articles, as has been reported from some places in the interior. The only case in this vilayet approaching incitement of Moslems against Christians is reported by Mr. Vice-Consul Vitali at Lattakia, where the editor of the newspaper "Al Lazikieh" and Sahal Pasha, the exiled Indian prince referred to in my despatch No. 62 of the 18th October,

1911, have been somewhat active in rousing the religious fanaticism of Moslems, the former in the columns of his paper and the latter in a widely distributed printed document in which religious rather than patriotic feelings are appealed to in very strong terms.

From Tripoli Commander Staple Cotton, of His Majesty's ship "Barham," now at Alexandretta, reported on the 16th instant that all was quiet there and that his first visit to that port on the 10th instant had had a very good effect on the Moslem inhabitants, who, though inclined to show little or no enthusiasm for the war against the Balkan States and very little sympathy for the Government in its troubles, were being stirred up by some newspapers, and especially by the publication of the Sheikh-ul-Islam's appeal to the ulemas, to follow the example of Christian priests in the enemies' armies by going to the front to encourage the defenders of the Mahommedan faith, thereby suggesting the existence of a holy war of Cross *versus* Crescent, in which all good Moslems were exhorted to join. It is this sort of publication that alarms the Christian inhabitants, whom sad experience has shown how easy it is to rouse Moslems to action if given a lead from high quarters.

At Sidon, beyond the natural uneasiness among Christians, Mr. Vice-Consul F. Abela has not had occasion to report any alarming attitude on the part of the Moslems in that town, and the short visit of His Majesty's ship "Prometheus" to that port last week did no harm.

From Haifa Mr. Vice-Consul P. Abela reports that the cause of uneasiness there was the news that the Moslems were purchasing arms and ammunition in all directions, but he said the presence of the German cruiser "Geier" had a calming effect, though the Germans are not popular in that district.

Mr. Abela and his French colleague had friendly interviews with the mutessarif at Acre and with some Moslem notables, and were assured by them that they would do all in their power to prevent any attack on Christians, which they sincerely deprecated as most undesirable at any time, and especially at the present critical moment.

At the present moment the war-ships at Beirout are His Majesty's ship "Prometheus" and the French cruisers "Henri IV" and "Montcalm," and at Haifa the German cruiser "Geier." His Majesty's ship "Barham" remains for the present at Alexandretta with the German cruiser "Breslau."

I have, &c.
H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[51709] No. 58.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 1009.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 29, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 999 of the 26th instant, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul-General Lamb reporting on a further violation by the Greek authorities of the conditions of the protocol for the surrender of Salonica, on the arrest of the leading local members of the Union and Progress party, and on the excesses committed on Mohammedans.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 58.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Salonica, November* 24, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 158 of the 19th instant, I have the honour to report that a further patent violation of the conditions of the protocol of November 8th–9th has been committed by the Greek authorities.

A large number of Turkish officers who, according to those conditions, were to be treated as prisoners on parole were this morning arrested in their houses or elsewhere and hurried on board a steamer for deportation to Greece. A certain number of gendarmerie officers, including the commander of the regiment, were amongst those so arrested. The reason given me by the préfet for this flagrant disregard of the terms of capitulation was that these officers had been guilty of issuing false certificates, in virtue

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of which soldiers who had discarded their uniforms had represented themselves as refugees desirous of returning to their homes and been enabled to penetrate into the interior for the purpose of forming bands to operate against the Greek troops.

This explanation appears to me unsatisfactory and far-fetched and is probably not the true one.

Yesterday evening Dr. Nazim Bey, the former secretary-general of the Committee of Union and Progress, who, since the outbreak of hostilities, has been working as director of the Red Crescent hospital in this place, was arrested in the hospital itself, whilst two other former leaders of the Union and Progress party in this district, viz., Ihsan Bey and the Cretan Ibrahim Skoumaki, were similarly arrested.

In this case the discovery of a plot to bring about an armed rising of the Turks is alleged to have justified the arrest, and it is probable that the deportation of the army officers is not unconnected with this alleged plot; but, in the absence of clearer information on the subject, I prefer to reserve my opinion as to the plausibility of the pretext adduced.

Rumours were in circulation yesterday to the effect that the Bulgarian comitajis, of whom the city is now full, had threatened a massacre of the Mussulman refugees.

Robberies and other acts of violence continue to be committed with impunity, and latterly complaints have begun to be made of the violation of unprotected Turkish women, numbers of whom are crowded together in various khans, &c., in the Mussulman quarters of the town.

If things are so bad in the city of Salonica under the eyes of the consuls of all the Powers and their vessels it may be imagined what is the condition of affairs in the interior of the country, where little or no attempt has been made by the advancing armies to establish any settled form of government in their wake. The Bulgarians in particular, in their frenzied haste to bring their forces in Salonica up to the level of those of the Greeks, left hardly any garrisons *en route*. The government of the districts through which they passed has been left to the local comitajis, whose first proceeding generally was to disarm the Mussulmans and hand their weapons over to the Christian population. The next was to plunder the farms of the Mussulman landlords, carrying off their cattle and stores of grain and burning all they could not carry off. The Mussulman notables in the towns were then forced to pay large sums for a few days' respite, after which their houses were plundered and themselves only too often killed. In many districts there is only too good reason to believe that organised massacre has been resorted to. According to Christian informants over 200 Mussulmans were killed at Serres on the 16th, when every Turkish house or shop in the town was sacked. Ninety are reported to have perished at Doiran. The districts of Avret-Hissar, Nogrita, Baïrakli-Djouma and Strumnitza are amongst those which have been severely visited. Bad reports are also to hand from Gheygheli, which is apparently in the joint occupation of the three allies. Nearer Salonica, the village of Yailadjik has been entirely destroyed by the Bulgarians, who also burned the farm of the Senator Suleiman Pasha almost within sight of the town. In short, ruin and desolation have followed in the track of the Christian allies, and years must elapse before the damage caused can be repaired, let alone the bitter memories effaced.

According to an announcement appearing to-day the Greek authorities have now appointed a préfet at Florina, which they occupied on the 22nd instant, and sous-préfets at Vodena, Yenidje-Vardar and Kassandra, to all of which districts it appears that small detachments of Greek gendarmerie have been dispatched.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[51711] No. 59.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 1011.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 29, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mitylene, giving an account of the Greek occupation of the island.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 59.

Vice-Consul Hadkinson to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Mitylene, November 23, 1912.*

BEFORE daybreak on Thursday, the 21st instant, the Greek fleet, consisting of the "Averof," "Hydra," "Spetsai," "Psara," "Nea Tentos," "Thyellas," "Niki," "Aspis," "Velos," "Terax," and two torpedo-boats, Nos. 14 and 15, appeared off this island, and anchored off the port at about 7 o'clock. Admiral Conondiros sent an officer under a flag of truce to the konak, demanding the unconditional surrender of the island, giving up to 11 A.M. for the Turkish authorities to decide. The vali invited the consular body, begging their help to induce the commander to extend the time to twenty-four hours, to allow time to communicate with Constantinople to obtain the Sultan's permission for the garrison to surrender, but the commander would not grant more than an hour and a-half to allow that portion of the garrison that was in the town to evacuate it and go to join the larger body of troops in the interior of the island; this was done, and at exactly half-past 12 the Greek soldiers commenced landing in town, amidst the loud huzzas of the populace. Before the landing took place there was some firing of pistols, but the Turks threatened to fire and put a stop to it; the Greek admiral, too, asked us to caution the people not to fire, as his men may mistake it for an attack, and they would reply by firing on the people, so when the landing took place not a shot was heard, and everything went on very smoothly, and the people are overjoyed at the occupation. The Greeks have for the present allowed the vali and the governor to remain at their houses, placing guards for their protection. The vali, Ali Ekrem, acted in a very sensible manner for the safety of the town in sending the soldiers inland; he also saved the town from a great danger by countermanding a military order to set fire to their ammunition before leaving the town. This ammunition was next the powder magazine, and the explosion of this would have had serious consequences to the town.

Early in the morning on the appearance of the fleet I wired you that "twelve Greek battle-ships anchored demanding occupation island," and after the extension of time was given I sent you a second telegram as follows:—

"Greek fleet gave two hours. After consultation between authorities and consular body was decided to ask twenty-four hours' delay. Commander accorded only one and a-half to occupy town without resistance. Vali promised to retire troops to interior island. Landing will take place half-past 12. Populace quiet."

Since the occupation the Greek authorities are collecting all rifles they can find, both in the Greek and Turkish houses, and are giving every protection to the Turkish population.

I have, &c.
F. HADKINSON.

[51712] No. 60.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 1012.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 29, 1912.*

A PROVISIONAL law has just been published in the "Official Gazette" authorising the issue of Treasury bonds to the amount of £T. 3,000,000. These bonds, which will be issued at par, are to carry an interest of 6 per cent., and to be redeemable in three years.

A ministerial decree which is annexed to the law states that it has been decided to pledge to this issue the receipts resulting from the new war taxes recently imposed. These consist of a surtax of 25 per cent. on buildings and tomettu, a reserve on the salaries and travelling expenses of Government servants, an increase of the salt dues, and the duplication of the tax on spirituous liquors.

These last two items are included in the revenues conceded to the Ottoman Public Debt, and are therefore ordinarily collected by that administration, whereas the other taxes, intended to serve as securities to these new Treasury bonds, are generally administered by the Ministry of Finance itself. It has been decided, however, that the total sums collected from all the war taxes shall now be paid into the Ottoman Public

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Debt on account of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and that the bank shall undertake the payment of the interest on the bonds now to be issued, as also their eventual redemption.

The decree concludes with the assurance that any deficit in the revenues pledged to the new bonds will be made good from the usual Treasury receipts. The Imperial Ottoman Bank is, moreover, to undertake the actual issue of the bonds in conjunction with the other public banking establishments.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[52358] No. 61.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 1013.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 2, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report the following information which I have received regarding the situation at Dedeagatch and Rodosto :—

The apprehension caused among the population of Dedeagatch by the presence, not far from the town, of bands of Greek and Bulgarian comitajis was increased by the departure of the French war-ship "Jules Ferry," which left Dedeagatch on the 12th ultimo on account of bad weather and has not returned. Various half-hearted expeditions against the bands were made by the few mustafiz troops in the town, but the latter appear to have retired in disorder as soon as they came into contact with the enemy.

On the 19th November, as reported in my telegram No. 674 of the 24th November, the town was taken by Bulgarian comitajis. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from the acting British vice-consul, reporting the capture of the town, and a further despatch describing the general state of Dedeagatch and the neighbourhood subsequent to the defeat of the Turkish troops.

On the 26th November the Bulgarian regular troops, under General Kovatchof, took possession of the town. I have the honour to enclose a despatch from Mr. Badetti describing this event.

The town of Rodosto was bombarded by the Turkish fleet in consequence of the approach of the Bulgarian troops. The agent of Messrs. Whittall & Co. reported that on the 16th November the whole of the upper part of the town was in flames in consequence of the bombardment. Messrs. Whittall expressed great apprehension as to the fate of their stores at that place.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 61.

Vice-Consul Badetti to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 22.)

Sir, *Dédéagatch, le 21 novembre, 1912.*

HIER en toute hâte je me suis permis, pour profiter du vapeur autrichien, de vous faire connaître que la ville avait été prise par les comitadjis bulgares et que la situation était des plus graves.

Je passe aux faits :—

Ma dépêche du 18 courant No. 20 vous signalait qu'environ 220 mustahafuz étaient partis par train vers la direction de Ferredjik à la recherche des Bulgares.

Le 19, vers les 8 heures du matin, ces mêmes soldats rentraient en ville. Une demi-heure après ils repartaient à pied vers la même direction sous la conduite de trois officiers.

Durant toute la journée on était aux écoutes, sans pouvoir apprendre rien de positif. A 4 heures 30 minutes du soir on entendit à la gare une fusillade éparpillée, et nous apprîmes que l'on se battait dans le lit du torrent Badoma à 1 kilom. de la gare.

Les mustahafuz ouvrirent, paraît-il, les premiers le feu, et leur situation était bonne, étant cachés sous la tranchée construite pour la déviation du courant des eaux.

Les Bulgares continuaient leur marche en avant avec beaucoup de prudence, dit-on; mais s'étant approchés de la tranchée, à leur tour ils commencèrent le feu. Les

mustahafuz, voyant l'ennemi progresser dans sa marche, commencèrent à se retirer de la tranchée vers le cimetière latin, peu éloigné de la gare des orientaux.

Déjà le jour baissait, et il paraît que les mustahafuz, pris de panique, essayèrent la fuite. C'est alors que les Bulgares, avec un élan furieux, tombèrent à l'arme blanche sur eux, tuant sans rémission. Grâce à la présence d'énormes chênes produisant la vallonée, la fuite de quelques mustahafuz passa inaperçue et ils purent de la sorte gagner la montagne.

Maîtres de la situation, les comitadjis avancèrent doucement vers la ville par la route principale, qui mène de la station en ville.

A l'entrée de la ville il y a en majorité des maisons musulmanes ainsi qu'une mosquée. Vers les 8 heures et demie en passant par là un coup de feu parti d'une maison turque blessa le porte-étendard. On lança une bombe dans la mosquée, qui communiqua le feu à l'édifice. De même un incendie éclata dans une maison turque; sur cela la fusillade recommence et l'incendie fait des progrès.

Il était 9 heures passées quand les comitadjis se présentèrent devant la maison du mutessarif le sommant de se rendre, ce qu'il fit immédiatement; les hourrahs éclatèrent. Le gouverneur prisonnier fut amené au moulin à vapeur situé non loin de la ville.

Les cloches des églises grecque, bulgare, arménienne commencèrent à sonner à toute volée. Les habitants, revenus de leur frayeur, prennent courage et sortent dans les rues, tirant des coups d'armes à feu en quantité innombrable. Le terrain libre, on entame le pillage en règle des magasins turcs, sans rien respecter. Cette besogne terminée, on s'attaque aux convois des moudjirs musulmans en enlevant les bestiaux et tout ce qui pouvait tomber sous la main, sans compter une certaine quantité d'armes en dépôts dans le "djami." La poste, le télégraphe, le konak, le capitanat de port ont été saccagés. On est allé aussi au phare; mais leur ayant fait comprendre que les intérêts étaient français, rien n'a été fait.

Ce n'est que vers les 3 heures du matin que le calme se rétablit et dure jusqu'au matin.

Le 20 on se rendit compte des conséquences de cette nuit de terreur. Un peu de partout on relevait la présence de cadavres musulmans; devant le portail du konak il y avait dix-huit, mais dans le quartier musulman et la mosquée il y avait une quantité plus grande. Je vous signalais dans mon No. 21 une trentaine, mais malheureusement ce chiffre est loin de la vérité, et dans la situation actuelle il est impossible d'effectuer le moindre contrôle.

Du côté des comitadjis il y a eu, dit-on, sept blessés, dont les deux gravement. Aucun chrétien de la ville n'a été tué ou blessé.

Durant l'engagement, du côté du cimetière latin, les comitadjis n'ont eu, prétend-on, que deux tués; quant aux mustahafuz, pas moyen de préciser le chiffre, mais les pertes ont dû être graves.

Cet après-midi, sur l'initiative de l'évêque grecque, lequel en cette triste circonstance est digne de tout éloge, on a commencé par ramasser les cadavres.

Voilà la narration de la prise de la ville par 118 comitadjis. Tous ces faits regrettables auraient pû être épargnés sans l'entêtement du mutessarif et du commandant de la gendarmerie, qui en sont les seuls responsables. On les supplait, le mufti en tête; les consuls l'engageaient d'éviter toute résistance; mais rien n'a été fait. Entre-temps le commandant de la gendarmerie a pris la fuite.

Les cinquante-trois blessés venus de Gumuldjina, se trouvant en traitement ici, ont été abandonnés à leur sort triste; les sœurs de charité les soignent actuellement.

Depuis ce matin on effectue des perquisitions là où l'on croit des musulmans cachés; dès que l'on en découvre ils sont fait prisonniers; deux ou trois, ayant voulu résister, furent tués.

Les prisonniers sont entassés pêle-mêle dans la cour de l'évêché grec. Je me demande ce qu'ils vont devenir dans cette rigoureuse saison; nous manquons de locaux pour leur donner abri.

Il est exactement 4 heures 40 minutes du soir, et nous n'avons aucune nouvelle sur l'arrivée de l'armée régulière bulgare; les comitadjis tâchent de rassurer la population en prétendant qu'elle apparaîtra d'un moment à l'autre. Je le souhaite vivement, pour mettre fin à de nombreuses fausses alertes, que nous subissons parfois.

Avec la présence sur rade d'un bâtiment de guerre étranger nous serons plus rassurés.

J'ai, &c.
G. BADETTI.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 61.

Vice-Consul Badetti to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 23.)

Sir, *Dédéagatch, le 24 novembre*, 1912.

J'AI l'honneur de vous confirmer ma dépêche du 21 courant No. 22, expédiée voie de Salonique.

La situation continue à demeurer la même, c'est-à-dire des plus indécises, ne voyant pas arriver le moindre bâtiment de guerre étranger, et d'un autre côté cette armée régulière bulgare est toujours invisible.

Le calme est loin d'être rétabli; nous sommes sur le qui-vive en permanence. La population est constamment dans les transes, les magasins fermés, et, au moindre mouvement insolite, c'est un sauve qui peut général.

L'évêque grec continue toujours à gouverner la ville et sa conduite ne mérite qu'éloges.

Les convois de musulmans, quoique peu nombreux, ne cessent d'arriver et faire leur soumission. Le chiffre des prisonniers agrandit et je me demande ce que l'on fera de tout ce monde: la ville n'est pas en état de suffir à leur installation.

Les perquisitions se poursuivent chez les musulmans, mais sans résultats. Dans l'après-midi d'hier deux Turcs cachés dans le tender d'une locomotive furent découverts. L'un ayant essayé de prendre la fuite a été tué, l'autre a eu la vie sauve.

Le tué répond au nom d'Ali (le Crétois). J'ai appris que, faisant partie de la preinière expédition contre Carabounar, comme rédif, il prit part à l'attaque de ce village, et l'on prétend que c'était justement lui qui assassina le prieur ("ighoumenos"); même on va plus loin en l'accusant d'avoir porté à son retour comme trophée un bras humain, qu'il exhiba aux musulmans pour avoir du bakchich.

D'après la quantité d'armes de munition trouvées dans les maisons musulmanes, il paraîtrait que le Gouvernement avait effectué une distribution. A cette époque j'étais en congé, sinon j'aurais été au courant de cet agissement.

Les nouvelles qui nous parviennent de l'intérieur sont des plus lamentables. Les fuyards incendient, saccagent, massacrent ce qui trouvent sur leur passage comme villages chrétiens, et la presse ottomane a le courage de donner des démentis.

Les villages de Tchoban-Keui à 37 kilom. d'ici, Kirka-Keui à 24 kilom., Ouroundjouk à 18 kilom., et Lidja-Keui à 12 kilom., ont été décimés.

La panique des fuyards est impossible de décrire; un chef de gare de la Compagnie Jonction-Salonique-Constantinople en a été témoin oculaire et me racontait qu'un convoi composé de mustahafuz, rédifs et d'autres ramas (celui qui brûla le village de Kirka-Keui) que, durant leur marche, à chaque bout de champ on se cachait dans la brousse hantés de la présence des Bulgares. Ils ont abimé la voie ferrée en faisant dérailler un train dans un tunnel.

Ils ont essayé aussi de faire sauter un pont de 11 mètres, mais il paraît que leurs bombes n'étaient pas de force.

A la station de Badoma, sur le parcours Jonction-Salonique-Constantinople, à 10 kilom. d'ici, il y avait en dépôt des armes, munitions, provisions, &c., les fuyards les ont incendiés et prirent ensuite la montagne dans la direction de Ferredjik (ce sont ceux-là qui mirent le feu aux villages de Lidja-Keui et Ouroundjouk) avec l'intention, paraît-il, de traverser la Maritza du côté d'Ipsala et passer à Gallipoli par les parages du Golfe de Saros.

Le personnel du Chemin de Fer de Jonction-Salonique-Constantinople à partir de la station de Koussé-Midjit et en deçà vers ici a quitté les stations. On dit que Gumuldjins a été prise jeudi dernier par les Bulgares. La ville s'étant rendue, il n'y a eu rien d'anormal. Les fuyards militaires provenant de cette ville étaient dans un état lamentable: il y en a parmi qui restent en route, la force leur faisant défaut; il y avait aussi des blessés.

J'ai, &c.
G. BADETTI.

Enclosure 3 in No. 61.

Vice-Consul Badetti to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 28.)

Sir, *Dédéagatch, le 27 novembre*, 1912.

J'AI l'honneur de vous informer qu'hier, à midi, le Général Kovatchof a fait son entrée en ville. Toute la population était sur pied, et la réception a été des plus cordiales.

Depuis, le passage des troupes n'a pas discontinué, et il est difficile de pouvoir en préciser le chiffre.

Vers le tard les prisonniers civils, y compris femmes et enfants, ont été libérés. Le mouvement est grand, et la ville disposent de peu de moyens comme approvisionnements. Je crains que nous n'aurons des difficultés pour nourrir tout ce monde, quoique de passage.

Ce matin j'ai fait ma visite au général, qui m'a dit que dans un ou deux jours il compte lui-même continuer sa marche, en laissant une garnison ici.

J'ai, &c.
G. BADETTI.

[51713] No. 62.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 1014.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 30*, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch from Consul-General Alvarez reporting on the panic created among the non-Moslems at Trebizond in consequence of the Bulgarian, Greek, and Servian victories over the Turks.

The telegram referred to in the last sentence of Mr. Alvarez' despatch was repeated to you in my telegram No. 669 of the 22nd instant, announcing the arrival at Trebizond of a Russian war-ship.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 62.

Consul-General Alvarez to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Trebizond, November 23*, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to state that during the last ten days or so a disposition to panic, in consequence of the Bulgarian, Greek, and Servian victories over the Turks, has been very manifest among non-Moslems in this city, and especially among the Armenians and Greeks. That such a feeling should prevail among the 300 or 400 Hellenic subjects that reside here (there are no Bulgarians or Servians) was, perhaps, under the circumstances, very natural, although from all I have seen or heard there has been absolutely nothing to justify any apprehension of massacre or outrage on the part of the Turks. But there is absolutely no excuse for Armenians and Greeks who are Ottoman subjects, especially in view of the fact that local Moslems have shown warm appreciation of the readiness displayed by Christians of those nationalities to take a share in the defence of the Empire. A good deal of my spare time during the last week has been taken up with endeavours to tranquillise various Armenian, Greek, and even European ladies of my acquaintance who had been frightened out of their wits by so-called friends or acquaintances by accounts of the massacre that was to take place on the occasion of Kurban Bairam, local Christians, according to rumours spread about, being destined to take the place of the victims it is usual to sacrifice on that occasion. I thought it my duty to speak very seriously to the vali twice on the subject, impressing on his Excellency the necessity of every precaution being taken to maintain order and security, but in such a manner as not to excite any apprehension among people who evidently are so prone to panic, while at the same time carefully expressing my conviction that such apprehensions were quite unjustifiable. Both the vali and other Mussulman dignitaries and notables to whom I have spoken on the

subject, while expressing themselves grateful to me for my intervention, have shown themselves very mortified at the bad opinion entertained concerning them by persons who shall be nameless. News circulated here from Batoum from Russian sources is to a large extent responsible for the excitement prevalent in town, which is not likely to be allayed by the intelligence conveyed to your Excellency in my telegram of yesterday.

I have, &c.
JUSTIN ALVAREZ.

[51714] No. 63.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 1015.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 30, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, recapitulating information received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Scutari with regard to the course of events at that place up to the 8th November.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 63.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 159.)

Sir, *Salonica, November 20, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 141 of the 22nd ultimo, I have the honour to report that, in spite of the unpromising outlook reported by Mr. Vice-Consul Summa as far back as the 14th of that month, the town of Scutari has continued to offer to the Montenegrin attack a resistance which redounds greatly to the credit of the governor and commandant, Hassan Riza Bey, and of the population in general, which appears to have borne up against an almost desperate state of affairs with a fortitude that was hardly to be expected from it.

The Montenegrins advanced to the attack of the town in three columns of about 7,000 to 8,000 each. At the date above mentioned, the first of these columns, starting from Podgoritza and advancing by Touzi, Kastrati, and Koplicon, had reached Vraka, a village situated about 4 or 5 miles north of Scutari on the east side of the lake, from whence it opened fire on the Turkish fortified camp at Fousha Stovi, just outside the town. The Christian Malissores occupying the intervening country continued to make common cause with the invaders, but the Mussulman villages along the foot-hills of Posripa offered a certain resistance, after which their inhabitants fell back on Scutari and the villages were mostly burned.

The second column, advancing from Vir Bazar along the opposite shore of the lake, had arrived at Zogaj, where it came under the fire of the strongly fortified positions on Mount Tarabosh, whilst the third advanced from Antivari to Obotti, a village on the right bank of the Boyana River, about 8 miles below the town. Here again all Mussulman villages appear to have been burned, the population retreating into the town.

The losses suffered by the first two columns, and especially by the second in its assaults on Tarabosh, appear to have rendered the Montenegrins disposed rather to invest the city and reduce it by a regular siege than to endeavour to capture it by assault. During the next twelve or fourteen days Hassan Riza Bey received from Durazzo, Elbassan, and Berat some 7,000 redifs, who brought the strength of his garrison up to about 20,000 men. The food supplies of the town, however, already began to be insufficient for the largely increased population, and in the absence of all means of transport it was becoming almost impossible to bring in further supplies from the south and west, on which sides the approaches were not yet entirely closed.

Towards the end of October the Montenegrins began to renew their attacks on the town, both on the side of Fusha Stovi and on that of the Tarabosh. Projectiles aimed at the former position began to fall in the town itself, and many casualties occurred amongst the inhabitants.

In view of this the foreign consuls held a meeting on the 31st October, at which it was decided to address a letter to the Montenegrin commander-in-chief, urging him to

spare the public buildings in the town as well as the inhabited quarters. With the permission of Hassan Riza Bey a certain number of families left Scutari and attempted to reach the port of Medua, in order to embark for Europe on the Austrian Lloyd. Half-way to the coast, however, they found the Montenegrin artillery in position on the heights of Kukli, and were compelled to return. Hassan Riza Bey detached two battalions from the garrison of the Tarabosh and attempted to clear the road, but though the Montenegrins were dislodged from their original positions they only withdrew to a still stronger one, from which they continued to dominate the road, and the Turks were compelled to retire after suffering considerable loss. A sortie on the east side of the town resulted in a greater measure of success, but was without permanent results on the situation of the beleaguered city.

On the 5th November Major Hubka, Austrian military attaché at Cettinjé, arrived in Scutari with the reply of the Montenegrin commander-in-chief to the consuls' appeal. This reply was to the effect that the action of the Montenegrins was guided simply by military necessity, and it invited the consuls, in the interests of humanity, to exert their influence rather with a view to hastening the surrender of the town, a suggestion which they naturally declared themselves unable to entertain.

The situation remained the same up to the 8th instant, which is the date of my latest advices from Mr. Summa.

The Mirdites, whose chieftain, Prenk Bib Doda Pasha, remained prudently at Trieste, were maintaining an attitude of neutrality, whilst characteristically endeavouring to turn the difficulties of the Turkish authorities to their own advantage.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[51715] No. 64.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 1016.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 30, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-General at Salonica, reporting a slight amelioration in the relations between Greeks and Bulgarians at that place, and the partial removal of the Bulgarian troops.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 64.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 160.)

Sir, *Salonica, November 24, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 155 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to report that there are signs that at least the official tension between the Greeks and Bulgarians has been somewhat relaxed.

Two of the three Bulgarian brigades, numbering some 30,000 men, are understood to have received orders to join the army of Thrace before Tchataldja, proceeding partly by rail and partly by sea viâ Dedeagatch. The Greek commander-in-chief was officially requested to provide transport for the latter purpose on the 20th instant, and on the following day the 13th Regiment, forming part of the Rifo Brigade, was embarked on board two Greek vessels. On the 22nd a considerable quantity of artillery was similarly embarked, the operations, however, proceeding with extreme deliberation. In the afternoon of the 21st, Prince Nicolas of Greece, in the name of the Greek army, gave a *vin d'honneur* to the Bulgarian officers by way of officially wishing them God-speed. The reception lasted little more than an hour and was not marked by any very conspicuous degree of cordiality, but it was remarkable as being the only attempt during the joint occupation of the town to bring the officers of the two armies into friendly contact.

In private conversation the Bulgarians continue to assert their determination that in no case shall Salonica be permitted to become the exclusive property of their allies, whilst even the latter have begun to moderate their initial enthusiasm and contemplate at least the possibility of an arrangement for the neutralisation of the town and port.

The non-Greek population is in general so disgusted at the treatment it has been

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subjected to during the past fortnight that it is almost unanimous in deprecating the perpetuation of Hellenic rule, apart from the fact that its incorporation in the Kingdom of Greece, by interposing a customs barrier between it and the major portion of the districts which it serves, would in all probability result in a serious limitation of the commercial development of the port.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[51716] No. 65.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 1017.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November 30, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna reporting on the annexation of Samos to Greece, proclaimed the 24th November, 1912.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 65.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 140.)
Sir, *Smyrna, November 26, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report, on the information of the British vice-consul at Samos, that the newly elected representatives (presumably those who were elected just before my visit), together with the four senators, officially proclaimed the annexation of Samos to Greece on Sunday, the 24th instant.

The Royal Greek flag was hoisted over the palace amid a scene of great enthusiasm.

The commission which will submit this decision to the Greek Government left yesterday, the 25th instant, for Athens.

The Government is in the meantime administered on behalf of the King of the Hellenes by M. Sofoulis and the four senators.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[51720] No. 66.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 211.)
Sir, *Vienna, November 30, 1912.*

THE news of the proclamation of the independence of Albania, contained in a telegram received by the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 29th November, from Ismail Kemal Bey, finds a warm welcome in Vienna, and is greeted by the press with evident relief and satisfaction.

The telegram addressed to Count Berchtold states that a Provisional Government has been established with the task of "defending the rights and the existence of the Albanian people, threatened with destruction by the Servian armies, and of freeing their country from the armies of the Balkan allies who have overrun it." The Albanians, continues the telegram, only desire to live in peace with all the Balkan States, and to become an element in the balance of power. They ask for Austria-Hungary's recognition of the new status of Albania, and are convinced that she, in common with the whole civilised world, will protect Albania from any attack upon its national existence and from any dismemberment of its territory.

The semi-official "Fremdenblatt" salutes the event as the birthday of a new State in Europe, which has become autonomous because it could no longer remain an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. The highly developed national consciousness of a brave and warlike race has always prevented the dissensions and the separations entailed among the other races of that part of the world by differences of religion. There had

been much difference of opinion as to how the Albanian question could be solved, but to-day the idea of a new autonomous State has taken shape throughout Europe as the solution best fitted to the actual conditions and historical development of this ancient people.

The "Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung" says that the settlement made by the Albanians themselves will be welcomed sympathetically by Europe, for it is the logical consequence of the great upheaval in the Balkans. As to Austria-Hungary, she sees in it the solution which she has long aimed at and which justifies her traditional policy. Italy, too, has the same views, and in fact, as is known, has an agreement with her ally to the effect that if the *status quo* could not be maintained, the two Powers should aim at an autonomous Albania, able to hold its own.

The "Zeit," alone of the Vienna journals, touches upon other and more delicate aspects of the case. Now, it says, the Albanian question has lost much of its acuteness; it is no longer a serious question for Austria-Hungary, but rather for the concert of Europe. It may now be questioned, without making difficulties for Count Berchtold, whether he was wise in stamping the question of Albanian autonomy and of an Adriatic port as a *Lebensfrage* for Austria. Italy is, perhaps, more interested than her neighbour in the future of Albania. True, it may not be a matter of indifference to Austria, who holds side by side with Italy, the entrance of the Straits of Otranto, but for Italy it is of the greatest importance who faces her on the other side of those Straits. Finally, no one knows how long the new State will enjoy, even formally, its newly-proclaimed independence. It will, perhaps, come into Austria's sphere of influence; it is certain that Italy hopes it will fall to her. Therefore, it would, perhaps, have been better had Count Berchtold ceded the *pas* to Italy in this question, and defined Austria's vital interests elsewhere. As soon as Austria stepped forward for Albania, Russia was naturally opposed to her, because Russia is opposed to everything that Austria thinks good for herself. But with Italy it is another matter. The precise nature of her agreement with Russia at Racconigi, in 1909, is not known. But if Italy had from the beginning entered the lists in favour of Albania, Russia would have hesitated before supporting Servian aims, because she would thus have shattered at one blow all the intrigues of the Triple *Entente* to detach Italy from the *Dreibund*. The fate of Albania seems fairly assured, and the only question remaining open is whether Austria's interests have really been properly guarded.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[52076] No. 67.

Note communicated by Bulgarian Minister, December 4, 1912.

(Translation.)

THE Bulgarian Minister presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to communicate to him the following telegram which he has received this afternoon from the Bulgarian Prime Minister:—

"The protocol of the armistice was signed at Chatalja at 8 o'clock last evening in the form in which it had been drafted by Dr. Danef. The conditions are as follows:—

"(*a.*) The belligerent armies remain in their present positions.

"(*b.*) The besieged fortresses shall not be revictualled, nor be supplied with ammunition.

"(*c.*) The revictualling of the Bulgarian army and replenishment of its ammunition shall be carried out by way of the Black Sea and Adrianople, commencing ten days after the signing of the armistice protocol.

"(*d.*) Negotiations for peace shall begin in London on 30th November old style or 13th December new style."

Bulgarian Legation, London, December 4, 1912.

[51865] No. 68.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 706.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 4, 1912.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 208 of 3rd December.

Up to hour of telegraphing Minister for Foreign Affairs states that he has no knowledge of armistice signed yesterday evening, but according to Grand Vizier it was concluded with Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro on following basis:—

1. Troops of belligerents to maintain present positions.
2. Peace negotiations to be begun within ten days.
3. Revictualling of Adrianople and allied forces by Black Sea to begin after starting of peace negotiations.

His Highness desires that peace negotiations should take place in London, as he hopes that public opinion will be more favourable there to Turkey, and states that abstinence of Greece was due to difficulty about Janina. He adds that Turkey will now stiffen her attitude towards Greece, and a certain reliance seems to be placed on early purchase and arrival of at least a battle-ship, presumably one of those mentioned in your despatch No. 544.

(Sent to Athens, Sophia, Belgrade, and Cettinjé.)

[51741] No. 69.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 212.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, December 4, 1912.*

ARMISTICE concluded last night. Details later.

(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

[51816] No. 70.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 213.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, December 4, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

Protocol of armistice signed at 8 o'clock last night.

Conditions as follows:—

1. Belligerents to retain present positions.
2. Fortresses are not to be revictualled.
3. Bulgarian army to be revictualled by sea and Adrianople ten days after the signature of the protocol.
4. Plenipotentiaries to meet 13th December in London to discuss peace conditions.

(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

[51850] No. 71.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 214.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, December 4, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

I hear that Greeks have not signed armistice, and they have reserved to themselves delay of twenty-four hours in which to sign or not, as may seem best to suit them.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[51849] No. 72.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, December 4, 1912.*

UNDER-SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs informs me that protocol of the armistice was signed yesterday. Peace delegates to meet in London. Only one Servian delegate definitely chosen as yet. Choice of second delegate lies between Servian Minister at Paris and President of the Skupshtina.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[51864] No. 73.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 101.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, December 4, 1912.*

I HAVE just seen my Austrian colleague, who looks upon the whole situation as distinctly more favourable than a few days ago. He says that Austrian military measures are much exaggerated and are mostly precautionary. He admitted that condition of affairs in Austrian Slav provinces is not satisfactory, but said that this is largely due to agitators from Servia, and it is on this account that troops have been drafted to the neighbourhood of Servian frontier. He maintains that his Government have no intention whatever of putting military pressure upon Servia, and desire to pursue an altogether conciliatory policy. He has therefore not again spoken to the Prime Minister on the Adriatic port question since his interview on 10th November (see my telegram No. 53 of 11th November). He read me a despatch sent by him to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, stating that attitude of Servian Government seems to be undergoing a change for the better, and that he has now good hope that Austrian and Servian differences may ultimately be satisfactorily arranged.

He expressed himself as gratified with the treatment which the Austrian consuls in Albania are receiving from the military authorities, and thinks that former incidents will be settled without much difficulty.

[51867] No. 74.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 469.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1320 of 3rd December.

Idea of Minister for Foreign Affairs is that Albanian frontier should follow a line drawn from a point on the coast near Khimarra to Lake Ochrida and then north along course of Black Drin, making a bend so as to leave Dibra to Albania and finally following White Drin to its junction with the Devana and thence along that river to the Adriatic. Point on which he insisted is that no Servian districts should be included in Albania. A consul well acquainted with ethnography of the district in dispute will assist Russian Ambassador with his advice.

As regards Durazzo, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that it would be far easier to construct an international railway to that port than to any other. Vallona, which was only other alternative, was too far distant.

His Excellency has heard that Austrian and German Governments would prefer London to Paris for meeting of Ambassadors. He has told Austrian Ambassador that it was a mistake to imagine that the personality of the Russian Ambassador at Paris would in any way influence the course of the discussion, as latter would receive precise instructions to which he would be bound to adhere. He told me that personally it was quite indifferent to him whether London or Paris were chosen, but that he feared that it would be a bitter disappointment to French President of the Council if the meeting did not take place at Paris, as latter had set his heart on presiding at an international conference. He hoped, therefore, that in the event of London being decided on you would be able to explain matters satisfactorily to his Excellency.

As regards views expressed by the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, recorded

in Vienna telegram No. 179 of 30th November, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Balkan States were quite aware that they would have to submit the treaty of peace to the Powers, but that only questions which would occasion any difficulties were those relating to Albania and Ægean islands.

The speech of the German Chancellor has made a bad impression on Russian press, but Minister for Foreign Affairs seems to take it quite calmly

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[51872] No. 75.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 183.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 4, 1912.*

POLITICAL situation is growing worse daily. It has been aggravated by the taking of Durazzo by the Servians and by continued declarations of responsible Servian personages that Servia intends to remain on the Adriatic coast. It is being realised here that the so called moderating influence of the Russian Government at Belgrade is leading to no result owing to personal influence of the Russian Minister there exercised in the opposite direction.

In all classes of society here, especially the industrial and financial circles, feeling is growing that it would be better to take action at once against Servia and so put an end to the present suspense. Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs tries to remain calm, but he may have his hand forced and be compelled to ask Servia to give explanations as to her final intentions. I believe that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs desires to wait until peace is signed before taking action, but if conclusion of peace is long delayed he may be forced to act sooner.

Attitude of French press in defending so vigorously Servian pretensions is causing the greatest irritation here. I am informed that Austrian Ambassador at Paris has made representations to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject, but could obtain no satisfactory reply.

I am informed that the word "fight" in the German Chancellor's speech was inserted by direct orders of the German Emperor.

[51848] No. 76.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 123.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, December 4, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 301 of 3rd December.

No mention was made of merchant-vessels. It should be remembered that ships cannot pass into or out of the Dardanelles at night, therefore merchant-vessels were in no danger.

I believe that Greeks were then especially on the look-out for a possible attack on large convoy transporting Bulgarian troops from Salonica to Dedeagatch; or perhaps their precautions were connected with proposal which I understand that they made for a joint attack on the Dardanelles.

[51876] No. 77.

Vice-Consul de Garston to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Ragusa, December 4, 1912.*

BY Austro-American steam-ship "Laura," from Trieste, 5,000 Hungarian troops were landed at Gravosa 3rd December, 400 of whom remained at Ragusa, balance proceeding to Trebinje, Castelnuovo, and Cattaro.

[50422] No. 78.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1089.)
(Telegraphic.) *En. clair.* *Foreign Office, December 4, 1912.*

INSTRUCT consuls in towns occupied by allies to inform military authorities that the revenues assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt are under the protection of the Powers.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 303; Paris, No. 766; Sophia, No. 187; Belgrade, No. 129; and Cettinjé, No. 139.)

[52082] No. 79.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1090.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 4, 1912.*

DOES situation at Constantinople require presence of "Inflexible" at Besika in addition to "Hampshire" and "Weymouth" at Constantinople? Admiralty wish to move "Inflexible" to Malta.

[52081] No. 80.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 416.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 4, 1912.*

SIR F. CARTWRIGHT'S telegram No. 183 of to-day, repeated to you.

I have this afternoon expressed to German Ambassador some anxiety as to effect of Chancellor's speech. It will be most unfortunate if some action by Austria follows that speech. I have hitherto understood that Germany considered that Austria would not interfere with Servian military operations on the understanding that points which it might be necessary for Austria to raise would be discussed with all the Powers when terms of peace were reviewed as a whole. I do not understand Chancellor's speech to be intended to change this, but an impression that Germany will support Austria without regard to merits will not tend to moderation. I have expressed cordial appreciation of what German Minister for Foreign Affairs said about relations with England. It is quite true that we have been working most cordially with Germany for peace; if Germany and England succeed in preserving peace the result will be excellent, but if we fail no one can tell where we may find ourselves.

The Chancellor's phrase that Germany might be fighting to defend her position in Europe and to protect her future and security is one that any Power might have to use if grave complications arose.

You should inform German Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 1325; Paris, No. 767; and Vienna, No. 408.)

[52081] No. 81.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.**

(No. 1326.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 4, 1912.*

MY telegram to Berlin No. 416 of to-day is repeated to you for your own information only.

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* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 768) and Sir F. Cartwright (No. 409).

[52076] No. 82.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 44.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 4, 1912.*

THE Bulgarian Minister gave me to-day the enclosed terms of armistice. He observed that they were less favourable to Turkey than the newspapers had made them out to be.

I asked whether Greece had signed them.

He replied that no mention had been made to him of Greece abstaining, and he assumed that the terms had been signed by all four countries. He called my attention to the fact that London was to be the meeting-place of the peace delegates, and he hoped that this would be agreeable to us.

I said that we should be delighted that London should be of use for such a purpose.

He then expressed a hope that I might be helpful in the negotiations.

I replied that, in so far as the terms of peace involved alterations in the Treaty of Berlin, I could not act or advise about their details except in consultation with the other signatory Powers. I regarded his news of the armistice, however, as a good augury, and I hoped that the temporary peace now arrived at would lead to a satisfactory and permanent peace.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[51660] No. 83.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 279.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 4, 1912.*

THE Italian Ambassador gave Sir A. Nicolson confidentially, on the 30th November, the following items of information:—

At the audience which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had of the Emperor of Russia, the latter had asked whether Austria would not permit Servian access to the Adriatic to be secured through a neutralised corridor to a port also to be neutralised, but apparently under Servian sovereignty. The Ambassador had said that he doubted much if his Government would agree to such an arrangement, and had explained at length to His Majesty the Austro-Hungarian views on the subject. The Emperor had listened in silence, and had made no remark at the end of the exposition. The Ambassador said that on all other points His Majesty was very gracious and conciliatory.

The Marquis Imperiali also said that the French councillor of embassy at Rome told the Marquis di San Giuliano that it was reported at Belgrade that Count Berchtold would ask that the administration of Salonica should be entrusted to the Balkan States under the presidency of Austria-Hungary. The councillor enquired the views of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, adding that the French Government did not approve of the scheme.

The Marquis di San Giuliano had replied that this was the first time he had heard of such a report, and that he could not pronounce an opinion upon it.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[51426] No. 84.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 549.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 4, 1912.*

THE Turkish Ambassador showed Sir A. Nicolson on the 29th November a telegram from Gabriel Effendi, saying that if, at a meeting which was to take place yesterday, the Bulgarians did not renounce their claims to have Adrianople and Scutari handed over to them, the Turkish delegates would, instead of continuing to discuss the terms of an armistice, suggest to the Bulgarians that discussions as to

peace conditions should be initiated. Tewfik Pasha expected to hear on the 29th November the results of the previous day's meeting, and said that he would communicate them to Sir A. Nicolson.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[51994] No. 85.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 304.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 4, 1912.*

I EXPRESSED satisfaction to-day to the German Ambassador at what Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter had said in the Reichstag about relations between England and Germany. I said that I appreciated it, and thought that it was true, and that our efforts had hitherto made for peace. I observed, however, that the reports which I received as to Austrian mobilisation was rather disquieting.

The Ambassador said that mobilisation of a sort was, no doubt, going on, but he thought that it was only in the nature of a precaution.

He then introduced the subject of the German Chancellor's speech, which to him personally had seemed perhaps a little sharp.

I asked what he understood to be meant by the speech. My belief hitherto had been that his Government considered that the questions which arose in connection with the war should be reserved for discussion till the terms of peace were discussed as a whole, and that meanwhile Austria would not interfere with Servian military operations, on the understanding that the points to which she might object would be discussed with all the Powers subsequently. Did the Chancellor's speech mean any change in this respect?

The Ambassador replied that he considered this still to be the position. In his opinion, the Chancellor's speech was not intended to change it, but simply to point out that, if Austria were attacked, Germany would have to support her. All the same he regarded the speech as a little sharp.

I said that the speech seemed to contemplate a little prematurely the possibility of war. The Chancellor had said that, if Germany fought, it would be for the defence of her own position in Europe, and for the protection of her own future and security. But this statement might be applied to any Power. If complications ensued from trouble between Great Powers, we might apply the statement to our own case. But hitherto we had abstained from saying anything of the sort, because we did not wish to seem to anticipate the possibility of such complications.

The Ambassador observed that Germany had an alliance, and was therefore more closely tied than we were.

I replied that the words which the Chancellor had used did not apply only to the question of an alliance, but to what the interests of a country might require.

We then had some general talk about the problems involved, in the course of which the Ambassador said that he thought the Chancellor's view probably was that to make it clearer that Germany would stand by her alliance would tend towards peace, as had been the case in 1909.

I said that I was sure that, if the situation of 1909 was reproduced, Russia would go to war. She had given way then, and the events of that time had been accentuated by the "shining armour" speech made subsequently. The apprehension in Russia was lest a crisis such as that of 1909 should occur again, as in that case she was determined not to give way a second time.

The Ambassador asked me whether I really thought that this was so.

I replied that I felt sure of it. This was one of the reasons for which I had been working to avoid a sharp dispute such as that of 1909. Then the first question was whether Turkey should get compensation, and on this Count Aehrenthal gave way. The second question was whether Montenegro and Servia were to get anything or nothing. There was no possibility of compromise on this; it was a question of yes or no; and they had got nothing. Now, however, there was room for a compromise, for I assumed that Austria would agree that Servia should get the sanjak and a great deal else; and I felt that, if the question of a Servian port on the Adriatic could be kept back till it was discussed in context with the things which Servia was to gain it might be possible to get for Servia the substance of an economic outlet without offending Austria as regards the form of it. But, if the impression was to be given

that Germany would support Austria in whatever the latter said her interests required; apart altogether from the merits of the case, this would not tend towards moderation. If Germany and we could succeed in preserving peace the very best results would follow; but if we failed no one could say where we should find ourselves.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52074] No. 86.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 591.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 4, 1912.*

M. CAMBON said to-day that his Government had received information from Belgrade that M. Pasitch had called together the leaders of the parties in Servia, and had informed them that Russia considered that they must go carefully as regards a strip of territory to the Adriatic, and if necessary be prepared to give up the idea of a port and be content with commercial access by the Danube-Adriatic Railway through Montenegro. This was good news. It showed that Russia had been acting energetically, and had this been done a few days earlier we should not have had the German Chancellor's speech. M. Cambon then asked me what had passed with the German Ambassador to-day.

I told him the substance of most that had passed in conversation this afternoon, saying that the Ambassador of course put the most favourable construction which he could on the speech, but had no information to give me.

M. Cambon said that if Austria attacked Russia, and Germany went to the help of Austria, France would be forced by the terms of her alliance to help Russia. She would then be obliged to ask us what we meant to do.

I said that of course she would in such circumstances have to ask us this.

He then enquired whether I thought that public opinion here would be roused?

I replied that much would depend upon how the war broke out. If Servia provoked Austria and gave her just cause of resentment, feeling would be different from what it would be if Austria was clearly aggressive. I did not think that public opinion could take things seriously unless Germany moved; and, if things did become serious, I thought that public opinion would first require an attempt to secure that Germany, France, and England kept out of the trouble.

M. Cambon said that he feared the first step would be a demand on France by Germany that France should remain neutral if Germany helped Austria. This, of course, France could not give.

No. 87.

[52075] *Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.*

(No. 403.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 4, 1912.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF came to see me to-day. He was very apprehensive as to the effect in Russia of the German Chancellor's speech, but he had no news from his Government.

I told him the substance of what I had said to the German Ambassador this afternoon.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[51880] No. 88.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 102.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, December 4, 1912.*

THE statement made to me by Prime Minister, and reported in my telegram No. 94 of 1st December, that Servia would submit to the will of Europe has now been twice repeated in the official press.

General Zhivkovitch, who commanded the Ibar column, has returned to Belgrade ostensibly on account of ill-health, but I hear on good authority that he has been recalled on account of chauvinistic influence he exercises among younger officers, a large section of whom declare they will refuse to surrender any of the territory which has been occupied by Servian troops.

[52008] No. 89.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 215.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 5, 1912.*

ARMISTICE.

My immediately preceding telegram of 4th December.

It appears that Greek Minister refused to sign armistice unless Ottoman Government ceded Janina at once.

As Ottoman Government refused, M. Panas left meeting and telegraphed to Athens.

Just after armistice had been signed, telegram was received from Montenegrin Government to the effect that they could not agree to armistice until after capitulation of Scutari.

Bulgarian Government have informed Montenegrin Government that their objection arrived too late. They also pointed out that they considered cases of Adrianople and Scutari as similar, and added that future of both would be settled during peace negotiations.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[52009] No. 90.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 216. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, December 5, 1912.*

IT is believed here in quarters that are the best informed in Sophia that a secret arrangement was come to by the Bulgarian and Ottoman Governments before the signature of the armistice for the capitulation of Adrianople.

M. Gueshof would neither deny nor openly admit the truth of this rumour.

[52011] No. 91.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, December 5, 1912.*

MY despatch No. 71.

King, whom I saw to-day, told me that a Russian Grand Duke was about to visit him.

I understand that Grand Duke Nicholas Michaelovitch will arrive on 10th December for the purpose of presenting field-marshal's baton to King Charles.

Time chosen for this visit is appropriate, as 11th December is the anniversary of fall of Plevna.

[52006] No. 92.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 123A.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, December 5, 1912.*

CANEA telegram No. 161 of 3rd December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me that the King of Greece has no thought of visiting Crete for the present.

(Sent to [group omitted: ? Canea].)

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[52007] No. 93.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 124. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, December 5, 1912.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 706 of 4th December.

Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs states that armistice was signed on 2nd December, but that he only heard of it yesterday. He heard at the same time that Servia and Montenegro, like Greece, were entirely opposed to an armistice, though ready to begin negotiations for peace without stopping hostilities. Bulgarian plenipotentiaries authorised to represent them must have therefore acted contrary to their wishes.

Abstention of Greece due not so much to Janina as to objection of opening sea routes to passage of coals and supplies to Turkey.

Minister suspects influence of Austria to have been exerted to make Bulgaria lenient to Turkey, and expects Bulgaria to renounce claim to Adrianople (to which he is assured Russia would not have objected) and to demand compensation in other directions to the detriment of her allies.

Please consider this confidential.

[52017] No. 94.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 5, 1912.*

SEMI-OFFICIAL press here announce that His Majesty's Government have officially made proposal to Powers for Ambassadors' conference. Is this true? I should like to know before I see Berchtold again.

[51999] No. 95.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 175.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, December 5, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 170 of 20th November.

Prime Minister said yesterday in the Chamber that Italian occupation of the Ægean islands had an exclusively military object. Greece was aware of the conditions when she went to war with Turkey. Italy could not claim to take possession of lands Greek by nationality, and could only contract to restore them when Turkey had completed the treaty conditions. Should Italy vacate them before the end of the present war, it was decidedly not her desire to prevent the Greeks from occupying them. In that case their status would be eventually defined by agreement between Greece and Turkey, or submitted to the appreciation of Europe in a congress in which Italy would have a voice. Fuller text by post.

[52017] No. 96.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 410.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 5, 1912.*

YOUR private telegram to Sir A. Nicolson of 5th December.

I have made no proposal about a conference or consultation since I told Austrian Ambassador here on the 29th November (see my telegram No. 404 of the 29th November) of the communication I had made to Berlin asking German Government to sound Austrian Government. I explained then that I thought it better to tell Austrian Ambassador what had passed as he questioned me respecting a report that had appeared in the press of our having proposed a formal conference.

I am expecting in due course to hear Count Berchtold's view through the Austrian Ambassador here as indicated in your telegram No. 179 of the 30th November, but do not wish to press for it if it is inopportune.

[52635] No. 97.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 412.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 5, 1912.*

SERVIAN port.

My telegram No. 549 to Rome of to-day is repeated to you for your information only.

[51867] No. 98.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan

(No. 1328.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 5, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 469 of 4th December.

I have explained to French Ambassador that I suggested Paris and have not suggested London, but that if Austrian Government accept and ask for London, and this is desired by others, I cannot well refuse.

[52076] No. 99.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 190.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 5, 1912.*

BULGARIAN Minister has communicated to me terms of armistice, including meeting of delegates to discuss terms of peace in London.

I have not yet had this information from any of the other signatories, but if London is the place chosen by all, His Majesty's Government will of course be quite agreeable and do what they can to consult the convenience of the delegates.

[52635] No. 100.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 549.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 5, 1912.*

ITALIAN Ambassador informs me that Minister for Foreign Affairs regards suggestion of consultation of Ambassadors with sympathy, and is consulting Vienna. He wished to tell me for my private information that Italy agreed with Austria that they could not consent to discuss Durazzo or Vallona or any part of the coast between these points being under Servian, Greek, or Montenegrin sovereignty. He did not include points north of Durazzo in this statement, and was favourable to guaranteed railway access for Servia to a neutralised port.

I deprecated any prohibition of discussion being made a condition, especially a public condition, of accepting consultation or conference. This would appear as if meeting of Ambassadors was from beginning a victory for Austria and Italy, whereas any agreement should be a compromise, the result of mutual concessions made in the conference. I could not say that Russia would accept solution of an international railway to a neutral port for Servia, but she had never said that this was an impossible solution. If, however, Italy and Austria were to state in advance that they would only accept a consultation on understanding that a Servian port was not discussed, Russia might very well say that she would not accept a consultation with such a limitation. The better course would be for Italy and Austria to instruct their Ambassadors that they could not give way on this point if it was raised, but not to make conditions about it beforehand.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Vienna, No. 411.)

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[51669] No. 101.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie.

(No. 770.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December* 5, 1912.

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 703 of 3rd December: Ottoman Bank.

Please ask the French Government whether they propose to take any action.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 1091; Athens, No. 305; Sophia, No. 189; Belgrade, No. 131; and Cettinjé, No. 141.)

[52548] No. 102.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 282.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 5, 1912.

THE Italian Ambassador informed me to-day that the Italian consul-general in Crete had reported that the King of Greece was coming there accompanied by Hellenic troops, and had asked for instructions as to his attitude. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs wished to know whether we had received this information and what we proposed to do.

I said that I was not sure that we had heard that the King of Greece was going to Crete. I certainly had not considered the subject, but I promised to let him know my opinion later.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[51425] No. 103.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 550.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 5, 1912.

TEWFIK Pasha questioned Sir A. Nicolson on the 29th November as to the reports appearing in the press in regard to conferences. Sir A. Nicolson told him that the system of exchanging views over the telegraph wires was a most confusing and dilatory one, telegrams were continually crossing and recrossing each other, and, therefore, all manner of misunderstandings ensued. It had been suggested in one or two quarters that the Ambassadors at some capital should meet together and discuss certain points, and this method would in any case ensure that there would be less delay and less confusion. This plan had been adopted, as he knew, on more than one occasion at Constantinople. As yet no definite decision has been reached on the proposal, and Sir A. Nicolson did not know if all the Powers would fall in with it.

Tewfik Pasha observed that there were many rumours as to mobilisation, possibilities of a general war, &c. Sir A. Nicolson said that this was the case, but that if the Powers were to get into conversation with each other through their representatives he trusted that the tension would be greatly relieved.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50540] No. 104.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie.[a]

(No. 587.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 5, 1912.

ON the 18th July last I addressed, as you are aware, despatches to His Majesty's representatives at the courts of the other protecting Powers of Crete, instructing them to inform the Governments to which they were respectively accredited of a suggestion made by His Majesty's Minister at Athens, that those of the four Powers who were able to disburse their share of the indemnity which it is proposed to pay to M. Zaïmis,

[a] Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 402) and Sir R. Rodd (No. 280), *mutatis mutandis*.

without awaiting parliamentary sanction, should do so forthwith, in order that the accumulation of interest on his debt to the banks might be diminished.

I further stated that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, before any payment of the kind was made, the four Powers should enquire of the Cretan Government whether they were in a position to find the necessary sum themselves, and should inform them of the course which it was proposed to adopt in the event of their alleging inability to do so.

The French and Italian Governments have already signified to His Majesty's Government their concurrence in the proposed course, but, owing to the absence of any reply from the Russian Government, no effect had yet been given to the suggestion at the moment of the outbreak of the present war.

In view of the changed situation produced by the results of the hostilities, it appears to me that the suggestion which I made in July in quite different conditions should now be reconsidered, and that the Greek Government, having declared the union of Crete with Greece, should be held responsible for the payment of the indemnity to M. Zaïmis so soon as the annexation of the island has been definitely accomplished and confirmed by treaty.

It should be observed that the only reason for the assumption by the Protecting Powers of responsibility for the payment of this sum was the inability of the Cretan Government to produce it themselves, a reason which no longer exists, for the Greek Government will be in a position to find it, and may, if they so desire, recoup themselves from the revenues of Crete.

In these circumstances the interest on M. Zaïmis's debt to the banks might well be allowed to accumulate till peace is concluded.

I have to request you to bring this proposal to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, and to suggest to them that a communication to this effect should be addressed by the four Powers to the Greek Government when the proper time arrives.

I transmit to you herewith, in this connection, copy of a despatch from Sir F. Elliot, pointing out that the interest in question, if allowed to accumulate beyond the end of the present year, would reach such a sum as to render the amount at which the indemnity has been fixed insufficient to cover M. Zaïmis's out-of-pocket expenses.[b]

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50220] No. 105.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie.

(No. 588.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 5, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 578 of the 29th ultimo, I have to inform you that I am desirous that you should enter into informal and tentative discussion with the French Government in regard to the interests of the foreign holders of Turkish bonds; but my views as to any definite decisions on the subject are, as explained in my despatch No. 552 of the 16th ultimo, that it would be expedient that the representatives of the bondholders at Constantinople should first submit their views as to how their interests could best be safeguarded, in face of the changed conditions in European Turkey.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52328] No. 106.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 593.)
(Extract.) *Foreign Office, December* 5, 1912.

I RECURRED, in conversation with M. Cambon to-day, to what he had said about the uneasiness caused by Herr von Kiderlen's reference to Germany's good relations with England. I said that I had observed that the French press still continued to talk of British intrigues in Syria, and I thought that this report,

[b] Part II, No. 760.

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combined with what Herr von Kiderlen had said, might put it into people's heads that we had been making some arrangement with Germany. I should therefore like to say that during the whole of this Balkan crisis nothing in Asia Minor, not even the Bagdad Railway, had been discussed between Germany and ourselves. We were carrying on no intrigues in Syria, and we had no intentions or aspirations respecting it.

M. Cambon readily accepted what I had said.

[52549] No. 107.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 597.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 5, 1912.

I TOLD M. Cambon to-day that I had not yet received any definite answer from Vienna about a consultation of Ambassadors. It might be that the Austrian Government would not accept the idea; or it might be that they would accept it, but propose London as the place of meeting. I had never suggested London, and, in fact, I had suggested Paris; but if the Austrian Government stipulated for London and there was a general feeling in favour of it, I could not refuse.

M. Cambon said that he would tell M. Poincaré.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52034] No. 108.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 192.)

Sir, *Athens, November* 29, 1912.

I HAD the honour to receive on the 16th instant, your telegram No. 282 of that date desiring me, when all my colleagues were similarly instructed, to join them in acquainting the Greek Government that, in any settlement which may be made, the interests of the Turkish bondholders will have to be safeguarded. The telegram from Berlin (whence this proposed action originated) to my German colleague, only contemplated the co-operation with him of the Austrian, British, French and Italian Ministers; therefore, although I knew that Russia was not represented on the Council of the Ottoman Debt, I enquired of you whether the omission of Russia was in accordance with your intentions, since your instructions to me were to join all my colleagues in taking the proposed step.

Your telegram No 285 of the 19th instant, told me to ascertain from my Russian colleague whether Russian financial interests were concerned, and added that it was desirable that no steps should be taken without the co-operation of all the Powers. I thought it best in the first instance to speak to my German colleague, in order that, if there should have been any omission on the part of the German Government, it should be set right by themselves. He telegraphed to Berlin, but it was not until the 27th that he was told he could act on his previous instructions, while I on the same day received your telegram informing me that I need not wait for my Russian colleague. The latter had in the meantime learnt, from some other source, of the communication it was proposed to make to the Greek Government and had informed his Government by telegraph, but received no reply from them.

After comparing notes as to the terms of our instructions, and finding them practically identical (excepting that the French Minister was to add a phrase reserving the moral and material rights of the French Government in the case of certain protected persons in Turkey) my four colleagues and I called upon M. Coromilas, successively, yesterday morning, I told him I was instructed to draw his attention to the fact that in any settlement that might be made the interests of the Turkish bondholders would have to be safeguarded. His Excellency replied, that the question was a complicated one, but that the Greek Government would clearly not desire to arouse the opposition of European financiers, of whose assistance they would certainly have need.

As M. Coromilas had some days ago remarked to me that he thought the financial part of the final settlement would be the easiest, I made an observation on his apparent

change of tone, saying that I supposed it was due to his scheme for the internationalisation of Constantinople having receded into the background within the last few days. His answer to that observation will be recorded in my next following despatch.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[52035] No. 109.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 193. Confidential.)

Sir, *Athens, November* 29, 1912.

UPON my saying to M. Coromilas yesterday that I feared his scheme for the internationalisation of Constantinople had fallen into the background within the last few days, he broke out into a tirade against the Bulgarian method of waging war, and of compromising the results of the successes they had gained by not pressing them home. The Greek Government had offered to transport 60,000 Bulgarians, 30,000 Servians, and 30,000 Greeks from Salonica to Dedeagatch by sea a fortnight ago, and even to place the Greeks under the orders of the Bulgarian general, but the Bulgarians had refused and insisted on staying where they were not wanted, so that a precious fortnight had been wasted, during which the Turks were bringing up their best troops from Trebizond and Damascus, and were receiving French guns by way of Roumania. He believed that the negotiations for an armistice would come to nothing, and that the allies would have to fight their way into Constantinople at a much greater cost than need have been incurred if they had pushed on at once.

I asked his Excellency what was the object of the visit of M. Honeos, late deputy for Salonica in the Turkish Parliament, who came here a week ago, as it was said, on a mission from the Turkish Government. He replied that M. Honeos came, not to try to detach Greece from her allies, but to express the desire of the Turkish Government to become eventually a member of the Balkan confederation. He was merely told that this question could not be considered by any one of the allies separately.

M. Coromilas's hope is, of course, that the connection of Turkey with the Balkans is about to be severed for ever.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[52038] No. 110.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 377.)

Sir, *Rome, December* 2, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that, with the general *détente* which the last few days have witnessed in the Balkan situation, there has been a corresponding diminution of the tendency in the press of this country to find fault with the attitude of the Italian Foreign Office, which was, as I pointed out in my despatch No. 362 of the 17th November, very generally criticised for its apparent subservience to Austrian aims and policy, and even the most extreme of the anti-Austrians seem to have recognised that it is not their interest to be more Servian than the Serbs.

The condition of certain politicians to initiate a discussion on foreign affairs in the Chamber was firmly resisted by the Prime Minister the day before yesterday. In reply to a deputy, who asked that a day should be fixed for the purpose, Signor Giolitti observed that there were moments when it was opportune to suspend all such discussions. It was not possible to foresee the eventual consequences of present developments in the Balkans, and it would be necessary to wait till events were more clearly defined before they could be justly appreciated. It would no doubt make the task of the Government easy to base their line of conduct on Parliamentary support, but Parliament could only express an opinion which would not be derived from a requisite knowledge of the situation. The Government had no intention of taking on

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themselves any unnecessary responsibilities, but if at the present moment the Government did not accept the responsibility of reserve, they would be failing in their duty.

The tone of the Chamber revealed that the views expressed by the Prime Minister encountered general approval.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[52020] No. 111.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 503.)
Sir, *Paris, December 5, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, a despatch which I have received from Colonel the Honourable Henry Yarde-Buller, military attaché to this embassy, reporting a conversation with Colonel Vignal, on the subject of the European situation.

I have, &c.
L. D. CARNEGIE.

Enclosure in No. 111.

Colonel Yarde-Buller to Mr. Carnegie.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, December 4, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you, that having resumed my duties after a fortnight's leave of absence in England, I visited the French War Office yesterday evening and had an interview with Colonel Vignal, chief of the 2nd Bureau, as a result of which I gathered that the French military authorities continue to view the present European situation with calmness and the future even with optimism.

On referring to the military preparations which are being actively pushed on in Austria, and the encouragement she may derive from the German Chancellor's pronouncement on that country's policy in his speech in the Reichstag, Colonel Vignal admitted that Austria is steadily mobilising, but he considers that Germany is not ready for war at the present time and will therefore do all in her power to prevent any action on the part of her ally which might precipitate events. Meanwhile Russia is maintaining a portion of her troops at an increased strength as a precautionary measure, but he assured me that this could in no way be regarded as a semi-mobilisation.

Colonel Vignal went on to draw a picture of the great possibilities for the further strengthening of the Triple *Entente* in the near future by means of an understanding with the Balkan League, to which end he considers France and England should work. He laid great stress on the importance of staving off a European conflagration for the next two or three years, which would give the Balkan States time to recuperate and establish their position, and, in pursuance of this idea, deplored the present friction between Bulgaria and Greece as a canker which, were it to spread, might ultimately sap the strength of this new influence on European politics.

Though I am of Colonel Vignal's opinion that Germany will do her utmost to avoid a European conflict, at any rate for the present, I can hardly follow him into such a roseate future; Germany and Austria must be fully aware of the menace which such a combination would constitute against the Triple Alliance, and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's allusion to the necessity of a resuscitated Turkey no doubt points to this. It might therefore be in Germany's interest to keep the pot simmering in Austria for the next few months whilst she herself plays the gratifying rôle, before the eyes of Europe, as a promoter of peace, so that, in event of any tendency on the part of the Dual Alliance (not to mention ourselves) to obtain such a powerful position as this combination would ensure, she could easily precipitate a war in the spring when she will be more fully prepared than at present.

I have, &c.
H. YARDE-BULLER,
Military Attaché.

[52116] No. 112.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 125. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, December 5, 1912.*

AUSTRIAN and Italian Ministers warned Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day that Greece must not annex Vallona or island of Saseno.

Minister replied that Saseno properly belonged to Greece as one of the Ionian Islands.

Definition of dependencies of the Ionian Islands does not appear in any treaty later than that of 21st March, 1800, between Russia and Turkey, of which I have no copy.

[52172] No. 113.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 172.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, December 6, 1912.*

I HAVE informed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the substance of your telegram No. 416 of 4th December. As regards first part, his Excellency said that there was no reason whatever to suppose that the Chancellor's words would affect in any way the moderate attitude which Austria had adopted, and which Germany had never ceased to advocate. Austria had said that she would not interfere with Servia's military operations, and had not done so, though Servians had taken provocative step in occupying Durazzo. She had shown herself disposed to make great concessions, and to consent to what Servia really required, namely, commercial access to the Adriatic by means of railway and free port. General consensus of opinion was that these were fair terms. If at the close of the war Servia refused any such solution and still held out for territory in a country to which she had no claim and refused to evacuate places occupied during hostilities, position would be grave, and Austria might be forced to take convenient measures. In that case, any Powers who supported Servia by arms would be provoking power, and Germany, though she had made every effort to maintain peace, would feel bound to support her ally. His Excellency added that he thought and hoped that things would not come to that pass, but that, if they did, that was the position. This gave me an opportunity of reading to his Excellency two last paragraphs of your telegram, on which he made no comment.

[52173] No. 114.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 173.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, December 6, 1912.*

AMBASSADORS' meeting.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has just informed me that Imperial Government accept with pleasure your proposal that Ambassadors of the Six Great Powers in one of the European capitals should be authorised to enter into unbinding conversations on several of the most important questions connected with the Balkan problem. They regard proposed procedure as an excellent means for simplifying and accelerating matters, and they would be glad if London could be chosen as the place of meeting in view of the fact that the proposal emanated from there. He added that if you agreed to this the Imperial Government will at once furnish German Ambassador with the necessary instructions. As regards conversations of the Ambassadors, Imperial Government presume that even an appearance of formal conference will be avoided.

His Excellency added that Roumania's important position and interests in Balkans placed her in the same position as the Great Powers, and that, as she was the only Power in the Balkans who would have no voice in peace negotiations, Imperial Government recommended that Roumanian Minister should be invited to take part in conversations.

[52163] No. 115.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 217.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, December 6, 1912.*

PEACE negotiations.

My telegram No. 155 of 16th November.

Bulgarian Government have decided to send M. Danef as one of their delegates. He will travel viâ Bucharest, and discuss political situation with the King of Roumania and Roumanian Government.

Suggestion has been made that the Prime Ministers of Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece should also proceed to London as senior delegates of their respective countries. Scheme is at present in embryo stage.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[52171] No. 116.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 218. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 6, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 178 of 23rd November.

My Italian colleague informed Prime Minister yesterday that the Austrian Government had not given his Government any intimation as yet of their intentions respecting the future of Albania; they had made no suggestions as to the boundaries of the new State or as to the form of Government that they would wish to see inaugurated. Prime Minister takes this as an indication that no definite programme has been arranged in Vienna up to date.

Italian Minister further told Prime Minister that if Servia behaved prudently and managed her affairs well she would succeed in obtaining a port from Austria. Italian Minister did not mention any particular port.

Prime Minister considers that the Italian attitude displayed towards Austrian policy in the Balkans is one of watchful jealousy.

[52174] No. 117.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 176.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, December 6, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 549 of 5th December.

I developed the arguments there advanced against making exclusion of certain discussions a condition of Ambassadors' conference. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that these arguments commended themselves to him and he would use them in communications he was making with object of reconciling diverse standpoints. He said that the Austrian Government, which had recently been very conciliatory, had again shown signs of irritation owing to Servian attitude, but he still hoped that conciliatory disposition would prevail.

[52167] No. 118.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 473.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 6, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1328 of 5th December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, now that Austria had accepted your proposal, he considered that it was definitely settled that Ambassadors would meet in London.

He personally preferred London, and had also heard from Russian Ambassador that Austrian President of Council was not anxious for meeting to take place in Paris.

He told me that the Austrian Ambassador, in speaking of Albania, had said that eventual settlement of that question must be subject to conditions incorporated in Austro-Italian treaty. His Excellency had replied that that treaty was a secret one, and only concerned the two contracting Powers. It had never been communicated to the other Powers, and could therefore have no binding force for them.

[52168] No. 119.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 474.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 6, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs is rather preoccupied by differences which have arisen between Greece and Bulgaria, and is constantly being appealed to by both to support their respective claims. He told me that Greek Government had proposed to refer their case to the arbitration of the Triple *Entente*, but he doubted whether Bulgaria would consent to such a course. If we were asked to arbitrate by both parties it would be difficult to refuse, but in that case we should have to consider on what lines we should proceed, as we could not be guided by sentiment alone.

[52170] No. 120.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 476.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 6, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 469 of 4th December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs referred in conversation to-day to German Chancellor's speech, remarking that it was truly German. He intended telling the German Ambassador that he was sorry that the German Chancellor should have had to express himself in a way that must have been distasteful to him, as he knew that the speech had been written by Kiderlen and read out by Chancellor.

President of Council, who is to make a statement in the Duma very shortly, would, his Excellency said, give Germany a moral lesson by the moderation of language which he would use.

[52636] No. 121.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 596.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 6, 1912.*

M. CAMBON asked me to-day whether I thought that, when the peace negotiations were already on foot, the conversations of the Ambassadors should be turned into a formal conference?

I replied that I was strongly of opinion that informal and non-committal conversations should take place between the Ambassadors first. If they went well, and after they were over, a formal conference might be arranged elsewhere.

I gathered that M. Cambon shared my opinion as to informal conversations being a necessary step.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52550] No. 122.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 95.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 6, 1912.*

IN sketching to Count Mensdorff to-day the sort of conversations which I had in mind for the proposed meeting of Ambassadors, I suggested that the representatives of the six Powers might:—

1. Agree in principle that the belligerents are entitled to settle their own terms of peace, and make what territorial arrangements they please, with a proviso that there are certain points on which the neutral signatory Powers of the Treaty of Berlin must make reserves.

2. Enumerate these points.

3. Make to their respective Governments on each of these points proposals which should receive the assent and support of all six Powers.

I added that it seemed to me not impossibly Utopian that this might be done in time to make Europe and ourselves a Christmas present of peace. Details relating to the Turkish debt and other things of that sort could be settled by experts at leisure. If the six representatives could come to a general agreement on these three heads, peace between the Great Powers would be secured.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52551] No. 123.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 96.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 6, 1912.*

THE Austrian Ambassador informed me to-day that Count Berchtold thought that a consultation between the Ambassadors at one place would be a good method of simplifying the proceedings. As soon as the place was settled, instructions would be sent to the Austrian Ambassador there to take part in non-committal conversations. To avoid misconception, however, Count Berchtold drew attention to the fact that there was an accord between Austria and Italy, with the object of obtaining the autonomy of Albania. Starting from this point of view, both countries had made declarations in Belgrade, Athens, and Cettinjé, concerning the Albanian coast. In conformity with this, the Austrian Ambassador would be instructed to participate, so far as access for Servia to the Adriatic was concerned, only in an exchange of views to secure the commercial *débouché* of Servia on the Adriatic. He could under no circumstances join in a discussion which would have the object of a territorial extension of Servia to the Adriatic, or the acquisition of a port.

I said that of course I knew that this was the Austrian view; but was it necessary to make it a condition before beginning non-committal conversations? Surely the object aimed at could be secured equally by accepting a consultation without reserves, and instructing the Austrian Ambassador as to the points on which he must not give way. I thought it possible that, if some Powers were prepared to accept unreservedly, and other Powers made conditions—especially if they made them publicly—the conversations might never begin at all. Whatever settlement was come to should appear as the result of compromise and mutual concession arranged in the course of conversation; and it might very well be that a settlement could be arrived at in the course of discussion that could not be secured if a stipulation was made in the first place that the discussion was to be limited. As far as the British Government were concerned, and I was speaking on their behalf, I had no direct interest in raising the question of a Servian port, and my observations were made from the point of view of promoting the best methods of finding an arrangement between those who were directly interested.

The Ambassador observed that the communication which he had just made to me was being made in St. Petersburgh, as well as in other places.

I said that, in view of this, I would wait to hear the answers from those places. I added that, both in St. Petersburgh and Belgrade, I had urged that there was more than one method of getting for Servia the economic freedom which she required. I

should not be justified in saying that the Russian Government would accept a method such as that with regard to which Austria had indicated that she could agree; but, on the other hand, the Russian Government had never said that such a method was an impossible solution, or that they would not discuss it.

The Ambassador then told me that, with regard to the choice of place, Count Berchtold would agree to London, if that was generally acceptable. Count Berchtold also raised the question of whether a Roumanian representative should not take part in the conversations. Roumania was directly interested, and had maintained a correct and peaceful attitude. Count Berchtold, however, did not make either the choice of London or the presence of a Roumanian representative a *conditio sine qua non*.

I said that the point of Roumanian representation had not occurred to me. As regards the place, I had suggested Paris, if that would be generally acceptable; but, if London was more generally acceptable, I should of course raise no objection, and would do all I could to facilitate the discussion.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52637] No. 124.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. E. Howard.

(No. 35.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 6, 1912.*

THE Swiss Minister came to inform me to-day that, on the 4th of the present month, the Russian Minister in Berne had asked to see the President of the Republic, and had told him that he considered that the situation created by the German Chancellor's speech was very dangerous. It had hitherto been supposed that Germany would not assist Austria if the latter was at war with Russia only amongst the Great Powers. But from the speech it appeared, and the French Ambassador in Berlin had been told the same thing, that if Russia and Austria were at war Germany would assist Austria, even if France remained neutral. The Swiss Minister thought that what the Russian Minister had said was intended to be repeated to Vienna, and he wished to know whether I was apprehensive that a general war might take place or was imminent.

I said that I had felt throughout this crisis that, if Russia and Austria went to war, there was not one of us, Germany, France, or England, that might not be drawn into it. But the understanding was that Austria did not intend to interfere with Servian military operations, and that the terms of peace were to be discussed by all the Powers in common. It was therefore only if, when this discussion took place, there were found to be irreconcilable differences, that war would arise. This made it a rather remote contingency, and I was not anxious at the present moment. Of course, if Servia did something very provocative to Austria that led to a conflict, trouble might begin at any time; but I did not think that Servia intended to do this. Also, if Austria adopted a menacing attitude, this would be resented in Russia, and there might be war; but Austria had hitherto been very patient. Therefore, though there was the risk of something untoward happening suddenly and upsetting everything, I did not expect it.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[38211] No. 125.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 128.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 6, 1912.*

THE Spanish chargé d'affaires asked me to-day about a conference as to the Balkan settlement.

I said that what was now suggested was informal and non-committal conversation between the Ambassadors of the neutral signatories of the Treaty of Berlin in some European capital; but this had not yet been definitely arranged. If there was to be a formal conference it would take place afterwards.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[50422] No. 126.

Foreign Office to Council of Foreign Bondholders.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 6, 1912.

SIR E. GREY has been in communication with His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica respecting the information contained in your letter of the 20th ultimo.

Mr. Lamb reports that, at the personal request of the director of the Ottoman Public Debt, the Russian consul-general, in his capacity of representative of Greek interests, gave to the director a certificate to the effect that his office was under an international administration in order to obviate the possibility of interference on the entry of Greek troops. He also intervened to prevent the director's private residence being requisitioned.

I am to inform you that Sir E. Grey has instructed His Majesty's consular officers in towns occupied by the belligerents to inform the military authorities that the revenues assigned to the service of the Ottoman Public Debt are under the protection of the Powers; and a communication has been made by the Powers concerned to the Greek, Bulgarian, Servian, and Montenegrin Governments to the effect that in any settlement which may be made the interests of the Turkish bondholders will have to be safeguarded.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[52250] No. 127.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 97.)

Sir, *Belgrade, December* 1, 1912.

I SAW the Prime Minister yesterday and read out to him translation of your telegram No. 126 of the 29th ultimo.

After stating that he took note of the communication, and requesting me to express his thanks to you, M. Pashitch went on to say that, in his opinion, if Servia was to be able to enjoy complete commercial independence and to have any prospect of development, a Servian port with access to it through Servian territory was a *sine qua non*. Various schemes had been mentioned for giving Servia a commercial outlet on the Adriatic, but they were all open to the objection that they would afford Austria the opportunity of impeding Servian commerce, either by inciting the Albanians to cause delays and transport difficulties on the railway, or possibly even by encouraging the tribes to make raids upon the railway.

He said the Servian Government were quite prepared to enter into an engagement not to erect anything in the nature of fortifications or to make a naval base upon the Adriatic coast; in fact, it was absurd to suppose that, with all this new territory upon her hands, which it would take years of hard work to put in order, Servia would waste her time upon such schemes; why, then, unless there were some ulterior motive, should Austria raise objection to Servia possessing a purely commercial port. The only construction to be placed on this attitude was that Austria grudged Servia commercial liberty, and this was borne out by the fact that every proposal or advance made by Austria to Servia implied some measure of dependency. He added that he would heartily welcome the prospect of living upon terms of close friendship with Austria but not at the price of Servia's freedom.

I told M. Pashitch I was sure all his arguments would receive sympathetic consideration from His Majesty's Government when the proper time came to discuss them, but that for the moment it was essential for the peace of Europe that Servia should not provoke Austria by blatantly and defiantly proclaiming that she meant to permanently establish herself in Albania and on the Adriatic coast regardless of Austrian opposition.

M. Pashitch acknowledged that in the present circumstances it would be the best policy for Servia to leave this question in the hands of Europe. If the Powers decided against Servia it would be an injustice, but she would have no option but to submit. He regretted that his name had been attached to the statement in the "Times" of the 25th November. It had been done without his authority by Mr. Stead, to whom he gave an interview. He would now follow your advice and do all in his power to avoid causing irritation to Austria, but he could not publish a retraction of anything which

appeared in his statement, as it would cause dangerous resentment and excitement here.

I suggested that it would be desirable for him to use his influence to induce the Belgrade press to moderate its tone, concerning which the Austrian Minister had spoken to me with great bitterness a few days before. M. Pashitch assured me that he was powerless to do anything to check the press, but I would see by reading the "Samouprava," the Government organ, of the previous day that everything possible was already being done by the Government to counsel restraint. I have the honour to enclose translation of the article to which M. Pashitch referred.

But to revert to the question of the port. It is impossible not to see that there is some justice in M. Pashitch's contentions, and, looked upon from an entirely matter of fact point of view, it is not altogether explicable why the Austrian opposition to Servia possessing a purely commercial port should be so strong. Where these contentions fail, however, is that they, in the first place, leave out of account the extent to which Austria has already given way to Servia, and has renounced former ambitions in the course of only a few weeks, and, secondly, that Austria is being hard pressed by Slavdom and feels it necessary to combat its advance at every point.

Although by common agreement this controversy is being left in abeyance for the moment, and there is hence somewhat of a lull, it is to be feared that its ultimate discussion by the Powers may yet be beset with difficulties. Owing to her previous complaceney, which has come to be construed by the Servian military party, the public and the press in Servia into a symptom of weakness, it has now become a point of honour and prestige with Austria to give way no further, at least so I gather from the Austrian official sources open to me in Belgrade. It is true that Russia does not apparently back up Servia to the full extent of her demands, and is working here for moderation, probably holding out hopes that in a short time the Austrian Empire will break up of itself, but this is not an argument which can well be openly used, and, though it may serve with the Government, public opinion in Servia since the war has become impetuous and intolerant, and, if forced by circumstances to submit to a disappointment, may turn against Russia. Russia may therefore yet have to choose between supporting Servia's demand to possess a port and territory on the Adriatic coast, or entirely losing her prestige in the Balkans. The question would then amount to this—"shall Austrian or Russian prestige be sacrificed?"

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

P.S.—I enclose a further article which has appeared in the "Samouprava" since writing the above.

R. P.

Enclosure 1 in No. 127.

Extract from the "Samouprava" of November 28, 1912.

(Translation.)

IN the very serious circumstances of to-day it is much to be regretted that some of our newspapers, by their insolent and provoking attitude, damage the general interests by introducing in the discussion elements which can only obstruct and otherwise hinder a sensible solution.

Under the present circumstances the Balkan States have no reason to complicate questions relating to their present position in the Balkans, and cannot be pleased by the language of newspapers which has that tendency. On the contrary, it is to their interest that the rights and aspirations of the Balkan nations and States should be represented and defended by just and serious motives which certainly do not include threats and provocations.

The Balkan States in general and Servia in particular are in such a situation as to wish to impose not so much by their force as by their right. Such a wish is always healthy both for the great and small. And the Servian Government is naturally also animated by such a desire.

The insolent and provoking language of some of the newspapers seriously damages this wish of the Government, it creates bad blood on the other side and renders the work for a sensible and friendly understanding more difficult. This should not occur at a time when every Servian arm is required to serve the general interests of Servia judiciously and conscientiously.

Enclosure 2 in No. 127.

Extract from the "Samouprava of November 30, 1912.

(Translation.)

WE recently called attention to the desirability of our newspapers writing calmly and objectively, and to the necessity of avoiding an insolent and provoking tone, which can only damage the sympathy and esteem in which Servia is held by civilised nations, besides presenting to the foreigner in an inadequate light the undoubted justice of our cause. To-day we repeat these admonitions and add that some of our newspapers, when writing about foreign personages, make use of expressions which not only give rise to an unfriendly disposition towards Servian people, at a time when the sympathy of the European Powers is of great importance to us, but also create an unfavourable impression with regard to our national aspirations, besides lowering the prestige of our press and unfavourably representing the character and ideals of the Servian nation in the eyes of Europe.

Articles of this kind beyond the possible momentary satisfaction they may afford the writer himself, can obviously benefit neither Servia nor the Servian people. And when, notwithstanding the most serious admonitions, many of our newspapers, with a regrettable inability to appreciate the gravity of the present crisis, continue to write in the same deplorable style, it is not surprising that their disregard of our highest national interests should work in an entirely opposite direction, and only succeed in damaging the cause, the furthering of which should be their unique aim and object. Such articles force upon us the unwelcome conclusion that the national press is neither worthy of our heroic people nor fitted to fill the exalted place created for it by our recent glorious achievements on the field of battle. This indictment were unfavourable under normal conditions, but it is still more so coming during the difficult crisis through which we are at present passing. The press of great and powerful nations upholds the power and greatness of the nation it represents by the moderation and dignity of its tone, in the same way that an individual gives proof of the worth of his education by the observance of an impartial and judicious attitude. And if a mental attitude of this kind is advantageous to the great and powerful it is not only advantageous but even necessary to the small and weak.

We are only fulfilling a public duty in calling the attention of our colleagues of the press to this aspect of the question. Feelings and passions should not run riot at a time when we are confronted by a serious and difficult situation, and when great interests are at stake. Therefore we trust, and sincerely hope, that we may never again have occasion to return to this subject.

[52224] No. 128.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 1020.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 2, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at the Dardanelles on the subject of the pilotage service there.

I will instruct Mr. Palmer's successor to keep a careful watch on the pilotage arrangements, and to report at once the recurrence of abuses such as those complained of in this despatch.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 128.

Vice-Consul Palmer to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 70. Confidential.)

Sir, *Dardanelles, November 27, 1912.*

BEFORE quitting my post on leave of absence, I have the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice a memorandum dealing with the general situation resulting from the laying of contact mines in the Dardanelles.

In the spring and summer several vessels stranded at the critical point below Kilid Bahr, and in every case captains of English ships complained to me of the faulty

pilotage, declaring that as the critical spot was reached pilot-boats made a sharp turn to starboard, or gave a signal to that effect, which resulted in the stranding of the vessel obeying the order.

I have referred to this in several previous reports, and illustrated the position with diagrams. At Constantinople the authorities ameliorated the regulations, but there was unfortunately no real change affected here.

Another irregularity was the obvious favouritism shown to the German Salvage Company. I give a few instances:—

On one occasion when an English vessel stranded, the only English salvage ship then stationed here was temporarily away at Smyrna. The port authorities demanded from me in writing that the vessel be refloated at once, and even informed the captain that they would bring a ship along to do so. This of course meant the German, the only salvage vessel then in the port. Lloyd's agent resisted this demand in the interests of underwriters and complained to me, but when the English salvage-boat returned next day, the matter was dropped.

The reason is obvious. A few days later a German vessel stranded, and although the German salvage vessel ostentatiously offered to refloat her for nothing, she desired to await the arrival of a sister ship and be towed off by her. The salvage money would then go to her own company. This vessel eventually arrived some days later, but failed to move her, whereupon the authorities rushed the ship into an open contract with the German salvage tug in the style already explained. The English vessel, which is more powerful, was here at the time.

Some four months ago a Russian stranded outside the entrance, and the motor-boat of the German company was allowed to pass down unpiloted in order to snap up the contract. All this time telegrams addressed to the Greek Company were delayed, allowing the opposition to get the start of them.

It was notorious here that this favouritism was not disinterested, but that the German (and allied French) company were paying somebody a commission on each stranding they obtained. But I could not quite see my way to interfere actively in a purely commercial matter, although underwriters were losing heavily and captains were doubtless having their certificates endorsed through no fault of their own.

The climax, however, came early in September. A rowing boat belonging to the English company had long been in the habit of waiting all day near the spot where vessels stranded below Kilid Bahr, a practice started or at least adopted by the Germans, in order to try and obtain the contract in case of an accident there.

On the day in question a launch containing the head of the Pilotage Commission arrested this boat, and the boatman, a Turk, was taken before the fortress authorities on a charge of espionage!

Upon the Greek Company's complaint, I realised that the moment for intervention had now come, and in a series of somewhat stormy interviews I drew attention to the existing abuses and demanded their immediate suppression.

The frivolous charge against the boatman was dropped, and a few days later I was privately informed that the employés of the Eastern Telegraph Company at Tenedos were undoubtedly in the pay of the rival companies. This last, no doubt, was a sort of "olive branch."

Since then the pilots have abandoned the sharp turn referred to, and during the two and a-half months which have elapsed, in spite of the equinoctial and early winter gales and the reduction of the number of pilot-boats to two, there has not been a single stranding in the channel, although there have been several others in this vicinity.

I think this proves that these strandings at Kilid Bahr are perfectly avoidable, and that there would be no excuse if they were to recommence in considerable numbers.

I have, &c.
C. E. S. PALMER.

[52225] No. 129.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 1021. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 2, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copies of two despatches from His Majesty's vice-consul at Cavalla relative to the situation there since the entry of the Bulgarians into the town.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 129.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 2/46. Confidential.)

Sir, *Cavalla, November 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on arrival in Cavalla on the 13th November I found the town in possession of Bulgarians, composed of regular troops and comitajis, the latter being the more numerous. The maintenance of order in the town was confided to local Christians, armed with rifles.

Since my arrival most of the regular Bulgarian troops have been withdrawn. Tchernopeyef, a noted voivoda, has been appointed military governor of the town, and Tchakof, another voivoda, kaimakam of the town and district.

Despite promises made when the surrender of the town took place to the effect that the lives and honour of all would be respected, a considerable number of Moslems have been arrested and done to death by comitajis. Forty-seven have been so murdered in a small valley to the west of the town, and a number, said to exceed 100 (the accuracy of these latter figures cannot yet be vouched for), on a hill east of the town. Most were killed by bayonet thrusts, and some of the bodies were mutilated. Among those murdered were a former harbour-master, a leading lawyer, several persons implicated in the anti-Greek boycott last year, and others prominently connected with the Committee of Union and Progress.

It is impossible to condone such brutalities, but the sufferings of Christians in Macedonia under the Turks and the burning of villages (in one of which, Plevna, near Drama, it is calculated that about 150 Christian families perished) by Turks just before the entry of Bulgarian troops into Drama, and the massacring of their inhabitants, seem to the comitajis a sufficient excuse for their action in Cavalla. It is further alleged, and there seems strong reason to believe it, that a general massacre of Christians in Cavalla was plotted by the Moslems of the town, and was only frustrated by the unexpectedly early arrival of the Bulgarian irregulars, who had got wind of the design.

The arrest and murder of Moslems seems now to have ceased, but arrests of Jews are now taking place.

All the horses in the town have been requisitioned and taken to Drama, where the main body of Bulgarians in this district seems to be.

Fighting is reported to be going on near Xanthi between Bulgarians and a body of Turks said to number 5,000. The result is not yet known.

A Bulgarian post-office has been opened here, and a Greek and a Bulgarian director of the customs have been appointed. Some delay was caused at first in the export of tobacco, the officials pretending that Bulgarian dues should be paid. Instructions have now been received from Sophia that customs charges should continue to be as in the past.

The "Zrinyi," an Austrian battleship, arrived here on the 8th November, and the French cruiser "Jules Ferry" on the 14th November. Both left on the 15th November for Smyrna.

The state of affairs is not yet normal here. The Moslems are excited and alarmed on account of the murders of their co-religionists; the Jews are alarmed on account of the arrest of several of their community, and certain individuals have taken advantage of the situation to blackmail both Moslem and Jew under pretence of being armed with authority, or under threat of denouncing them for fictitious wrongs in the past. Demands for imaginary arrears of wages have also been received by several foreign houses from former workmen, who seem to have imbibed the notion that the present authorities of the town would support them in any such demand.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 129.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 3/47. Confidential.)

Sir, *Cavalla, November 26, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that persons who have arrived here from Serres state that, after the occupation of that town by Bulgarians, some local Moslems fired

on a number of Bulgarians who had taken up their quarters in the local Government offices situated in the Turkish quarter, and killed one officer and two soldiers. Thereupon a two-hours' battle in the Turkish quarter was ordered, and in that time some 90 Moslems (males) were killed. I have no means of verifying this story. It is further stated that in retiring the Turkish forces burned a number of Christian villages near Serres.

Apart from the burning of the village of Plova, near Drama, by Turks before the occupation of Drama by Bulgarians, no incident of note seems to have occurred in that district.

Since my immediately preceding despatch, some eighteen Moslems have been arrested and killed by Bulgarians.

Seven of the leading members of the Jewish community were arrested four days ago and sent under escort to Siri-Shaban. It is feared that they will be treated in the same way as the arrested Moslems, but there is a possibility that they will be held to ransom. Four other Jews have since been arrested.

Great alarm prevails among the Moslems and the Jews.

There is a great scarcity of flour here, and bread is sold for five and ten times its ordinary price. In the villages the need of flour is still greater.

Four of the town mosques have been converted into churches. They are said to have been formerly Christian churches. The local Greeks (Cavalla is a Greek town) are not too well pleased at the fact that only the Bulgarian flag has been hoisted over these churches, and that a Bulgarian priest was imported to perform the inauguration services, although there is already a Greek bishop here. It is reported that the Bulgarian bishop of Nevrocop will arrive here shortly.

The government of the town is still in the hands of comitajis.

I have just learnt that a ransom has been demanded for the arrested Jews. The amount to be paid is 10,000*l*. The local Jews have already collected this sum.

In my opinion the Government of Sophia is conniving at the doings of the local comitajis.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

[52226] No. 130.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 1022.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 2, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of memorandum received on the 23rd November from Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell, military attaché at this embassy, reporting on events on the 18th November to the 21st November, during his presence at the front.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 130.

Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell.

MY last report, dated Chilingir, 18th November, mentioned that Bulgarian bombardment of Chatalja lines commenced early on the 17th and lasted throughout the day, with attempts at infantry attack all along the front of the centre of the position. The 18th and 19th were repetitions of the 17th, but the bombardment was not so severe nor the advances so persistent. On those two days the Turks, who had by now located the Bulgarian batteries, probably fired more than the Bulgarians. The latter appear to have dug trenches during the night, as each day fresh lines were visible nearer to the Turkish position, but all attempts of Bulgarian infantry to advance across the open during the day were easily defeated by the fire, both of artillery and infantry. As nothing more has been heard of the batteries which the Bulgarians were reported to have abandoned in front of the Turkish right on the 17th, it is to be presumed that they succeeded in withdrawing them.

On the evening of the 19th, just before dusk, a Bulgarian force, estimated at two

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regiments, supported by four batteries, advanced towards Baghlik and Karakol Nokta (right of Turkish centre), but were repulsed with loss.

During 19th, some Bulgarian infantry, about two companies, had succeeded in establishing themselves in a trench on east side of the Katarchi River, about 1,000 yards south-west of Otluk Tabia (a knoll in front of Mahmudiyeh, where the Turks had made a small infantry redoubt).

Night of 19th–20th, two companies of 35th regiment and two companies of Kurdish volunteers surprised this trench, killing thirty-nine Bulgars. The rest of the Bulgars fled, but are said to have taken away two machine-guns which they had in the trench.

20th and 21st practically nothing except desultory bombardment of Bulgarian position by Turks, and some ammunition wasted by Turkish fleet, Bulgarians seem to have withdrawn.

It is reported that proposal for an armistice by the Turkish Government has been accepted by the Bulgarians, and that the cholera is raging in the Bulgarian army before Chatalja, and that latter are withdrawing to Cherkesskeui and Chorlu.

On the Turkish side the cholera has been pretty bad, but it is impossible to give figures, as the Turks have none themselves. 3,000 cases per day, with 1,500–2,000 deaths for the whole army are the figures given by an official at San Stefano. But in the last day or two there seems to have been a considerable diminution of the sickness. This is not thanks to any measures or precautions taken by the Turks. Their lines and camps are kept in a filthy and disgusting state, and no sanitary precautions whatever are taken, even the most elementary. No latrines are dug, dead horses are left to rot where they fall, no water is set aside for drinking purposes. I have myself seen men washing their clothes, and at the same time drinking in a stream a few yards below the carcase of a horse lying in the same stream.

At the same time the army seems to have improved considerably in the last week, both in appearance and in tone. Their purely defensive rôle, and the failure of the Bulgarians to push home any attack on the 17, 18, and 19th, seem to have given confidence to the troops, and to have raised the *moral* of the army. If the Bulgarians could have come on even a week ago, they would probably have gone through the Chatalja lines like castor-oil. Now, I doubt, if any attack they can make will succeed, and it looks as if they themselves were discouraged. Certainly what I saw of their advances were most half-hearted. In the last few days the position has been considerably strengthened, and fresh trenches and gun pits are being dug every day.

Most of the confiscated Servian field batteries are now horsed and up here. Men and horses supplied chiefly by the 30th and 31st field artillery regiments (Baiburt and Erzinjan).

Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha, commanding the army corps in first line of right sector, was severely wounded on the 17th or 18th, and his staff appears to have suffered also. He was in the habit of exposing himself unnecessarily. He has been replaced by Mahmud Pasha, general officer commanding XIth Reserve Army Corps. Three generals reported to have died of cholera—one of these is the senator, Topji Riza Pasha, who was in general command of all the artillery of the position. He is replaced by Ibrahim Pasha, inspector-general of heavy artillery.

Izzet Pasha, chief of the general staff, has now arrived here from the Yemen. His presence is important, but he has no particular function in the army, and appears to be here as a spectator and adviser.

Hadi Pasha conserves his functions as chief of the general staff of the army of operations.

During the three days I had good opportunity of observing the effect of Bulgarian artillery fire against two field batteries in gun-pits on left of Mahmudiyeh redoubt. These two batteries were about 50 yards behind crest. About 2,000 shell fell in and around them. Two men were killed (one in each battery), and five wounded. Other result nil, though the shields were struck by many bullets. Of the men killed, one was killed by a direct hit.

The large majority of the Bulgarian shell fell from 100 yards to 200 yards behind the batteries. Fuzed shell picked up were set at 5,100 metres.

The flashes of the Bulgarian guns were distinctly visible, though the batteries could hardly be located by ordinary field-glasses.

E. TYRRELL,
Military Attaché.

Hadamkein, November 21, 1912.

[52227] No. 131.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 1023.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 3, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 969 of the 17th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a schedule drawn up by the Régie Company, giving statistics of the revenue from tobacco obtained during the last five years in the districts of European Turkey, exclusive of Constantinople, which I have received from the Administrative Council of the Ottoman Public Debt.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 131.

Schedule prepared by Régie Company.

RENDEMENT net de l'Exploitation du Revenu du Tabac dans les Bache-Mudiriets de la Turquie d'Europe (non compris le Bache-Mudiriet de Constantinople) de 1907–12.

Exercices.	Andrinople.	Cavalla.	Janina.	Salonique.	Scodra.	Xanthie.	Recettes diverses.	Total.
	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.
28me (1911–12).. ..	55,413	14,844	7,438	89,018	— 1,030	+ 1,472	21,050	188,205
27me (1910–11).. ..	65,219	13,580	9,154	87,649	— 574	— 71	12,100	187,066
26me (1909–10).. ..	57,446	21,359	15,698	80,346	— 749	— 1,052	13,750	184,798
25me (1908–9)	51,584	25,769	19,252	74,472	— 952	+ 739	5,750	176,614
24me (1907–8)	46,060	21,076	16,680	67,162	— 1,124	+ 1,232	4,609	156,286
Total	276,722	96,637	66,222	398,647	— 4,429	+ 2,320	57,259	892,969

Moyenne de cinq Exercices .. .. .. £ T. 178,593.

[52447] No. 132.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 98.)

Sir, *Belgrade, December* 2, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copies of three despatches which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub. Nos. 8 and 9, discussing the qualifications of the Albanians for autonomy, will be found particularly interesting at the present moment, though Mr. Peckham's remarks apply rather to the Albanians in the vilayet of Kossovo than to those further west and south, who would be likely to principally come within the scope of the projected autonomous Albania.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure 1 in No. 132.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 7.)

Sir, *Uskub, November* 11, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith comment and criticism on the downfall of Ottoman power in Kossovo. I would premise that, while I shall in general speak of the element dominant here till the day of Kumanovo as "the Turks," I consider it improbable that there is much true Turkish blood in this province, the great bulk of the Moslem population here being doubtless of Slavonic or Albanian blood.

The Turks in this crisis have displayed, in my opinion, all the faults which lose, and none of the virtues which maintain, an empire. Humanity and toleration I hardly looked for, procrastination will continue in the death-throes of the Ottoman Empire, but

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I looked at least for some degree of *sang-froid* and improvisation. This charge is so grave that, at the risk of being tedious, I propose to relate some well-authenticated instances to support it.

A person connected with the Red Crescent here (himself a Jew, and therefore unlikely to be biassed by religious sentiment) informed me, while the battle of Kumanovo was in progress, that the Turkish stretcher-bearers picked up Moslem wounded only, passing over not merely the wounded of the enemy, but even Ottoman Christian soldiers. On their side, the Servians state that they were forced to arm their stretcher-bearers, because the wounded Albanians attacked them when they came to transport them to the field-hospitals. It has been suggested to me that the Turks were under the impression that the Servians carried off the enemy wounded to murder them, if this be so, it only proves how far removed the Turk is from the "humanity" he is so fond of talking about in crises.

On one of the Ottoman soldiers who took refuge in the French consulate a quantity of dum-dum bullets were found. My French colleague gave me a charger full, which I showed to the Moslem refugees in my house. They at once replied that these had been taken from the Servians, that the Servians habitually used them, while the Ottomans never did, and pointed out that they were of a smaller calibre than the Turkish Mauser. Questioned, the soldiers in sanctuary, Greek Ottomans, stated with a formal assoveration (*μὰ τὸν Θεόν*) that the cartridges had been issued to them by the Government at Monastir. On examining them I found that the bulk of them were marked "E.H.Σ. 1907." No official alphabet but that of Greece uses the sigma (from its shape and position I am certain that it is not an M). On these facts, and on the assumption that the soldiers were speaking the truth, I base the following hypothesis: The cartridges were deliberately issued by the Turks at Monastir, who presumably expected that the men to whom they were issued would be sent to the Greek frontier. If the cartridges were discovered there they would be *primâ facie* evidence that the Greeks were using dum-dums, the difference of bore acquitting the Turks. Unfortunately for the scheme, the men were sent north instead of south. If the cartridges were deliberately issued to Greek rayah soldiers, this would complete the Machiavellian cunning of the scheme, making them incriminate their own kin. I have been assured, and find it credible, that the chetniks used to use dum-dums, this would account for the Monastir authorities having cartridges which did not fit the Ottoman Mauser. It is but just, however, to insist that this is only a hypothesis.

At 4 o'clock on the morning of the 25th, just six hours after the Uskub notables had made their eloquent appeals to the consuls "in the name of humanity," a passenger train left for Salonica. There was a crowd of women, Jewish, Christian, and Moslem, who wished to leave. A Turkish officer, revolver in hand, prevented the Jewish and Christian women from boarding the train, reserving it for Moslemahs. The French dragoman was an eye-witness of this. I believe, however, that subsequently some Moslem civilians intervened and succeeded in getting some non-Moslem women on to the train.

With the blood almost dry on the field of Kumanovo the Turks still procrastinated. When, on the night of the 24th, the notables had decided to telegraph to the Grand Vizier, we had almost to push them out of the Russian consulate to go to the telegraph office, otherwise they would have finished their cigarettes in comfort. Even at that crisis it was hard to make them realise that every moment was valuable. (It may also be noted that even then they took thought, not merely for the lives and honour of the Moslem population, but also for the grain on their farms.)

Yunus Bey, of Ipek, my first refugee, on the 26th expressed a wish to be enrolled at once as a British subject. I explained the impossibility of this, and added, "besides, such an act would be cowardice, your duty is to your country, loyally to support whatever administration may hereafter be established in Turkey in Europe."

Hereon the defterdar (chief finance officer of the vilayet), who had also taken refuge with me, asked what I considered his duty to be. I replied that so long as an iota of Kossovo was under Turkish administration his duty was to work for that administration. Hereon the following conversation ensued:—

"What should I do at present?"—"Go to the Konak."

"But there is nothing for me to do."—"Something may turn up."

"Then they can send for me; they know where I am."—"That would waste about an hour. Cannot you understand how precious an hour is?"

"But my wife and family here?"—"Of course, they stay here, and you yourself go or stay entirely at your own will."

He left the room to speak to his wife. Instead of simply telling her that his duty called him to the Konak, he asked her advice. It is needless to say what it was. He returned to my sitting-room: "My wife begs me to stay here. I shall do so."

As he settled down into one of my basket chairs he added: "After all, it is Friday" (the weekly day of rest at the Konak).

I find it hard to judge the defterdar severely; he is an old man, but Hassan Bey is a young man. At the beginning of the war he talked valiently of shooting Servians, and wished to buy my field-glasses to use in the war. Utterly crushed by the news of Kumanovo, he took refuge with me on the 25th. On that night, when I had decided to set sentinels, I asked for volunteers from among the beys. Though this was to protect a house full of Mahommedan women, not one of them offered himself. My cavasses had no difficulty in finding enough men from among the common folk. Subsequently I asked Hassan Bey why no one had volunteered. "We were waiting your order." It is not with such stuff that a dying Empire is held up.

There were, I believe, exceptions to this general state of cowardice and collapse, and I would mention with all honour the name of the vali, Ghalib Bey, himself an *émigré* from South Servia. Till his life was attempted by an Ottoman soldier in the very streets of Uskub he showed no lack of personal courage. I do not for an instant blame him for taking sanctuary after that event, and from the Russian consulate he continued to strive to administer his dwindling vilayet. My Russian colleague, who speaks English well, and who was in close contact with him during the crisis, expressed his opinion, in which I entirely concur, by saying, "Ghalib Bey is a gentleman."

I would also except from the general accusation, Said Hoja, ex-deputy for Uskub. He, with M. Karavevof, a Bulgar gentleman, organised a certain amount of police on the 26th and prevented the sack of the Konak and of the bazar. The latter was intact when the Servians entered Uskub, but was in part pillaged that night.

It is instructive to notice that the Turks, who in time of peace struggle to limit the activities of consuls to as small a sphere as possible, international law and treaties notwithstanding, turn naturally in times of crisis to these same consuls and expect from them things which are clearly outside their sphere of duty. Thus, at the beginning of the panic, it was to the consuls that the Moslems turned to guarantee them against the Christians. Before leaving Uskub the Turks deposited the key of the powder magazine with the French consul; on the morning of the 26th, although there was still an acting vali and a mayor in the town, it was from the consuls that the military doctors asked the orders to supply food for the wounded, and no one would leave Uskub to surrender the town unless the consuls came with them.

Gratitude is not a virtue of the Oriental. Out of a house full of refugees two only, up to date have thanked me for receiving them, and one of these was not a Moslem. The impression is, I suppose, that His Majesty's Government maintain a consulate here to act as a sanctuary for the inhabitants in time of stress. Certainly there is a deep-rooted belief that it is a consul's duty to protect the subject against the Government. Several Moslem deputations since the Servian occupation have assured me: "Our trust is first in God, then in you." (This may account for the extraordinary hesitation, not to say impoliteness, shown by the Servian authorities in the matter of recognising us officially.)

If it be true, as I have heard, that the original Turkish plan of campaign contemplated the offensive at one point only, along the Uskub–Vranya–Nish railway, then the battle of Kumanovo may rank as one of the decisive battles of the war, and my personal impressions of the reasons for the utter collapse of the Turks may be of some interest.

If the Turks have belied their reputation as fighting men, that is in part because that reputation has been too high, dating in part from the middle ages, when Turkey was a very different country and war a very different matter. Even since Plevna and Domoko both war and the Turk have changed.

I was most unfavourably impressed by what I saw of the Turkish mobilisation. I am convinced that in no European country would men in full marching order be seen straying about the streets in twos and threes, nor do I believe that the wives and families of reservists and the general public would be allowed into the station of what is practically a frontier town, during a big mobilisation. I believe that no unit went up to the front complete. Discipline I know to be bad, a sentry in the streets of Uskub having gratuitously insulted me a few days before the outbreak of the war with Servia.

But I did not dare to draw any inference from all this. I reflected that Turkish

military arrangements, like Turkish finance, could not be judged by European standards, the Turkish genius for "muddling through" might cover a multitude of sins, and a soldier who insulted a Giaour in the streets of Uskub might well become a pattern of discipline when fighting against the Giaours at Kumanovo.

Some of this muddle I suspect to have been due to over-confidence. "Why put ourselves out over trifles, we shall get to Belgrade and Sophia anyway" was probably the thought. The parallel of 1870 recurs to me, and I heard of one case of an officer who promised to telegraph to his friends as soon as he got to Belgrade, while others licked their lips at the thought of the *cafés-chantants* of Sophia.

Just as many Turks thought that the mere possession of a paper constitution was an amulet against foreign intervention and for good administration, so they seem to have thought that the possession of good war matériel ensured victory. In neither case was it necessary to learn to use the thing intelligently. There was, I believe, only one rifle-range close to Uskub. This was by a path over which I walked many times in the earlier part of the summer. Only once did I see the range in use. There were then two targets up, and men were firing from not more than 200 metres distance. There was, I believe, no artillery range. The Servians tell me that the Turkish guns at Kumanovo were admirably laid, but that the shell failed to explode because the gunners had forgotten to set the fuzes.

I take a particular interest (dating from my volunteer days) in machine guns, and on the 26th I asked the Servians how the Turkish Maxims had acquitted themselves. "They began well, but we think our shrapnel must have found them out, as they were all silenced soon." With all deference to military opinion, I suggest another possible reason. A Maxim is a complicated piece of mechanism, and I suspect that, in many cases, there was no one among the machine-gun squads capable of setting failures right on the battle-field.

There seems to have been a pitiable confusion in the ammunition supply. I hear of cases supposed to contain cartridges which, when opened on the battle-field, proved to be full of soap or other objects equally useless on a campaign, and an English war correspondent tells me that he himself saw many boxes of blank ammunition at Kumanovo. I conclude that either ball-cartridge boxes were not marked with distinctive marks (necessary in so illiterate an army as the Turkish) or that these marks had not been sufficiently impressed on the minds of the men who had to handle them.

I learn from the Servians that they have found several railway bridges intact, but with dynamite charges under them, these had not exploded owing to a fault in the caps. The failure to blow up the railway bridge over the Vardar here was a capital mistake on the part of the Turks.

The Turk shows the Oriental trait of unintelligent imitation. The Turkish service uniform is almost exactly the same shade as the British, a shade much too green to match a bare dry Macedonian hillside. (The Servian grey matches it perfectly.) And though the footgear of all peasants on this side of the Danube seems to be sandals, the Turk tends to thrust the feet of his infantrymen into unaccustomed ammunition boots, while the great mass of the Servian infantry, so far as I have seen, wear the thick socks and sandals that the men are accustomed to in civil life.

Whatever opinions may be as to the relative merits of the man and the machine, the man counts heavily, and in my opinion the Turks have failed in personnel as well as in matériel. The men of Kumanovo are not those of Plevna or even Domokô (and with regard to the latter I was once assured that in the Greco-Turkish war it was an open question which side ran first. I did not believe it at the time, but find it more credible now). I know from personal experience (in April, 1909), that the favorite statement that "the Turkish soldier has no nerves" is untrue. I have reason to believe that the taste of cheap cognac is not unknown in the Moslem villages of Anatolia, and I have heard stories of drunken redifs in the days when the army was entirely Moslem. And, whatever may have been the tradition earlier, 1908 set a fatal example of disobedience.

Among the conflicting accounts of what befell at Kumanovo one thing seems reasonably certain, that the first men to break and flee were a Kossovo redif regiment. In the light of this, certain of my reports on the Albanian revolt of this summer, particularly my despatch No. 57 of the 27th July, take a fuller meaning.

One of the vices of Islam is that it confuses State and Church, Ottoman patriotism exists only in newspaper leaders, and Ottoman subjects are sharply divided along religious lines. The Serb rayah looks to Belgrade, not to Constantinople, and pride of race and religion replace patriotism in the Turk. The Turks were virtually fighting in an enemy country, and when the Servians entered Uskub I noticed local

guides accompanying many units. Under the circumstances, it was a blunder to have admitted Christian soldiers into the army. I have reason to believe that they played a considerable part in corrupting the Albanian Field Force this summer, and I hear that at the outbreak of war with Montenegro several regiments on that frontier, which were largely Christian, went over almost bodily to the enemy. I do not know, however, that Christian soldiers were in any way directly responsible for the *débâcle* of Kumanovo.

An ex-sergeant-major (Bash Chaoush) of the Turco-Greek war, one of my refugees, asked me on the night of the 25th-26th about the Bulgarian army. I told him that it was said that the only country in the Balkans where an officer was never seen in a café before sunset was Bulgaria. "Ah!" he said, "ours are not like that, they pass all their time in cafés and brothels." Such condemnation leaves little more to be said.

I doubt whether a precedent existed in international law for officers in uniform taking refuge in consulates. It exists now. Two officers took refuge in the Austrian consulate. The consul explained to them: "You are free to enter if you like, but if the Servians demand you when they come in I may have to surrender you as prisoners of war, and if you are exchanged later you may be tried by court-martial and shot."

One of them, a lieutenant, decided at once to place himself under the orders of Fethi Pasha; the other, a major, stayed, though I believe that he too, later, left to try and restore discipline. One officer took refuge in the French consulate, and subsequently took thought for his wife and family. He suggested that a cavass should be sent for them, but learned that a cavass could not be spared. Finally, he put on the cavass's uniform, and went, trembling, to find them himself.

On the afternoon of the 25th an officer came to see me. He asked for the British flag and British passports to protect his family. I replied that this was impossible, but that my doors were open to refugees. He asked for a separate room for them. I replied that I could promise nothing except to separate the sexes. Finally, finding him inclined to gossip in my entrance hall, I cut him short: "You have my answer; your clear duty is to go and bring the women here at once, and then to try and restore discipline in the army." I forget his answer, but it expressed the most utter hopelessness of ever again introducing discipline among his men, and remembering as I do his war-stained uniform, his unshaven chin, and, above all, the look of defeat and disaster in his eyes, I find it hard to judge him.

One of my two refugee officers told me that he was ill at the beginning of the war. I asked the other why he had not used his revolver, if need be, to get his men to fight. "I did my best," he said, "I spent hours pulling men out of water-closets."

If Turkish discipline has been bad, Albanian has been worse, if the Turks imitated St. Mark's young man with the linencloth, the Albanians have taken Judas as their model. Isa Bolatin's objection to "cooping reservists up in barracks" (my despatch No. 78 of the 3rd October to Salonica), expressed Albanian feeling. The Lap redifs when ordered to assemble for mobilisation, refused to leave their villages whereon the Government (finding that the mountain would not come to Mahomed) sent out arms and ammunition to the villages. It is not surprising to hear that such men broke and fled at the first reverse. I heard that after the fall of Prishtina Kossovo Polye was covered with rifles thrown away by runaways.

During the Servian advance on Prishtina an Albanian bairakdar advanced under a white flag. A Servian officer of high rank advanced to meet him. When they met the bairakdar put one arm round the officer's neck, and, while kissing him, with his other hand plunged a dagger into his abdomen. Colonel Clisic, of the Servian army, was likewise treacherously murdered under the white flag at Kumanovo. It is but just to state that I have only Servian authority for these two stories, but they strike me as credible.

And I have, comparatively speaking, independent authority for the events of the fall of Parisovich. On the approach of the Servian cavalry that town hoisted the white flag and welcomed the Servians. The men had piled arms, off-saddled, and were grooming when a sudden rifle fire broke out from various houses, killing thirty-eight men. The remainder escaped, but returned later with reinforcements and took a revenge, which I cannot condemn under the circumstances, putting to death, according to one account, about a thousand of the inhabitants. I fear, however, that the innocent suffered for the guilty, as the treachery appears to have been the work of men from the neighbouring villages.

As usual, in such crises the cry of "We are betrayed" was raised. I have heard several versions. The Albanians complain that they were betrayed by the Turks, and

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the Turks that they were betrayed by the Albanians. (If, as one story goes, the first to flee from Kumanovo were the Gilan redifs who left to protect their own villages as soon as they heard that they were being burned by the Serbs, there is some foundation for this complaint.) I have also been assured that Turkey was betrayed by Germany, which had sold her rotten war matériel, and by the Union and Progress party, which, on leaving office, had, out of spite, tampered with the mechanism of the guns. And behind all there seems to be a strong tendency to cast the whole responsibility on the Constantinople Government, and I think it is questionable if, were the impossible to happen and the administration of the Sublime Porte were re-established here, it would be welcomed by the local Turks. To the Kossovo Moslem remedy and disease have alike become intolerable.

I cannot close this despatch, in general so unfavourable to Moslems, without mention of the fidelity of my two cavasses, Naïm and Zulfikyar, Albanians from the province of Yannina. I have throughout felt entire confidence in their loyalty and trustworthiness, and this has not been misplaced. Naïm's conduct is all the more creditable, as he was in bad health at the beginning, and on the night of the 25th went on the sick list, having, I believe, worked till he dropped. On the morning of the 26th, while changing into uniform before leaving to surrender the town, I gave Zulfikyar last directions in case I was shot in Uskub or on the Kumanovo road. Promptly came his objection: "If you are going into danger, why am I not coming with you?"

I have, &c.

W. D. PECKHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 132.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 8.)

Uskub, November 16, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency certain opinions of mine as to the future of Albania. These, naturally, suffer from the disadvantages of the almost mediæval seclusion in which I have lived since Kumanovo (I saw my first regular London newspaper three days ago) and from ignorance of the intentions of the Powers, but have the advantage that I am to a certain extent in touch with Albanian feeling. Another important limitation to be borne in mind is that I can only speak for the province of Kossovo.

Whether the word Albania figures on the new map of the Balkans or not, the Moslem Albanians will, I take it, live in future under what they will describe as a Christian Government, that is, a Government which will assign to the Moslem element at most only that position to which its importance entitles it. It is therefore to be expected that there will be an appreciable Moslem emigration, as has happened every time that the Crescent has given way to the Cross. (I believe that very often the *émigrés* are the "mauvais sujets" who hope for impunity under a Moslem Government for offences which an impartial Government would punish. A Boshnak *émigré* quarter in Uskub is notorious for lawlessness). But this time a new element enters into the question. It was one thing for Islamised Europeans to move from Bosnia to Kossovo, emigration from Europe to Asia is another. It is also significant that the local Moslems tend to blame the Turkish Government for this *débâcle*. I have heard wishes expressed to emigrate to Egypt or India, as I naturally would, but I know of no case of local Moslems wishing to return to the administration of the Sublime Porte in Anatolia. The very men who three months ago objected to spending a few years of military service out of Europe are now talking of settling permanently in the climate of Egypt, which would probably be more trying to them that to an Englishman.

Should the partition scheme of the allies be carried out, and the name of Albania blotted out from the map of Europe, even more effectually than it was under Turkish rule, nevertheless the Albanian question will continue for some time.

However good the intentions of the Central Government may be, the local officials will inevitably show an anti-Moslem bias, and I have already heard of cases of forcible unveiling of Moslem women. If the high-handed action of the Ottoman Government this summer in arresting the wives of several of the revolted beys fanned the flames of the revolt, much more will such acts provoke disturbance. And there are two circumstances which tend to embitter the Servians against the Albanians.

1. The money and arms poured into Albania this summer were intended (the Servians themselves admit it) as a bribe to induce the Albanians to join the allies

against Turkey. Instead of which the rifles were often used against Ottoman Serbs, and I know of no case in this province of a single Albanian joining the allies before their victory was certain.

2. The Albanians have been guilty, during the war, of several most disgusting pieces of treachery, generally under cover of the white flag. Human nature being what it is, it is hardly to be expected that men who have seen such things, and maybe have even lost relations by them, should at once settle down into impartial administrators.

It is also to be expected that the Servians will make every attempt to denationalise the Albanians, and will most certainly proscribe the famous Latin alphabet. Albanian nationalism is at present but a spark, but the wind of persecution may fan it into a flame.

On the other side there are two important considerations. An Albanian is probably infinitely easier to denationalise than a Greek or a Slav. He has no national culture of his own, and Skanderbeg is a very poor substitute for Pericles or Stevan Dushan. Besides many so-called "Albanians," even in mid-Kossovo, are really Albanised Slavs, and there are *soi-disant* Albanians whose mother-tongue is good Yugo-Slav.

And the present war has, to use a colloquial expression, put the fear of God into the Albanians. Till 1908 they were petted or left to themselves; during the four stormy years of the constitution they have made and unmade the committee (single-handed, in their own estimation) and, as this summer has proved, as a last resort they could talk over Moslem troops. But no appeal to "humanity," "liberty," or "the brotherhood of Islam," has been, or will be, of any avail against Servian artillery.

The basic theory of the Rumelian Moslem was that the Moslem was everything and the Slav, whether a subject of the Sultan or of King Peter, mere "cattle" to use their own expression. The guns of Kumanovo brought their universe crashing about their ears. (I myself noticed how utterly dazed my own Moslem servants were, and I have more than once seen tears, such as those of Boabdil, in Moslem eyes). With few arms, no hope of talking soldiery into revolt, and a Government remorselessly determined to penetrate everywhere, their only courage will be the courage of despair.

If Servian administration of Albania presents difficulties, autonomy is not without them. The mass of the population of mid-Kossovo, from Mitrovitza to Kachanik, is Albanian, and there are Albanian villages up to the Servian frontier. But sprinkled among the Albanian villages is an appreciable Serb population, whose woes formed one of the Servian occasions for war (as I suggested they might in my despatch No. 76 of the 24th September to Salonica), and it would be difficult to abandon these while taking over villages south of the Sar Planin, which are undoubtedly Bulgar in sympathies, whatever they may be racially. Servian public opinion here—and all Servia is in Rumelia these days—is clearly against an autonomous Albania.

And an autonomous Albania would be hard to form. Of the Albanian leaders, some, like Isa Boletin and Idris Sefer, are mere brigands; neither Riza Bey, of Dyakova, Mohammed Pasha, of Kalkandelen, late mutessarif of Prisrend, can read or write, while men of some culture and political experience, like Hassan Bey, of Kuchitra, and Nejib Bey Draga, have, by their own confession, lost all influence. Probably, the Kossovo Albanian least unfit to help in the work of government is Hassan Bey, with whom circumstances have brought me into some contact, and I am convinced that if an autonomous Albania under such leadership were left to its own devices, its neighbours would very soon be forced to annex it in self defence. Crete has shown itself turbulent, but Hassan Bey is not to be mentioned in the same breath with Venizelos or Sfakianakis.

There is no more material for an autonomous Albania than there was for an autonomous Bulgaria when the Treaty of Berlin was signed, and the task of maintaining order and educating the people politically would probably be harder among the outlaws of Kossovo than among the cultivators of the vilayet of the Danube, not to mention the complications produced by differences of religion.

But these latter may easily be overestimated. While a partial Servian administration would probably produce extensive Moslem emigration—a serious factor in the economic situation—and Moslem revolts, I am assured by a man who knows the Albanians well, and the theory is in accordance with my own independent judgment, that if a strong and impartial administration were established in Albania, Islam would disappear. Nor is the reason far to seek. With the apparent exception of the Bosnians (in their case Bogomilism had prepared the way for Islam) no European people has taken kindly to Mahommedanism, and those Europeans who have, like the Albanians,

embraced it, have gravitated to the Pektashi sect, whose orthodoxy, in spite of the secrecy of its tenets, is more than questionable.

No religion has a strong hold on the Albanian. (I heard of a recent case where a Catholic flock boycotted its spiritual pastors, abandoned the church and attended mosque till the priest they objected to had been removed. And I had occasion last spring, in my despatch No. 16 of the 11th March to Salonica to report the Moslem boycott of the mosque which contained the hair of the prophet's beard.) The consideration that Moslems only were allowed the right to carry arms would have been enough to decide them in favour of Mohammed and against Christ.

I therefore expect wholesale reconversions to Christianity, produced by no political pressure but solely by the desire of the Albanians to be on the winning side. Nor should I be at all surprised to find whole villages which, like the Gromlis of Trebizond, or the Linovamvaki of Cyprus, have preserved their ancient Christianity under a mask of Islam through the centuries of Moslem domination.

But to set an autonomous Albania going, it is absolutely necessary that for about a generation there should be foreign administration and foreign military occupation, and I am assured that the Albanians would prefer this to be in British hands. I consider this to be something more than mere Oriental politeness for the following reasons: In April of this year Hassan Boy confided to me alone of the foreign consuls his schemes of revolt. In July I, and I believe, I alone, was invited to visit the rebels at Prishtina. And in the panic which succeeded the news of Kumanovo, I believe that the greatest number of Moslems who took sanctuary, took it under the British flag, either in my house or in my dragoman's.

No other Power would enjoy their confidence to the same degree. Austria is always under suspicion; Russia would be distrusted as Slav; and Germany and Italy as Austria's allies; and I have no doubt that Albania would prefer Great Britain to France, and has never heard the names of Switzerland or Belgium.

To sum up, I expect that Moslem emigration will take place in any case, its size will be in inverse ratio to the impartiality of the new administration. I have reason to fear that Servian administration would be partial, but consider that it would probably be efficient enough to keep the Albanians in order, and might succeed in denationalising them. An autonomous Albania would need foreign control at first, there being no materials for a native Government. Under an impartial administration the bulk of Albania would become Christian. The Albanians would prefer above all things British occupation and administration.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

Enclosure 3 in No. 132.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 9.)

Sir, *Uskub, November 25, 1912.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 8 of the 16th instant concerning the future of Albania, I have the honour to submit certain further considerations herewith.

It appears that many Moslem Albanians are already declaring themselves Christian, or at least using the sign of the Cross in the hope of saving their lives. I have also been assured that Idris Sefer has always been a Catholic in secret, and it is to be expected that all the Gheg crypto-Christians will prove Catholics.

Hayreddin Bey, late Mutessarif of Ipek (see my despatch No. 62 of the 5th August to Salonica) is now in Uskub, and I took the opportunity of discussing the future of Albania with him, promising that the fact that I discussed autonomy in no way pledged His Majesty's Government, and that any views I expressed were simply my personal views.

Hayreddin Bey does not agree with my view that there will be Moslem emigration after the war. "Where are we to go to?" I still, however, adhere to my view, though I believe that such emigration will not be extensive. He confirms my opinion that Albania has no wish to see the authority of the Sublime Porte re-established. I remarked that no religion but the cult of the Mauser had any hold on the Albanian. "Yes," he said, "I knew of a case where the father was Moslem and the son Catholic" (and here he made the Oriental gesture for money).

He is positive that no administration but British will produce order in Albania, and asserted that even the wildest clansmen know of the justice of England, while

neither French nor international administration would engender anything but revolts, and Austrian or Italian would be worse still.

It is with some diffidence that I approach the broader question of the possibility of ever forming an independent Albanian State, to which the autonomous Albania would be a stepping-stone. However, though I do not venture to offer my views on questions of high policy, such as the exceeding clumsiness of international administration, I venture to think that this question comes within the range of my consular duties.

The Albanians, like the Poles, only in a greater degree, seem to lack some quality necessary for the making of a State. An Albanian once quoted me the names of the four great Albanians in history—Alexander the Great, Byrrhus, Skanderbeg, and Ali Tepelenti of Yannina. Admitting this catalogue it will be noticed that Byrrhus and Skanderbeg were soldiers pure and simple, and in every case the death of the individual caused a collapse in the structure which he had reared. I am in complete accord with Sir Charles Eliot's opinion of the Albanians, "as individuals . . . . brave and capable, but with little political instinct or power of combination" ("Turkey in Europe," p. 22), and think it very doubtful if they will ever win to a political existence of their own. Like the Dersim and Sfakia, neither Montenegro nor the Mirditia were ever conquered by the Turks, and although the Catholic Mirdites had more claim for the help of their Italian neighbours than the Orthodox Montenegrins, Montenegro is to-day a conquering State, and Mirditia was yesterday an Ottoman kaza.

And the Gheg, at any rate (I cannot speak for the Tosk) has always resisted both conquest and civilisation. Even the Romans appear to have failed in civilising him, and I think that even in the twentieth century it may only be possible at the expense of a disproportionate amount of blood and treasure. It is a grave thing to weigh human lives in the scales, but I am tempted to say that all Albania is not worth the lives of men like Colin Scott-Moncrieff. As will some day happen with the Kurds in Anatolia, the State which undertakes the pacification of Albania may find that the only way is to cut the Gordian knot and exterminate the Albanians (*solitudinem faciunt . . . .*).

But a case may be made out on the other side. The tendency of recent years to develop national, as opposed to political, feeling has not left Albania untouched. I believe that a survey of the various revolts in Albania from 1908 to this last summer will show a steady growth in national consciousness. And, just as the establishment of the Exarchate and of Bulgarian schools, and the consequent revival of the Cyrillic alphabet (see "Turkey in Europe," p. 252), was the forerunner of Bulgaria, so the Congress of Monastir and the Latin alphabet may be the foundation of a national union such as Albania has never hitherto attained to.

And it is but fair to the Gheg to state that he is not invariably a savage, while Konak officials here have assured me that there was a genuine demand for education in Albania.

Moreover, it is to be noted that, however the Albanians at home resists civilisation, out of his native mountains he seems to settle down into a hard-working peaceable subject. In Salonica, in Constantinople, and, I believe, in America, he shows himself perfectly civilisable, even if he is only there to earn enough blood-money to compensate for a murder which he has committed. When the Albanians came into Uskub this summer their conduct was surprisingly good (see my despatch No. 69 of the 20th August to Salonica), although more than half were armed, and they had the town practically at their mercy.

I am continually reminded, both in small matters and in great, of the parallel between the Highland clans of the '15 and the '45 and the Gheg of to-day. There is, therefore, some chance that if civilization is brought to the Ghegs they may avail themselves of it.

But it is at least possible that by the time that a congress has assembled there will be no Kossovo Albanians left to receive the boon of autonomy. I have heard from two or three sources of massacres of Albanians. The first version represented this as a systematic clearing of the ground for Serb immigrants. I am a little slow to believe this, I have previously heard many stories of grave irregularities committed by Servian soldiers, but on examination the bulk of these appear to be exaggerated or devoid of foundation. I have recently met a Servian officer from Parisovich who told me that he had heard that the Lyuma Albanians had been exterminated. The Lyuma Albanians had a bad reputation, even for Albania, and I am informed that their extermination will cause general rejoicings in Albania. According to his version this was in revenge for acts of gross treachery after surrender. I have already had occasion to report some instances of Albanian treachery (see my despatch No. 7 of the 11th instant) and this

officer tells me that they are continuing, and I have very little doubt are being avenged terribly. Two things make me inclined to believe his account, it is in accordance with the Albanian character (see "Turkey in Europe," p. 357) and both General Bourke and I have been extremely prepossessed in favour of my informant. (I venture to request that the source, at least, of this information be treated as confidential.)

I soon hope to come by more information on this subject, but my present impression is that at any rate the Albanians east of the Mitrovitza rail are being massacred, as a just reward for their treacherous conduct.

There are two further points to note. The Montenegrin troops, who are absolutely irregulars, have penetrated as far as Dyakova. Probably, therefore, the sanjak of Ipek has suffered more than the south; and unlike Paraguay, it is unlikely that many women will be left to carry on the race, with some outside male assistance, as the Albanian women seem as treacherous as the men. According to one version, women played some part in the treachery of Parisovich, and my officer informant told me that Albanian women were given to secreting revolvers in the more intimate parts of their dress.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

[52251] No. 133.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 99.)
Sir, *Belgrade, December 3, 1912.*

I HAD the honour to report in my telegram No. 56 of the 11th ultimo that the Servian Government had asked for the immediate recall of the Austrian consul at Prizrend on the ground that he had fired at the Servian troops from the consulate on the occasion of the capture of the town. To this request the Austrian Government replied that they would be unable to comply until they had been able to institute an enquiry into the circumstances.

Hereupon the Austrian Minister endeavoured to enter into communication with the consul, from whom he had apparently received no news for some time past, but messages from the Austrian Legation failed to elicit any reply from Herr Prochaska. This continued silence at last caused uneasiness and suspicion, and this was increased by the fact that no news had likewise been received for some three weeks from the Austrian consul at Mitrovitza.

Under the circumstances M. d'Ugron asked the Servian Government for an explanation, and requested facilities for them to send a consulate official from here to make enquiries. The reply of the Servian Government was shifty and evasive. They stated that the consuls were believed to be alive and well, but that they had had difficulties with the military authorities, and the latter could not permit an Austrian official to be sent, in the then disturbed state of the country, to hold an enquiry. Not unnaturally this reply and the unconciliatory attitude of the Servian Government caused great resentment and indignation in Vienna, and the Austrian Minister received instructions from Count Berchtold to demand peremptorily from the Servian Government that an Austrian consular official should be permitted to proceed to Mitrovitza and Prizrend to investigate.

With this demand the Servian Government, seeing public opinion throughout Europe to be against them, finally complied, and an Austrian consular officer named Edl was dispatched to Uskub. I should mention, however, that in the meantime the consul at Mitrovitza had succeeded in reaching Budapest, where he stated that when Mitrovitza was occupied by the Servian troops he was kept virtually a prisoner in his house, and only succeeded in escaping with difficulty.

Upon Consul Edl's arrival at Uskub he found that Herr Prochaska from Prizrend had likewise arrived there safely, and, under the circumstances, the most dangerous feature of the whole incident was overcome.

But the matter is not yet altogether closed. The Servian Government have yet to give an explanation of the treatment which was meted out to the consuls.

The latter complain that they were treated with want of respect and harshness, and that they were prevented from communicating either by post or telegraph with their legation at Belgrade or anyone else, and that their liberty was restricted by the military authorities. These reply that the attitude of the consuls was openly hostile; that they incited the Albanians to resistance, encouraging them to believe that an

Austrian army was coming to drive the Servians out, and that the consul at Prizrend fired on the Servian troops from his house as they entered the town.

The Servian Government have, however, adopted a conciliatory attitude. They state that they are willing to afford every facility for an investigation of the circumstances, and to give whatever explanations may seem to be required, and they hope thus to satisfy the Austrian Government.

Consul Edl is at present, I believe, holding at enquiry at Prizrend.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[52252] No. 134.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 100.)
Sir, *Belgrade, December 3, 1912.*

THE Austrian military preparations which continue unabated on the Servian frontier are causing considerable uneasiness in Belgrade.

As a result of both Austria and Servia tacitly acquiescing in the suggestion to postpone discussion of the Adriatic port difficulty until the general settlement in the Balkans, which must follow on the conclusion of peace, there had during the last few days been a diplomatic lull and a more hopeful feeling, as it was expected that a cessation of the Austrian mobilisation would ensue. This has unfortunately not proved to be the case.

I have endeavoured to discover whether any fresh disagreement has arisen between the Austrian and Servian Governments to account for the Austrian attitude, but so far as I can ascertain, the conduct of the Servian Government is now entirely unprovocative, and indeed the Austrian Minister himself admitted to me only two days ago that he had now no complaint to make concerning the tone either of the Government or of the press.

The explanations of the situation suggested to me respectively by the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and M. de Hartwig are: that Austria intends, when her arrangements are complete, to put military pressure upon Servia to extort guarantees that she will in future pursue a policy in conformity with Austrian interests, and that Austria thinks to enhance her prestige in the Balkans, if Servia gives way upon the Adriatic question, by making it appear that Russia and Servia were intimidated by the Austrian preparations.

Both M. Yovanovitch and M. de Hartwig likewise referred to the state of the Austrian Slav provinces, which they said had since the Servian victories become more and more disaffected, and were now ripe for open revolt in the event of a war between Austria and Servia. They cited several cases of insubordination on the part of troops, desertion by officers, &c., and said that these occurrences were not generally known, as all news was being studiously suppressed.

M. de Hartwig told me he thought present events would prove to be the beginning of the end of Austria. She had placed herself in a hopeless position. If she was not prepared to give way all along the line she should have occupied the sanjak when the war began, for now, even if she succeeded in barring Servia from the sea, she would be defeated by the fact that as soon as King Nicholas dies Servia and Montenegro will probably fuse into one nation, and Servia would then have several ports on the Adriatic.

I gather from various conversations I have had that, should war break out, whilst the Servians and Russians count upon difficulties Austria may encounter from a revolution in the Austrian Slav provinces, the Austrians hope that this will be more than set off by the disaffection towards Russia in Poland and Little Russia.

Copy will be sent to Vienna by next messenger.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[52243] No. 135.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 501.)

Sir, *Berlin, December 4, 1912.*

THE "Berliner Tageblatt" publishes this morning the account of an interview which its correspondent at Constantinople has had with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In the course of this interview Noradunghian is reported to have stated that Turkey was in an excellent position to continue the war in the event of a failure of the peace negotiations. First-rate troops were pouring in from Anatolia, and Turkey had large economic resources at her disposal, whereas the resources of the allies were nearly exhausted. As regards the terms of peace which Turkey was prepared to accept, his Excellency expressed the opinion that Adrianople, Salonica, Thrace, and many other districts must remain in her possession. When the negotiations began, he added, the programme announced by the allies on the outbreak of the war, as well as the declarations of the Powers, would have to be taken into account.

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

[52247] No. 136.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 170. Confidential.)

Sir, *Madrid, December 4, 1912.*

BEFORE leaving for Paris the day before yesterday, the French Ambassador told me in confidence that Spain was very anxious to be admitted to any conference which might be held with regard to the new settlement of affairs in the Balkan Peninsula. The Minister of State (Marquis of Alhucemas) had recently sounded his Excellency on the subject, explaining that Spain was necessarily interested in questions affecting the distribution of power in any part of the Mediterranean. In virtue of her new treaty with France concerning Morocco, she must now be regarded as holding both shores of the strait giving entrance to that sea. She was, moreover, engaged on a ship-building programme, which, when completed, would give her once more a voice in maritime questions. Like the other important Powers, she had assumed a share in preparing for the defence of the foreign missions and their colonies in Constantinople by sending a ship of war to that city.

M. Geoffray added that King Alfonso had already spoken to him on the subject, expressing the hope that Spain would be allowed to participate in the expected conference.

Both to His Majesty and to the Minister of State M. Geoffray replied that he had no knowledge of the views of the French Government as to the composition of the conference which might possibly be held. He added, however, that, so far as he knew, it was not likely that objection to the admission of Spain would be raised in Paris, where there was a growing desire to see Spain and France co-operating actively in international questions. His Excellency told me that he intended speaking to M. Poincaré in support of the Spanish demand, assuming that it will take the shape of a formal petition to the Great Powers.

Since my conversation with M. Geoffray, I have seen the Marquis of Alhucemas, but the latter, though he asked me if I had any information on the subject of a conference or meeting of Ambassadors, did not actually raise the question of the participation of Spain.

Personally, I am inclined to share M. Geoffray's view that Spain would naturally fall into line with the Western Powers in the event of her admission to a share in the discussions. His Excellency is in favour of a renewal eventually, in some form or other, of the declarations made in 1907, by means of an exchange of notes between the British, French, and Spanish Governments to the effect that the foreign policy of those countries was directed towards the maintenance of the *status quo* as regards their possessions in the Mediterranean and Atlantic. When a new settlement has been arrived at, M. Geoffray thinks it might be quite worth while to confirm the adherence of Spain to

it by means of a fresh declaration on the lines of the one which was embodied in the notes exchanged on the 16th May, 1907, to the above effect in London and Paris.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[52272] No. 137.

Note communicated by Tewfik Pasha, December 7, 1912.

UNE des clauses de l'armistice est de commencer dans une dizaine de jours les négociations de paix. Le lieu de réunion sera Londres. Un delai de quatre jours est fixé pour l'ouverture et la rupture de l'armistice. Le droit de ravitaillement n'a été maintenu qu'en faveur des Bulgares. Andrinople et Scutari ne manquant pas de provisions, nos délégués n'ont pas cru devoir en faire une question *sine qua non*.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 5 décembre, 1912.

[52767] No. 138.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, December 7, 1912.

LE Comte Szecsen a communiqué, le 6 décembre, à M. Poincaré la réponse du Comte Berchtold à la proposition de Sir Edward Grey. Le Gouvernement autrichien accepterait une réunion d'Ambassadeurs à la condition que cette réunion soit simplement préparatoire; il doit faire connaître à Sir Edward Grey que son Ambassadeur à cette conférence recevra pour instructions formelles de n'accepter aucun accès territorial de la Serbie à la Mer Adriatique; il rappelle les engagements qu'il a pris avec l'Italie au sujet de l'Albanie. Le Comte Berchtold préférerait personnellement Londres—il pense que Paris soulèverait certaines difficultés—mais il déclare qu'il ne fait pas de ses préférences une condition de son acceptation.

Le Comte Szecsen a donné connaissance à M. Poincaré d'un autre télégramme du Comte Berchtold précisant que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois n'avait aucune intention d'exclure Paris ou de marquer une défiance à l'égard du Gouvernement français.

Le Comte Mensdorff aurait été chargé d'exprimer l'espérance que la Roumanie puisse se faire entendre par la conférence projetée des Ambassadeurs.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 7 décembre, 1912.

[52405] No. 139.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 184.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 6, 1912.*

DR. STREIT, Greek Minister here, has been appointed one of the plenipotentiaries to the peace conference in London.

[52321] No. 140.

Vice-Consul Geary to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(Telegraphic.) *Bitolj (Monastir), December 6, 1912.*

THE following Servian military movements have taken place: The cavalry division, Keui, Danube, and Timoriv divisions, and the chief of staff of the first army have left [? groups omitted] division is at Perlepe. The two Morastip divisions have headquarters at Monastir and Resna.

Servian troops have occupied Ochrida and Struga and Dibra and are near Elbassan. The position of the Greek troops in this district is as follows: The 4th and 5th divisions

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are at Florina. The 3rd division has left Kastoria for Gorcha, which is held by about 30,000 Turkish troops under Javid Pasha, who is likely to offer determined resistance, although he has little artillery. The 5th and 8th divisions are operating against Turkish troops near Janina.

Servian military authorities now deny that the Turkish commander-in-chief of the Turkish western army has surrendered.

A temporary Servian civil governor of Monastir has arrived. The Christians of Monastir, who are almost all Greeks and Bulgarians, resent the Servian occupation. Telegraphic communications have been suspended during the past few days.

[52353] No. 141.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 52. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, December 7, 1912.*

PEACE negotiations.

M. Mijuskovitch, accompanied by MM. Vojnovitch and Popovitch, left here yesterday for London.

M. Mijuskovitch was Prime Minister six years ago; he is a protégé of the King, who has employed him on confidential missions. M. Vojnovitch is an Austrian subject, native of Ragusa; he was once Minister of Justice here, tutor to the Servian Princes at Belgrade, and also attached to the Court of Sophia. Austrians view him with suspicion and contest his claim to a title. He is an able writer and speaker. M. Popovitch was ormerly chargé d'affaires at Constantinople.

[52322] No. 142.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 126.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, December 7, 1912.*

SUBJECT to approval of the King of Greece, Greek Prime Minister has decided to go to London as first plenipotentiary, Bulgarian Prime Minister having expressed the wish to meet him there.

(Confidential.)

He tells me that he considers an arrangement with Bulgaria rather than with Turkey the principal object of his mission.

[52347] No. 143.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 185.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 7, 1912.*

AUSTRIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs read to me to-day Count Mensdorff's telegram reporting a conversation with you on the subject of the Ambassadors' meeting, in which you express regret that Austria made a reservation with regard to the question of Servian access to the Adriatic. His Excellency thought you had not quite understood what he meant. He did not wish to limit subjects to be discussed at the meetings of the Ambassadors, but that if this question were raised in a shape other than that of a commercial port the Austrian Ambassador would have to declare that this was a matter he was not authorised to discuss, and he would have to abstain from taking part in the discussion.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me he wished Roumania should be admitted to the Ambassadors' meetings. He gave various reasons for this, laying stress on the necessity of trying to evolve out of the meetings an arrangement which would be lasting in the Near East, and none such could be arrived at without taking Roumanian interests into consideration. He said that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had raised no objection to this idea when the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh mentioned the matter to him.

[52339] No. 144.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 103.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, December 7, 1912.*

SERVIAN Government have again been approached through unofficial channel with proposal for economic understanding on lines reported in my telegram No. 80 of 23rd November.

[52340] No. 145.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 104.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, December 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 770 of 5th December to Paris: Ottoman Bank.

French Minister tells me that he telegraphed to the French consul at Uskub and made a representation here some days ago.

Should I act likewise?

[52326] No. 146.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, December 7, 1912.*

VICE-CONSUL at Constanza reports two Turkish transports arrived at that port 4th December, and are embarking war material and 1,300 horses.

[52316] No. 147.

Viscount Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, December 7, 1912.*

HAVE received application from consul, Salonica, to raise fund for relief of distressed Mussulmans there. As Egypt has already contributed considerable sums of money, and Khedivial vessels are doing much to relieve refugees, I hardly think it would be advisable to start another fund. Moreover, it would, I think, interfere with contributions to Lady Lowther's fund. If you agree, would you inform consul?

[52332] No. 148.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 212.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, December 7, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informed me this morning that, owing to it having been stated in the Austrian press that objection to Paris as the place for the conversations of Ambassadors was made for reasons personal to M. Isvolsky, the Russian Government, regarding objection as offensive to their Ambassador, insist on Paris as originally proposed by you.

Minister for Foreign Affairs feels very much embarrassed at the request of the Russian Government that he should support them in representations to you on the subject. If Paris be eventually accepted, Minister for Foreign Affairs would ask M. Paul Cambon to preside over the meetings.

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[52346] No. 149.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 177.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Rome, December 7, 1912.*

IN reply to two interpellations in the Italian Chamber to-day, Minister for Foreign Affairs said Italian Government had informed Hellenic Government amicably, but firmly, that, while continuing to respect the freedom of Greece in her military operations, they could never consent to the Bay of Vallona, of which Saseno Island is an integral part, belonging to Greece or being converted into base of military operations. The Austrian Government have taken similar step at Athens.

[52167] No. 150.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1340.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 473 of 6th December.

German and Austrian Governments have also stated preference for London. This will cause disappointment and soreness at Paris. While ready to facilitate conversations in London if generally desired, I have therefore suggested that they should consider this point before coming to final decision, and, if London is selected now, indicate to French Government that if a formal conference takes place later they would be agreeable to Paris.

Conversations now contemplated should, in any case, be as informal as possible.

What does Minister for Foreign Affairs think of Austrian suggestion that Roumania should be admitted? I should have thought it preferable to confine conversations in first instance to the Six Great Powers who signed Treaty of Berlin. It would be time enough to take Roumanians into consultation when we had got over Servian and Albanian difficulties, but I have expressed no opinion hitherto, as the matter concerns Russia so much more closely.

[52766] No. 151.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 192.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 7, 1912.*

BULGARIAN Minister has asked me formally whether it would be agreeable to His Majesty's Government for peace delegates to hold their meetings in London. I have replied that it would be quite agreeable, and that the King is willing to place a room in St. James's Palace at the disposal of the delegates for their meetings, if this would be convenient to them.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 1095; Belgrade, No. 132; Cettinjé, No. 143; and Athens, No. 306.)

[52766] No. 152.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1096.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 7, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 192 of 7th December to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[52173] No. 153.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen

(No. 417.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 173 of 6th December.

If London is generally desired as place for conversations, I will of course facilitate in every possible way their taking place here. But rejection of Paris, which I originally suggested, is bound to cause soreness there. I hope, therefore, that German Government will consider this point before coming to a final decision.

In any case, if conversations, which I entirely agree should be as informal as possible, take place here, the Powers who have suggested London might indicate to French Government that should a formal conference take place later they would be agreeable to Paris.

(Repeated to Vienna, No. 413.)

[52195] No. 154.

Sir Edward Grey to Viscount Kitchener.

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 7, 1912.*

THERE are persistent statements in French press that, through naval officers, your private secretary and consulate at Beirout, we are intriguing in Syria to get the country. I have told French Government it is untrue, and that we have no intentions or aspirations there.

It would be well, if you find the report current in Egypt, to let it be known that it is untrue.

[52195] No. 155.

Sir Edward Grey to Viscount Kitchener.

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 7, 1912.*

RED CRESCENT enquire whether Egyptian Government would allow the settlement in Egypt of some of the refugees from Macedonia now in Salonica, and, if so, could they render help in transporting them to Egypt.

Please telegraph your views.

[52871] No. 156.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 306.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 7, 1912.*

AS the German Ambassador spoke, in the course of conversation, as if we were outside all groups, I said to him to-day that the position, as I understood it, was not that there were no diplomatic groups, but that, though there were different diplomatic groups, they were not in opposing camps. Germany, for instance, was exercising a moderating influence and working for peace amongst those with whom she was most closely associated, and we were doing the same. I thought that the fact of the matter was that Germany, France, and England were all in the same position in this Balkan question.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[52342] No. 157.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 219.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, December 7, 1912.*

PEACE negotiations.

My telegram No. 217 of 6th December

Bulgarian delegates are as follows:—

1. M. Danef, President of the Sobranjé.
2. General Paprikof, Bulgarian representative at St. Petersburgh. He was recalled from his post in October, and has taken an active part in the war.
3. Bulgarian representative in London.

In addition to the above, Colonel Yostof, military chamberlain.

Prime Minister informed me that the relations between the Greek and the Bulgarian Governments had considerably improved in the last day or two.

[52355] No. 158.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 174.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, December 7, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 173 of 6th December: Ambassadors' meetings.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs repeated to my French colleague to-day the answer of the Imperial Government to your proposals. French Ambassador expressed some surprise at the proposed invitation to the Roumanian Minister to attend the meetings, as the question to be discussed had for the most part no direct interest for Roumania.

From the conversation which ensued, the French Ambassador gathered that the inclusion of the Roumanian Minister was suggested rather than formally proposed, and that perhaps it would be considered sufficient if the Minister was only invited to attend in case of discussion of any subject in which Roumania was directly interested.

I inform you of this not as an official utterance on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but as an indication of his probable attitude should any objection be raised to the suggestion.

[52334] No. 159.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 477.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, December 8, 1912.*

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, and he told me, in the strictest confidence, of the military measures which Russia had taken, by way of preparation in case of war. A considerable sum of money had been granted to the military authorities for the purchase of the necessary commissariat, ammunition, and other stores, and the reservists had been retained with the colours.

Speaking of Germany, his Excellency said that he had no doubt that Austria had inspired the German Chancellor's speech, but he did not think that the latter country would now attack Servia, seeing that Russia had succeeded in inducing her to modify considerably her demands.

M. Sazonof was in his most pacific mood, and viewed with calmness Austria's military preparations, which he attributed to her nervousness lest war should break out.

He ended by denying that Russia had moved a solitary man.

[52335] No. 160.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 478.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 8, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1340 of 7th December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees that it would be a mistake to admit Roumania, more especially as the Balkan States are to take no part in the conversations, and thinks that she might be told that any views that she may wish to submit for our consideration should be communicated to the Powers by her representatives at the various capitals.

His Excellency said that before the Ambassadors met England, France, and Russia ought to come to an understanding on the various points that would have to be discussed. He would send you by next Russian messenger a detailed statement of his views, together with a map showing proposed limitation of Albania (see my telegram No. 469 of 4th December), but meanwhile he would like me to give you their general outline.

Albania ought to be the first question to be taken in hand, and his views on the subject are almost identical with those recorded in my telegram No. 465 of 30th November, with the exception that discussion of the Albanian question should precede any protest that Austria might wish to lodge against a Servian port on the Adriatic. His idea is that if we arrive at a settlement of the Albanian question on the lines indicated in my above-mentioned telegram we should eliminate danger of a controversy on the port question, and should merely have to consider how to provide for Servia access to one of the neutralised ports by means of a railway.

On my asking whether he contemplated establishment of any sort of international machinery for the administration of these ports, his Excellency replied in the negative, and said that administration should be Turkish or Albanian. The Powers would, however, have to sign an international Act guaranteeing the neutrality of ports in question as well as Servia's right to free commercial intercourse through them.

He mentioned Ægean islands and Mount Athos as further subjects of discussion, and I gathered, though he did not expressly say so, that his views on these two questions are those already reported in my telegrams No. 436 of 17th November and No. 465 of 2nd November respectively.

[52333] No. 161.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 709. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 8, 1912.*

SIR R. CRAWFORD tells me that the financial situation of the Turkish Government is very serious, and Mr. Nias, acting director-general of the Ottoman Bank, now informs me that the Government have only 90,000*l.* left, while 400,000*l.* are due for salaries on 15th December, and at the request of the Ottoman Government he has made an appeal to Paris.

Under the old régime, omission to pay six months' salaries was not considered abnormal, but under the new régime failure to pay even one month might produce very bad effect internally.

[52343] No. 162.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 186.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 8, 1912.*

POLITICAL crisis continues to weigh heavily on all classes in this country, and great impatience is felt at the inaction of the Austro-Hungarian Government in respect of Servia. On all sides irritation is felt at the uncertainty of the future, and the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs is being accused of softness and indecision even by high officials of his own Ministry. In Galicia situation is described as desperate,

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panic existing in financial circles and among the peasantry. If this state of things continues much longer, I think that it will be difficult for the Minister for Foreign Affairs to refrain from taking action, and so put an end to the strain on the public mind.

Under these circumstances it is essential that as much pressure as possible should be brought to bear upon the peace negotiators to come to terms before Christmas at least with regard to a preliminary peace. This might be concluded on the following lines :—

Turkey and Bulgaria to draw up provisional frontier from some point on the Black Sea to one on the Ægean Sea, leaving Adrianople to Turkey; Turkey to leave the fate of Salonica and of the islands to the decision of Europe; Turkey to grant autonomy to Albania, leaving to Europe the limitation of its frontiers. The last clause would carry with it withdrawal of Servian troops from the Adriatic to within a certain line, which would be designated in preliminary treaty.

Russian Ambassador here feels confident that the united pressure at Belgrade of the Powers would bring about withdrawal from the Adriatic of the Servian forces.

If such a preliminary treaty were signed, it would produce immediate *détente* here, and Austria-Hungary might calmly await the signature of the ultimate treaty of peace. As soon as preliminary peace is concluded it might be possible to merge peace negotiations with the meetings of the Ambassadors and of Roumanian representative (see my immediately preceding telegram of yesterday), who would elaborate at their leisure details of a final treaty, which would then be ratified at a formal conference.

[52337] No. 163.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 127.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, December 8, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 126 of 7th December.

Although Bulgarian Prime Minister will not go to London, Greek Prime Minister leaves to-morrow with other Greek peace delegates, and should arrive 12th December.

[52338] No. 164.

Viscount Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cairo, December 8, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 93 of 7th December.

Khedive has already brought in his yacht a large number of refugees to Alexandria, and the Khedivial vessel "Abbas" is being employed to bring more. I am very doubtful that introduction of these refugees will not have a bad effect in Egypt and am certainly not in favour of an increased number being imported. They should, in my opinion, be sent to Smyrna and other parts of Asia Minor.

[52341] No. 165.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinje, December 8, 1912.*

ARMISTICE.

Commandant of Scutari has been informed of armistice by a letter signed by the German Minister here and delivered by a Montenegrin officer. He has refused to accept the communication.

Fighting continues.

[52384] No. 166.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 88.)
Sir, *Bucharest, November 27, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 87 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me yesterday at his weekly reception of M. Danef's approaching visit to Bucharest. His Excellency was evidently anxious to remove any impression that I might have had that this visit was due to any pressure from Roumania. He said that the Roumanian Government had taken no initiative in the matter, and he regretted that the false idea should have got abroad in the press that Roumania had asked Bulgaria for any compensation or reward for her neutrality in the present war. Just as Great Britain and Russia had considered it desirable in 1907 to come to an agreement on questions in which there might be friction between the two Powers, in the same way it was very desirable that Roumania and Bulgaria should come to a friendly agreement on such questions as those of the treatment of the Koutzo-Vlachs in Macedonia and the Dobrudsha frontier, which latter, his Excellency reminded me, had been settled over the heads of the two countries, and, moreover, settled—owing to Russia's anger at Roumania's resentment at the loss of that part of Bessarabia assigned to Roumania by the Treaty of Paris—in a fashion very unfavourable to his country. M. Kalinkof's announcement of M. Danef's visit was therefore very welcome to the Roumanian Government as paving the way to a satisfactory arrangement.

(Very Confidential.)

I do not of course doubt the technical accuracy of M. Majorescu's statement that M. Danef's visit is not due to the initiative of the Roumanian Government, but it is pretty clear from Sir R. Paget's telegram No. 57 of the 13th instant that there must have been at least some private or indirect feeling of the ground at Sophia for some time past, and I infer, from a conversation I have had with my Russian colleague, that this has been done through Russia, to whose prompting, M. Tchebekof tells me confidentially, the decision to send M. Danef to Bucharest was in great part due.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[52414] No. 167.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 134.)
Sir, *Sophia, December 4, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Philippopoli reporting on the state of affairs in his district. Mr. Young's remarks regarding the disturbances in the newly conquered district will be found to be of interest, as the problem will undoubtedly prove a serious one in the future.

I have, &c.
H. G. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 167.

Vice-Consul Young to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Philippopoli, November 21, 1912.*

DURING the past five days there has been a very noticeable absence not merely of news, but even of rumours from the front.

Batches of Turkish prisoners are brought in from time to time, and, though, in this as in all else, secrecy is maintained, the number of prisoners here probably exceeds 2,000.

The second Red Cross Mission from Russia, under the immediate direction of Countess Ignatief, has arrived and established a hospital of fifty beds.

The number of wounded in hospital here, allowing for cases already discharged, probably does not exceed the estimate given in my despatch No. 3 of the 12th instant

viz., 800. It seems to be intended to utilise first the hospitals at Sophia and other places in the north and west, reserving all available accommodation here for the very large numbers of wounded expected later on.

The "Women's Convoy Corps," a party of fifteen of sixteen Englishwomen, under Mr. and Mrs. St. Clair Stobart, passed through Philippopoli on the 16th [instant *en route* for Stara Zagora and (it was hoped) Kirk Kilissé.

I learn on good authority that the Bulgarian military authorities have found themselves under the necessity of taking measures of the utmost severity in the Kirdjali district and other places in the recently conquered country to the south of this, where the Moslem inhabitants have, in several instances, attacked the insufficient forces left in occupation. I have as yet no precise details, but the incidents referred to suggest that it may prove necessary at the end of the war to keep a considerable force in certain districts in order to demonstrate to the inhabitants the futility of further resistance.

I have, &c.
H. E. W. YOUNG.

[52385] No. 168.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 89.)
Sir, *Bucharest, December* 1, 1912.

AS reported in my telegram No. 26 of the 30th ultimo, General Conrad von Hötzendorf, inspector-general of the Austro-Hungarian army, arrived here on the 29th ultimo, bearing an autograph letter from the Emperor Francis Joseph to King Charles. The general was received on his arrival by an aide-de-camp of the King, who conducted him to the palace, where he was a guest during his stay in Bucharest. He was received in audience on the afternoon of his arrival by King Charles, who conferred upon him the Grand Cordon of the Crown of Roumania, and he was entertained at dinner by the Prime Minister. He left Bucharest for Vienna last evening after interviews with General Averescu, chief of the General Staff, and with other Roumanian military authorities.

The autograph letter from the Emperor Francis Joseph is said at the Ministry of Affairs to have conveyed to the King the Emperor's condolences on the death of the Countess of Flandors, King Charles's sister. That so special a channel was selected for these condolences was doubtless due to the desire of Austria, at a moment of severe international tension, to demonstrate once again the close ties uniting the two countries. The visit was so short that there can hardly have been time for much discussion of eventual military dispositions, though there was doubtless time enough, if this was an object of General von Hötzendorf's mission, to put the finishing touches to any arrangement there may be for eventual military co-operation.

General von Hötzendorf's visit follows closely on the visit to Berlin of the Austrian chief of the General Staff and it also synchronises with the announcement of the new Mobilization Bills proposed by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Whether any positive agreement exists between Austria and Roumania or not, it is generally believed here that general Austrian mobilisation would be followed immediately by a similar step in Roumania. It was therefore quite natural that General von Hötzendorf's sudden visit—it was only announced in the press on the morning of his arrival—should have aggravated the general anxiety which is felt here at the tension now existing between Austria and Russia, and, in order to allay the prevailing apprehension, an inspired, but clumsily worded, statement appears in the Government organ, "La Politique," of this morning. It runs as follows:—

"The visit of General von Hötzendorf, inspector-general of the Austro-Hungarian army and late chief of the General Staff, who brings an autograph letter from the Emperor Francis Joseph to King Charles, has given rise in a certain press to comments which are in no way warranted.

"The friendly relations uniting Austria-Hungary and Roumania find a new echo in the political manifestation of the neighbouring monarchy, and we are profoundly surprised that it should have occasioned anxiety, which, if it is sincere, is baseless, and if it is feigned, is frankly to be condemned.

"Since, therefore, the more serious organs start by recognising that there is nothing in the presence of General von Hötzendorf among us to warrant the fears of an aggravation of the international crisis through which we are passing, we have every reason to be surprised that any importance is attached to the ignorant or interested comments which have been made."

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[52416] No. 169.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 136.)
Sir, *Sophia, December* 3, 1912.

IN my despatch No. 130, Confidential, of the 19th ultimo, I had the honour to keep you informed of the progress of the war down to the fall of Monastir on the 18th ultimo, and to report that King Ferdinand had instructed the Prime Minister to inform the Grand Vizier that the Bulgarian generals at the front had been commanded to negotiate at once with the generals of the Ottoman forces respecting the conclusion of an armistice.

Little reliable news of military interest was reported in the first few days since my previous despatch, with the exception of the capture by the Bulgarians of Dede Agatch and Mahgara on the 21st ultimo (see my telegram No. 177 of the 23rd ultimo), and the successful attack by a torpedo-boat on the Ottoman cruiser "Hamidieh" in the Black Sea about 18 miles from Varna. An attack was also made by the Turkish garrison, apparently in force, against the Bulgarian positions surrounding Adrianople on the morning of the 22nd. This attack appears to have been followed up by an attempt at a general sortie. The engagement was prolonged throughout the day, and ended with the eventual retreat of the Turks within their fortifications, after suffering considerable loss. This movement was interpreted in the Bulgarian capital as indicative of very considerable shortage of provisions in the besieged city, necessitating extreme measures for the alleviation of a desperate condition of affairs. No news of importance has, in fact, been received regarding the progress of the siege up to the date of this despatch, nor any reliable information from local sources regarding the fighting on the Tchataldja lines, where it would appear that there has existed what practically amounts to a *de facto* armistice, pending the discussion of the question of a general armistice, although reports of further fighting have been received from other sources.

It will be remembered (see my telegram No. 151 of the 16th ultimo and my despatch No. 130 of the 19th ultimo) that the King of Bulgaria had informed the Ottoman Government that he must first consult his allies before proposing terms for an armistice. This was immediately done. The reply of the Greek Government, including a demand for the evacuation of Constantinople by the Ottoman Government and the establishment of an autonomous European administration, in which their numerical superiority would give them the most power, was considered out of all reason by the Bulgarian Prime Minister. Amongst their reasonable demands was the surrender of Janina.

The Servian Government confined themselves to insisting on the evacuation of Durasso and Dibra by the Turkish troops. The former town was reported from Belgrade as having already fallen. The demands of Greece were at first thought likely to carry little weight with the allies in the negotiations, though latest news would seem to imply the contrary. The Bulgarian army was undoubtedly anxious to enter Constantinople, but the prevalence of cholera and typhoid fever among the troops at Tchataldja has acted as a deterrent on King Ferdinand, whose constitutional aversion to contact with disease of any description is well known to those who are acquainted with the more intimate characteristics of this monarch. The action of the Ottoman Government in filling the Mosque of St. Sophia with cholera patients tended to increase the improbability of the allies ever entering the building.

In the meantime the Prime Minister stated in an informal verbal reply to myself and my French, Russian, German, and Italian colleagues that, although grateful for the kind offer of mediation made by the representatives of the Great Powers in view of the wish expressed by the Grand Vizier that direct negotiations be carried on between the Ottoman and Bulgarian Governments, the proposal for mediation by the Great Powers had become unnecessary.

On the 23rd ultimo I heard that the Greek Government had decided to be

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represented at the armistice negotiations at Tchataldja by the Greek Minister at Sophia, who received orders to proceed to the front. Servia and Montenegro were contented to leave their interests in the matter in the hands of the Bulgarian Government. At the eventual negotiations for peace it is arranged that the allies will be represented, including Montenegro.

The Bulgarian delegates chosen to negotiate with Nazim Pasha and the Turkish delegates were M. Danef, General Savof, and General Fitchef, together with two secretaries. It was understood at first that a delay of twenty-four hours should be accorded to the Turks in which to reply to the Bulgarian proposals, but such an intention proved impracticable, and was abandoned. The terms which the Bulgarians originally intended to propose were, according to Russian sources—

1. The surrender of Adrianople and garrison.
The surrender to Bulgaria of the fortifications at Tchataldja.
The surrender to the Greeks of Janina and garrison.
The surrender of Scutari to the Montenegrins.
The surrender of Dibra to the Servians.

2. The Turks were also to be required to abandon the peninsula to the west of Tchataldja, which would form a line of demarcation between the two armies. The blockade of Bulgarian ports to be raised in order to enable the Bulgarian army to obtain supplies.

M. Gueshof had already informed me in a conversation that the above would form the basis of the terms proposed by Bulgaria. The eventual peace conditions will in all probability give Turkey a larger strip of land—the line of Media and the River Ergene joining the sea at Enos, being apparently contemplated.

Another interesting feature has been provided by the visit of the Bulgarian Minister of Railways, M. Fringhia, to Uskub and Salonica for the purpose of organising traffic on this line. It is to be hoped that the fact that the Greek troops were thus sent to the fighting line by this route is to be construed as a proof that some steps are being taken to counteract the effects of the serious friction between the Greeks and the Bulgarians in Salonica reported by His Majesty's consul-general in that city. On the 24th ultimo the railway from Salonica viâ Dede Agatch to Baba Eski was reported to be in working order, thus forming another means of communication of Greek and Servian troops to the front.

The discussion of the armistice proposals were to begin on the night of the 24th ultimo at Baghchi Koui in the neutral zone near Buyuk Chekmedje, but a delay was caused by the late arrival of M. Danef. The general impression at Sophia was at the opening of the negotiations that they would be refused by Turkey—a contingency which this Government received with equanimity if not with relief, as they realised that delay will afford them time to bring up further reinforcements and thus strengthen their position. These reinforcements consist of 30,000 recruits of the year 1913 who have already received a useful, if hurried, training of one month, and the allied troops proceeding from Salonica by sea and rail to Baba Eski.

At a meeting of the Turkish representatives with the Bulgarian representatives on the 26th ultimo the latter were asked if they were authorised to discuss peace as well as armistice. They replied in the negative as other delegates would have to be chosen for the peace negotiations. Nothing further was done at this meeting although it was remarked that the Turkish representatives made no reference to the conditions proposed being unacceptable, and it was decided to await the arrival of the Turkish Ambassador at Berlin and the Greek Minister at Sophia who were both on their way to attend the negotiations. The journey of the former was broken at Vienna and Bucharest, and in the latter capital his reception by the King has not unnaturally, as was reported to you from other sources, given rise to the opinion that the Ottoman Government are making efforts to induce Roumania to adopt an attitude of hostility towards the allies.

On the 26th ultimo the Prime Minister heard from his cousin who is the Bulgarian representative at Berlin that the German Government had approached him with an offer of mediation—an offer which if refused could be disavowed. There was nothing to make one suppose that the allies would accept such mediation.

On the 28th ultimo I learnt that the recruits for 1914, amounting to about 30,000 men between the ages of 19 to 20 would be called upon for active service, if necessary, after receiving a month of preparatory training.

The Bulgarian and Turkish delegates meet again on the 27th and 28th ultimo to discuss the armistice conditions. The Turks seemed to be anxious that peace pourparlers

should be commenced as soon as possible, and M. Gueshof informed M. Danef by telegraph that he had no objection to such a step.

On the 29th ultimo the War Office were able to announce a victory near Merlambi, between Demotica and Dede Agatch, over the Turks who lost over 8,000 men and 2,000 horses as well as several guns. The latest report of these losses make them out as over 12,000 men. The surrender apparently took place on the 27th.

On the 29th the Minister of Finance left for the front to discuss with the King certain financial problems including, it is understood, the amount of the indemnity to be demanded from Turkey. The exact sum is not known but it was the original intention of the Bulgarians to demand one and-a-half milliards of francs of which Bulgaria would receive about six hundred millions.

A further meeting of the armistice delegates took place on the 29th ultimo at which the Bulgarians demanded the raising of the blockade of the Black Sea ports, and the Ottoman Government the raising of the Greek blockades. The Greek delegate who is the Greek Minister at Sophia refused this and the Ottoman delegates telegraphed for instructions. The attitude of the Greek Minister at these negotiations caused serious misgivings to the Bulgarians, and it is even thought that the demands of the Greek Government will make the Bulgarian Government more amenable to accept less stringent peace conditions from the Ottoman Government. Whatever the outcome may be their demands for the three last-mentioned of the six vilayet towns, viz, Adrianople, Scutari, Uskub, Monastir, Janina, and Salonica, seem out of all proportion to the result of their prowess.

The news communicated to a waiting world as to the results of the negotiations on Sunday last, the 1st instant, by the "Wiener Correspondenz-Bureau" was entirely fallacious as in response to a telegraphic enquiry by the Prime Minister it was learnt that no meetings of the negotiators took place on that day.

After many conflicting and often pessimistic rumours regarding the progress of the negotiations in the intervening period since the 1st instant the armistice protocol was eventually signed at 8 o'clock on the night of the 3rd instant, and contained the following conditions:—

1. Belligerents to retain their present positions.
2. The besieged fortresses not to be revictualled.
3. The Bulgarian army to be permitted to revictual itself by sea and by way of Adrianople after the lapse of ten days from the signing of the protocol.
4. The plenipotentiaries to meet in London on the 13th December to discuss peace conditions.

It will be seen that these conditions are practically the same as those I reported to you by telegraph yesterday (my telegram No. 208) as being the final offer of the Bulgarians, who, however, appear to have made one further concession inasmuch as they have agreed that ten days shall elapse before they be permitted to revictual their troops either by sea or by way of Adrianople.

I have, &c.
H. G. BAX IRONSIDE.

[52418] No. 170.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 138. Confidential.)
Sir, *Sophia, December 2, 1912.*

MY Russian colleague called at His Majesty's Legation, by appointment, on the 30th ultimo. He translated to me from an unsigned Russian document a statement which he informed me emanated from the Russian Foreign Office.

The wording was somewhat vague, but it contained a warning to the Servian Government that the Russian Government did not consider their present policy a diplomatic one, and that it would not have their approval.

From M. Nekludof's translation it appeared that his Government considered that Servia was alienating both English and French sympathy. It appeared evident, therefore, that the Russian Government were endeavouring to place the onus of their action on their allies.

The Russian Minister asked me if His Majesty's Government had not quite recently given a warning in the above sense to the Servian Government. I replied in the

negative. I did not, of course, refer to the action taken in Belgrade under the instructions contained in your telegram No. 93 of the 13th November to Sir R. Paget.

I understood from M. Nekludof that a warning was about to be issued to the Servian Government, and that the Russian Ministers in Belgrade, Athens, and Cettinjé had received similar instructions to his own.

In his conversation with me yesterday the Prime Minister said that M. Nekludof had read the document to the Bulgarian Minister of Finance on the previous day, which the latter considered was a vague warning to Servia. I asked M. Gueshof why the Russian Minister had not read it to him, whereupon his Excellency replied that perhaps it might have been because M. Teodorof was leaving that very night for head-quarters, where he would see the King; but that in any case, as the Russian Minister's personality was so curious a one, it was not possible to account for many of his actions.

I was somewhat surprised at the slight importance the Prime Minister attached to the whole matter.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

(Secret.)

P.S.—Since writing the above despatch I have been able to obtain a French translation of the note communicated to the Bulgarian Government by the Russian Minister.

I enclose a copy of this translation.

H. O. B.-I.

Enclosure in No. 170.

Note communicated by Russian Minister to Bulgarian Government, November 30, 1912.

(Traduction.)
(Secret.)

NOUS trouvons que la manière imprudente d'agir de la Serbie menace de créer une situation dans laquelle seraient mis à l'écart les résultats brillants obtenus par les alliés dans cette guerre contre la Turquie. Il n'y a pas de doute que l'intransigeance de la Serbie et le danger que cette intransigeance a provoqué d'amener un conflit armé entre elle et l'Autriche-Hongrie n'encourage la Turquie dans les pourparlers de l'armistice, en lui donnant l'espoir de pouvoir améliorer sa situation, grâce à la possibilité de reprendre la guerre qui menacerait l'Alliance balkanique. La conduite de la Serbie a déjà provoqué un refroidissement à son égard de la part de l'opinion publique en France et en Angleterre et augmenté les sympathies de ces États envers l'Autriche-Hongrie, dont la modération pendant ce dernier temps a été très-vivement par les Puissances. Veuillez attirer là-dessus l'attention de M. Gueshof et lui conseiller d'exercer une influence amicale sur la Serbie dans ce sens, afin que la Serbie modère ses demandes et ne crée pas une situation qui exclurait une solution pacifique et, pour elle-même, le règlement de la question de son accès à la mer.

[52419] No. 171.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 139. Secret.)
Sir,

Sophia, December 3, 1912.

SINCE I had the honour to address to you my despatch No. 133, Confidential, of the 27th ultimo, regarding the question of Servian access to the Adriatic, I have had two conversations with the Prime Minister.

In an interview on the 29th ultimo his Excellency repeated to me that he considered it a *sine qua non* that Austria should allow Servia some outlet on the Adriatic, although not necessarily Durazzo. He had done everything he could, he told me, to avoid discussing this question until the conclusion of the present war, but had been obliged to submit to the force of circumstances.

His Excellency, moreover, made a further statement to the effect that (as reported in my telegram No. 201, Secret, of the 30th November) he hoped and thought it possible that Austria and Servia might arrive at some joint arrangement without the

cognisance of Italy. The grounds for this optimistic utterance are somewhat curious, and are to be traced to some very secret unofficial negotiations which have been commenced by instruction of the Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs between the Servian and Austrian Ministers here in Sophia.

These negotiations have as yet come to nothing, no reply to the Servian suggestions having been received from the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and it is further certain that, if they lead to no ultimate result, their very existence will be strenuously denied.

I thought it worth while, however, to inform you of their existence, and reported the matter at some length in my telegram No. 201, Secret, of the 30th ultimo.

The Servian offers embraced the following points:—

The administration by Servia of Albania under the suzerainty of the Sultan.
The nomination of the future ruler of Albania by Austria.
The granting of special facilities to Austria for the entry of her goods into Servia, or any part of Old Servia that might fall to Servia in the repartition of the Balkan territories, and into the vilayet of Kossovo.

The object of this policy would be to exclude Italy entirely from Albania, and, although no answer has up to the moment of writing this despatch been received from Count Berchtold, it will be interesting to learn if any reply is to be made by the Austrian Government to these advances. The whole matter has been conducted in a very secret manner, Sophia being chosen as the scene of the negotiations solely, I understand, on the grounds that there would be less chance of any facts concerning them leaking out than might be possible in Belgrade or Vienna.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[52386] No. 172.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 90.)
Sir,

Bucharest, December 3, 1912.

DURING the past fortnight reports received in Roumania of ill-treatment by the Greeks of the Koutzo-Vlachs in the districts now under Greek occupation have provoked a certain amount of agitation in Bucharest on behalf of the Koutzo-Vlachs.

The agitation culminated in a meeting of protest held in a public hall in Bucharest on the 1st instant. The meeting was largely attended. Patriotic speeches were delivered, and a resolution was passed by acclamation to call upon the Roumanian Government to see to it that the rights and the honour of Roumania should not receive injury. I am told, however, by one who was present that the noisy enthusiasm displayed lacked the mark of spontaneity, and it is generally believed that the meeting was engineered by the Government.

After the meeting a procession of demonstrators, largely composed of students, paraded the streets with banners flying and shouts of "Long live autonomous Macedonia!" "Long live the Union of all the Roumanians!"

There was an attempt to make a demonstration before the Greek Legation, but this was prevented by the police, though the demonstrators are said to have broken the windows of a few Greek shops.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[52387] No. 173.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 91.)
Sir,

Bucharest, December 3, 1912.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs at his weekly reception to-day complained in a friendly manner of what he called Great Britain's lack of interest in Roumania.

I venture to remind you that this is not the first time that M. Majorescu has made this complaint. He did so on the 23rd July, as reported by Mr. Vaughan (see his

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despatch No. 50), and again to me during a lunch party which M. Maioresco was good enough to give in my honour on the 7th September last. On this latter occasion M. Maioresco's remarks seemed to me to be more or less of a private nature, and as I was quite new to the post I told M. Maioresco that I would prefer to take no action upon them until longer experience of this post should have enabled me better to judge the bearing of what he had said; but I assured him, of course, that it was not in any way my Government's desire to appear neglectful. In the circumstances I did not feel called upon to report the conversation, though while in England in September last I mentioned it privately to Sir A. Nicolson.

The complaint made yesterday was made with such deliberation and earnestness that it is my duty to report M. Maioresco's language officially. His Excellency began by reminding me of his previous conversations, and went on to say that he much desired to see more profitable ("utiles") relations with Great Britain. He noticed a lack of interest on Great Britain's part which was all the more remarkable as Roumania would one day have as her Queen an English Princess. I told M. Maioresco that you, Sir, had said to me in London that you desired that Roumania should not consider herself neglected, and I asked his Excellency if he could tell me precisely in what way the supposed indifference had manifested itself. His Excellency said he would mention one specific sign of the lack of interest he complained of. The representatives of the Powers —he mentioned specially the Austrian, French, and Russian Ministers—spoke openly to him about the international situation, whereas the British representative, though he attended regularly the weekly reception of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, did not do so, conversation during his visits being generally confined to an exchange of compliments ("amabilités"). For instance, his Excellency said, he had no idea from me what was the British attitude in regard to (1) the question of Albanian autonomy, and the kindred question of the treatment of the Koutzo Vlachs, on whose schools and churches in European Turkey Roumania spent annually a sum of 30,000*l.*, provided for in the budget, and whom Roumania could not see deprived of the rights which they had enjoyed under Turkish rule; and (2) the question of the rectification of the Dobrudja frontier. My silence on these points, which closely interested Roumania, argued a lack of appreciation of the very important rôle played by her in the present crisis as a peace factor. His Excellency said that there had been moments, especially last week, when the mobilisation of Roumania might have started a general conflagration. Instead of this Roumania had stood firm in her resolution to stay quiet as long as there was a hope of the Great Powers remaining in agreement. Such an attitude merited proper appreciation.

I promised M. Maioresco to report his remarks to you.

I gathered that his Excellency was especially anxious to learn your views on the points named in view of the conference of Ambassadors which I understand you, Sir, are proposing. His Excellency foresees that Austria will raise the claims of Roumania at this conference. He feels assured of their receiving favourable consideration at the hands of Austria, France, and Russia, and he hopes that this will be the case with Great Britain.

Not having had time properly to study the print sections which arrived by last messenger on Sunday night, I did not think I could usefully attempt to enlighten M. Maioresco as to the British attitude in regard to the points named by his Excellency, and I merely reminded him that, as regards the rectification of the Dobrudja frontier, his Excellency had never even informed me what were the Roumanian claims.

I ought to say that I cannot but feel that there is some truth in M. Maioresco's observation as to the barrenness of my conversation with him. He is, I feel pretty sure, more reticent with me than with many of my colleagues, and I attribute this in large measure to the fact that the latter have more up-to-date information than I have in this time of rapidly moving events. At a time of crisis like the present the print sections reach me too late to be of much more than historical interest, and although so far as regards my own personal requirements I should be diffident in asking for more recent information, yet I feel that I should be in a better position to talk with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and with my colleagues if I were kept more up to date, and I therefore venture to beg that I may in future be supplied with the telegraphic sections. In this connection I would recall the fact that the Bucharest messenger service now no longer passes through the hands of a Roumanian chancery servant, but is from London to Bucharest in British hands.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[52449]

No. 174.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December 9.*)

(No. 102.)

Sir,

Belgrade, December 4, 1912.

MY Austrian colleague whom I saw this morning is inclined to take a far more optimistic view of the situation than was the case some days ago. In his opinion a very considerable *détente* had set in lately. I enquired why under the circumstances Austria was continuing to make military preparations on such a large scale. M. d'Urgon replied that these preparations had been much exaggerated but that in view of the attitude of Russia at one moment it had been necessary to take precautions. He admitted, however, that there was considerable unrest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slavonia and Croatia, though the latter province would never be a danger to Austria. This unrest was mostly due to agitators from Servia, hence the stringent military measures adopted in the neighbourhood of the Servian frontier.

He assured me that nothing was further from Count Berchtold's thoughts than to put military pressure on Servia. On the contrary, his Government desired to proceed in as conciliatory a manner as possible and, as proof of this desire, he told me that since the 10th November, when he first explained the Austrian point of view regarding the Adriatic to M. Pashitch, he had not again mentioned the subject to his Excellency.

M. d'Urgon then read to me a despatch he had yesterday addressed to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs in which he stated that he detected signs of far less uncompromising tone in Servia and now had good hope of an ultimate favourable settlement of the Austro-Servian differences.

In support of this opinion, he referred to two articles which have appeared in the "Samouprava" of the 2nd and 3rd instant (19th and 20th November old style), translations of which I have the honour to enclose. These articles are unfortunately somewhat lengthy but are well worth attention as they set forth in full the views of the Servian Government regarding the proposal to create an autonomous Albania and enlarge upon the injustice that will be committed if Servia be excluded from the possession of a port on the Adriatic, whilst their chief importance lies in the fact that each concludes with the assertion that, whatever the rights or wrongs of the case may be, Servia will submit to the decision of the Powers.

Under the circumstances M. d'Urgon is well entitled to be optimistic. He attributes this sudden change of tone to the Servian Government having finally grasped that they cannot expect military support from Russia and a disturbance of the peace of Europe for the purpose merely of securing for Servia a port upon the Adriatic.

I asked him, for my personal information, what would be the great objection to granting Servia a purely commercial port with a proviso of non-fortification and also whether he thought that if Austria now prevented Servia from having a port their future relations would be satisfactory.

He replied that such a condition as non-fortification soon became a dead letter and could not be relied upon. As instances he quoted Silistria, Batoumi, and other ports, but he acknowledged that the attitude his Government had been obliged to adopt would not lead to an improvement of feeling between Austria and Servia, and he was not able to anticipate with confidence that there would be any long period of peace in the Balkans.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure 1 in No. 174.

Extract from the "Samouprava" of November 19 (December 2), 1912.

(Translation.)

ASSUMING that the correspondent of the "Temps" is correctly informed, and that his statements really reflect the present views of the Austro-Hungarian Government respecting the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia, we declare that it is agreeable to us at last to hear a decided, clear, and completely open statement in this direction. When this is once known, then it is much easier to carry on a discussion and to arrive at an understanding. In any case, when once this statement is made the situation becomes clearer, easier, and ripe for solution.

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We now ask to be allowed to make a few comments on this communiqué, because the present view of the Austro-Hungarian Government, notwithstanding all its clearness, still contains some dark points and inaccuracies and deficiencies.

1. First of all, it is not true that Austria-Hungary put forward no pretensions of an economical nature. As proof, we call attention to the statements made in the Delegations by most authoritative and distinguished members of that body, and to the fact that Count Berchtold not only did not deny them, but to a certain extent covered them by his authority by stating that he was glad that the Delegations agreed with his policy. Statements to this effect were also made outside the Delegations by distinguished Austrian political personages, who, it must be assumed, know the views of the Austro-Hungarian Government. The Vienna correspondent "T." of the great German paper, "Frankfurter Zeitung," expresses himself in the same sense in a telegram from Vienna on the 28th November, in which he says: "Informed circles here state that even when the Servians occupy Durazzo, this will not be a reason for Austria to intervene, because Austria, before clearing the way for friendly relations towards the neighbouring country, has not only the question of the Adriatic port, which is wrongly given the first place, to settle with Servia, but a whole series of political and economic questions."

2. It is not true that Austria-Hungary has made no military demonstrations against Servia. In proof of our statement we refer to the great military measures taken by Austria-Hungary, which are a public secret, and which during the last few days were crowned by the presentation before the Legislature of three urgent Bills of an altogether special military character—and this at a moment when Servia is still at war and when not only on her northern frontier, but also in the whole country, so to say, she has not a single soldier, all her troops being on the battlefield in Turkey.

3. If Italy and Austria-Hungary fifteen years ago concluded between themselves a secret treaty respecting Albania, why should this treaty also bind the Balkan States and Servia, seeing that such a treaty concerns Turkish lands and possessions and has no international value? Further, if Albania, according to that treaty, can be both Turkish and independent, why can she not be Greek and Servian? Or why could Servia not have her territorial outlet on the Adriatic, when by doing so she takes nothing which is Austria-Hungary's, and when she has taken what she asks for from Turkey by war, a land which once was Servian, as stated by Todor Ipen, for many years Austro-Hungarian [?] in those districts? To the contention that this is Albanian littoral, besides what we have already said, we reply: Dulcigno was also Albanian littoral, and, although Montenegro did not conquer it, it was, with the consent of Austria-Hungary, given by Europe to that State. Why should the same not be done with San Giovanni di Medua, Alessio, Plava, seeing that the Servian Army took this part of the littoral by war at the cost of great sacrifices both in blood and in money?

4. In the communiqué in question nowhere is it openly and clearly said what Italy and Austria-Hungary really mean by Albania. It speaks of the whole of Albania, but fixes no limits, and this is a most important point for settling the question, because Albania as an ethnical province never existed hitherto.

5. We understand and respect every struggle for one's national rights, and we would have understood the struggles of the Albanians. The Albanians, however, neither before nor during the war asked for territorial autonomy. All they asked for was that they should not pay taxes and that they should not serve in the army! Are these demands of a people fit for an independent existence? And is this what Italy and Austria-Hungary so strongly advocate? Ismail Kemal came to Avlona from Vienna only a few days ago and declared himself president of some provisional Albanian Government not a single member of which is as yet known to anyone. It must not be lost sight of that during the war the Albanians either fought for the Turks and Turkey or joined the Servians, receiving their army without opposition. This is a most important factor.

6. So far as we know, we never asked for any passage or corridor across Albanian territory.

7. We fully understand the disposition of European public opinion and that of the Great European Powers for peace. We, who are still at war, can appreciate this much better, but we consider that an injustice is being done to us by those organs of European public opinion, among which are some very important and respectable ones—in the first place, the great English newspapers such as the "Times," and others—in that they do not rightly understand the question and merely represent us as a nation who want to disturb the peace of Europe. We must admit that the European

Socialists, who very energetically defend the cause of peace, are more just towards the Balkan States and especially towards Servia.

We are thoroughly convinced of the justice of our fundamental demands, and, as a proof that it is not we who want to disturb the peace of Europe, so dear to all, it is with pleasure and without a word that we accept beforehand the decision of this question either by The Hague Tribunal or by a conference of the Great Powers.

We believe that nothing more can be asked of us.

Enclosure 2 in No. 174.

Extract from the "Samouprava" of November 20 (December 3), 1912.

(Translation.)

WHEN at the Congress of Berlin Lord Beaconsfield proposed that Bosnia and the Herzegovina should be handed over to Austrian administration, speaking of peace and order in these provinces as a necessity for peace and order in Austrian territory bordering on these provinces, he stated: "That the two provinces which possess no elements for good administration should be turned over to the administration of one of the neighbouring Powers, strong and interested in the maintenance of peace."

This proposal was at the time accepted and confirmed by Europe, and the two provinces were occupied by Austria-Hungary and received Austro-Hungarian administration. Subsequent developments are well known to everyone.

These provinces were inhabited by a people whose healthy national sense could not be denied. They were of one race, had one language, and had more than once struggled for freedom. The leaders of the Bosno-Herzegovinian insurrection also addressed written memoranda to the Great Powers in which they set forth the necessity of the freedom and independence of the Bosno-Herzegovinian nation.

Nevertheless, Europe at the Congress decreed the occupation of these provinces by Austria-Hungary, and placed them under Austro-Hungarian [?] for two reasons: (*a*), because she (Europe) doubted their capability for a good self-administration; (*b*), because it was recognised that it was necessary for Austria-Hungary to maintain peace in her territories, which were in contact with Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

And the Albanians, more generally called Arnauts, who possess neither one common language (they have three languages), nor unity of race (they are of Servian, Turkish, and Greek origin, besides being descendants of the old inhabitants of the Balkans), nor any national culture (they are, from a cultural point of view, much below the Serbs in Bosnia and the Herzegovina), should to-day, thirty-four years after the Berlin Congress, be granted, in accordance with Austria-Hungary's proposal, autonomy and independent government! . . . . .

What sort of a State ought this to be? This question is asked by everyone who looks for the consolidation of the new political situation in the Balkans with a sincere wish that lasting peace should be introduced into this part of Europe.

The Serbs in Bosnia and the Herzegovina fought for their freedom and independence. They begged Europe to decree them their freedom. Europe nevertheless placed them under foreign administration because she doubted of their ability for a good administration, and because she recognised as just the demand of Austria-Hungary that peace should be secured in regions bordering on her frontier possessions.

The Albanians fought against the State when it tried to force them to fulfil their obligations towards the State—payment of taxes and military service. They fought in order to free themselves from the elementary obligations which every State must demand of its subjects.

Can Europe find guarantees for a good State administration under such conditions and give the Albanians that which thirty-four years ago she refused to the far more cultivated Serbs?

This is another question raised by to-day's developments of circumstances in the Balkans.

There have been occasions in history when a nation living under foreign rule has revolted and struggled for freedom, and, if successful in the struggle, obtained it, but, if unsuccessful, its slavery became all the harder. This has usually been the case with the insurrections of the Serbs, whom the Turks stifled in their blood. England alone granted the conquered Boers full autonomy after these had been completely beaten in their revolutionary movement, and they were allowed to keep the rights they enjoyed

before their defeat. Such an attitude is undoubtedly to the honour to the name of England.

In fighting the Turks the Balkan States had in the Albanians the most blood-thirsty enemies; they made use of treachery and ruse, and killed the Servian soldiers and cut to pieces their dead. Both Turks and Albanians have been beaten by the Balkan nations; and while the Turks, because they are beaten, lose their Empire in Europe, the Albanians, on the other hand, on the proposal of Austria and although they are beaten, must receive their freedom and the independence of their State. What would they have obtained had they beaten the Balkan States?

However, the Balkan States, who request that Albania should be divided amongst them because such a partition is an imperative necessity for peace and order in their own countries, do not intend thereby to enslave the Arnauts. On the contrary, they accept them in their State as their own citizens with the same rights and privileges as their other subjects, those who defeated them. For in these countries there exist no different administrations for the different districts, nor High Treason Courts, nor exceptional measures. The laws in force there are the same for all. By taking the Albanians under their administration the Balkan States would therefore give them everything which only England could give them.

But this is not wanted. It is not the Albanians who do not want it, seeing that they surrender *en masse* to our authorities and behave quietly. This is especially the case with the Arnauts in Albania. Those around the Lab and Kossovo at first showed great resistance to the Servian army, being afraid of revenge for the ills they had formerly done the Serbs. Now, when they have seen that there is no revenge, they also have begun to behave quietly. The mass of the Albanians begin to see and feel that with the advent of the Servians an altogether different order of things has commenced and that this new order is good. And there is no doubt that in due time they also will become good and peaceful subjects, just as did those fellow-countrymen of theirs who came under Servian rule in earlier days.

Austria-Hungary, however, does not want this at any cost.

Fifteen years ago she came to an understanding with Italy that Albania should either remain Turkish or become autonomous. To-day, when Albania can no longer be Turkish, it must, according to that understanding, become an autonomous State.

The agreement between Italy and Austria-Hungary that Albania—in case of its separation from Turkey—should come under neither of these two States can only be binding on these two. Under no circumstances, however, can this agreement be binding on a third party who was not a party to it. It therefore cannot bind the Balkan States. Besides, it is evident that it cannot have the character of an international political instrument, because it was concluded only between two States and because it has not been ratified by Europe. This agreement can therefore be of value only for the two contracting States so long as they wish to keep it. It can have no binding character for the Balkan States; should this be the case, the result would be an inextricable chaos in international relations.

The contention of the Austrian and Hungarian press that should Servia obtain territory on the Adriatic Sea across Albania this sea would thereby be closed to the Austro-Hungarian fleet is only a surmise and that a most improbable one.

This was very nicely explained at the Delegations by M. Kramarz. Free movement on the sea, as was said by M. Paul Leroi Beaulieu in the "Economiste," must not be the monopoly of the Great Powers, because this is against the very soul of the civilisation of mankind. The issue of Servia on the Adriatic Sea would, on the contrary, be a guarantee both for Italy and Austria-Hungary, as neither of these two States could, at a given moment, become absolute mistress of this sea, for the reason that there would always be two States to oppose the one who made the attempt.

Moreover, this outlet is necessary to Servia for her economic independence, to which she has undoubted rights. Refusal to grant her this outlet means opposition to her economic independence.

What reasons could Europe have for this?

All the same, we said so yesterday and we again repeat it to-day: Servia will not endeavour to elude the decision of the European Court regarding the autonomy of Albania, although she feels that this political combination is directed against her and against her vital interests. But she has confidence in the love of justice of Europe, and expects that Europe will take just as much into consideration the vital requirements of the Balkan States for peace and order in their countries as she did the similar requirements of Austria-Hungary at the Congress of Berlin.

[52421] No. 175.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 141.)

Sir, *Sophia, December 4, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 214 of to-day's date concerning the conclusion of the armistice negotiations, I have the honour to report that the Bulgarian delegates suggested that Sophia would be the most suitable place for the conduct of the peace negotiations. To this the Ottoman delegates assented, but the Greek representatives refused, and suggested Constantinople, which was in return refused by the Bulgarians. London was then proposed by the Turks as being a good neutral centre; it was accepted at once by all.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[52423] No. 176.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 503.)

Sir, *Berlin, December 4, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Crown Prince of Roumania arrived in Berlin yesterday on his return from attending the funeral of the Countess of Flanders at Brussels. His Royal Highness was entertained at luncheon by the Emperor at Potsdam, and Herr von Kiderlen was also invited.

The "Kölnische Zeitung" published a telegram last night from its Berlin correspondent pointing out that it is quite natural that people should connect the visit of the Roumanian Crown Prince to the Emperor with the events in the Balkans, but His Royal Highness could hardly pass through Berlin without paying his respects to the Emperor. The paper emphasised the fact that Herr von Kiderlen was invited to the luncheon at Potsdam, and that naturally politics would be touched upon. There was, however, no question of a political mission in the Crown Prince's visit. The telegram added that it is uncertain whether His Royal Highness would remain some days or whether he would leave to-day.

The Conservative "Kreuz-Zeitung," on the other hand, sees great political significance in the Crown Prince's visit, and even devotes a leading article to it. In speaking of the solidarity of the Triple Alliance, the "Kreuz" almost hints that the real Triple Alliance is now composed of Germany, Austria, and Roumania, who are now, it says, particularly close friends both in a military and political sense. It adds that apparently the Triple Alliance had made an agreement with Roumania, and that the visits of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the Roumanian Crown Prince, and the chief of the Austrian general staff to Berlin, and of the Austrian army inspector, Baron von Hötzendorf, to Bucharest, all tended to show that there was no doubt that the diplomacy of the Triple Alliance was intended to demonstrate to their adversaries that they meant to see that in the settlement of the Balkan question their views would be energetically represented, and that they would not tolerate any unnecessary prejudice to the interests of any one of their members.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[52421] No. 177.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 505.)

Sir, *Berlin December 4, 1912.*

IN reviewing the Chancellor's recent speech to the Reichstag, most of the prominent German newspapers have contented themselves with calling attention to the moderation, combined with firmness, which characterised his utterances, without going into much detail or underlining his words. Some critics considered that the Chancellor was somewhat chary of information, and that he might have risen to a higher level at a moment of such great international importance, but on the whole it was generally admitted that it was difficult for him to say more than he did. The language he used

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with regard to the alliance with Austria-Hungary and his allusions to Russia were regarded as a counterpoise to the communiqué which the Imperial Government had issued a few days before for the purpose of allaying the panic on the Bourse, and but few papers attempted to attach more weight to his utterances than the Chancellor meant them to bear.

It has remained for the "Kölnische Zeitung," one of the most important papers in Germany, and one much used by the Government for semi-official communications, to underline the Chancellor's words and to give them, indeed, a somewhat bellicose significance—to adopt, in fact, a tone at variance with the studiously moderate language used throughout this crisis by the Imperial Foreign Office.

This article is entitled "War or Peace?" After calling attention to the efforts being made by "outside influences" to lay Germany under suspicion and to sow distrust of her policy, the article observed that the country must be grateful to the Chancellor for having given such a clear exposition of what that policy was. It added that the unmistakable hint to the Powers of the Triple *Entente* which his words contained was both valuable and necessary. It showed them that Germany's future and Germany's safety lay more than ever in her alliances, and that, therefore, if she drew the sword in accordance with her duty as an ally, she would be fighting also for her own vital interests. It was for these interests, which were so closely bound up with the future of her ally, that Germany would fight, not, as was foolishly stated both at home and abroad, for a dispute over a worthless port on the Adriatic.

The article then called attention to the acknowledged moderation with which Austria-Hungary was defending her economic interests, but pointed out that if Austria-Hungary now lowered her flag before Servian obstinacy her prestige would be so weakened that her value to Germany as an ally would be sensibly diminished; moreover, more humiliating demands would be made upon her at the very first opportunity, and then war would be unavoidable.

In concluding this portion of its article the "Kölnische Zeitung" observes:—

"We have in this place often called the attention of our readers to the reason why the situation as it stands at present contains so many disturbing elements. Only a word from Russia is required to reduce Servia's megalomania to proper bounds. For this word the world is waiting in vain, and nothing indeed has transpired to show that Russia's partners in the Triple *Entente* have taken any special pains to induce her to open her lips. Until, therefore, Russia has spoken the war spectre will be still with us, and the Chancellor is perfectly right; the whole people will stand behind the Imperial Government if we are forced to fight, not on account of a harbour in the Adriatic, but for the maintenance of a powerful ally at her full strength, and consequently for our own strength and security in the future."

The article then goes into other points in the speech, and ends with another flourish of trumpets and rattle of the sabre, but the part of the article which I have quoted above is the important part, and it seems to have caused some uneasiness in financial circles, where it was considered to have had its inspiration in the Press Bureau of the Imperial Foreign Office. A semi-official communiqué was therefore at once published by the latter in the "Frankfurter Zeitung" to the effect that the article represented in no way the sentiments of the Imperial Foreign Office, as could easily be seen by a reference to the Chancellor's speech, in which special mention had been made of the efforts which all the Great Powers in common accord were making to secure a peaceful issue out of the present situation.

This *démenti* would not in itself carry much conviction, as there are observations in the Chancellor's speech which, with due allowance for journalistic embellishment, may be said to be fairly faithfully reproduced in the article in question, but, as a matter of fact, I have heard from one or two independent sources that the article did not receive its inspiration from Berlin but from Vienna.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[52360] No. 178

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 1025. Confidential.)
Sir,
Constantinople, December 4, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at the Dardanelles, relative to reported massacres in the neighbourhood of Keshan.

I have received no other news of massacres of Christians on a large scale by Turkish troops in these districts, and Mr. Vice-Consul Palmer's report seems to be founded on somewhat meagre evidence.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 178.

Vice-Consul Palmer to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 72. Confidential.)
Sir,
Dardanelles, December 2, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice some scanty details of the recent massacres near Keshan. Communication with Gallipoli is so irregular that it may be some time before a report from there can reach Constantinople.

The following villages appear to have been pillaged and burnt: Keshan, Mavros, Carabouna, Caratchali, Ipsola, Malgara.

In the following massacres, with all their accompanying atrocities, took place as well: Bairamitch, Cadi Keny, Cavak, Iksemit, Choeal, Bulair.

There are many versions as to the cause of this outburst. According to one, telegraph wires had been cut, and troops were sent to discover and punish the culprits.

Upon their arrival, they were fired upon by the Greek and Bulgarian peasantry, and this caused the wholesale massacre.

The son of the French consul at Gallipoli told me that the Laz redif responsible for the massacres sell their booty openly in the streets there, and that he has seen officers purchase it. About 100 of the richest inhabitants of Gallipoli have come here in fear of their lives, and it is from them that the above details were obtained.

It is to be feared that the Lazes have now got out of hand, for an attempt was made upon the principal flour-mill of Gallipoli by seven of them. A hole was dug out in the wall at night, but fortunately a patrol arrived and caught them. Four of them were wounded and died afterwards, while the other three will be court-martialled.

I have, &c.
C. E. S. PALMER.

[52362] No. 179.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 1027.)
Sir,
Constantinople, December 4, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of a memorandum by Mr. Heathcote-Smith, which has been forwarded to me by His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, relative to the present financial and commercial situation in that city.

I venture to suggest that this memorandum may be of interest to the Committee of Imperial Defence.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 179.

Memorandum by Vice-Consul Heathcote-Smith on Financial and Commercial Situation in Smyrna.

Market and Credit.

DESPITE the successive wars Turkey has had to sustain since September 1911, the Smyrna market to-day shows a greater steadiness than might have been expected.

With the advent of the Balkan conflict a momentary crisis was approached, but the normal conditions that prevailed throughout the period of the Italian war soon set in again, and though money is tight, credits restricted, and dealers are forced to follow a somewhat hand-to-mouth policy, there have been no bankruptcies of the slightest importance, and there is no panic, or even undue commotion, now threatening the market.

The banks are by now accustomed to the situation, and feel they have gauged just how far they can help their customers without running risks, while advances on merchandise have never been discontinued by them to merchants of any standing. In a previous memorandum it was noted that the system adopted here (especially by the local Greek banks) of refunding deposits before maturity in return for a discount, was largely responsible for the failure of the Bank of Mitylene in 1911. Another side of this bad system has been illustrated during the recent tension. Banks appealed to for the refunding of deposits not yet due were forced to reveal their inability to satisfy the demands made, and this introduces an unwelcome factor into a situation already dominated by anxiety. The banks of Greece having been granted the facility of a moratorium, the Bank of Athens' head office took advantage of this, and though its Smyrna branch continued to meet all legitimate engagements, the action of its head-quarters was felt as far from reassuring.

Rates of Discount and Exchange.

The Smyrna export season starts in June, is at its fullest pressure in the succeeding months, and slackens off towards the middle of October.

Naturally gold has to be largely introduced at this period, but being contraband of war there was less facility for bringing it from Europe or Constantinople this year. Consequently the banks had not sufficient cash in their safes, and the price of exchange declined considerably, especially in the days of tension when the Balkan War was breaking out.

The normal exchange is 110 for sight cheque on London, and about 108½ for three months paper. The exchange once more stands at these figures, but at the end of October the sight cheque on London stood as low as 106½, while three months paper touched 104¾. Such low rates had not been experienced for a great many years.

This drop in the exchange was one reason why the banks could not assist merchants, because banks were obliged to keep a cash reserve large enough to meet a possible run on their deposits, and most banks had more advantage in investing their money in exchange than even in making advances to the market at the legal maximum of 9 per cent.

At one moment only the Ottoman Bank was able to help the market, for it was receiving the Government money (especially the bedel or military exemption tax) in large quantities, and the difference between buying and selling prices for it rose from the customary 2 per thousand even to 1 per cent. During the crisis all who had any ready money began to speculate in exchange, and the market, helped by this kind of investment, and the reduction of the export due to the prohibition on cereals and the high freight ruling, rose towards its present equilibrium.

Imports.

The customs statistics show encouraging results up till quite recently, that is, throughout the length of the Italian War. As was natural, food-stuffs did particularly well, and though at times cautious methods were followed, the totals do not fall behind those of previous years. In manufactured goods a decrease has been noticeable, though so far it is small, what may be called the "European" population of the town having shown no signs of a slackening consumption. The falling off, indeed, was

mainly due to the banks refusing full assistance and to Europe granting smaller credits to buyers.

Now, however, that many shipping lines have discontinued their calls in these ports, and that sufficient time since the outbreak of the Balkan War has elapsed for the working off of previous orders, a sharp decline may be expected in all classes of "bazaar" goods—that is, the cheaper qualities of imports destined for the poorer inhabitants and the Turk of the interior—for as is natural with the tremendous exodus since the war's inception, business up-country is at a standstill, and all orders have been cancelled.

Re-exports.

During the year the island's trade naturally suffered somewhat from the elimination of the Turkish flag from all shipping. But a heavy blow fell on the transit trade when the seizure of Rhodes and the other islands caused all transit goods for that destination to become *ipso facto* re-exports, with a fresh duty to pay before they could enter Rhodes. Now, by the still more recent occupation of other islands by the Greeks, nearly all goods for the archipelago will be subjected to a double duty by passing through Smyrna. It is, of course, only dealers importing goods destined for transhipment, and which never leave the lighters, who can escape these double dues, while all merchandise requiring handling, sorting, or other preparation, is now likely to be exposed to this second duty.

The long-felt need for bonded warehouses now becomes a necessity if Smyrna is not to lose her entrepôt trade.

War Risks.

The rates actually being charged are 1½ per cent., but end September contracts, many of which are now being carried out, were covered at ¾ per cent.

The principal obstacles which the present war has caused for the Smyrna overseas trade have been, firstly, the above high rates; secondly, the Greek Government's attitude in declaring "food-stuffs for the Turkish Government" as contraband of war, by which, for example, rice consigned to private individuals has been seized and vexatious delays introduced; thirdly, the general restriction of credits and consequent decreased export to the Levant; and fourthly, this diminished trade affording but little scope to foreign shippers in view of the fact that freights for general cargo to the Levant are fixed, better opportunities for freights offered elsewhere, as the discontinuance of so many shipping services here show.

Exports.

The wealth of this district—its crops—proved exceptionally abundant in 1912, without, however, there being any record crops. Cereals and fruit did especially well.

Owing to the speculative tendency of merchants here, good years have often proved disastrous to many exporters (as 1911), for they have engaged in extravagant forward sales and then later found themselves obliged to fulfil their engagements at a loss, or suffer the consequences of their inability. The Italian War served as a useful corrective.

Shipments generally throughout the whole season (June to end September) were made clear of forward engagements, and both the up-country producers and the agents at this seaport made good profits.

In England rain destroyed the barley crop throughout the country. This was Turkey's opportunity, with its barley so excellent for malting purposes. The market advanced from the outset, and the highest prices ever known were reached. Beans, too, proved an excellent crop, and were largely bought by the continent.

The previous two yields of the Smyrna fruits—sultanas and figs—had been under average, and there were no stocks on hand in May. Consequently there has been an active demand throughout the season, and prices were good.

Tobacco was a small crop, and so far little has found its way on to the market.

It was in October that the crisis began, and the export of cereals was then prohibited. Fortunately the bulk of the produce had been already marketed, though the upland barleys still remained for shipment.

The Cassaba Railway along the Hermus valley was used for seventeen days consecutively for the exclusive transport of troops, and business nearly approached a

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standstill. In mid-November the prohibition was raised, and some new business in barley is now being done, but at reduced prices, as buying countries have been satisfying their requirements elsewhere.

Immediate Prospects.

Now that the rains are falling the winter field work should begin, and the great shortage of labour is looked on with some apprehension. Many who know the country well, however, believe that the women will literally put their hand to the plough, and that the area under cultivation next year will not be found to have appreciably decreased. Produce such as tobacco, the culture of which depends more particularly on the number of hands available, is, however, likely to suffer. The probability of many Macedonian refugees, who are excellent workers, finding their home in this fertile district, is also a factor, but they will not presumably arrive early enough to help materially in this winter's work.

Commercially the future depends so entirely on political events that nothing can be forecasted, but the stability shown throughout the Italian War, and even at the present moment, is at least a hopeful sign.

[52364] No. 180.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 1029.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 4, 1912.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 1087 of the 2nd December, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general, giving the names of and the number of days during which British ships were kept at my disposal in the port of Constantinople.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 180.

Consul-General Eyres to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 30.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 2, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report, for your Excellency's information, that the Ellerman liner steam-ship "City of Khios" was recalled by me to this port from Rodosto on the 4th ultimo, and reached this on the 5th, since which date she has been lying here at the disposal of His Majesty's Ambassador until the 30th ultimo. The master was informed in writing at 3 P.M. on that date that she was free to proceed. She is, however, waiting sailing orders from owners.

The Khedivial Mail steam-ship "Towfikieh" was detained here from Saturday, the 9th, to Monday, 11th ultimo, and then was replaced by order of His Majesty's Government by the steam-ship "Abbassieh," which remained here till the 30th ultimo. She was then released.

The tug "Hawk" was also retained, at the rate of £T. 9 per diem, from the 9th to the 12th ultimo inclusive. She was then released, and another arrangement was made on the 13th ultimo with the "Richard Greeh" for £T. 2 per diem. The latter was released on the 2nd instant.

I have, &c.
H. C. A. EYRES.

[52369] No. 181.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 1035.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 5, 1912.*

THOUGH the permanent suppression of the principal opposition newspapers has shorn the Ottoman press of its most interesting features, a perusal of the somewhat anodine articles, which have appeared in those newspapers whose existence has not been cut short by the hand of the court-martial, conveys some idea of the views of the less chauvinistic elements in this country with regard to the present state of affairs.

The chief topics of discussion are naturally the question of the conclusion of peace and Turkey's future policy with regard to the two groups of Powers in Europe. In the earlier stages of the war all mention of Turkish reverses was rigorously excluded from the press. The news, however, of the overwhelming defeats in Macedonia which has gradually filtered through, coupled with the proximity of the enemy, has engendered a more pacific frame of mind. Some writers now even go so far as to recognise openly that Roumelia is lost. The majority, however, persist in shutting their eyes to facts, and cannot or will not recognise the sacrifices which this country will in all probability be called on to make. Peace is essential, they are unanimous in declaring, but there can be no talk of peace under anything but honourable conditions, especially "after the glorious victories which our intrepid soldiers have won at Tchataldja." As a rule, no mention is made of what actually are these conditions which will be considered honourable by Turkey and acceptable to the allies. The "Sabah" has, however, at last come forward with a definite programme. The solution which this paper suggests, is the application of the terms of the treaty of San Stefano. Turkey would not think such a solution derogatory to her dignity, having accepted it once before, while the allies would be happy to secure definitely what they thought they had got thirty-four years ago. Turkey cannot give up Adrianople. It would be suicide to do so from the point of view of her position in Europe. "A new frontier between two States does not always imply the end of conflicts and ambitions, the inauguration of an era of good understanding. To cede Adrianople would be to expose ourselves to fresh perils." The Bulgarians having failed to capture Adrianople cannot object to its retention by Turkey, and even if it had fallen it ought to be restored to her in the interests of peace. Turkey, who profiting by the lessons of the war, will become a great civilised military Power, would be ready to enter into an alliance with the Balkan States if peace were made on acceptable conditions which left her both a European Power and a Balkan State.

As to what should be Turkey's policy in the future the inventive faculty of the contributors to the local newspapers has so far failed to produce any very satisfactory programme. They are loud in their laments at the perfidy of Europe, and particularly England and France, in abandoning Turkey and the *status quo*. Some writers, however, are frank enough to admit that it is not sentiment but interests which dictate the policy of the Great Powers, and discuss more or less dispassionately the respective advantages of friendship with the Triple *Entente*, which urges Turkey to give way to the Balkan confederation, or the Triple Alliance, which urges resistance. They seem, moreover, to appreciate that both groups are anything but disinterested, and that their attitude is for the moment dependent on the different phases of the Servian question, and they openly confess that Turkey is friendless unless she can buy a friend, and that, until she can find the wherewithal to do so, she will remain the catspaw of whichever group she joins. One paper maintains that the Ottoman Empire should stand by itself away from Europe, from whom it has never derived the slightest advantage. The rest, however, are agreed that Turkey should enter some combination of Powers. Great Britain is looked on as a broken reed, but Germany, Russia, and the Balkan league are each put forward as possible allies. The suggestion put forward by the "Times," that Turkey should remain absolutely neutral, has not been received with any enthusiasm. Ever since she entered the concert of Powers, the "Sabah" says, Turkey has suffered. But she cannot help herself. Neutrality is for her an impossibility. If, in accordance with the advice given by the "Times" she made a peace at any price and surrendered an Adriatic port to Servia, the Triple Alliance would not consider this the act of a neutral. And why should Turkey be told she must at all costs remain neutral while no such advice is given to the Balkan States?

In the meantime, while discussions continue as to the line of action which this country should adopt, the press cannot refrain from giving expression, sometimes

openly, sometimes by hints, to the hope which is entertained by every Turk that history will repeat itself, and that, as in 1878, Turkey may still be able to profit by the rivalries of the Powers to pull something out of the fire.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[52370] No. 182.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 1036. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 4, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose two despatches, Nos. 73 and 74, Confidential, of the 18th and 25th November, from Mr. Fontana, His Majesty's consul at Aleppo, reporting on the state of effervescence and disorder in the Zeitun region of the Aleppo vilayet.

In view of the past history of Zeitun, and especially the incidents there at the time of the Armenian massacres in 1896, it is perhaps not surprising that recent events in Turkey in Europe and the capital should have a special echo in the northern portions of the province of Aleppo. Though the Armenians have behaved well and fought well during the Balkan war, they, in common with the Arabs and Kurds, have been prospecting as to their possible fate in the eventuality of further disruption of the Turkish State, and a noticeable feature is that, though in the past and even after the big massacres in 1896 they preferred Turkish to Russian rule, the massacres at Adana in 1909, and the continual menace of the repetition of such a calamity have gradually brought them round to regarding a Russian occupation as less unbearable than their present existence.

An Armenian who has had special occasion to interest himself in the Hajin and Zeitun districts recently told a member of this embassy that Armenians there had recently received hints from German sources to the effect that in the event of a further break-up of Turkey Germany would be disposed to specially interest herself in Cilicia, i.e., the region in and around the Gulf of Alexandretta. The Armenian in question remarked that the "Germans were ticks," and that as their Emperor had immediately after the big Armenian massacres proclaimed himself the friend of Abdul Hamid and the protector of Islam, the Armenian people could never have confidence in the Germans, and would much prefer the Russians, who allowed the Armenian population in the Caucasus to increase and prosper. Even the Armenian Tashnack revolutionaries, who are anti-clerical and republican in doctrine, and consequently bitterly anti-Russian, have recently shown signs of modifying their attitude in this respect.

I have had the Minister of the Interior's attention drawn to the facts narrated in Mr. Fontana's despatches. Reshid Bey, who, as Vali of Aleppo acquired a first-hand knowledge of the regions in question, states that he is trying to arrange the matter of the deserters in concert with the Armenian Patriarch.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 182.

Consul Fontana to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 73. Confidential.)

Sir, *Aleppo, November 18, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 67 of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to report upon the present state of things in this vilayet.

I have received further letters from an Englishman at Ourfa speaking very highly of the mutessarif, Ismail Pasha, concerning whom I wrote in my despatch No. 67. Ismail Pasha recently called together sixteen Moslem and ten Christian notables, and addressed them cordially as fellow-citizens, urging them to work together for the common good at this time of national peril, and he exhorted the khojas among the Moslems to take care that the Christians were treated with kindness and respect. The meeting was a great success, and the Christians in general in that district seem to have been reassured and cheered accordingly. I mentioned the matter to my French colleague, who informed me that he also had

received excellent reports from the Catholic orders at Ourfa regarding the mutessarif. And we agreed that, should the present vali be recalled or transferred, the nomination of Ismail Pasha as Governor-General of Aleppo would be most desirable and greatly to the interest of the native Christians at this momentous time. And I understand that both M. Laporte and the Russian consul have suggested to their respective embassies the desirability of Ismail Pasha's nomination to Aleppo, which suggestion, as emanating primarily from myself, I would beg to submit to the consideration of your Excellency. The present vali, Vefik Bey, does not seem to possess the mental or physical stamina to cope with any emergency calling for much energy and determination. And such an emergency may present itself before long. It is whispered that the Committee of Union and Progress intend fomenting anti-Christian disturbances to avert the public attention from themselves at the close of this disastrous war. And, on the other hand, it is rumoured that the Armenians will take advantage of Ottoman reverses to create trouble and draw attention to themselves. The state of things in this region has been latterly extremely quiet, almost ominously so, and a reversion of feeling, easily and swiftly produced, may change the present apathy and despondency of the Moslems into fanatical excitement, and the assurance and tranquillity of the local Christians into unreasoning panic. To-day I heard that certain Germans have expressed their intention to betake themselves to the Armenian quarter for protection in case of anti-Christian disturbances. That quarter, consisting in stone houses and narrow alleys rather than streets, might easily be held by relatively few against many. But there the Germans would probably find themselves in the very thick of the fray. Their presence, however, might further any secret designs which the Armenians may now possibly be entertaining.

The news regarding Zeitun is not reassuring. An extra battalion of troops has been sent to Elbistan, the Zeitun garrison has been reinforced, and troops and mountain guns have been dispatched to Marash. Some thirty or forty soldiers have also been sent to each of the two Armenian villages of Fernouz and Gheben (near Zeitun), where troops had not previously been quartered. The Zeitun barracks are situated outside of the town. Some thirty troopers from there were some days ago told off to arrest four Armenian deserters from the army. The troops entered the town and surrounded but did not dare to arrest the deserters, who sat and smoked their cigarettes taking no notice of the soldiers. The soldiers withdrew, and the kaimakam informed the Armenian agas that unless they delivered up the deserters he would proclaim martial law. A day or two later one of the four deserters was shot by a soldier whilst passing before the barracks. Another Armenian, a native of Gheben, was murdered in cold blood by Moslems. According to letters received from the American mission at Marash by my American colleague, and from the French vice-consul there by M. Laporte, a large number of Moslem deserters from the army have taken refuge in the Zeitun district, where they are daily committing acts of brigandage on the mountain roads, and robbery in both Christian and Moslem villages. These acts, however, are represented by the authorities as committed by Armenians, although the Armenian deserters are relatively few, and the town and people of Zeitun are absolutely quiet. The Armenian Patriarch has telegraphed to the murakhas of Aleppo that the Minister of the Interior has received information that Armenian individuals and bands are robbing and pillaging in the Zeitun district. Thus the crimes of the armed Moslem deserters are imputed to the Armenians, and a pretext is found for the dispatch of troops to the Zeitun region.

And it is to be feared that the reinforcement of troops at and around Zeitun, following upon the ungrounded charges of brigandage brought against the Armenians by the Zeitun and Marash authorities, may indicate a design to utilise the present moment when the attention of the European Powers is occupied by the war in European Turkey, to provoke an outburst and create a pretext to utterly wipe out the Zeitun Armenians and demolish Zeitun. Such a climax has been hoped for for long past by the Moslems, if not by the authorities of Marash and Elbistan. Friendly representations to the vali with regard to the dispatch of troops to the Zeitun district have been made, at the request of the Armenian bishop, by the French consul, supported by our Russian colleague and myself. The vali, however, gave assurances that the dispatch of troops to the Zeitun neighbourhood was merely a measure taken to ensure public tranquillity there, and that small bodies of troops were being sent to other districts with a similar object.

Yesterday the French and Russian consuls, followed by the Armenian bishop, called upon me, and after discussing the situation at Zeitun, regarding which the bishop seems to feel deep anxiety, a telegram (of which the copy is enclosed) was drawn up

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jointly for dispatch by the Russian consul to his embassy. M. de Zimmermann undertook to request that copies of that telegram might be communicated to the British and French Embassies, and to the Armenian Patriarch, and M. Laporte informed the bishop that he would instruct his vice-consul at Marash by telegraph to proceed, if possible, to Zeitun and acquaint himself thoroughly with what was going on in that town and neighbourhood. The bishop, who is from the Zeitun kaza and knows the country well, has drawn up a map (upon which the enclosed sketch is based) of the Marash–Zeitun–Elbistan region, which he has handed to me. The relative position therein, however, of the important Armenian villages of Fernouz and Gheben, where troops are now quartered for the first time, are, according to Keepert's map, reversed. The sketch, nevertheless, may be of use for reference, as it indicates the approximate number of the Christian and Moslem population of the more important towns and villages, and their distance from Zeitun.

In this connection I would emphasise the fact that, although the authorities appear to attach much importance to the delivery into their hands of a few Armenian deserters from the army at Zeitun, they appear to ignore that of the existence of many Moslem deserters both in the Zeitun kaza and elsewhere in the vilayet. The Armenian murakhas urged, before the outbreak of war, that a general pardon might be granted to deserters returning to their regiments with their rifles, but his suggestion was not approved of.

The progress of the war between the Balkan States and Turkey has had a depressing, but salutory, effect among the upper-class Turks, whose former overweaning confidence in the military power of Turkey has received a rude shock. Feelings of bitter resentment are expressed for Germany and the Germans, and, as seems usual in times of misfortune, England is looked to as the only reliable friend. Such, however, does not seem to be the case when things are going smoothly. There seems to be a general desire, both among the Christians and the majority of the Arabs, that England should take over and govern the country. Among many of the Arab notables and tribal sheikhs the Turkish defeats have caused real rejoicing, in spite of the fact that those defeats have been inflicted by Christian States. The most important sheikh of the Jerablus neighbourhood—Sheikh Busrawi—recently informed an Englishman there, with whom he is well acquainted, that he was delighted at the reverses of the Turks, and was only awaiting the signal from the sons of the late Ibrahim Pasha to join them with 5,000 men and march upon Aleppo. Meanwhile, the sons of Ibrahim Pasha have gone up to the Van district with the avowed object of fighting, partly, it seems, at the secret request of the Government and partly on their own account. They are rebuilding Weiranshehir, and seem to retain their father's influence and more than their father's ambition. Sheikh Busrawi has informed his followers and the people of his countryside who have received with joy the news of the Turkish defeats, and are hoping for the downfall of the Central Government, that England holds the future of this country, and that she will eventually take it over. He told the Englishman, however, that the Khedive, the Shereef of Mecca, and the Sheikh El Senoussi, have agreed together to found an Arab Empire under an Arab Sultan, and that the Arabs and Kurds are to form a military alliance against the Turks. Sheikh Busrawi is a Kurdish chief of great importance, and it is he who, as reported in my despatch No. 67, nefariously obtained money and rifles from the military authorities by feigning to furnish volunteers for the present war.

Letters received here from Mardin report widespread brigandage in Upper Mesopotamia, robbery of travellers, caravans, and camels being of daily occurrence.

I have, &c.

R. A. FONTANA.

P.S. *November* 19.—I have to-day received communication from my French colleague of a letter just received by him from the French vice-consul at Marash, extracts from which, with his permission, I have the honour herewith to enclose. The state of things in the Zeitun region, as therein depicted, does not entirely coincide with my description in this despatch, but his information should be more reliable as derived in the vicinity of Zeitun itself. It is only just to add, however, that the writer inclines to depreciation of the Armenians and of their bishop, and that it would therefore be safer to strike a line, as regards the responsibility of Armenian maraunders in the Zeitun kaza, midway between the information furnished by him and that received by me and submitted in this despatch.

On the receipt of the letter in question the French consul, my Russian colleague,

Enclosure 3 in Consul Fontanas' No. 73 of November 18, 1912.

	Population.	Distance from Zeitoun (hours).
ZEITOUN .	25,000 A	—
FERNOUZ .	8,000 A	6
GHEBEN .	6,000 A	14
CHUKUR-HISSAR	500 T	10
ANDIRIN .	300 T	15
GHIUKSUN .	5,000 M	10
YARPOUZ .	700 M	12
ELBISTAN .	2,000 M	15
HADJIN .	35,000 M	18
MARASH .	40,000 M	10
SISS . .	15,000 M	30

A denotes Armenian Population.
T denotes Turkish Population.
M denotes Mixed Armenian and Turkish Population.



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and I thought well that the projected telegram before alluded to, a copy of which is enclosed, should be withheld.

R. A. F.

Enclosure 2 in No. 182.

Projected Telegram to Russian Embassy.

BRUITS de nombreux vols et assassinats perpétrés pas les musulmans et attribués par ceux-ci aux Arméniens dans la région de Zeitoun.

Les autorités prétextant, entre autres motifs, la question de déserteurs arméniens, envoient des renforts de troupes et menacent de l'état de siège si les Arméniens ne livrent pas leurs coreligionnaires déserteurs.

Nous donnons cette information afin de prévenir, si possible, toute complication.

[For Enclosure 3, see Map.]

Enclosure 4 in No. 182.

French Vice-Consul Habib Eddé to M. Laporte.

(Extrait.) *Marache, le 11 novembre*, 1912.

LE sandjiak de Marache se trouve, aujourd'hui, parcouru dans tous les sens par les brigands. Leurs exploits arrivent jusqu'aux portes de la ville. Les uns sont originaires de notre arrondissement, d'autres nous viennent d'Aintab, de Killis, d'Osmanié, d'Islahié, de Hadjine et de plusieurs contrées, voire même des frontières persanes. Une bande de Kurdes qui rôdaient dans les vilayets de Malatia, Mamourat-el-Aziz, Siwas, dans le mutessarifflik de Césarée, se voyant poursuivis par les troupes, se jetèrent sur les districts de Hadjine, d'Albistan et de Kiksun. On n'ose plus s'aventurer seul hors de la ville, des assassinats et des vols à Andrino, Gueben, par-ci par-là . . . Le mutessarifflik ne disposait que d'un nombre insuffisant de gendarmes. Il vient d'en recevoir une quarantaine.

La garnison de l'armée régulière, comprenant le 77e régiment d'infanterie, était, à la suite des mouvements occasionnés par la dernière mobilisation des troupes, dispersée ainsi qu'il suit :—

Du 1er bataillon, les 1re et 2e compagnies, s'élevant à un effectif de 250 soldats environ, se trouvent casernées à Marache. La 3e compagnie, formée de 117 hommes existe à Zeitoun.

Le 2e bataillon est à Alep et le 3e à Beyrouth.

Un bataillon de rédifs de la circonscription de Zeitoun est concentré à Marache. De ce bataillon, la 2e compagnie, d'environ 147 hommes, a été expédiée, ces jours derniers, à Zeitoun.

Le bataillon de rédifs d'Albistan reste sur place, attendu que les habitants de cette localité ont eu recours à leurs manœuvres habituelles, en agissant à Constantinople, à Adana et à Alep, pour faire arrêter son départ, sous prétexte qu'ils redoutent les Zeitounlus et, cette fois encore, les Albistanistes y ont réussi.

A l'heure actuelle, il y a donc :—

A Marache :

Deux cent cinquante soldats nizams et ihtyates formant l'effectif des 1re et 2e compagnies du 1er bataillon du 77e régiment d'infanterie.

Trois cent quatre-vingts rédifs (1re, 3e et 4e compagnies du bataillon de Zeitoun). Plus un canon (pièce de montagne dépourvue de valeur), déposé dans l'ancienne forteresse de Marache.

A Zeitoun :

Cent dix-sept soldats nizams et ihtyates (3e compagnie du 1er bataillon d'infanterie).

Cent quarante-sept rédifs (2e compagnie du bataillon de Zeitoun), plus treize artilleurs et deux gros canons à tir rapide, déposés à la caserne de Zeitoun.

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A Albistan :

Huit cents rédifs formant le bataillon de la circonscription d'Albistan.

Les autorités civiles et militaires réclament aujourd'hui leurs deux bataillons se trouvant à Beyrouth et à Alep et appartenant au 77e régiment d'infanterie. Celui dont vous m'annoncez télégraphiquement l'envoi d'Alep en est du nombre. Sous peu il sera ici avec une cinquantaine de charges d'armes et de munitions et un canon-mortier. A l'arrivée de ces deux bataillons, on licenciera probablement les rédifs et l'on distribuera les troupes régulières de l'armée active de la manière suivante :—

Un bataillon sera établi à Zeitoun avec mission de poursuivre les déserteurs et les brigands de cette contrée.

Deux bataillons seront logés dans les casernes de Marache. De ces deux bataillons un nombre suffisant de soldats seront expédiés à Andrine, Güeben, Yannijakaleaa, Kuksun, pour surveiller la sécurité des régions que le brigandage désole depuis quelque temps. . . . .

De leur côté, les brigands de Zeitoun continuent leurs agressions sous la direction de leur chef, Nazareth Chaouïche. Ils attaquent et dévalisent les passants et les caravanes ; ils menacent les soldats, les gendarmes et les fonctionnaires. Depuis peu, l'un de ces brigands a menacé de son Mauser le mufti et le caïmakan, qui, de concert avec le commandant militaire, ont demandé des troupes de renfort afin de pouvoir agir sérieusement contre les malfaiteurs et maintenir l'ordre dans la contrée. Cette demande a été approuvée en soutenue par les autorités civiles et militaires de Marache et d'Alep. Aux bruits de cette demande de troupes, Nazareth Chaouïche, avait essayé, indirectement, une tentative auprès de moi, à l'effet de faire échouer par les intimidations cette action contre les siens, mais quand il a senti que sa démarche ne pouvait rencontrer aucune chance de succès, il a eu recours à Constantinople, à Sis, à Alep et ailleurs, au moyen des comités "Tachnaksoutioun," de ses amis et connaissances. Au lieu de se tenir tranquille et de suivre les sages conseils que les chefs spirituels, les principaux notables, les personnages sérieux et amis de la nation arménienne lui donnent, Nazareth Chaouïche croit saisir dans son intérêt propre le moment favorable d'encourager le brigandage. A Alep il est protégé par Mgr. Tanielian et Compagnie, qui le défendent avec chaleur, et font manœuvrer, en sa faveur, auprès des hautes personnalités, certains individus d'esprit turbulent, capables de compromettre la situation. C'est la sagesse et la prudence qui leur manquent. Il nous faudrait surveiller leurs machinations, les nouvelles qui leur sont données de Marache et de Zeitoun et diriger tous nos efforts vers la tranquillité. En un mot, tant que le chef de brigands, Nazareth Chaouïche, et le Mourakhas Karamfilian—sérieusement malade, me dit-on—sont en vie et à Zeitoun, il n'y aurait pas de repos dans la contrée.

Le mutessarif et le commandant des troupes m'ont, du reste, affirmé que le Gouvernement n'a nullement l'intention de punir les pauvres innocents pour les coupable. D'ailleurs, la présence à la tête du vilayet d'un homme tel que Véfik Bey, dont j'ai eu le bonheur de faire la connaissance à Sivas, constitue une sérieuse garantie de sûreté.

Enclosure 5 in No. 182.

Consul Fontana to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 74. Confidential.)

Sir, *Aleppo, November* 25, 1912.

IN continuation of the last despatch which I had the honour to address to your Excellency, I have since learnt from the Russian consul that the telegram alluded to (and a copy of which was enclosed) therein as not sent, was, in fact, dispatched a day or two later. M. de Zimmerman explained this to me afterwards, although he had previously agreed with me that it was not desirable to send that telegram as it was, without some modification.

I beg herewith to enclose the copy of a letter addressed to the Russian and United States consuls, and to myself, by M. Laporte, communicating further information received by him from the French vice-consul at Marash regarding Zeitun. From this letter it appears that the Armenians of Zeitun would be willing to lend their clandestine aid to the authorities in arresting the deserters, who are robbing on the roads, were it not for the fear of denunciation followed by retribution at the

hands, perhaps, of a secret society. And he suggests that the better way to ensure the surrender of the deserters would be to grant a general amnesty. M. Laporte also states that his vice-consul at Marash has undertaken to assist the Protestant missionaries in his district, in case of need, with his good offices. I have duly thanked M. Laporte for this letter, and have offered to support any suggestion he may find it possible to make to the Governor-General, with regard to the amnesty, which would tend to improve the situation in the Zeitun district.

It is to be regretted that the force of gendarmes available in this vilayet is totally inadequate for present needs.

In connection with the paragraph in my last despatch dealing with the situation at Jarablus, I have the honour to quote the following extract from a letter to-day received from my correspondent there :—

"Busrawi tells me that the Kurds and Arabs have definitely done with the Osmanlis, and mean to have a Sultan of their own, and he expects perhaps three years of fighting in North Syria to establish this end. . . . . Derai was moving with 900 men viâ Birejik to Aleppo ; the son of Ibrahim Pasha has turned back from his march towards Bitlis, and with 1,600 men is proceeding towards Aleppo ; the rest will probably move soon. I cannot quite make out their plans : they profess that they are going to assist the Government against the allies, but this is, I am sure, a pretext. Among themselves they say they are now going to Aleppo 'for food,' and this may be the case. They have a great dread of the winter, since the hard frosts of two years ago, and quite possibly they mean to live for four months at Government expense, while keeping on the spot for hostilities. That they will advance north I do not for a moment believe. They talk freely of plundering Aleppo when the moment comes, and of sacking the railway line. They are most anxious to have the good-will of England for an Arab Sultanate, and will not hurt the English (at least if they keep in hand), and I strongly urged them to respect Germans and all foreigners and Christians."

I am hardly inclined to think that any advance of these Kurds upon Aleppo will, even if accomplished, prove a very serious matter unless events lead to a state of military disruption and Governmental paralysis sufficiently acute to offer them easy booty without much danger to their own persons.

I should conjecture that they would wait, like vultures, until dissolution was very near indeed.

I have, &c.

R. A. FONTANA.

Enclosure 6 in No. 182.

M. Laporte to Consul Fontana.

Alep, le 23 novembre, 1912.

J'AI reçu avant-hier un télégramme du vice-consul de France à Marache.

Il confirme dans ce sens la nouvelle que nous a donnée Mgr. Nersès.

Un déserteur-brigand, ayant opposé de la résistance à douze soldats lancés à sa poursuite du côté de la caserne de Zeitoun, fut fusillé par la troupe venue à l'aide. Il semblerait qu'on ait gaspillé les coups de fusil contre un seul homme. La population n'aurait fait aucune manifestation pour cet événement et se trouverait "presque" tranquille.

M. Eddé ne voit donc pas la nécessité, pour le moment, de se rendre à Zeitoun. D'après mes renseignements, une panique s'étant manifestée récemment dans le caza de Marache, il doit être difficile à notre agent consulaire de se déplacer sans autorisation spéciale de l'Ambassade.

J'ai obtenu par ailleurs des informations de notables arméniens de la région. Les Zeitounlus sont les premiers intéressés à la capture de la bande de déserteurs qui commet des actes de brigandage et entretient l'insécurité des routes. Ils aideraient clandestinement les autorités à s'en emparer, mais ne peuvent les dénoncer ouvertement sous peine de vengeance meurtrière. Ils se trouvent ainsi paralysés, et ce serait aux forces de police à accomplir d'elles-mêmes leur devoir. Ce qui revient à dire que les gens de Zeitoun ne pourraient et ne devraient être rendus responsables des actes de la bande. Le meilleur moyen d'en venir à bout consisterait à accorder une amnistie ; dans ces conditions le clergé et la nation arménienne se feraient fort de faire rentrer dans l'ordre les insoumis. J'ai cru devoir répondre à cet argument qu'il était difficile d'obliger

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les autorités ottomanes à ne pas appliquer la loi aux coupables. Mais peut-être pourrons-nous insister au vilayet sur les conséquences heureuses d'une pareille mesure de clémence.

M. Eddé s'est encore engagé à rendre aux missionnaires protestants tous les services qu'ils lui demanderaient à titre officieux.

[52372] No. 183.

Sir C. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 1038.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 4, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose translation of an extract from the "Ikdam," conceived in a sense of apparent unfriendliness to Great Britain. The same paper, which to a certain extent may be regarded as a Government organ, and which, under the committee régime was opposed to the committee and friendly to England and France, has also recently published a couple of articles in an anti-French tone. I believe these are merely temporary ebullitions, partly due to annoyance that England and France have not come to the rescue of Turkey in her recent difficulties in the same tangible form as during the Crimean and Russo-Turkish wars. The common Turkish trait of ignoring their own defects and putting the blame on some foreigner also seems to come into play. During the crushing military disasters of the early stages of the war in Thrace and Macedonia, the first instinct was to attribute them to the pernicious policy of the Committee of Union and Progress, and to the defects of German military training and the inferiority of Krupp guns. German and committee agents have recently been endeavouring with considerable success to divert Turkish animosity against England and France by spreading the notion that the latter Powers have worked for the war and Balkan successes with the object of opposing a Slav barrier to pan-German alleged *Drang nach Osten* projects. The Turkish public is sufficiently gullible to credit such distortions of fact, and is quite ready, like certain political circles at home, to believe that British bureaucrats are secretly scheming against legitimate German projects of expansion.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 183.

Extract from the "Ikdam."

(Translation.)

EUROPE wanted this war, and Europe made it. Why could not Europe, if she had so wished, have restrained the Balkan States? Why did she not see to the carrying out of the reforms which we desired? Perhaps she has ceased to interfere in our internal affairs! The truth of the matter is that the Powers, with England at their head, approved of this war, for at that time they thought that it would serve their interests; if its result is not to their liking, it will be because they made a mistake in their calculations. The Powers counted on this war serving their own ends, and each counted on being able to avoid, in part at least, the dangers arising from the difficulties of the situation. Russia thought it was a good opportunity for aiming a blow at Austria and England at Germany; the Germans and Austrians imagined they would be able to take a step eastwards, but all were equally mistaken. At one moment, indeed, it looked as if the Slavs were winning. Russia rejoiced, England smiled, and France was jubilant. But Germany and Austria let it be known that they would not tolerate such a state of things, and clanked their swords the while.

When France and England entrusted the management of their foreign affairs to such men of genius as Richelieu and Palmerston, Pitt and Talleyrand, they sought and found the balance of power and the security of Europe in the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. If these States had followed the line of policy laid down by those great statesmen, and had really desired Turkey's welfare, they would, before the outbreak of war, have given us time and prevented our enemies from attacking our frontiers.

In spite of mistakes and errors, the existence of the Ottoman Empire is of enormous benefit to Europe. In the first place it assures to each of the nations great commercial advantages; secondly, it prevents that hostility which, but for its

existence, would constantly arise from international rivalries and ambitions; and thirdly, it serves as a *terrain d'entente* between the Islamic world of the East, and the civilisation of the West.

Europe, and above all England and France, have done us a great injustice on this occasion, but by reason of this injustice they have disturbed the equilibrium of Europe, and exposed the general peace to perpetual danger.

[52373] No. 184.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 1039.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 4, 1912.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs in a conversation on the 2nd instant mentioned the question of Samos, and said that since the declaration made at the instigation of the brigand Sofoulis of the annexation of the island to Greece the life of the Prince was in danger, and his Excellency thought that an English or a French ship should be sent there.

I made no reply to his Excellency's observations.

My French colleague subsequently told me that the Minister had spoken to him in the same sense, and he had also refrained from any observation, but his Excellency thought that the obvious course for the Prince to take, if his life was in danger, was to leave the island, as he clearly had no authority there.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[52374] No. 185.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 1040.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 4, 1912.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, forwarding a translation of a letter addressed to the British vice-consul at Vathy by the President of the Provisional Government of the island, M. Sofoulis, announcing the annexation of Samos to Greece.

The Greek original of M. Sofoulis's letter is being kept in the archives of this embassy.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 185.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 143.)

Sir, *Smyrna, December 2, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the original, with translation, of a letter addressed by M. Sofoulis to Mr. Vice-Consul Mare, announcing the annexation of Samos to Greece.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 185.

M. Sofoulis to Vice-Consul Maré.

(No. 15.)

(Translation.)

Sir, *Vathy, November 14, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, at a sitting held on the 11th November, the Assembly, by virtue of a specific and peremptory mandate from the Samian people, voted the union of Samos with the kingdom of Greece.

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For the administration of the island, in the name of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, the following members of a Provisional Government have been appointed,—

President.

M. Themistocles Sofoulis, who is also President of the National Assembly.

Commissioners.

M. D. Georgiades (Interior).
M. Jean Hadjiyannis (Finance).
M. Th. N. Nicolis (Justice).
M. Dem. Orfanos (Public Instruction).
M. Emm. Adamides (Commerce and Agriculture).

The protection afforded hitherto by the high protecting Powers of the interests of the Samian people convinces us that the Government of Great Britain will take a favourable view of this act of the Samian people, a decision which fully ensures their progress and happiness, and realises their long-felt wishes.

I avail myself of this opportunity, Sir, to interpret to you, in the name of the representatives of the Samian people, the sentiments of their sincere gratitude for your just and kindly attitude in the defence of the general interests of the Samian people.

You are requested to accept the expression of the high esteem with which I remain,

THEMISTOCLES SOFOULIS.

[52388] No. 186.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 92. Confidential.)
Sir, *Bucharest, December 5, 1912.*

YOU will have noticed that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his conversation with me reported in my immediately preceding despatch, coupled the question of the autonomy of Albania with that of the treatment of the Koutzo-Vlachs. I was somewhat surprised at the time, as I had never heard that there was any great quantity of Koutzo-Vlachs in Albania. I had always imagined these people to be settled principally in Thessaly and Macedonia. Whether or not the discovery that Albania has a large Koutzo-Vlach population is as new as I believe it to be, it is only now that prominence has been given to the Roumain brothers in Albania, and this appears to throw a suggestive light on the Koutzo-Vlach agitation of the last few days, on which I have reported in a separate despatch. It makes one, indeed, somewhat dubious as to the spontaneity of this agitation.

My French colleague has a theory, which is at least ingenious, to account for this sudden emergence into prominence of the Koutzo-Vlachs in Albania. There is no doubt that there is a growing feeling here that Roumania is too much in Austria's pocket, and popular sentiment towards Russia has considerably improved of late; some cry, such as the defence of the Koutzo-Vlachs against Servian oppression, would be helpful to the Government if a conflict between Austria and Russia obliged Roumania to take sides with Austria. The Albanian difficulty is clearly the one which presents the most acute danger of such a conflict, and it may well be the desire of the Roumanian Government to foster any feeling of kinship there may be between Roumania and Albania.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[52488] No. 187.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 380.)
Sir, *Rome, December 5, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that in the debate in the Italian Chamber of Deputies on the Treaty of Lausanne the Prime Minister yesterday took the opportunity offered by the questions put to him in other speeches to refer to the Italian occupation of the Ægean islands. The substance of his remarks, as reported in the press—no other report being yet available—was as follows:—

The peace of Lausanne was concluded before war broke out between Greece and Turkey. Greece was aware of the obligations which Italy had undertaken towards Turkey. We could make no other engagements. We could not claim to take possession of lands of Greek nationality. That would have implied the sanction of a genuine irredentism and would have been contrary to the sentiment of nationality. We could not therefore do otherwise than contract for their restoration, demanding guarantees on behalf of the inhabitants, which are secured by the Sultan's decree. We further stipulated that we should not withdraw from the islands until after the Turks had completely evacuated Libya.

This is the precise situation, of which Greece was well aware at the moment of declaring war on Turkey.

But Signor Bissolati has addressed two questions to me, to which it is my duty to give clear answers.

If we withdraw from the islands before peace is concluded between Greece and Turkey, are we under the obligation of preventing the Greeks from occupying them? I answer emphatically, No. This was not anticipated, and could not be anticipated, by a treaty negotiated before war between Turkey and Greece broke out.

If our withdrawal from the islands takes place after the conclusion of peace between Greece and Turkey, what will happen then?

I have no means of knowing whether or how the question of the islands will be approached or settled in a treaty of peace between Greece and Turkey. If it be resolved between Greece and Turkey, we shall have nothing to say in the matter. But if the status of the islands is to be submitted to the appreciation of Europe, and decided in a congress in which Italy will take part as one of the Great Powers, she will be able to make her voice heard in perfect freedom.

I have sent a brief summary of Signor Giolitti's observations by telegraph.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[52494] No. 188.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 51.)
Sir, *Munich, December 5, 1912.*

THE Imperial Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag on foreign relations is generally but not enthusiastically approved by the South German press with the exception of the Social Democratic organs. That approval is, however, meted out in less degree to the pacific passages in the speech than to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's declaration that Germany under certain eventualities would stand faithfully by her ally. It is obviously this statement which the "Münchener Neueste Nachrichten" had in mind when at the close of the two days' debate it declared that the main result had been to show that the Chancellor's foreign policy met with the approval of all parties. Other papers, such as the "Schwäbischer Merkur" (National Liberal) and the "Augsburger Abend-Zeitung" (Liberal), lay so much stress on this point that they practically ignore anything else that the Chancellor may have said. The "Münchener Zeitung" (Liberal) carries this line of thought a little further and declares that the Chancellor has "knocked the bottom out of the suspicion which has crept in that the friendship of certain other Great Powers might, at the last moment, appear more valuable to Germany than the fulfilment of her duty towards her allies."

The Clerical "Bayerischer Kurier" is less cordial in its appreciation than might have been expected, owing, no doubt, to the antagonism between the Centre and the

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Government on the Jesuit question. The Social Democratic "Münchener Post" continues to object to being dragged into Austria's quarrels.

The attitude of the Democratic "Frankfurter Zeitung," which has published more than one article on the subject, is a little curious. In its issue of the 3rd it argued for the alliance with Austria on the ground that if Austria ceased to be a Great Power, Germany would be isolated and would very likely have herself before long to wage a desperate life and death struggle. On the next day, however, it remarked on the tendency to be noticed both in St. Petersburgh and Vienna and also in several German newspapers to ignore the Chancellor's allusion to the common action of the Powers in promoting peace in the Balkans and to lay the stress on his asseveration of Germany's loyalty to her allies. But the latter passage in the speech can only, it thinks, be regarded as a concession to Austrian susceptibilities, which is, however, not intended to supersede the note in the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung."

From such conversation as I have had with officials and others I gather that public opinion here is in general optimistic as to a peaceful settlement of the Balkan question. This result most people do not hesitate to ascribe to the powerful influence of Germany which now, as in 1909, Russia dare not oppose.

The friendly co-operation of the British and German Governments is recognised and Baron Hertling to-day expressed to me his hearty satisfaction at the better relations now subsisting between them. I have not observed any enthusiasm in other quarters, but rather a sceptical feeling that the newly developed cordiality is founded on the evanescent conditions of the moment.

I have, &c.
VINCENT CORBETT.

[52470] No. 189.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 361.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, December 5, 1912.*

THE German Chancellor's speech has on the whole been received with calm by the Russian press, although it cannot be said to have caused a favourable impression.

The "Novoe Vremya" observes that bellicose speeches are more frequent in Germany than elsewhere, and have been heard in connection with Tangier, the Algeciras conference, the French foreign legion, and recently with reference to Agadir. Luckily, however, for humanity and for Germany herself, such warlike demonstrations usually terminated in words only, for if the desired effect were produced further action was superfluous, and if the desired effect were not produced warlike speeches gave way to more peaceful utterances, and all ended well and without bloodshed. The Bosnian incident was an instance of threatening words having had the desired result, and Germany had on that occasion sacrificed her good relations with Russia, and had been prepared even to go to war with her for the sake of Austria and Austria's point of view. Now, apparently history was repeating itself. The principal actors were the same, but fortunately the setting had changed entirely. It was not now, as four years ago, a dispute arising from words. The matter now was one of great importance to Servia, to all the Balkan peoples, and even to Russia herself. Therefore it would not be so easy to compel Russia to yield by means of mere words. Four years ago the position of the Balkan States was far different from what it was now. During the Bosnian incident Russia was passing through a trying time of convalescence after a disastrous war which had inflicted a heavier blow on the spirit of her people than on her material power. Now Russia was probably more powerful than at any other period of her history, and the justice of her cause was evident to all the world. Russia, with the other Powers of the Triple *Entente* and the Balkan League, was striving to establish a lasting order of things in the Balkans which would satisfy the just and vital needs of the peoples of the peninsula. Austrian diplomacy was making plans for maintaining conditions there which would lead to further trouble and unrest. But the situation at present was such that wordy threats could not frighten anyone.

The "Novoe Vremya," commenting on that part of the Chancellor's speech in which it is stated that Germany is ready to fight side by side with her ally, remarks that at first sight such statements read as categorically as the orders to a regiment for its disposition on the eve of an action, but a closer examination shows that they are conditional, and that the Chancellor considers that Germany is bound to defend Austria from attack by a third party only if the very existence of her ally be threatened.

Germany in this way guaranteed to herself a line of retreat. She might declare that collision with a third party did not threaten the actual existence of Austria, and in that case the obligation for Germany to defend her by arms would not arise. The caution of the German Chancellor was quite comprehensible. He was not blind to the enormous changes which had taken place in the political situation during the last few years. The Italian Government continually repeated its assurances of fidelity to its treaty obligations towards its allies, but Italian public opinion had shown a pretty clear appreciation of the dangers to Italy's vital interests arising out of those obligations. M. de Bethmann-Hollweg could not but know that the Triple Alliance was in effect a Dual Alliance. He could not but know that the military preparedness of Austria at present was not great. However powerful Germany might be, she was not in a position to try conclusions with all Europe. It could not be expected of Germany that she would risk all the sacrifices which she had made for the development of her trade, and her very existence itself merely to pander to the thoughtless caprices of Austrian diplomacy. That was why the Chancellor had made the assistance of Germany conditional on the existence of Austria being in danger.

Caution, however, was never superfluous. When a neighbour drew attention to the fact that it might be compelled to resort to arms in fulfilment of its treaty obligations caution became obligatory. The Russian Imperial Bank had about a milliard of marks in German banks. State viligance demanded the recall to Russia of this enormous sum. "With all sincerity to our traditional friendship, we desire that this step be adopted as soon as possible. When our friend draws pictures of war with us we must not leave our money at his disposal. Money is the very nerve of war. The sooner it is withdrawn from Germany the better for the inviolability of our friendship."

The "Rech" observes that M. de Bethmann-Hollweg's reference to assisting Austria, read literally, meant that Germany must assist Austria if her existence were threatened, and it expresses the opinion that these words were not spoken for nothing, but represented the feeling in Germany not to support the caprices but only the vital interests of Austria.

The "Bourse Gazette" remarks that there is every ground for the lively satisfaction which the speech is reported to have given at Vienna. It regards that part of the speech referring to the obligations of Germany towards her ally as the centre of importance, and it describes the statement as couched in the brutal form for which the announcements of the Chancellor are now noted. The speech had been made with a view to producing an effect on the Balkan League and the Powers of the Triple *Entente*, but it also indicated the course which the Triple Alliance now intended to take when the moment for European intervention was drawing near.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[52471] No. 190.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 362.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, December 5, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that it is reported in the Russian press that the discount loan, Russo-Asiatic, and Azov Don banks of Russia have arranged a loan of 10,000,000 roubles for Bulgaria exclusively from their own funds, and without participation of foreign capital. The loan is for six months. At the same time, French capitalists, in proposing to lend 40,000,000 fr. to Bulgaria, have invited Russian banks to participate in their loan to the amount of one half. The Russian banks are said to have replied that although they have already given Bulgaria 10,000,000 roubles, they are quite ready to distribute amongst themselves a portion of the French loan.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

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[52564] No. 191.

Vice-Consul Keyser to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantza, December 5, 1912.*

IN continuation of my despatch of the 21st November relative to the shipment of war materials and horses from this port to Constantinople, I have the honour to transmit to you, with Major Baldwin's approval, the accompanying copy of a despatch on the same subject, which I addressed to him at Galatz on the 29th November.

Yesterday evening the two Turkish transports "Ak-Deniz" and "Karadeniz" arrived here to load thirteen hundred horses. There is also at least one train load of war material awaiting the arrival of a transport.

With regard to the Medgidieh–Copadin military railway, I went to shoot at Medgidieh a few days ago and learnt that there are there at present some two thousand troops engaged on the construction of the line, which does not touch the town of Medgidieh but commences at a point five kilometres to the west of it on the main line. I was told it would be completed by next March.

The Public Works Department is constructing a high road from Medgidieh to the Bulgarian frontier. The main railway line from the Danube to Constantza, which has so far been a single track, is being doubled. The rails have already been laid commencing from the Danube to a point about 15 kilom. distant from Constantza. This work appears to have been commenced last spring. When completed it will greatly facilitate the transport of merchandise, the object for which it is primarily intended, and thereby alleviate the periodical congestion of the traffic. At the same time it would equally facilitate any necessary movement of troops.

I have, &c.
LIONEL E. KEYSER.

Enclosure in 191.

Vice-Consul Keyser to Consul-General Baldwin.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantza, November, 29, 1912.*

THE Master of the British steam-ship "Dromore," Mr. P. C. Cummins, which leaves for Galatz this afternoon, has kindly consented to be the bearer of the present despatch to you.

I enclose for your information a copy of a despatch which I addressed to the Foreign Office on the 21st instant.

The small Turkish cruiser, which arrived off the port on the 21st November, sailed again during the night presumably as escort to the Roumanian mail-ship. She returned here on the afternoon of the 22nd and entered the harbour, remaining here until early morning of the 24th. All knowledge of her name was disclaimed at the Port Captain's Office, but I managed to learn that she was the "Berc-I-Satvet." On the 24th two more Turkish transports arrived, viz.: the "Zahir" and the "Marmara." Some of the transports are hired ones, but each carries about twenty Turkish soldiers in khaki uniforms. At 3.30 P.M. on Wednesday the 27th three Turkish torpedo-boat-destroyers arrived at the entrance to the port and signalled to the transports, which got under way about 5 P.M. and sailed with the destroyers as escort. I learn that the cargoes of the four transports were as follows:—

"Midhat Pasha"; 1,300 tons of war materials said to include 188 cannon and 300 tons of ammunition.

"Ak-Deniz"; 570 horses.

"Marmara"; 300 horses.

"Zahir"; 220 horses.

Though everyone in the town knows what is going on the Roumanian authorities evidently wish to keep the matter as quiet as possible. I have not seen any mention of the matter in the Roumanian press and I am informed that messages on the subject to foreign papers are not allowed to go through. For instance, yesterday a man representing himself to be a courier acting for Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett, special war correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph" at Constantinople, called on me and said he thought I should be interested to learn that he sent a telegram from here on the 27th instant to the

"Daily Telegraph" giving details of the Turkish flotilla which left here that day, and that he was subsequently officially informed by telegram that his message had been stopped by the authorities at Bucharest. He stated that on complaining to the director of the local post office he was informed that it was "contre le caractère roumain" (whatever that may mean) to allow such a message to go through. The same man informed me that on the 27th instant a special train arrived here in the afternoon conveying 200 Turks from the island of Rhodes, who had been prisoners of war in Italy and were now returning to Turkey, and that he knew as a positive fact that the same train brought twelve German artillery officers who were on their way to instruct the Turkish officers in the working of the latest pattern Krupp guns which had been shipped on the "Midhat Pasha." He added that the officers in question immediately embarked and sailed on that vessel. I am not able to confirm this information though a similar rumour was current in the town.

With regard to the railway from Medgidieh, I heard rumours about a fortnight ago that 2,000 pioneers from Braila had arrived there and were hurriedly constructing a military railway to Copadin, a place about half way between Medgidieh and the Bulgarian border. It was rumoured that the railway was to be completed within three days, which appears to be nonsense. I have not been able to obtain any definite information on the subject. Yesterday, however, I learnt from a reliable source that the railway has actually been under construction for about a fortnight and that troops are employed on the work. At present I can obtain no information regarding the progress already made or the rate of construction.

I am, &c.
LIONEL E. KEYSER.

[52389] No. 192.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 93.)

Sir, *Bucharest, December 6, 1912.*

I HAD the honour last evening to be received in private audience by King Charles in order to convey to His Majesty the expression of King George's condolences on the death of Her Royal Highness the Countess of Flanders, the King's sister. King Charles bade me convey to King George his warm thanks for the message of condolence, and His Majesty recalled the fact, that King Edward had been on terms of close friendship with the Countess of Flanders.

Afterwards King Charles stayed and conversed with me for half an hour. From what I had heard from a prominent Roumanian who had seen the King a day or two ago, I had expected His Majesty very pessimistic as to the chances of escaping a European war. His Majesty had said to my informant that he regarded the chances for and against war as about equal. From His Majesty's conversation with me I did not gather that he was otherwise than hopeful. He said that all the Governments of the Powers were manifestly desirous of peace, which was natural, as war would mean ruin to all countries engaged, and the misery of the people would be so great that Socialism would triumph.

His Majesty spoke of the Austro-Serb conflict as the black spot in the outlook, and on this question he expressed himself as specially pleased with the recent utterances of British Cabinet Ministers. He also spoke highly of the tone of the British press, mentioning in particular the article in the "Times" on the communiqué of M. Pasitch to that paper.

His Majesty regarded the Servian demand for access to the Adriatic by the acquisition of a part of Albania, even though it were by means of a narrow strip, as incompatible with Albanian autonomy, and Albanian autonomy was a matter of great interest to Roumania. Moreover, a Servian road cutting through Albania would give rise to constant conflicts with the Albanians, who were a people not easy to restrain, and as for Durazzo, the idea of access for Servia to the Adriatic through this port was unpractical. It was the worst harbour on the Adriatic, and a railway to it, passing, as it must, through extremely mountainous country, would be a most unprofitable undertaking.

I ventured to ask why Albanian autonomy was considered to have such interest for Roumania. His Majesty replied, that there were about 150,000 Koutjo Vlachs in Albania, and, furthermore, the Albanians were more nearly akin in language to the Roumanians than to the Slavs. He hoped that Great Britain was not opposed to

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autonomous Albania. I said that she was not, though I believed that you thought it a pity that the question of a Servian access to the Adriatic had been raised at this juncture as you felt that such questions would be more susceptible of adjustment when the whole settlement European Turkey was under consideration.

His Majesty spoke of the present Koutzo Vlach agitation in this country and said that it was quite natural, as horrible accounts had reached Roumania of persecution of Koutzo Vlachs in districts occupied by the Greeks. Roumania had spent at least 30,000,000 fr. on churches and schools for these people in European Turkey and they had always been treated with consideration by the Turks.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[52430] No. 193

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 510.)

Sir, *Berlin, December 7, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I have duly carried out your instructions to inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of your views respecting the speech recently delivered by the Imperial Chancellor in the Reichstag.

Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter was somewhat restive under the communication, and seemed inclined to resent the idea that the Chancellor's speech might have something less than a moderating effect in Vienna. He said that one of the many proofs that the attitude of Austria-Hungary continued to be moderate and conciliatory was that she had taken no notice of the occupation of Durazzo by the Serbs, nor of the exceedingly provocatory language used not only by the Servian press but even by the Servian President of the Council, M. Pasitch. Her attitude was, in fact, quite in accordance with your views and those advocated throughout by Germany that all questions with Servia should be left over until after the war when all the conditions of peace would come under review by the Great Powers. There was no indication that the attitude would be changed, and he could not see why you should feel any anxiety. His Excellency added that you were quite right in thinking that the Chancellor's speech indicated no change in the policy of the Imperial Government. They had preached calm and moderation to Austria-Hungary, and, as I had no doubt noticed, had observed the greatest calm and moderation themselves. I said that I could readily corroborate his statement that all through this somewhat difficult and unsettled period the Imperial Government had remained perfectly calm, and had also used their influence in Vienna in favour of moderation. As regards, however, their own moderation, I was glad to feel that the exercise of that quality had not yet been rendered necessary. His Excellency replied that when mobilisation was taking place on their eastern and northern frontiers it surely needed considerable patience and moderation on their part not to take counter-measures, whereas they had not moved a man. I said that I had of course read reports in the newspapers that Russia was making some military preparations, but that I had never heard of anything in the nature of mobilisation taking place in France. "But we, his Excellency said, "have heard of such things; the French call them 'essais de mobilisation,' but we know quite well what that means." I said that in times like the present, when no one could foresee for certain what was going to happen, it was, I supposed, the duty of every Government to provide for all contingencies. "As for Germany," I said, "she needs no preparations as she is always ready," at which he laughed and asked whether I had that from my military attaché.

As regards the Austrian military preparations he said that they had been greatly exaggerated; still, in view of the attitude of Servia and the uncertainty of the future, Austria had doubtless found it necessary to put her military house in order. Personally, he thought that Servia would finally recognise that there were other means of securing access to the Adriatic for her trade and commerce than by laying hands on territory to which she had no claim either ethnically or geographically. If this proved to be the case then all would be well. If, however, she persisted in her present obstinacy, refused all solutions but her own, and endeavoured, for instance, to retain Durazzo, Austria-Hungary might see herself forced to take strong measures.

Should this regrettable eventuality occur, and some of the Powers with no interest of any sort in Albania find it necessary, or in some way advantageous, to support Servia by arms, then Germany, however much she might regret having to go to war, would,

by the terms of her alliance and for reasons indicated by the Chancellor, most certainly support "Austria and Italy." He hoped and trusted that things would not come to such a pass, but it was a contingency that had to be faced.

I considered this a good opportunity for communicating to him textually the two last paragraphs of your telegram on which I was acting. His Excellency offered no comment upon them. At the end of our conversation he said that the present state of affairs was, in his opinion, one in which either exaggerated optimism or undue pessimism would be out of place.

He thought that the prudent counsels which the Russian Government had undoubtedly urged at Belgrade constituted a very hopeful factor in the situation, but he would feel more sanguine still if he could be sure that the good effects of these counsels were not counteracted by the private advice of the gentlemen whose duty it was to transmit them.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[52433] No. 194.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 513.)

Sir, *Berlin, December 7, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy and translation of the memorandum handed to me yesterday by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs containing the answer of the Imperial Government to your proposals for a meeting of Ambassadors in some European capital to discuss certain questions connected with the Balkan problem.

In view of the fact that a week ago Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter informed my Russian colleague that Austria-Hungary had accepted your proposal with the same satisfaction as Germany had done, I was at a loss to understand how it was that when I saw his Excellency three days ago he told me that he had had no reply from the Austro-Hungarian Government, and attributed the delay to the terrible slowness with which affairs were always treated in Vienna. A possible reason for the delay may, however, be found in the last paragraph of the enclosed memorandum, in which it is proposed that the Roumanian Minister should be invited to take part in the conversations. This proposal has probably formed the subject of an interchange of views between the Cabinets of the Triple Alliance, which would fully account for the loss of valuable time that has occurred.

As Herr von Kiderlen could only see me at a very late hour yesterday, and his Excellency was pressed for time, I was unable to have any conversation with him or to ask him any questions. I therefore begged my French colleague, who was going to see his Excellency to-day, to try and ascertain his views on the subject of the proposed invitation to the Roumanian Minister to take part in the meetings of the Ambassadors.

M. Jules Cambon has now given me an account of his conversation with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He tells me that his Excellency at once communicated to him the substance of the reply which he had made to your proposal, adding at the same time that the same answer had been returned by the Austro-Hungarian and Italian Governments. He (M. Cambon) had expressed some surprise at the proposal that Roumania, to whom the only question of direct interest connected with the subjects to be discussed by the Ambassadors was one which under present circumstances seemed hardly likely to be raised, namely, that of the Dardanelles, should be asked to take part in the conversations, and said that it might perhaps add an atmosphere of formality to the proceedings. From Herr von Kiderlen's reply, which was slightly vague, M. Cambon gathered that his Excellency's personal ideas on the subject were that the question whether the Roumanian Minister should be invited to take part in the conversations or not was in no sense one on which the acceptance of your proposals by the Powers of the Triple Alliance depended, that it was only a suggestion actuated by the feeling that as Roumania would take no part in the settlement of Balkan affairs contemplated in the peace negotiations she would, unless admitted to the meetings of the Ambassadors, have no opportunity of making her voice heard in matters which, as a Balkan State, interested her deeply; and that, moreover, if it was felt that the presence of her representative at discussions which concerned matters in which she had no direct interest would be useless or superfluous, it could easily be arranged that

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he should be only invited to attend when questions came up in which her interests were distinctly involved.

I ventured to telegraph to you the substance of the above conversation, as, although the views expressed by Herr von Kiderlen were vague and personal, I think that they may be fairly regarded as indications of his Excellency's probable attitude, should any objections be raised to the suggestion with regard to the Roumanian Minister.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 194.

Memorandum communicated to Sir E. Goschen by Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter.

(Translation.)

THE Imperial Government have taken note with lively satisfaction of Sir Edward Grey's proposal to authorise the Ambassadors of the Six Great Powers in one of the European capitals to enter into unbinding conversations on several questions connected with the Balkan problem of special importance from the international point of view. They regard the proposed procedure as a suitable means of simplifying and accelerating matters, and they would be glad if London could be chosen as the place of meeting in view of the fact that the proposal emanated from there. In the event of Sir Edward Grey agreeing to this the Imperial Government declare their readiness to furnish Prince Lichnowsky at once with the necessary instructions. In doing so they assume that as regards the conversations of the Ambassadors even the appearance of a formal conference will be avoided.

Since Roumania is in the same situation as the Great Powers in view of her important position and interests in the Balkans, and is the only Balkan Power which will have no voice in the peace negotiations of the belligerents, the Imperial Government recommends that the Roumanian Minister also should be invited to take part in the conversations of the Ambassadors.

Berlin, December 6, 1912.

[52477] No. 195.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 510.)

Sir, *Paris, December* 7, 1912.

WITH reference to your despatches Nos. 552, 568, 578, 588, and 589 of the 16th, 21st, and 28th November, and the 5th December respectively, I have the honour to acquaint you that I asked M. Poincaré to-day what would be the procedure which he would suggest for the discussion of the question of the interests of the foreign holders of bonds of the Ottoman debt.

His Excellency said that the matter had been under the consideration of a commission of experts here, and he thought that it would be well that the councillor of His Majesty's Embassy should be put in communication with the commission, so that the details of the question should be so threshed out before it was discussed by himself with me.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[52380] No. 196.

Consul General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, December* 8, 1912.

MY telegram of 27th November and my despatch of 3rd December.

Reports of massacre and pillage by Bulgarians continue.

My Austrian colleague and my German colleague strongly favour dispatch of international commission of enquiry.

[52574] No. 197.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 187.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December* 9, 1912

FOLLOWING from consul at Ragusa:—

"Austrian cruiser 'Kaiserin und Königin Maria Teresia' arrived from Salonica, also 'Komet' from Castelnuovo. I hear privately that an Austrian squadron of two divisions is expected to sail from Pola between 9th December and 13th December with sealed orders, destination unknown. Naval tow-boats are bringing lighters with patent fuel to Gravosa. Four hundred horses are also expected to arrive at latter port. I understand that there are two Austrian war-ships at Cattaro, the 'Erzherzog Ferdinand-Max' or the 'Kaiser Max,' and the 'Kronprinz Erzherzog Rudolf.'"

[52647] No. 198.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 188.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December* 9, 1912.

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"Information from a good source states that 4th corps at Budapest has received orders to concentrate opposite Belgrade immediately. Cavalry in Galicia organised in three corps of two divisions each, head-quarters at Cracow, Jaroskar, and Cernowits. In all 152 squadrons, including Pressburg and Budapest divisions."

[52576] No. 199.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 480.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, December* 9, 1912.

THE step taken by M. Isvolsky, as reported by Sir F. Bertie in his telegram No. 212, would, in view of M. Sazonof's language reported to you in my telegram No. 473, appear to have been taken without instructions from the Russian Government. No hint was given to me by M. Sazonof that he was insisting on Paris as the place of the meeting of Ambassadors when we discussed the question together yesterday.

[52631] No. 200.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 32.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bucharest, December* 9, 1912.

SOPHIA telegram No. 217.

M. Danef arrived last night. He will see the King this afternoon, and will probably leave for Vienna to-night.

(Secret.)

I am informed from a most confidential source that Bulgaria would be willing to grant ecclesiastical autonomy for the Kutzo Vlachs in the territory conquered by the allies, and also a Roumanian bishop and schools. She would not be willing to make any appreciable cession of territory, but would agree to a strategical rectification of frontier.

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[52642] No. 201.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, December 9, 1912.*

KING of Roumania opened new Parliament this morning. Following is a summary of the speech:—

"Roumanian policy, which is one of moderation and peace so far as is compatible with superior interests of the country, permits her to have friendly relations with all countries, and to enjoy the particular confidence shown her by the Great Powers.

"In the firm desire to contribute to the localisation of the war she has observed neutrality, while attentively following the course of events which concern many of her interests.

"We have the right to expect that this attitude will have favourable results for our good relations with the Balkan States as in future constituted, and that our interests will be respected.

"Roumania is regarded as an important factor in European concert, and her voice will be heard at the time of final settlement of the questions raised by Balkan crisis."

Speech alludes to the army, which is ready at any moment to do its duty.

[52643] No. 202.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 34.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, December 9, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 32 of to-day.

M. Danef leaves here to-morrow morning, and intends to reach London for conference on Friday. He is to have interviews with Herr von Kiderlen at Berlin and M. Poincaré at Paris on the way. He does not go to Vienna.

[52628] No. 203.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 220.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 9, 1912.*

PEACE negotiations.

My telegram No. 217 of 6th December.

M. Danef left here yesterday for London, travelling by special train viâ Bucharest.

It is understood that time will not permit of his coming to any definite arrangement with the Roumanian Government, but it is hoped that he will be able to smooth Roumanian susceptibilities and dissuade the latter country from inducing Germany and Austria to adopt hostile attitude towards Bulgaria in any future ambassadorial pourparlers.

The "Times" correspondent accompanied M. Danef at the special request, I am informed, of the Minister of Interior.

(Sent to Constantinople and Bucharest.)

[52644] No. 204.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 222.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, December 9, 1912.*

PEACE negotiations.

My telegram No. 217 of 6th December, last paragraph.

Prime Minister wishes me to inform you that he would much have liked to come to London, but he has now decided not to do so, as neither Prime Minister of Servia or Montenegro are able to go. He much regrets that he cannot follow his inclinations in this matter.

[52633] No. 205

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 175.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, December 9, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 417 of 7th December acted on.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs cannot think that French Government can be susceptible about the selection of London, as, although you originally suggested Paris, it is more natural that the conversations should take place in the capital whence proposal came. So he hopes that you will yield to the almost unanimous wish of the Powers. He also hinted that it would doubtless soothe any feeling of Paris to know if your many duties prevented you from attending all the meetings the latter would probably be presided over in your absence by the senior Ambassador, viz., M. Cambon.

On his saying of his own volition that another reason for France not taking present selection amiss was that formal conference, if such took place, would probably be held at Paris, I mentioned your suggestion that Powers who preferred London in present case might give an indication to the French Government that there would be no objection on their part to Paris in the event of formal conference later. He seemed to think that this might be difficult, as the question of formal conference was as yet in abeyance.

I said I thought that in view of what he had just said to me he might very well give an indication such as you suggested in informal conversation with French Ambassador. He said he would think of it, but he seemed to me rather anxious to avoid bringing up the question of conference at all at present moment.

[52640] No. 206.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, December 9, 1912.*

A STATEMENT appears in the "Times" of 7th December concerning the reinstatement and probable promotion of Colonel Popovitch.

I did not report because I have reason to believe that he will be replaced on the retired list when the war is concluded in accordance with the statements of the chargé d'affaires (see your despatch No. 14 of 2nd October).

[52335] No. 207.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1344.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 9, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 478 of 8th December.

I entirely agree with what Minister for Foreign Affairs says about Albania, both as to the place it should occupy in discussion and how the settlement of it may precede and prepare the way to a settlement of the Servian difficulty by means of a railway, international, I presume, to a neutralised Albanian port.

It is very desirable that conversations of Ambassadors should begin as soon as possible. Once they have begun there will be less risk of an incident between Austria and Servia, if such does occur, being fatal to peace.

There is an impression in Paris that Russian Government are insisting on Paris being place of meeting. I have explained to French Ambassador, in accordance with your telegrams No. 473 of 6th December and No. 480 of 9th December, that this does not agree with my information. It is clear from views received from Berlin and Vienna, and generally, that for various reasons Paris is not regarded as very suitable for these informal and non-committal conversations. I have suggested that if formal conference is arranged later it might be held at Paris; there is no desire to have that in London.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs, and ask whether he thinks it possible for Ambassadors to begin conversations here before detailed statement of his views arrives.

We might agree this week (1) that Great Powers do not desire to interfere with

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settlement of terms between belligerents except on certain points on which reserves must be made; (2) these points might be enumerated—Albania will certainly be one of them, and Ambassadors would then be able to enter upon discussion of that after Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' detailed views had arrived. It seems desirable to constitute informal reunion of Ambassadors as soon as possible for reason given above, but conversations, once begun, need not be hurried.

[52316] No. 207*.

Sir Edward Grey to Viscount Kitchener.

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 9, 1912.*

YOUR telegram of 7th December: Balkans War.
I agree, and am informing consul-general.
(Repeated to Salonica.)

[52868] No. 208.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 598.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 9, 1912.*

THE French Ambassador told me to-day of the apprehension which was being expressed, that Austria might take some strong action respecting the affair of the consul. He did not think that the reunion of Ambassadors should wait till this was settled. If they were meeting at the time they could recommend that the question should be referred to arbitration, as the consular incident between Germany and France in Casa Blanca had been.

I said that no doubt this apprehension was the same, in another form, as that which the Servian chargé d'affaires had expressed to me this afternoon; and I told M. Cambon briefly what had passed with the chargé d'affaires and what I had told the Austrian Ambassador, as recorded in my despatches Nos. 40 and 99 of to-day to Sir R. Paget and Sir F. Cartwright.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52869] No. 209.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 599.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 9, 1912.*

AS M. Cambon told me to-day that his information from Paris was that Russia felt it necessary to insist upon Paris being the place of meeting for the Ambassadors, I showed him Sir George Buchanan's telegram No. 473 of the 6th instant, and added that Sir George, telegraphing to-day, said that he had discussed the whole question of the meeting of Ambassadors yesterday, the 8th, with M. Sazonof, who had never once hinted that he was insisting on Paris. I also said that M. Sazonof had been favourable to London when speaking to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

M. Cambon said that it was clear that the communications in Paris had been received through M. Isvolsky.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52086] No. 210.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 407.)
Sir, *Foreign Office December 9, 1912.*

THE Russian Ambassador called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 3rd December. Sir A. Nicolson enquired of him what impression he considered would be produced

in Russia by the speech of the German Chancellor, and he said that he feared it would be deplorable.

Count Benckendorff, from conversations which he had had with Prince Lichnowsky, is convinced that the latter is genuinely and absolutely convinced that this country will remain outside of any possible complications, and that our relations with Germany will remain, whatever might occur, undisturbed on the present intimate footing. Prince Lichnowsky, Count Benckendorff remarked, was by nature a great optimist, and as a fresh Ambassador it was natural that he should be carried away by the friendly reception accorded to him here and should attribute more importance than was right to friendly and cordial civilities; but it was unfortunate that his Highness should have given his Government, as, judging from what was said in the Reichstag, he apparently had, the impression or conviction that this country as a possible belligerent need not be considered. An opinion that this country would stand aside and remain neutral would make for war rather than peace, and without any menaces and in the interest of peace Count Benckendorff thought it should be made clear at Berlin that Great Britain, like Germany, might be forced to "fight for her position and for the protection of her future and security." Count Benckendorff said that, as far as he could judge, Prince Lichnowsky still laboured under the belief that the neutrality of this country could be safely relied upon. M. Sazonof remarked recently in a private letter to Count Benckendorff that the only nation of which Germany was in real fear was Great Britain.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52085] No. 211.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 94.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 9, 1912.*

THE Austro-Hungarian Ambassador called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 3rd December to ask for "news." Sir A. Nicolson told his Excellency there was nothing particularly new, beyond perhaps the speech of the German Chancellor. Count Mensdorf enquired what was Sir A. Nicolson's opinion. Sir A. Nicolson told his Excellency that of course statesmen had a perfect right to say what they liked, but it might be a question whether the moment was always well chosen, and he was curious to learn what effect the speech would produce in Russia. Count Mensdorf said that there was nothing new in the Chancellor's speech. Sir A. Nicolson said this might be so, but reiterating facts might be interpreted as drawing exceptional attention to them and in a sense as a warning. If the Chancellor's speech was interpreted in that sense in Russia it would be unfortunate, as public opinion there was at present sensitive. Sir A. Nicolson hoped sincerely that the speech would have no such effect, as it would be most regrettable if mischief ensued, and if complications arose, from which it would be difficult for any Power to stand aloof.

Count Mensdorf said that it was possible that he would shortly hear from Count Berchtold as to the ambassadorial conversations. He rather gathered that Count Berchtold might accept the proposal "with certain reservations."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52864] No. 212.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 97.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 9, 1912.*

COUNT MENSDORFF said to-day that the reception of the Austrian reply about the meeting of Ambassadors had been favourable. No objection had been taken to the reserves which Austria made.

I observed that, if this was the case, I would certainly make no objections either.

Count Mensdorff told me that M. Sazonof, in commenting on the Austrian reply, had said that if the Ambassadors could meet round a table now the solution would be easier than a short time ago. He had made no objection to the Austrian reserves, but

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had seemed to think it a little premature for Roumania to be admitted, and the Austrian Government did not make this an absolute condition.

I said that, though I had not made any remark at the time, it struck me, when the Austrian Ambassador first mentioned Roumania as a country which should be represented at the meeting, that it would be better for Roumania not to have a representative at the conversations at first. She could be consulted at a later stage, if need be. It would be better to begin with only the Ambassadors of the neutral signatory Powers of the Treaty of Berlin. Albania would presumably be one of the first questions to be discussed, and it would be well to get over this difficulty before the Roumanian representative was present.

Count Mensdorff said that there had been an idea that, if the peace negotiations went well, the meeting of the Ambassadors might be transformed into a formal conference.

I said that I was opposed to this idea. I thought that the conversations at the meeting of Ambassadors should deal with those larger subjects which gave rise to anxiety. If they resulted in an agreement, a definite statement could then be made that would remove from Europe all anxiety of war. A formal conference could then be arranged, if necessary, later; and I would suggest that it should be held either at Paris—as M. Poincaré had been the first to suggest a formal conference—or, if not, in some neutral place like The Hague, rather than in London.

With regard to the sketch which I had given of possible proceedings at the meeting of Ambassadors, and which, I reminded Count Mensdorff, had been thrown out very informally, he told me that Count Berchtold thought that the subjects for discussion should be decided when the Ambassadors met.

I said that I quite agreed, but it was well to have some idea of the subjects beforehand, to make sure that we all had the same object in view in beginning conversation.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52865] No. 213.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 98.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 9, 1912.*

COUNT MENSDORFF, in speaking to me to-day, said that, though the Austrian Government could not refuse to consider Paris as a place of meeting for the Ambassadors, M. Sazonof himself, when receiving the Austrian reply about the meeting, had said that he thought Paris not a very favourable place for it, as so many things leaked out there.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52867] No. 214.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 99.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 9, 1912.*

AS the Austrian Ambassador came to see me to-day immediately after the Servian chargé d'affaires had left, I told him of the apprehension which the Servian Government had as to a decisive step on the part of Austria, of what I had said to the chargé d'affairs respecting the Austrian attitude, and of the advice which I had given.

The Ambassador said that this seemed to him very satisfactory. He believed the attitude of his Government to be as I had said it was.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52872] No. 215

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 39.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 9, 1912.*

THE Servian chargé d'affaires communicated to me to-day the following names of the delegates who were coming from Servia in connection with the peace negotiations.

Délégués:

M. Stoyan Novakovitch
M. Andra Nikolitch.
M. Milenko Vesnitch.

Experts militaires:

Général Petar Bojovitch.
Lieutenant-Colonel d'État Major Zivko Pavlovitch.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52866] No. 216.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 40.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 9, 1912.*

THE Servian chargé d'affaires informed me to-day that his Government had reason to think that Austria would take some decisive step this week to obtain from Servia the abandonment of her claim for an outlet on the Adriatic, and that this step might be accompanied by some military demonstration, or even some military action. The Austrian military preparations seemed to point in this direction. His Government thought that Austria would first try to obtain from Servia renunciation of a port; that she would then insist on pushing the frontier of Albania to the north so as to include even Prizrend; and that finally—this they had from a reliable source—she would press a *modus vivendi* upon Servia to draw the latter into the Austrian political and economic sphere. He was instructed to ask me what information I had on these points, and what advice I could give.

I replied that I had no information pointing to a decisive step on the part of Austria such as he feared. My information was that Austria was prepared not to interfere with Servian military operations, and to regard them as measures taken against Turkey, provided that it was understood that any questions which Austria might wish to raise would be discussed when the definite terms of peace were considered as a whole. The suggestion which I would therefore put forward was that Servia should be careful to make it clear that all that was done in the course of military operations was provisional, and not permanent, till the definitive terms of peace were discussed and settled.

The Servian chargé d'affaires reviewed the history of the last few weeks, to show that it was Austria who had been aggressive in raising questions.

I said that I could not enter upon this. I had given the best advice I could for the needs of the moment.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52870] No. 217.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 79.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 9, 1912.*

The Greek Minister informed me to-day of the reasons why Greece had not hitherto signed the armistice. Servia and Montenegro had not wished to agree to the conditions either, but they had not been able to insist on this attitude, because Bulgaria had been empowered to sign on their behalf. Greece had now told Bulgaria

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that, if Bulgaria desired it, Greece would agree to the armistice; but if Greece did this she hoped that everyone would recognise the sacrifices which she was making for the sake of her allies, and she had put before Bulgaria some considerations why she should prosecute the war while the peace negotiations were proceeding.

The Minister also said that his Government felt it a great honour that rooms should be placed at the disposal of the peace delegates in St. James's Palace—the palace from which the British Court took its title.

I observed that, if their negotiations resulted in peace, a pleasant association would be added to St. James's Palace by the fact that it was the place where this result had been obtained.

The Minister said that he felt that the atmosphere here was good.

On my saying that I thought the British press had created this, he said that the judicious utterances of the Prime Minister and myself had, he thought, been useful in discouraging interference from quarters in Europe where otherwise it might have been expected.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52682] No. 218.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 104.)
Sir, *Belgrade, December 7, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 100 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to report that the Servian delegates for the Peace Conference will be M. Novakovitch, leader of the Progressist party in the Skupshtina, and either M. Andra Nikolitch, president of the Skupshtina, or M. Vessnitch, Servian Minister in Paris.

General Boyovitch and Lieutenant-Colonel Pavlovitch will accompany the mission as military experts.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[52689] No. 219.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 9. Consular.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Sophia, December 9, 1912.*

NOEL BUXTON, M.P., wishes British vice-consul at Philippopoli should undertake short tour Macedonia to help to distribute Balkan relief fund. Buxton proposes to discuss with you personally question of expenses. May I authorise tour?

[52811] No. 220.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 223. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 10, 1912.*

GREEK Minister, just returned from Chatalja, is of opinion that peace can only be concluded if Turkey cedes Adrianople.

He states that the roads around Adrianople are almost impassable.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[52812] No. 221.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 224.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, December 10, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 220 of 9th December.

M. Danef will stop at Vienna and Paris on his way to London, and will see Austrian and French Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

[52813] No. 222

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 225.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 10, 1912.*

KING has ordered two Bulgarian generals to go to Bucharest at once to greet King of Roumania [group undecypherable] on the Plevna anniversary, which falls on 11th December.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[52705] No. 223.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 106.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, December 10, 1912.*

MY despatch No. 104.

Servian Minister at Paris is appointed third delegate. M. Novakovich came to see me before he left and spoke very sensibly regarding Servian territorial claims on the Adriatic coast. He said that he thought that there was something behind Austrian attitude which was not altogether clear, but Servia must leave her interests in the hands of the Powers to avoid provoking a European war.

[52810] No. 224.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 107.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, December 10, 1912.*

THERE seems to be a very distinct disposition here now to enter into unofficial conversations with Austria. Professor Masaryk is at Belgrade, but I have reason to believe that if important unofficial negotiations take place they are more likely to be conducted between Dr. Baernreiter for Austria and Dr. Zwicho on Servian side.

[52786] No. 225.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, December 10, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 34 of 9th December.

I understand that M. Danef will, after all, also see Count Berchtold in Vienna, and will probably not reach London till Friday night.

[52711] No. 226.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 710.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 10, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1096 of 7th December: Conference at St. James's Palace. Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed grateful thanks for offer.

[52773] No. 227.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 711.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 10, 1912.*

TURKISH delegates for peace negotiations finally appointed are:—

1. Reshid Pasha, formerly Ambassador at Rome and Vienna.
2. General Osman Nizami Pasha, Ambassador at Berlin.
3. Nabi Bey, Ambassador at Rome and peace delegate at Ouchy.

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They will be accompanied by Colonel Ali Riza Bey, who was chief of staff to Mahmoud Shevket in 1909, and Reshid Bey, legal adviser at the Porte.
(Sent to Sophia.)

[52807] No. 228.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 712.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 10, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 711 of to-day.

General Salih Pasha, Acting Minister of Marine, at the last moment was selected to replace Nabi Bey, it being thought inadvisable for Turkey to be represented by two Ambassadors accredited to Powers.

All delegates left this afternoon.

[52804] No. 229.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 213.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, December 10, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 770 of 5th December.

At the solicitation of the French administrators of the Ottoman Bank, the French Government, in consideration of usage by which funds in banks, even if privileged, have always been treated as private property, have instructed their representatives at Athens, Belgrade, Sophia, and Cettinjé to point out to Governments to which they are accredited the responsibilities which military authorities would incur if they laid hands on the funds of the bank's agencies.

No instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Constantinople, as the agencies in places held by Ottoman troops do not appear to be in danger.

[52808] No. 230.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 482.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 10, 1912.*

I READ to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon paraphrase of your telegram No. 1344 of 9th December.

His Excellency said that he entirely shared your views, and hoped that you would arrange for Ambassadors to meet at once without waiting for detailed statement, which will reach London on Monday.

Even if no serious discussion could take place this week, the fact of their having met would be a great point gained. He begged me to assure you that he had never insisted on Paris, and had, on the contrary, told me that he personally preferred London.

To serve their own purposes, the French Government must have invented the story. The Minister for Foreign Affairs considered this to be rather mean, and I did not venture to undeceive his Excellency.

In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding, I read to him part of a despatch which I am sending by messenger recapitulating conversations reported in my telegrams No. 465 of 30th November, No. 469 of 4th December, and No. 478 of 8th December. His Excellency said that it gave a perfectly accurate statement of his views on the Albanian and the Servian questions.

[52809] No. 231.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 483.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 10, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that the Servian Government had informed him that they had reason to fear lest Austria was determined to send them an ultimatum, and had asked for his advice.

His Excellency had urged them strongly to abstain from action of any kind and to place their case unreservedly in the hands of England, France, and Russia, who were very friendly disposed, and who would do all they could to secure their economic emancipation. He would be grateful if you would authorise His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade to give the same advice. He did not know whether the expected ultimatum had reference to the occupation of Durazzo or to the consular question. If the latter, he rather thought that Servia would have to yield, though he, personally, did not know the rights and wrongs of the case.

His Excellency had received from Budapest information very similar to that reported in Vienna telegram No. 183 of 4th December to the effect that present state of suspense was becoming unbearable. Austria, he said, seemed to fear that she would be eventually obliged to expel Servians from Durazzo, and that she would then be attacked by Russia, and it was deplorable to think that Servia had it in her power to kindle a European war.

I asked whether his Excellency thought that it would be possible for the Powers, should Austria threaten action, to guarantee collectively the execution of any settlement of the Servian-Albanian question on which they might ultimately agree, so as to deprive her of all reason for intervention. His Excellency replied that, while he would be prepared to join in any collective action so long as that action was restricted to persuasive methods, it would be difficult for him to engage to join Powers in forcing Servia to withdraw.

[52644] No. 232.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 193.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 10, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 222 of 9th December.

You should thank Prime Minister, and say that I much regret, personally, that I shall not have this opportunity of seeing him, but I understand reasons why he cannot come.

[52689] No. 233.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H Bax-Ironside.

(No. 196.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 10, 1912.*

YOUR telegram of 9th December.

You may authorise tour, if necessary, to help to distribute Balkan relief fund.

[52633] No. 234.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 419.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 10, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 175 of 9th December.

All the Powers have now agreed to London, and it is very desirable that conversations should begin as early as possible next week. As far as I can judge there is a prospect of their going well, and if so, an untoward incident between Austria and Servia will be less likely to occur, and perhaps less dangerous if it did occur, for there will be great reluctance to break up conversations when once begun.

Meanwhile, reports of Austrian mobilisations and warlike preparations continue, and it is most desirable to avoid an untoward incident and to preserve an atmosphere for conversations of Ambassadors in which it may appear that no one is contending for victory, but that each is seeking for some compromise on which to agree.

I have spoken in this sense to German Ambassador, who said that he thought Austrian measures were only precautions, and that, though Germany had declared intention to support her ally, she had used her influence at Vienna for peace and moderation; he expressed hope that I would speak to Austrian Ambassador as I had done to himself, and this I have done.

There seems to be anxiety lest the question of Austrian consul may give rise to

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an ultimatum from Austria. I do not know that there is any foundation for this; the Austrian Ambassador has not given me any indication that the report received at Vienna of treatment of consul is serious, and I have no information about it.

After what Minister for Foreign Affairs has said to you, I propose, in any statement I make about meeting of Ambassadors, to recall that first suggestion of a formal conference came from French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that, when that is found to be necessary, Paris would presumably be the first place to be considered.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 774, and St. Petersburgh, No. 1347.)

[52340] No. 235.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 773.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 10, 1912.

SIR R. PAGET'S telegram No. 194 of 7th December: Protection for Ottoman Bank.

Have French Government taken similar action in other capitals? Please press for reply to enquiry in my telegram No. 770 of 5th December.

[52854] No. 236.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.**

(No. 309.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 10, 1912.

SIR F. BERTIE'S telegram No. 213 of 10th December: Protection of Ottoman Banks.

You may take action similar to that of your French colleague.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 1099, "for information only.")

[53055] No. 237.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1316.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 10, 1912.

RUSSIAN Ambassador having told me that Minister for Foreign Affairs did not object to London, but hoped some way might be found of soothing susceptibilities of the French, I said I had already mentioned Paris to German Minister for Foreign Affairs as place for meeting of formal conference if required later, and found him well disposed.

Austrian Ambassador has been summoned to Vienna to receive instructions. I have urged upon him that conversations of Ambassadors should begin as early as possible next week, and that it is very desirable to avoid any untoward incident in the interval.

[53054] No. 238.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 416.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 10, 1912.

AUSTRIAN Ambassador has been summoned to Vienna to receive instructions. I have urged that conversations of Ambassadors should begin as soon as possible. Indications are that Servia is making up her mind to leave her claims in hands of Powers, and that it may be possible for Russia and Austria to find ground of agreement. Conversations of Ambassadors may very likely go well. In this event it is

* Also to Sir H. Rumbold (No. 195), Sir R. Paget (No. 136), and Count de Salis (No. 115).

important that they should begin as early as possible next week. I urged strongly on Austrian Ambassador how desirable it was to avoid any untoward incident in the interval, and to preserve an atmosphere for conversations in which it should appear that no one was contending for victory, but that each was seeking for some compromise on which to agree.

[53147] No. 239.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 604.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 10, 1912.

THE French Ambassador told me to-day that M. Poincaré would accept London as the place of meeting for the Ambassadors, but he had no information from St. Petersburgh that the Russian view had changed, and he hoped that I might suggest Paris as the place for a formal conference later on.

I informed M. Cambon that I had already instructed Sir Edward Goschen to mention this to Herr von Kiderlen, who had expressed himself favourably with regard to it. I might be able to say something on the point of Paris as a probable meeting place for a formal conference when I made an announcement in the House of Commons about the conversations of Ambassadors.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[53148] No. 240.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 605.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 10, 1912.

M. CAMBON spoke to me to-day of the anxiety lest the question of the Austrian consul should give rise to the sending of an Austrian ultimatum to Servia. He asked whether there could not be some intervention in favour of arbitration if this occurred. He also urged how important it was that the Ambassadors should meet soon, and he suggested next Monday (the 16th instant) as the day of the first meeting.

I entirely agreed, and said that I would be ready if the other Powers were ready too. I also told him what I proposed to say to the German Ambassador and the Austrian Ambassador about Austrian mobilisation, and the importance of avoiding any untoward incident. Even if Russia and Austria had not been able by next Monday to give definite instructions to their Ambassadors as to their views respecting the limits of Albania, the Ambassadors might at any rate meet and agree that the belligerents were free to make their own territorial arrangements except on certain points, and then proceed to enumerate these points, without going on to discuss them until the Austrian and Russian Ambassadors had received full instructions. The meeting of Ambassadors would then have been constituted, and that would be a point gained.

M. Cambon quite agreed that the first step of the Ambassadors might be to enumerate points in this way.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[49876] No. 241.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 10, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a despatch, dated the 15th November, from His Majesty's Minister at Athens, respecting the revenues assigned to the service of the Greek debt.

I am to request that Sir E. Grey may be furnished with the views of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury on the points raised in this despatch.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* Part II, No. 642.

[52833] No. 242.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 194.)
Sir, *Athens, November 30, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 187 of the 23rd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a continuation of the diary of the war, taken from the official bulletins, up to the 29th instant.

Unofficially, the Chalcidic peninsula has been reported entirely cleared of Turkish troops by Greek irregulars. Other exploits of irregular bands are also mentioned in the press.

The following villages have been reported as having been burnt by the Turks and Mussulman Albanians in Epirus: Plesivitsa, Drestenik6, Revenitza, Jelovo, Kaminia, Doliana, Sipiani, Dovrò, Ano Kalouta, Kato Kalouta, Soudena, Helion, and Tsepelovo entirely, and Kretsounitsa, Tsiarkovitsa and Artsista partly. Murders and outrages of women and children are said also to have been committed by them.

On the other hand, I hear privately that Turkish prisoners committed to the custody of Cretan irregulars frequently disappear.

Seventy-two Turkish officers, including Generals Nazim and Ghalib Pashas, two colonels, and fifty-five lieutenant-colonels and captains, were brought down from Salonica on the 26th, and are lodged at the Aktaion Hotel, at Phaleram. Some of them are said to have been implicated in a plot alleged to have been discovered at Salonica against the Greek authorities, and in obtaining passes from the German consulate-general for soldiers by representing them to be peasants returning to their homes.

The Turkish torpedo-boat "Adalia," which was sunk by the Turks at Prevesa, has been raised and brought to the arsenal; she requires little repair, and will be added to the Greek fleet.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 242.

Diary of the War for November 23 to 29, 1912.

November 24.—Official announcement by the Ministry of Marine:—

"Torpedo-boat 'No. 14,' under Lieutenant P. Argyropoulos, entered Aivali and attacked a Turkish gun-boat, the captain of which opened the valves and abandoned her. The torpedo-boat went alongside and a party boarded the gun-boat, but were unable to close more than one valve, and she began to sink. The men were, therefore, recalled and the vessel was blown up. She is believed to have been the 'Zephyr,' of 8 knots speed, and mounting three 5·7 cm. Krupp guns."

November 24.—Official announcement by the Ministry of Marine, based on a telegram from Admiral Condouriotis, reporting the occupation of Ploumarion in Mitylene and the detention of the Turkish officials:—

"The Turkish army in Mitylene withdrew to the villages round Molyvos."

November 24.—Official announcement by the Ministry of War:—

"Yesterday a detachment of 500 Turks from Yanina attacked our detachment between Vytinitsa and Chrysovitsa, two hours west of Metsovo. After eight hours' fighting the enemy fled, losing over 100 men and all their *matériel*. Our casualties, three killed ten wounded."

November 26.—Official announcement by the Ministry of Marine:—

"The fourth division of the fleet, comprising the auxiliary cruisers 'Macedonia,' 'Hesperia,' and 'Arcadia,' and the destroyers 'Nea Genea' and 'Keravnos' under Captain Damanos reached the capital of the island of Scio (Chios) at 8 A.M. on the 24th instant, with two battalions of the 7th infantry, one battalion of the 1st infantry, and one battery of mountain guns, under Colonel Delagrammatica. (These troops were brought from Salonica.) The intervention of the consuls in favour of a peaceable surrender having proved fruitless, the disembarkation of troops at Kontari, south of the capital, began at 3 P.M., covered by the guns of the fleet. About midnight the Turks abandoned the town and withdrew to the summit of the Provato hill. The capital was occupied without opposition at 8 A.M. on the 25th, and the troops then followed up the Turks whom they defeated and pursued into the interior. Our casualties, five killed and one wounded. The authorities of the island were taken prisoners with about thirty soldiers and gendarmes.

November 26.—Official announcement by the Ministry of War:—

"The Crown Prince, with the object of visiting the Crown Prince of Servia and of consolidating the relations of fraternity between the Greek and Servian armies, visited Monastir with his general staff. The meeting between the two princes was most cordial, and the fraternisation between the two princes was complete. The town of Monastir had prepared for the Greek Crown Prince a splendid reception, in which Turkish, Jewish, and Bulgarian notables also participated. His Royal Highness has returned to Florina."

November 27.—Our cavalry regiment, on the 25th, occupied Kastoria, where a whole division has now arrived, and whence the Turkish army has fled. Telegraphic communication has only been restored to-day.

Dated from Florina.

CONSTANTINE.

November 28.—Official announcement by the Ministry of Marine:—

"The position known as St. Mark, the summit of the Provato hill (Scio), has been captured after a brave attack by our infantry and landing parties. The attack was covered by the mountain battery and the 'Macedonia' quick-firers. The Turkish troops retired to the west of the hill and occupied a line from St. Mark to Langadu. The advance continued all to-day. Prisoners, including sixty regulars and 117 irregulars, have been sent to the Pireus. Turkish soldiers are coming in daily to surrender."

November 28.—The "Doxa," on patrol duty near the coast at Sedil Bahr (at the entrance of the Dardanelles), was fired on four times by the fort at 6·15 A.M. but was not struck. She immediately returned the fire with five shots. The patrols are being continued.

Dated from the "Averoff."

CONDOURIOTIS.

[52834] No. 243.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 195.)
Sir, *Athens, December 1, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 190 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of two further despatches received to-day from the British military attaché with the Greek field forces, describing the Greek advance to Florina and Kastoria.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 243.

Reports by Major Cunliffe-Owen.

(1.)

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Banitza, November 21, 1912.*

THE Greek army is now concentrated around Banitza with the view of advance to Florina to-day.

The 4th division effected a junction with the 5th, and these two divisions moved north through Sorovich and Eksisu; these places were reached respectively on the 19th, and by the evening of the 20th the 5th division was on the road from Banitza to Florina and the 4th at Rosna. Detachments of the enemy were encountered and dispersed.

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On the 19th the 6th and 1st divisions had occupied Ostrovo, a small action taking place close to the station, some twenty Turks being killed and the same number taken prisoners.

The 3rd division marched through Cegan.

Head-quarters moved to Ostrovo, whence the rail was in working order.

On the evening of the 20th these three divisions were all encamped around Banitza—Zabrdani, the advanced guard of the 6th division having dispersed a party of the enemy which had taken position at the small bridge east of Gornicevo.

Head-quarters moved by rail to Banitza, and the first through train entered that place from Salonica.

Connection was gained with the Servian cavalry at Brod, news having meanwhile arrived of the surrender of the main Turkish force to the Servians at Monastir.

The Turks directly in front of the Greek advance were estimated in all at about 5,000 to 10,000 men on the flanks, *i.e.*, by Ostrovo and by Sorovich. The country has been cleared of these detachments, who have dispersed to the west of Florina, many parties of prisoners having been taken and some guns.

Florina, November 22, 1912.

Florina was occupied yesterday by all the Greek divisions, except the 1st, which is some way in rear. A large part of the artillery has been left behind owing to the difficulty of the roads.

A Servian cavalry brigade is also in occupation of the town.

Snow has fallen and much rain.

The railway is working to this place.

The Turks in their retreat burnt the town of Banitza, while several villages have been destroyed by order of the Crown Prince, owing to the action of certain bands belonging to these places.

The Greek army is pretty well exhausted, and it is lucky for them that they have had little organised resistance in the front and the benefit of the railway in their rear.

I have, &c.
F. CUNLIFFE-OWEN.

(2.)

(No. 5.)
Sir, *Florina, November* 23, 1912.

After the occupation of Florina, the remnants of the Turkish force retired in the directions of Zelova–Biklista and of Kastoria.

Towards the first of these two directions the Greek cavalry was dispatched and reached Zelovka on the evening of the 22nd.

The 3rd division was sent down to Eksisu, which place was also reached on the evening of the 22nd, with the eventual objective of Zelev-Kastoria.

The locations of the other divisions on the evening of the 22nd were:—

4th,	and head-quarters:		Florina.
5th,	„	„	Armenihor.
6th,	„	„	Rosna.
1st,	„	„	still at Banitza and ordered to return to Salonica.

It appears that during the advance to Florina the Greek cavalry (*i.e.*, the 1st regiment) captured 24 Turkish field guns and 1,200 prisoners.

I have seen both the guns and the prisoners. The former are the ordinary Krupp, with which the nizam divisions were furnished, though what regiments they belonged to it is impossible to ascertain. The breech-blocks were removed. The prisoners are of all descriptions. A large number are Albanian irregulars, but there are also men from regular nizam as well as redif organisations, mainly the 13th Nishanjes of the nizams. Only four or five officers are included in the number taken.

The Servian troops (which also included infantry as well as cavalry) have withdrawn outside the town, which is entirely policed and occupied by the Greeks. The latter have behaved well to the inhabitants, but their sanitary arrangements leave much to be desired. There is also no regulation of water supply whatever.

The commander-in-chief intends to visit Monastir to-morrow, and it is hoped that the military attachés will accompany him.

Later.—To-day, the 3rd division has reached Kastoria and the 5th has advanced in support to Eksisu. The 3rd apparently proceeded further than Eksisu the preceding evening.

I have, &c.
F. CUNLIFFE-OWEN.

[52909]

No. 244.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 11.)

(No. 197.)
Sir, *Athens, December* 2, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a statement which has appeared in the Athens press to-day concerning the activity of the Greek navy and mercantile marine in operations of war during the last ten days, of which it is pointed out the country may rightly be proud.

The transport of the Bulgarian troops from Salonica and their landing at Dedeagatch appears to have been a creditable performance. I have no doubt that it was for the protection of this convoy that greater vigilance was exercised at the entrance of the Dardanelles, and that a consequence of that was the warning to foreign ships of war which formed the subject of your telegram No. 299 of the 30th ultimo.

Although it is not so stated in the press, it is understood that the Greek division which embarked at Salonica is being transported to Epirus, where the operations will now no doubt be pushed on with greater vigour.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 244.

Newspaper Extract.

OPERATIONS OF THE GREEK FLEET.

(Translation.)

ON the 8th (22nd) November the "Averoff," "Hydra," "Psara," "Spetsai," with the scout "Ierax," the destroyers "Nea Genea," "Aspis," "Thyella," "Nike," and "Velos," the torpedo-boats Nos. 14 and 15, and the mother vessel "Kanaris," accompanied by the transports "Ismene," "Pelops," and "Kaloutas," carrying three companies of sailors and four companies of infantry, sailed into the port of Mitylene. This division of the fleet was under the personal command of Rear-Admiral P. Coundouriotis, and occupied the town of Mitylene, establishing a Greek occupation of the greater part of Lesbos.

On the 11th (25th) November another section of the fleet, comprising the auxiliary cruisers "Hesperia," "Macedonia," and "Arcadia," with the destroyers "Kerkyra" and "Nea Genea," the latter vessel being detached after the occupation of Mitylene, and the transports "Patris," "Sappho," and "Henrietta," with a regiment of infantry, a company of sailors and one mountain battery occupied the capital of Chios (the town of Kastro), and supported a landing of troops at Kontari, which took three hours. This division is aiding with its guns the victorious advance of the landing parties under Colonel Delagrammatica.

At the request of the Bulgarian Government, which asked for the aid of the Greek navy for the transport of the whole of the 7th Bulgarian army division, comprising 500 officers, 35,000 men, 8,500 horses, 1,500 oxen, and 1,700 waggons with 26 guns, the naval authorities concentrated at Salonica within forty-eight hours fifty-one transports belonging to the Greek mercantile marine, as follows: the "Elpis," "Agia Pelagia," "Christophoros," "Barbara," "Sophia," "Byzantium," "Urania," "Helene" (of the Achaia Company), "Elda" (Achaia), "Epirus" (Yannulato Company), "Agnes Hounta," "Samos" (Pan-Hellenic Company), "Kalypso," "Alexandra," "A. Koromilos," "Inglessis," "Hermoupolis," "Margarita," "Peneios," "Patris," "Themistocles," "Sparta," "Thrace," "Ismene," "Dolphin," "Nile," "Æolos," "Caloutas," "Kypros," "Theophano Siderides," "Phroso," "Assos," "Karystinaki Siphnos," "Agios Georgios," "Marchetti," "Kythera," "Sappho," "A. Michalinos," "Argostoli," "Kerkyra," "Stenemachos," "Konstantinos," "Pantins," "Thessalia," "Dirphys," "Sesostris," "Milt. Embericos,"

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"Athenee," "Leonardos," "Spetsai." At the same time the means of disembarking the Bulgarian troops at Dedeagatch were prepared.

As, however, the Bulgarian military authorities subsequently preferred sending a part of the 7th Division by land, the Greek ships simultaneously effected the transport of a Greek army division and that of a Bulgarian brigade, the latter being disembarked at Dedeagatch.

The Greek division was transported in the "Dolphin," "Epirus," "Phroso," "Helene," "Despoina," "Leonardos," "Argostoli," "Embericos," "Angelike," "Agnes Hounta," "Helene," "Kerkyra," "Nauplia," "Theophano," "Kalypso," "Alexandria," "Caloutas," and "Ismene," the last two vessels being recalled from Mitylene after landing the troops in that island. In all by eighteen vessels.

The transport of the Bulgarian brigade of 13,000 men and 3,000 animals under Colonel Mitof was effected by the vessels "Spetsai," "Inglessi," "Marchetti," "Kythera," "Sophia," "Thrace," "Agia Pelagia," "Kypros," "Hermoupolis," "Margurita," "Barbara," "Elpis," "Athene," "Assos," "Peneios," "Agios Georgios," and "Stenemachos," or by seventeen steamers.

These vessels were protected by the Greek fleet, which guarded the entrance of the Dardanelles with the destroyer flotilla, whilst the battle-ship squadron sailed towards Dedeagatch, together with the scouts.

The vessels sailed in one line from Salonica at 9·20 A.M. on the 14th (28th) November, under the leadership of the "Mykale," commanded by Commander M. Matthaiopoulos, chief of the naval general staff.

On reaching the Kara Burnu point the vessels formed in three lines with the "Mykale" at the head of the left-hand line, the "Spetsai" carrying Colonel Mitof in the centre, and the "Agia Pelagia" at the head of the right-hand line. The vessels were 400 metres apart, and each line separated by 800 metres from the adjoining line.

At 6·20 the procession doubled the Kassandra promontory, where the light-house was lighted for the first time since the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish war. At 1·30 A.M. on the 15th (29th) Athos was passed in full moonlight. The arrival at Dedeagatch took place at 1 P.M. The "Averoff," "Hydra," "Psara," and "Spetsai" lay at anchor off Dedeagatch from the morning with the scouts "Leon" and "Panther" and torpedo-boats Nos. 11 and 14 with the "Kanaris." The lighters and all necessary appliances for the landing of the troops were also ready, including a tank steamer with water.

The disembarkation commenced at once, and was aided by the calm which had succeeded the bad weather which had prevailed for forty days past. The landing was interrupted during the night at the request of the Bulgarian commander, and was continued in the morning, being concluded in the evening in bad weather. The landing of 13,000 men and 3,000 horses with material, &c., was thus effected in eighteen hours under not altogether favourable conditions, at a distance of 260 miles from the Pireus, the only port which provides the means for operations of the nature on so large a scale.

During the time these operations were in progress the remaining steamers (eighteen) were busied in transporting 30,000 prisoners from Salonica to different parts of Greece. Another fourteen steamers were occupied in service connected with the Epirus army, whilst at the same time fourteen large steamers had sailed into Pireus, or were transporting material of the Greek army and navy.

Four mail steamers, the "Hesperia," "Macedonia," "Arcadia," and "Mykale," have been converted into cruisers during the war, and all have been armed with quick-firing guns. Two mail-steamers have been converted into floating hospitals, one for the army and one for the navy, whilst there have been taken into the service of the State two permanent colliers for the fleet, one petroleum vessel and eighty-five army transport ships, or ninety-five vessels in all.

[52856] No. 245.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 88.)
Sir,

Canea, Crete, December 2, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that for the last three weeks, since the departure for Beirout of the French ship "Henri Quatre," the only vessels of war at Suda Bay have been His Majesty's ship "Diana" and the Russian gun-boat "Donetz."

When the international troops were withdrawn in the summer of 1909 the four protecting Powers undertook to guard their flags and that of Turkey on Suda Island by means of ships of war, which should land parties for the purpose. During the war between Turkey and Italy no ship of the latter Power was of course stationed at Suda Bay, but after the signing of peace there was nothing to prevent the Italian Government from resuming its share in the work. It has, however, sent no ship.

At the present moment a French ship should be providing the guard on Suda Island, but the duty has to be undertaken by His Majesty's ship "Diana" out of her turn. During the winter rains the task is a far from pleasant one.

My French and Italian colleagues have called the attention of their Governments to the situation, but without result.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[52822] No. 246.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 1041.)
Sir,

Constantinople, December 7, 1912.

WITH reference to Sir H. Bax-Ironside's telegram No. 198 of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch from British vice-consul at Dedeagatch reporting in regard to the capture of Yaver Pasha's army by the Bulgarian General Covatchof.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 246.

Vice-Consul Badetti to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 25.)
Sir,

Dédéagatch, le 30 novembre, 191.

DANS mon rapport No. 23 du 24 courant j'ai eu l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que les débris de l'armée ottomane laissaient dans sa fuite des souvenirs bien amères aux villages chrétiens.

Dans la zone comprise entre Gümuldjina et nos parages on évaluait le chiffre à 10,000 hommes, ayant à leur tête Yaver Pacha, avec l'intention de se sauver en traversant la Maritza.

Après le départ d'Ouroumdjouk, distant d'ici de 18 kilog., ils se rendirent à Ferredjik. Là aussi il y a eu pillage en règle et une dizaine de chrétions massacrés seulement, la plupart ayant pris la montagne.

Les eaux de la Maritza étant très hautes, la marche en avant devient impossible.

Le Général Covatchof, dès son arrivée ici, fut avisé de la présence de tout ce monde; d'urgence il expédia les troupes nécessaires pour leur livrer bataille. Un parlementaire a été expédié, mais n'a pas réussi dans sa mission.

Le 28, vers midi, entre les kilomètres 39 et 40 (vers Andrinople) à la rampe de Mulamly les Bulgares livrèrent bataille à l'ennemi. L'engagement dura environ deux heures et se termina par la défaite des Turcs.

Yaver Pacha avec environ 9,000 hommes, 3,000 bachi-bouzoucks, 14 canons, quatre mitrailleuses et 250 officiers ont été fait prisonniers. Ces derniers ont été autorisés à garder leur sabre.

On prétend que les munitions pour canons et mitrailleuses faisaient défaut aux Turcs. Tous les prisonniers seront dirigés vers la Bulgarie. Deux mille fuyards essayèrent avant l'engagement de passer la Maritza en jettant des poutres en bois. Leur plan a été très mal conçu, car le courant étant fort, une grande quantité a péri dans le fleuve.

Durant l'engagement aux kilomètres 39–40 les pertes bulgares ont été insignifiantes, celles des Turcs plus sérieuses.

Aujourd'hui est parti d'ici un train avec quatorze wagons pour aller ramasser sur le théâtre de la guerre les fusils et autres munitions abandonnés par les Turcs.

J'ai causé ce matin avec un employé de la gare de Ferredjik arrivé hier au soir. Il me raconta que la station a été saccagée par les troupes turques; le coffre-fort et les

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appareils télégraphiques ont été brisés; sur un parcours de près de 1 kilom. se trouvent éparpillés des tickets pour voyageurs.

Un calque vient d'arriver d'Énos et nous apprenons que les villages de Maistro et Amigdalia ont eu la visite des fuyards, et subirent le même sort des villages chrétiens de nos parages.

J'ai, &c.
G. BADETTI.

[52824] No. 247.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 1043.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 7, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché at this Embassy containing observations on the present position of the Ottoman army at the Chatalja lines, and considering the possibility of their eventually making a successful offensive movement.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 247.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 89.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 2, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the foreign military attachés, who had been with the army in the Chatalja lines since the 14th November, were brought down to Constantinople last night. No reason was given, but we were told that we should return after a fortnight or three weeks, when hostilities recommenced. I make no comment on this piece of information, as we have kept quite in the dark as to the progress of the negotiations, and your Excellency is doubtless better informed of these from other sources, as well as of the prospects of an armistice or of the eventual conclusion of peace.

I have already reported my impressions of the fighting which took place on the 17th, 18th, 19th November, and I do not think there is anything new to add, except to repeat that the Bulgarian attack seems to me to have made a mistake. Whether intended seriously or not, its result has been to encourage the Turks and to strengthen any determination they may have had to prolong the war. Whatever may be the feelings of the Turkish Government on this point, the feeling among the officers of the army now is that the period of disaster has ended, and that at last they have an army which can not only resist, but which is even capable of successfully taking the offensive. The repulse of the Bulgarians is magnified into a serious defeat, their losses are spoken of as very great, and tales of the prevalence of cholera in their camp, of starvation, lack of ammunition, and discouragement, are rife.

A good deal of this is probably bluff or *mot d'ordre*, for the purpose of supporting the diplomatic task of their Government as well as of encouraging the men and raising their spirits. But I think there remains a considerable residue of sincerity, and am of opinion that the army is very different, both in material and in a moral sense, from what it was three weeks ago.

It is impossible to state numbers, but many fresh troops have arrived, and a great many of the weakly and undesirable have been weeded out. Units have been re-formed, and have had time to shake down into their new positions. Drills and exercises have been assiduously carried out in the intervals of the fighting, and confidence between the officers and men must have been to some extent re-established. The cholera, or whatever the epidemic was, has practically disappeared, the men look healthy and well fed, and the army as a whole has acquired a confident tone and serviceable appearance which were conspicuously absent when it first began to assemble in the Chatalja position. An enormous amount of work has been, and is still being done in digging trenches and and gun-pits, and each day the position grows stronger. Though I state figures with all possible reserve, I think there may be 150,000 rifles and 300 guns now in the lines.

By the 30th ultimo, three Creusot mountain batteries had arrived at the front, and more were expected to be arriving in Constantinople, viâ Constanza. On the other

hand, some of the Creusot field batteries, confiscated from the Servian Government before the war began, had disappeared, and I am told that these are being sent to the Gallipoli peninsula.

Hitherto the troops have been content to live in their tents, but lately they have begun to supplement these by digging into the hill sides, using timber and brushwood to improve their shelters, while hut barracks are being built at Hademkeui and other centres.

So far nothing has been done towards improving communications within the position, such as repairing roads or making bridges, though the need of this sort of work is very apparent.

On the whole it may be said that the army is now comfortably established in its defensive position, and that the chances of a successful attack on it appear to be small.

But when one comes to consider the question of its taking the offensive, even granting the premise of the Turks that the army now cannot be compared with that which retreated from Kirk Kilissé and Lule Burgas, I must state that I do not consider it a practical proposition. It is one thing to remain in an entrenched position, with the questions of supply and demand reduced to the simplest expressions, and another to direct a general offensive movement of forces amounting to some 200,000 men, which is probably the least that could carry out the successful advance to the frontier, Philippopoli, and even Sophia, of which they now talk. I do not think the Turks possess commanders and staffs capable of directing such a movement, while their organisation for supply and their means for assuring communication and cohesive action are certainly deficient in every respect. I state this as my opinion, but events may prove it to be quite erroneous.

It may be worth while noticing that both the German and Austrian military attachés appear not only to encourage the Turks to prolong the war by freely stating their opinions that the army is now ready for all contingencies, that the Chatalja lines are impregnable, etc., but also express their belief in the practicability of a successful offensive which would restore their fortunes and prestige.

Meanwhile the Bulgarians appear to be in no way behind the Turks in the matter of entrenching their position, and the ridges west of the Kara Su valley, which divides the two hostile camps, are covered with the works which they have made.

It looks as if each army were preparing to defend the position which it now occupies.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

[52825] No. 248.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 1045.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 7, 1912.*

IN discussing the prospects of peace the "Jeune Turc," which has not hitherto shone by its moderation, yesterday published an article arguing in favour of the establishment of good relations between Turkey and Bulgaria. "If, it states, the peace is one which is compatible with the dignity and prestige of the Ottoman Empire a sincere and close understanding between the two countries is essential, as the real interests of both are identical. Bulgaria will be the first to suffer if Turkey's possessions in Europe are so reduced that she will no longer count as a force on that continent. As in the past, so in the future, Bulgaria would find in Turkey the best markets for her produce. Until now the industrial produce of Bulgaria has been taken almost exclusively by Turkey. The best means, then, for establishing good relations after the conclusion of peace will be the introduction of a customs union, a political understanding, and perhaps also something more.

The article concludes by stating that it may be considered in some quarters premature to discuss these questions, but they are far from being impossible of realisation, and the Government has the very best intentions in the matter.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON]

[52826] No. 249.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 1046.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 7, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith copies of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Damascus reporting on the state of public feeling in the Syrian vilayet in regard to the present war.

In view of the enquiries forwarded in your despatch No. 507 of the 5th ultimo, I am of opinion that Mr. Devey's remarks may be of interest to the Committee of Imperial Defence.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 249.

Consul Devey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 63.)

Sir, *Damascus, November 14, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to submit some remarks on the public sentiments in respect of the Balkan wars which have inflicted so many severe losses on the Turkish arms.

Situated so far from the scene of hostilities, where news only dribbles through, and as often as not may be contradicted, it is not surprising that the wildest rumours may obtain momentary credence, and sometimes incidents likely to happen in Turkey's disfavour are announced as facts before they occur, whilst the actual effects and consequences of these sad and disastrous wars are not visible, but largely left to the imagination.

As a chief Islamic centre, one is naturally prepared to find religious feelings deeply stirred by the existing wars, and the small Christian communities of this district (a bare tenth of the vilayet population) in great trepidation lest some fanatical demonstration or outbreak might occur. Many among them have gone to sojourn awhile in Egypt or the Lebanon.

This movement, beginning early last month, was due partly to the hope of escaping the summons for military service, which is so abhorrent to them that nineteen out of twenty would certainly have preferred to pay exemption rather than serve, and that despite the repeated calls for this tax.

Among causes contributory to the Christians' apprehensions have been chiefly these :—

1. The mischievous tone of the local press since the middle of last month, repeating false tales of Bulgarian ill-treatment of Moslems—nay, even massacre and rape, and defilement of mosques—and once or twice even words intended directly to incite acts of fanatical outbreak upon Christians, or expressing rancorous animosity against Europeans ;

2. The unfortunate incident of a Moslem corporal striking and assaulting an Armenian private, who shot him dead, then ran away, but gave himself up. This occurred simultaneously with some kind of dispute between military police (Kanun) and soldiers. Police moved in large numbers down the Christian quarters seeking the murderer, and this created confusion and alarm on the 5th instant, which, however, was happily quickly allayed ;

3. Rumours that Moslems were buying arms to prepare for an outbreak, and of secret night meetings at certain houses to lay their plans. These meetings, however, turned out on enquiry to have been held for quite another purpose, viz., to reconcile certain notable families among themselves as their zeal as unionists or ententists have led them into what was almost amounting to an armed feud among themselves, and there were no designs upon Christians ;

4. The arrival of some 500 Arab volunteers from Medina who visited the Great Mosque with banners and demonstrations eager for "Jihad" on the 8th instant ; and lastly

5. A few speeches had been previously delivered in mosques of inflammatory nature against Christians, but I am told that some of a calming nature recommending patience in adversity have also been made since. I need not recall the incident of the crazy fanatic's behaviour mentioned in my despatch No. 59 of the 2nd ultimo.

I am glad to observe an excellent attitude on the part of local authorities who, in spite of the increased difficulty of carrying on their duties, seem alive to the weight of responsibility upon them. Police forces are relatively small but fairly good in the province, but awhile ago it had been rumoured that 100 mounted gendarmerie were to have been called out from each battalion to supplement the cavalry. This was evidently quite untrue. Already there are small indications of increasing unruliness among Bedouins and Mutuwalis of the province in some districts (while, however, the Druzes are absolutely quiet and well-behaved) owing to the loss of prestige by the Ottoman Government. The presence of foreign war-ships at Beirout also now goes far to allay apprehensions of disturbances ; this, too, had been erroneously rumoured and declared a fact some ten days ago.

The enthusiasm to go to the wars was very notable at the beginning of last month, and already the first troops were sent off for mobilisation with cheers before hostilities began. The subsequent misconduct at Aleppo of some 300 redifs would indicate that the Syrian soldier is not hardy and dogged like the Anatolian, whilst probably most of the mutineers were men who had never done a day's soldiering nor suffered the smallest discomfort. The rumours of the fall of Constantinople (meaning, I suppose, a Bulgar advance upon San Stefano which appear to have obtained these last three days in the city) have increased the general despondency in official circles, though Bedouin and Circassian volunteers are still eagerly offering for active service and being sent forward, a few hundred of each.

The nomination of Kyamil Pasha as Grand Vizier, and his selection of ministers, including Reshid Bey for the interior, which were known here a fortnight ago, gave general public satisfaction both among civil and military people and to native local personages, whatever their party. In their country's stress, political parties appear to be putting aside their mutual animosity, and the postponement of elections promotes this end. During the last two years the antipathy of Syrians against the policy of the Union and Progress Society had been growing more pronounced, but otherwise it may be said they take no very deep interest in politics. Then, again, no doubt because of the language, the drift of educated Syrians is always towards Egypt rather than to Constantinople, and though there is little reciprocal affection between Syrian and Egyptian, they mutually influence one another.

Nothing is yet heard of the lately appointed vali, Kyazim Pasha's movements, but Osman Pasha as his substitute is respected and liked.

In conclusion, as nationalists of the hostile belligerents are extremely few here, little mention has been made of need to expel them.

I have, &c.
G. P. DEVEY.

P.S. *November 16.*—Kyazim Pasha left Constantinople about the 7th instant, it seems, and may be arriving at Aleppo to-day or to-morrow.

G. P. D.

[52839] No. 250.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 512.)

Sir, *Paris, December 10, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 213 of to-day's date, copy of a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, acquainting me with the action taken by the French Government in consequence of the request made to them by the French administrators of the Imperial Ottoman Bank with a view to the protection of the funds deposited in their agencies in the territories occupied by the forces of the allied Balkan States.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

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Enclosure in No. 250.

Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Poincaré.

EN réponse à la note de l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique en date du 6 de ce mois, le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, a l'honneur de faire connaître à son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie que les administrateurs français de la Banque ottomane se sont adressés à son département en vue d'obtenir que les agences de cette administration situées dans les provinces occupées par les armées des alliés balkaniques soient protégées contre les tentatives de mainmise effectuées par les autorités des belligérants. Considérant que, suivant les usages, les fonds existant dans les caisses des banques, même privilégiées, ont toujours été traités comme des propriétés privées et respectées comme telles par les armées conquérantes, M. Poincaré a prié les représentants de la république à Sophia, Belgrade, Athènes et Cettigné d'appeler l'attention des Gouvernements auprès desquels ils sont accrédités sur les responsabilités qu'encourraient les autorités militaires si elles mettaient la main sur l'encaisse des agences de la Banque ottomane dans les pays occupés par elles. Il n'a pas été envoyé d'instruction de cet ordre à l'Ambassadeur de la république à Constantinople, les agences de la Banque ottomane dans les contrées occupées par les armées ottomanes ne paraissant pas menacées.

M. Poincaré saisit, &c.

Paris, le 9 décembre, 1912.

[53444] No. 251.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, December 11, 1912.

(Confidentielle.)

UN échange d'idées avec les Cabinets de Paris et de Londres pour établir un accord le plus complet possible sur les questions qui seront soumises à la conférence des Ambassadeurs nous semble urgent.

Nous plaçons en première ligne la question de l'Albanie et celle de l'accès de la Serbie à la Mer Adriatique.

Il est notoire que notre but fondamental est de garantir l'indépendance politique et économique de la Serbie.

Mais en même temps le Gouvernement Impérial désire affranchir ces questions autant qu'il sera possible du caractère de conflit austro-serbe, à plus forte raison de conflit austro-russe, que l'opinion publique très à tort lui a donné.

Gardant en vue ce but et cette difficulté, nous sommes d'opinion qu'il importerait de poser tout d'abord à la conférence la question de l'organisation de l'Albanie, remettant en seconde ligne celle concernant la délimitation des frontières de cette province.

Sans entrer dès aujourd'hui dans les détails de la question, l'Albanie devrait, dans l'opinion du Gouvernement Impérial, constituer une province autonome sous la souveraineté du Sultan avec le droit pour la Turquie d'y maintenir une garnison militaire restreinte dont les proportions seraient à définir plus tard.

Nous portons, en outre, un intérêt principal et spécial à ce que soit stipulée la neutralisation de l'Albanie et de son littoral, de manière à exclure toute prédominance spéciale d'aucune Puissance.

Le Gouvernement Impérial attache le même intérêt à la reconnaissance au profit de la Serbie d'un droit d'accès à la mer libre et exempt de toute perception de droits de douane, à travers le territoire albanais par les chemins de fer qui relieront la Serbie aux ports albanais. Le droit d'importation de munitions de guerre devra être garanti à la Serbie.

Toute jonction entre les chemins de fer serbes et les ports du littoral albanais qui pourra être effectuée au moyen d'un syndicat international devra être soumise à des conditions donnant toute garantie au fonctionnement régulier et de la sécurité du mouvement de transit à travers l'Albanie.

Dans la pensée que le degré des bonnes dispositions de l'Autriche-Hongrie à faire droit aux intérêts légitimes de la Serbie sera conditionnée surtout par le cours des négociations au sujet de la délimitation des frontières albanaises, le Gouvernement

Impérial est d'avis que les frontières naturelles de l'Albanie devraient être déterminées à peu près de la façon suivante :—

Au nord de l'Adriatique, le long de la rivière Drine jusqu'au point de son conflux avec le Drine Blanc; à l'est, à partir de ce point en suivant le Drine jusqu'au lac d'Okhrida, en suivant la rive ouest de ce lac, la continuation de la frontière vers le sud un peu plus vers l'est dans la direction d'Onnisé, d'où la frontière méridionale suivrait en ligne directe vers la mer jusqu'à Delvine.

Le Gouvernement Impérial aime à espérer que la communication des principes qui précèdent concourra efficacement à l'établissement d'un point de vue commun entre les trois Cabinets.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 11 décembre, 1912.

[52818] No. 252.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 713.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December* 10, 1912.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs to-day told the Russian Ambassador that the Turkish delegates had received instructions to refuse to negotiate unless Greece had previously signed the armistice. His Excellency strongly advised the Minister to cause these instructions to be modified.

To me the Minister for Foreign Affairs merely expressed the hope that Greece would sign the armistice before the 13th.

It would be extremely unfortunate if the smoothness of the negotiations were to be marred by a difficulty of this kind.

(Sent to Athens.)

[52957] No. 253.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 714.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December* 11, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 1089 of 4th December: Ottoman debt.

Have instructed British consul-general at Salonica by wireless, and British consul-general at Smyrna by telegram, to endeavour to send instructions to British consuls in Macedonia and Mitylene respectively, but doubt if they will be able to do so. Communication interrupted between here and Rodosto. May I venture to suggest communication through Balkan capitals?

[52974] No. 254.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 715. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December* 11, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 1085 of 1st December.

While I and my French and Russian colleagues have been intimating to Turkish Government the expediency of recognising facts and of being reasonable and moderate in matter of peace terms, with a view to early settlement and afterwards establishing sound relations with their Balkan neighbours, I understand that representatives of Triple Alliance have advised Turks to assume stiffer and perhaps uncompromising attitude.

I am informed confidentially that official instructions of the Ottoman peace plénipotentiaries comprise terms certain to be rejected by the Balkan plenipotentiaries; for instance, that while Adrianople, Kirjali, and district to the south should remain Turkish, Bulgarians should receive rectifications of the frontier in the Rhodope, Nevrokopo, and Djuma regions; that, while Servia and Montenegro should receive similar rectification for sanjak and Kossovo regions, Salonica, Monastir, and Uskub

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with the adjacent territories, should be formed into an autonomous province of Macedonia under a European or Egyptian prince; that, while the law of 1880 should be applied, Janina and Albania be formed into an autonomous province governed by Ottoman prince—for example, Mejid Effendi or his son, who has studied in Vienna. Cavalla, with Thasos, should become a fief of the Khediviate, while Bulgarians would be given some access to the sea at Karagatch.

I gather that there are no official instructions about Greece, she not having signed the armistice. Ottoman plenipotentiaries have, I have been given to understand, some latitude for modification of these apparently fantastic terms, and may even have secret instructions of a more reasonable nature; but it is surmised in some quarters that Triple Alliance, in view of declarations made before hostilities as to the maintenance of the *status quo* in Turkey in Europe, would be disposed to support Turkey to a certain extent on the lines of the terms mentioned above.

(Repeated to Sophia and Vienna.)

[52975] No. 255.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 716.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 11, 1912.*

GERMAN ship "Vineta" passed out of the Dardanelles yesterday.

[52950] No. 256.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 226.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, December 11, 1912.*

ARMISTICE.

[Group omitted: ? My telegram No.] 215 of 5th December.

Greek Minister informed me that the Bulgarian Government agree with the decision of the Greek Government not to sign the armistice. Allies were of opinion that the raising of Ægean blockade prior to the conclusion of peace negotiations might be unfairly taken advantage of by the Ottoman Government to land stores and to increase number of troops in the fighting line, in which case they would have no redress.

The Prime Minister confirmed above.

My Greek colleague adds that he has had no information as to Greek Government signing the armistice at present as reported in certain European journals.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[52951] No. 257.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 228. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 11, 1912.*

POSITION of the King is at present somewhat delicate. His Majesty is anxious to return to his capital; he cannot make a triumphal entry as there is not a sufficiency of troops here at present, nor would he receive very warm welcome in view of uncertain result of negotiations. Meanwhile he is still at Kirk Kilisse, which he hates. His Majesty has approached Government as to the possibility of his going to Salonica. Question is now under consideration, but the Cabinet are not very favourably disposed to adopt the suggestion in view of difficulties of the situation.

[52948] No. 258.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, December 11, 1912.*

I ASKED Minister for Foreign Affairs last evening if he could tell me anything of what had passed during M. Danef's visit. His Excellency said he had found M. Danef friendly. There had been little time for discussion, but the ice had been broken.

M. Danef had desired to postpone continuation of the conversations until he returned after the peace negotiations, but Minister for Foreign Affairs had deprecated this delay, and it was decided to continue them in London between M. Danef and the Roumanian Legation.

(Confidential.)

Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke of granting leave to M. Mano and sending someone more familiar with the questions to be treated to replace him temporarily.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[52979] No. 259.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 191.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 11, 1912.*

M. DANEF leaves here to-night for Berlin to see the German Minister for Foreign Affairs. His Excellency was received this afternoon by Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who told me that Bulgaria insisted on the cession of Adrianople, and that he feared that this would delay conclusion of peace. M. Danef also told him that he expected the peace negotiations to last for at least three weeks. The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared to me that public opinion here demanded rapid conclusion of peace, and he hoped that the Powers would bring pressure to bear on the Balkan States to accelerate it. The Russian Ambassador, who has seen M. Danef, says that Bulgaria will absolutely refuse to allow the Greeks to remain at Salonica, and may possibly offer Salonica to Turkey in exchange for Adrianople. The Russian Ambassador told me that M. Danef had enquired of the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs what Austria considered to be the limits of Albania, having in his mind the desire of the Balkan States to meet, as far as possible, the wishes of the Powers on the subject of Albanian autonomy.

M. Danef assured the Russian Ambassador that he was astonished that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs should have replied to him that he had no idea what could be considered to be the frontiers of Albania.

[52959] No. 260.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 214.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, December 11, 1912.*

OTTOMAN debt.

Sir F. Bertie's despatch No. 510 of 7th December.

Am I authorised to enter into communication with commission experts as suggested by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs? Ministry for Foreign Affairs is pressing for reply.

[52879] No. 261.

Consul-General Spence to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11.)

(Telegraphic.) *Trieste, December 11, 1912.*

HIGH official assures me that Austria will begin war within a week.

[53054] No. 262.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1348.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December* 11, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 482 of 10th December.

Austrian Ambassador here has been summoned to Vienna to receive instructions. I urged him to return as soon as possible; he said he would use his utmost endeavours, and hoped to return in time for conversations to begin on Tuesday.

[52809] No. 263.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1352.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 11, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 483 of 10th December: Austria and Servia.

Servian chargé d'affaires expressed similar anxiety to me on 9th December, and also asked for advice. His Government feared some decisive and imminent step by Austria to obtain from Servia the renunciation of an outlet on the Adriatic. This might be followed by insistence on pushing the Albanian frontier so far north as to include Prisrend. His Government had also heard from a reliable source that a *modus vivendi* would be pressed upon them to draw Servia into the Austrian political and economical sphere.

I replied that I had no information tending to confirm the fears of his Government as to a decisive step by Austria. I understood that Austria was prepared to regard Servian military operations as measures taken against Turkey, on the understanding that, when the definite terms of peace were considered as a whole, any questions would be discussed that Austria might wish to raise. I therefore suggested that Servia should meanwhile be careful to make it clear that all that was done in the course of military operations was not permanent, but only provisional.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that I am repeating this telegram to Belgrade with the instructions contained in my telegram No. 138 of to-day to Sir R. Paget.

(Repeated to Belgrade, No. 137.)

[52809] No. 264.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 138.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 11, 1912.

MY telegram No. 1352 of to-day to St. Petersburgh.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in addition to advice given to Servian chargé d'affaires, I would say that best way for Servia to avert danger of menace from Austria would be for M. Pasitch to make a declaration that as regards her claims she will, if there is dispute, leave them in the hands of Great Powers and accept whatever agreement they may come to *unanimously*. The sooner this could be done the better.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 1353.)

[53441] No. 265.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 609.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 11, 1912.

M. CAMBON told me to-day that M. Sazonof, when applied to by the Roumanian Minister as to the admission of Roumania to the conversations of Ambassadors, had, in order to be agreeable to Roumania, suggested that the Roumanian Minister might be present with a "voix consultative."

I stated the objection to his being present in the early stages of the conversations, and said that Roumania might be consulted later, if necessary.

M. Cambon agreed with this.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[53442] No. 266.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 610.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 11, 1912.

WHILE enumerating in conversation with M. Cambon to-day the various questions which might be raised during the discussions of the Ambassadors, I said that, after what had passed in 1908, we could not object if Russia desired to raise the question of the Straits; but it was not for us to suggest that this question should be raised.

In this M. Cambon cordially agreed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[53443] No. 267.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 287.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 11, 1912.

THE Italian Ambassador informed me to-day that the Marquis di San Giuliano agreed willingly to the proposed meeting of Ambassadors, which he regarded as the best way to simplify the proceedings and to facilitate an agreement on the various questions pending in connection with a Balkan settlement. He would instruct the Italian Ambassador to take part in the discussions, and to express the views of the Italian Government about the Adriatic coast and the Ægean islands. He made a statement similar to that made by Austria respecting Servian territorial access to the Adriatic, and would instruct the Italian Ambassador to decline to discuss this point should Italy's allies also decline. He thought that London was the best place for the meeting. He also made the same suggestion as to Roumania as had already been made by Austria and Germany, adding that it was not an absolute condition.

I said that I thought it would be undesirable for a Roumanian representative to be present at the discussion of the Albanian question, which would presumably be the first to be discussed in detail. But, if necessary, Roumania could be consulted later, when we came to anything which concerned her interests.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[53444] No. 268.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 416.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 11, 1912.

COUNT BENCKENDORFF gave me to-day the accompanying sketch respecting Albania and Servian access to the Adriatic.

I said that it seemed to me excellent. The geographical details respecting the limits of Albania I should have to study on a map before I could say anything about them, but the general lines of the sketch seemed to me an excellent way of discussing the question.

Count Benckendorff said that, with this in his possession, he thought that he ought to be in a position to enter into the discussions with the Ambassadors at any time. It seemed to him to be on lines with which Austria had indicated agreement.

I remarked that I did not see how Austria could possibly refuse an agreement on

these lines without going back upon what she had said in Belgrade some time ago respecting communication by the Danube-Adriatic railway to an Albanian or Montenegrin port.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[53887] No. 269

Memorandum of Conversation between the Earl of Onslow and Count Trauttmannsdorff.

COUNT TRAUTTMANNSDORFF told me he had arrived from Vienna this morning, so I asked him what he thought of the situation and how things appeared to him. He said that the Austrian Government were fully determined to avoid war if possible, but they had also made up their minds that the Servian question must be settled now once and for all. They could not go on having crises about Servia every two years. In 1909 they had had to mobilise, and now again. In two years time they might have the same sort of thing afresh—but to settle the Serb question did not by any means mean war. In fact, he and the Austrian Foreign Office thought war improbable, since no one wanted it. I asked him how the general public looked at the matter. He said the man in the street did not want war, because he did not want to go and fight. Still, there was not any peace-at-any-price feeling. He said that the notary in his village at home had told him that many men liable to be called out were coming to him and making their wills, &c., so that all might be ready if war broke out. I asked him whether the Pan-Slav feeling was getting ahead. He said that in his country (Bohemia) the Czechs were pretty quiet. There was not any enthusiasm there for their southern Slav brothers. The only people who were intransigeant at all were the more violent Radicals, and only the leaders among these. On the southern frontier, he said that, as far as he had heard, the Serb population was pretty tranquil, but the Croats were very lively, and, he told me, very anxious to go for the Serbs. In Galicia the Poles were very anti-Russian, and ready to go for them. Galician officers had told him that masses of Russian troops were visible along the frontier, and the Polish troops in Austria were asking their officers when they would be led against their Russian enemies. This, he said, was an uncomfortable symptom. I said I was sure that the Russians were as anxious to avoid trouble as anyone. He said he was sure this was the case, and he could tell me that the relations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh were better now than they have been for years. The Russians were moving troops, &c., but he said the Austrians quite saw their point of view—if they showed no sympathy with the Serbs their influence in South-Eastern Europe would be gone for good. I said that there was also national sentiment to be considered, and the feeling in Russia, especially in the south, was very strong. He quite agreed, and added that the common religion was probably as great or a greater bond than the racial relation.

I asked him if he had been telegraphed for to take charge because Count Mensdorff had been summoned to Vienna. He said no—he was at home shooting when he got a telegram calling him to Vienna. When he got there he found that he was to be the bearer of detailed verbal instructions to Count Mensdorff. He told Count Berchtold that this was no good. If he was the bearer of instructions there would sure to be a muddle, and it would be much fairer to Count Mensdorff, and much simpler, to get him to come to Vienna and get the whole Austrian point of view first hand. He told me that he himself was very averse to taking the responsibility of being the bearer of instructions of this kind.

He said that in Vienna they were very much in favour of the ambassadorial conference. He hoped that it would be as informal as possible, and that all parties would talk the matter over frankly and freely, and make their views as clear as possible. He laid stress on the informality, and he said that he hoped that there would be no written report of the proceedings, as if there were people would not talk quite so openly. He asked whether you or Sir Edward Grey would preside, but I told him I could not tell him. He was very glad that the conference was to take place here, and not at Paris, firstly, because of the indiscretions of the French press; and secondly, because M. Poincaré might make capital out of it and use it for political purposes.

I give Count Trauttmannsdorff's conversation at length (it was, of course, quite private and unofficial, and represented merely his own views) as he comes straight from Vienna. The two points which I gathered he laid most stress on were:—

1. That Austria meant to have a settlement of the question between her and Servia, and if the worst came to the worst would fight.
2. That there was no political significance in Count Mensdorff's journey to Vienna.

I also asked Count Trauttmannsdorff about the Prisrend consular incident. He said he had not talked about it at Vienna. It was a baddish business, and if any Great Power had treated the consul of another Great Power in the way the Serbs had treated Herr Prochasky, it would have been difficult to avoid a war. With Servia, however, it was different, and the Austrians had no wish to make more of the incident than they were obliged. He thought it would be settled all right; at any rate, Austria would not use it as a bone to pick with Servia. If they wanted pretexts to provoke a war they could find plenty others of a more important nature.

Foreign Office, December 11, 1912.

[53886] No. 270.

Minute by the Earl of Onslow.

COUNT TRAUTTMANSDORFF came to see me to-day and asked me to give Sir A. Nicolson the following message:—

The Montenegrins had seized the Austrian post office at San Giovanni di Medua and refused to deliver letters or telegrams. The Austrian postal authorities at Medua objected without success, and now Count Berchtold had instructed the Austrian Minister at Cettinjé to make a strong protest and say that unless the Montenegrins desisted from these proceedings and observed the Capitulations properly the Austrian Government would take very energetic measures.

I said I hoped that this would not be the beginning of a new incident of a tiresome nature. Count Trauttmansdorff said he hoped not also, and thought that it was unlikely that there would be any serious trouble. The Montenegrins would give way, he thought.

Foreign Office, December 11, 1912.

[53025] No. 271.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received December 12.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, December* 11, 1912.

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to forward to you herewith, to be laid before Secretary Sir E. Grey, copy of a memorandum which has been prepared in this department on British trade with European Turkey and the Balkan kingdoms, and the effect thereon of such rearrangements of territory as may result from the present war.

From this memorandum it will be evident that British commercial interests are likely to be materially affected by any distribution of the territories of European Turkey amongst the Allies, and I am to suggest, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that the course of the negotiations which are shortly to be opened requires to be carefully watched from this point of view.

I am, &c.
H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 271.

Memorandum respecting British Trade with the Balkans.

THE present war in the Balkans appears likely to result in the transference of a somewhat large amount of territory from Turkish rule to the various Balkan kingdoms, and it is the purpose of this memorandum to examine the possible effects of such a transference upon British trade with the territory in question.

2. The total value of the consignments of British produce and manufactures to the four independent Balkan States and to European Turkey in 1911 was 6,516,000*l.*; the average for the three years 1909–1911 was 6,092,000*l.* Rather more than one-half of the trade was with European Turkey, and rather more than one-quarter with Greece; Bulgaria took about one-seventh; the trade with Servia was quite small, and that with Montenegro (entirely by parcel post) insignificant. The following table gives the totals for each country for the past three years (1909–1911) and the average:—

CONSIGNMENTS of British Produce and Manufactures, 1909–11.

To—	1909.	1910.	1911.	Average, 1909–11.
	£	£	£	£
European Turkey	3,123,000	3,499,000	3,551,000	3,391,000
Bulgaria	857,000	708,000	940,000	835,000
Servia	204,000	341,000	319,000	288,000
Montenegro	1,000	2,000	1,000	1,000
Greece	1,481,000	1,546,000	1,705,000	1,577,000
Total	5,666,000	6,096,000	6,516,000	6,092,000

It is believed that this somewhat underestimates our trade with Servia, owing to the fact that a certain quantity of British goods, duty-free or dutiable at low rates, are imported by houses in Austria and subsequently distributed in Servia; and it is possible also that some of the goods consigned to Salonica are destined to be conveyed thence by rail into Servia. The latter fact, if correct, would slightly reduce the total value of British produce and manufactures consumed in European Turkey, and possibly some further deduction should be made in respect of goods shipped to Constantinople and thence distributed to Asiatic Turkey.

3. But taking the total for 1911 as it stands at 6,516,000*l.*, it includes "articles wholly or mainly manufactured" to the value of 5,565,000*l.*, of which 3,200,000*l.* worth to European Turkey, the value of such articles consigned to the other countries being: to Greece, 1,194,000*l.*; to Bulgaria, 860,000*l.*; to Servia, 310,000*l.*; and to Montenegro, 1,000*l.* Of the trade to this group of countries not included under "articles wholly or mainly manufactured," about two-thirds (as to value) consisted in coal, the larger part thereof going to Greece.

4. Of the total value of 5,565,000*l.*, cotton goods accounted for 3,076,000*l.* (including 605,000*l.* for yarns), or over 55 per cent.; woollen goods amounted to 686,000*l.* (including 70,000*l.* for yarns), or about 12 per cent., so that cottons and woollens together represented about two-thirds (in value) of our total export trade in "articles wholly or mainly manufactured" to this group of countries. The only other classes of goods of appreciable importance were "machinery of all kinds" (350,000*l.*), "iron and steel and manufactures thereof" (241,000*l.*), and "chemicals and manufactures thereof" (131,000*l.*).

5. With regard to cottons, the details of the trade are shown in the following table:—

	European Turkey.	Bulgaria.	Servia.	Greece.
	£	£	£	£
Cotton yarn	116,000	258,000	155,000	62,000
Cotton manufactures:				
Piece-goods—				
Unbleached	374,000	25,000	10,000	78,000
Bleached	353,000	82,000	19,000	89,000
Printed	352,000	91,000	9,000	79,000
Dyed	356,000	102,000	27,000	131,000
Total	1,435,000	300,000	65,000	377,000
Other	158,000	14,000	28,000	62,000

Of the "cotton manufactures, other," a considerable part, especially in the case of the Balkan kingdoms, consists in sewing thread.

It will be observed that the exports of cotton yarn from the United Kingdom to European Turkey are very small relatively to the exports of cotton manufactures. The same is true, though less markedly, in the case of Greece. In the case of Bulgaria, however, the values are much closer together, though the yarns still represent the smaller value; but with Servia the position is reversed, and yarns represent by far the larger value—this may not be unconnected with the fact that, whilst the Servian duties on cotton yarns do not appear to be any heavier than those of the other countries (and are indeed lighter than the Greek), the duties on cotton manufactures are relatively extremely heavy (as will be shown later).

6. In the case of woollens our exports to Bulgaria and Servia are insignificant, amounting to only 27,000*l.* (including 7,000*l.* for yarn) and 8,000*l.* (including 1,000*l.* for yarn) respectively. The yarn sent to the group of countries is mainly worsted yarn.

7. Reverting now to our trade with Turkey in Europe in particular, there is a total (on the figures for 1911) of approximately 3,500,000*l.*, which could be affected by the transference of any portion of the Turkish territory to the Balkan kingdoms. How this trade is distributed between the various ports of European Turkey we have no means of determining with any precision. The Turkish customs returns for the year 1910–11 give the value of the total importations into each of the Turkish customs districts in Europe during that year as follows:—

	£
Stamboul and Galata	13,430,000
Salonica and dependent ports	4,940,000
Dedeagatch and dependent ports	1,420,000
Prevesa and dependent ports	840,000

Next to Stamboul and Galata (Constantinople), for which we do not appear to have any details by countries, Salonica is by far the most important of these ports from the point of view of British trade—it serves practically the whole of western Turkey in Europe, except Albania. Salonica itself is connected by rail with Monastir, and also with Uskub, whence the line continues into Servia. According to our latest consular reports of the total imports at Salonica in 1911, valued at 4,663,000*l.*, the share of the United Kingdom was 993,000*l.* (and of India and Burmah 140,000*l.*). Austria's share in that year was 975,000*l.* (in the previous year she surpassed the United Kingdom slightly); then came Germany with 492,000*l.*, France with 350,000*l.*, Russia with 265,000*l.*, and Italy with 179,000*l.*

Dedeagatch is connected by rail with Adrianople, but we do not appear to have any data as to the amount of British trade which makes use of that port. Adrianople is of course also connected by rail with Constantinople, but the distance is about a 100 miles greater than from Adrianople to Dedeagatch. The Adrianople vilayet has a population of about 1,000,000, and is a fairly good market for British goods.

The Prevesa customs district includes all the Adriatic ports. Prevesa itself is in Epirus, at the extreme south-west corner of European Turkey; its local trade is very small, but it serves Janina. Other ports in the district are Durazzo, Scutari, and Valona. The total trade is not large, it is mainly for Albania; and British interest in the trade through these ports can scarcely be important.

8. The general rate of customs duty levied by Turkey is at present 11 per cent. *ad valorem*. The Montenegrin tariff is quite simple, and the general rate of duty leviable on United Kingdom goods appears to be 10 per cent. *ad valorem*. For each of the other Balkan States an attempt has been made to calculate an average *ad valorem* rate on the lines adopted in the memoranda on the comparative incidence of foreign tariffs, contained in the Fiscal Blue Books of 1903 and 1904, with the difference, however, that instead of the incidence being calculated on the main classes of goods exported from the United Kingdom to all destinations, the main classes of goods exported to the Balkans as a whole have been taken. The results of the calculations are as follows:—

ESTIMATED *ad valorem* equivalent of the Import Duties levied on the Principal Manufactures exported from the United Kingdom.

	Per cent.
Turkey	11
Bulgaria*	16
Greece	21
Servia	32

* In the case of Bulgaria there is an octroi duty levied on imported goods at the rate of 20 per cent the import duties.

Allowing, therefore, for the Bulgarian octroi duty, the average rate of *ad valorem* duty levied by Bulgaria and Greece is roughly double that levied by Turkey, whilst in the case of Servia it is treble.

9. With regard to this, however, there are certain points to be noticed:—

(1.) The incidence is calculated on the British export values in the cases of the three Balkan kingdoms—the incidence would, therefore, be less on the values at Balkan ports, and the Turkish incidence remaining at 11 per cent., the differences between the treatment of the imported goods by Turkey on the one hand, and three kingdoms on the other, would not be quite so pronounced as would appear from the above table.

(2.) In considering the effect of any possible transference of territory, it must be borne in mind that the Powers were, before the war, practically committed to consenting to an increase of the general rate of customs duty levied by Turkey to 15 per cent. *ad valorem*, though we were trying to get a lower rate for cottons. Some such increase will presumably be unavoidable after the war, and this, combined with the consideration noted in the preceding paragraph, appreciably diminishes the harm which would from the above table seem likely to be done to British trade as a whole by any territorial rearrangement.

(3.) But whilst this is true of the trade as a whole, it is evident from the calculations which have been made that some branches of trade might be very adversely affected if the Balkan kingdoms extended their present tariffs to their new acquisitions, as presumably they would do, unless they took the opportunity to recast their tariffs. This is conspicuously the case with textiles. There seems on the whole no reason to think that the trade in cotton yarns would suffer; but as regards cotton piece-goods it is observed that whilst the Turkish duties are at present 11 per cent. *ad valorem*, the estimated *ad valorem* equivalents of the duties levied by the Balkan kingdoms are—

	Per cent.
Greece	20 to 27
Bulgaria (plus the octroi)	14 „ 21
Servia	42 „ 57

Even when allowance is made for the necessary imperfection of the calculations it is obvious that any considerable distribution of Turkish territory among the allies would materially affect British commercial interests. In particular any large transference of territory from Turkey to Servia (and especially the transference of Salonica) would have a very disturbing effect on a not inconsiderable amount of our trade in cotton piece-goods (our imports of such goods at Salonica alone in 1911 was valued at about 260,000*l.*). The trade in cotton thread, which is of course relatively quite small, would seem likely to be unaffected.

(4.) Woollens generally would also be seriously affected. On the other hand agricultural machinery, &c., and textile machinery would be unaffected—much agricultural machinery, and machinery for the first installation or enlargement of factories is free in Turkey, and agricultural and textile machinery is generally free in the Balkan kingdoms. Such chemicals as sulphate of copper, soda ash, and caustic soda would benefit.

10. Assuming the present tariff arrangements of the Balkan kingdoms to stand, it is evident that British trade would, on the whole, be likely to be most disadvantaged by any large extension of the Servian dominions; and it is obvious that every possible effort should be made to safeguard that trade generally, and our cotton trade in particular. The possible revision of the existing commercial treaties of Bulgaria and Servia must be kept in view, and also the possibility (even though somewhat remote) of a Balkan Zollverein; but the effect of either of these events lies outside the scope of the present memorandum.

11. An extension of Montenegro, or the acquisition of territory in Novi-Bazar by Austria, would presumably be of small interest to British trade.

[53086] No. 272.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 109.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, December 12, 1912.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 138 of 11th December to me and 1352 of 11th December to St. Petersburgh.

Prime Minister only returns from Uskub to-night. I will endeavour to see him to-morrow, and have, meanwhile, communicated substance of above telegrams to Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Austrian Minister assured me again yesterday that his Government had no intention of pressing Servian Government. He said that the press on both sides was principally responsible for the bad feeling, wild rumours, and nervousness.

[53073] No. 273.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Sophia, December 12, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 118 of 23rd September, Sobranjé meets on 14th December and will vote two-sixths 1913 budget and certain credits for administration of newly occupied territory. Chamber then will adjourn indefinitely.

[53083] No. 274.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 192.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 12, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 189 of 11th December.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that the military changes would in no way affect his policy. He intimated that he proposed to continue to abstain from taking any action against Servia so long as peace was not concluded between Turkey and Balkan League, but as soon as it was signed the situation would change, and he might be compelled to take action to bring about a settlement of Austro-Hungarian differences with Servia, unless the latter showed a disposition to settle them amicably. I think that Minister for Foreign Affairs is anxious that the Ambassadors' meeting should decide against a Servian port on the Adriatic, so that the Powers in concert might bring pressure to bear upon Servian Government to give way with regard to that point as soon as peace is signed.

[53077] No. 275.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 176.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, December 12, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 419 of 10th December acted upon yesterday.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will instruct German Ambassador at once. His Excellency considers it most important that the conversations should be kept entirely secret until their conclusion. This would give entire freedom of discussion to the Ambassadors without fear of tentative suggestions being represented by the press as definite proposals which could not be withdrawn or modified without appearance of giving way. It would greatly interfere with the desired atmosphere if, owing to press misrepresentations, *amour-propre* was called into play.

His Excellency did not anticipate any untoward incidents such as might interrupt or disturb the conversations, but he seemed rather preoccupied as to the attitude of the Turks in the peace negotiations.

As regards Prochaska case, he has no misgivings. Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs had told German Ambassador at Vienna that there was nothing in the incident that could not be arranged.

[53085] No. 276.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, December 12, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 145 of 10th December: Ottoman Bank.

I have spoken in sense of your instructions, French Minister having taken similar action.

[53089] No. 277.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 37. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Bucharest, December 12, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 36 of the 11th December.

I am informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that it is the intention of the Roumanian Government to send their Minister at Constantinople, M. Misu, to take charge of the Roumanian Legation in London while M. Mano is away from his post.

Owing to his thorough conversance with the Eastern question, M. Misu will be well qualified to carry on negotiations with M. Danef, and also to take part in the meetings of the Ambassadors, at which I understand the Powers have consented that the Roumanian representative shall be present.

[53077] No. 278.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 420.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 12, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 176 of 12th December.

You may tell Minister for Foreign Affairs that my own views agree entirely with his in the matter of conversations of Ambassadors. I am relieved to hear what he says about improbability of untoward incidents, the more so as I am now exceedingly hopeful that an amicable agreement will be reached by Ambassadors on Albanian and Servian questions, and an outbreak between Austria and Servia before the Ambassadors meet would spoil this prospect.

[52249] No. 279.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 141.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 12, 1912.*

PECKHAM may send envass to Sophia or Belgrade, as proposed in your despatch No. 96 of 1st December, but he should first enquire as to opportunities for forwarding from either place.

[52387] No. 280.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 12, 1912.*

YOUR despatch No. 91 of 3rd December.

Telegram sections are being forwarded to you by messenger to-day, and will be sent regularly in future so long as present route is continued.

As regards points in which Roumania is interested, such as rectification of frontier, His Majesty's Government understand that these are being discussed between Roumania and Bulgaria direct, and that there is no occasion for them to express an opinion.

His Majesty's Government's attitude in this connection and with regard to the

consultation of Ambassadors and Roumanian interests will be apparent from telegram sections.

You can assure Minister for Foreign Affairs that the peaceful attitude of Roumania through these trying times has been much appreciated by His Majesty's Government.

[52387] No. 281.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 12, 1912.*

YOU will see from telegram sections dispatched to you to-day that question of Roumania being represented at Ambassadors' conference has not formally arisen, and no arrangements have been made for admission of Roumanian representative.

[52959] No. 282.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 775.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 12, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 214 of 11th December: Ottoman debt.

Yes.

[52957] No. 283.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.**

(No. 311.)
(Telegraphic.) *Code.* *Foreign Office, December 12, 1912.*

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 714 of 11th December: Ottoman debt.

Ask Government to which you are accredited to instruct their military authorities accordingly.

[53445] No. 284.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 417.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 12, 1912.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF communicated to me yesterday, verbally, the substance of an instruction which M. Sazonof had sent to the Russian Minister in Belgrade, and he asked that I should do something similar.

I said that I thought the best way for me to put it would be to advise M. Pashitch to make a declaration that Servia would submit her claims to the Powers, if need be, and accept any decision to which they came unanimously. I emphasised the word "unanimously."

Count Benckendorff said that this would effect the same object as M. Sazonof's instruction.

Since this conversation, Count Benckendorff has sent me, confidentially, the following text, asking me to keep in mind that it is the text of a telegram to the Russian Minister in Belgrade.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 284.

Text communicated by Count Benckendorff.

(Confidentielle.)

LE Ministre de Serbie est venu, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, me dire qu'il avait des raisons de redouter de la part de l'Autriche dans le courant de la semaine une démarche décisive tendant à obliger la Serbie de renoncer au port adriatique.

* Also to Sir H. Rax-Ironside (No. 198), Sir R. Paget (No. 140), and Count de Salis (No. 147).

On pense à Belgrade que les préparatifs militaires autrichiens serviront à appuyer cette démarche. Le Cabinet de Vienne désirant en même temps de provoquer un motif d'ingérence pour reculer vers l'est les frontières des acquisitions territoriales de la Serbie et d'incorporer Prizren à l'Albanie, désirerait, d'après le Ministre, mettre la Serbie sous la dépendance économique et politique de l'Autriche.

Cette communication nous oblige à retracer encore une fois avec le plus de précision possible la ligne politique que le Gouvernement Impérial est fermement décidé à maintenir en présence des périls qui entourent la situation actuelle.

Toutes les Puissances, sans excepter l'Autriche, ont décidé de discuter collectivement toutes les questions touchant la liquidation de la guerre.

La Serbie connait parfaitement notre point de vue par rapport aux questions qui l'intéressent directement. Nous sommes prêts à défendre l'émancipation politique et économique de la Serbie, son accès à l'Adriatique à travers le territoire albanais (avec garanties du trafic commercial et du libre transport de ses matériaux de guerre), et à insister dans la mesure du possible sur le recul vers l'ouest de la frontière albanaise.

C'est dans ces limites que l'appui de la Russie est acquis à la Serbie.

Si nous ne communiquons pas notre programme au Cabinet de Vienne, c'est dans l'intérêt de la Serbie. Nous assurons toutefois ce Cabinet que les instructions à notre représentant seront conciliantes et qu'elles tiendront compte des intérêts de l'Autriche.

Il est indispensable pour nous de nous convaincre que la Serbie se soumettra à la décision qui sera adoptée avec le concours de la Russie, appuyée, nous l'espérons, par l'Angleterre et la France. Si la Serbie refusait de s'y soumettre, elle ne pourra pas compter sur notre appui, ni, nous en sommes convaincus, sur celui d'Angleterre et de la France.

Nous ne pourrons pas—pas plus que nos alliés et amis—admettre que ce soit le Gouvernement serbe qui en décide de la question d'une guerre européenne. Par conséquent le meilleur moyen pour la Serbie d'éviter les complications qu'elle redoute est de déclarer sans retard, ne fût-ce qu'au représentant britannique à Belgrade, qu'elle se soumet d'avance à la décision et aux conseils des trois Puissances de l'entente en tout ce qui concerne la Mer Adriatique.

Nous pensons que par ce procédé la Serbie préviendrait le danger de l'ultimatum autrichien qu'elle redoute.

[53398] No. 285.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 611.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 12, 1912.

M. DE FLEURIAU came to-day to express the thanks of the French Government for the allusion which I made in my statement of yesterday evening to the initiative taken by the French Cabinet in regard to a conference.

He then read to Sir A. Nicolson a telegram from the French Ambassador at Vienna of a somewhat alarmist character—and especially mentioning that it was reported that Servian emissaries were endeavouring to provoke risings in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sir A. Nicolson told M. de Fleuriau that our information from Vienna during the last two days was of a more tranquillising nature, and he read to him Sir F. Cartwright's telegram No. 192 of yesterday. M. de Fleuriau observed that Count Berchtold stated that he would take no action pending peace negotiations, but that afterwards the situation would change. M. de Fleuriau said that probably the Servian port question would be settled amicably, but there were points of difference which would still remain, and the reports as to alleged Servian intrigue in Bosnia could be seized upon for demanding from Servia guarantees (impossible to furnish) that she would abstain from fomenting trouble and agitation among the Serb populations of Austria-Hungary. Why was Austria-Hungary making such active naval and military preparations? Sir Arthur told him that in view of her official pacific utterances he was greatly mystified as to the object of these preparations.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[53103] No. 286.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 516.)

Sir, *Berlin, December* 10, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 515 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to report that yesterday evening's edition of the "National Zeitung" contained an article in regard to the renewal of the Triple Alliance, in which attention was called to the welcome given by the British press to the recent announcement. In this article it was stated that the friendly attitude of the British press was the result of no mere accident, but sprang from the recognition of the sincere and zealous support rendered by the Triple Alliance to His Majesty's Government in meeting the dangers which threatened Europe from the side of Russia. In explanation of the part played by England in the negotiations between the Powers, the article quotes a statement emanating from "a well-informed diplomatic source" which showed, it says, that the British Government had been working, in conjunction with Germany, to prevent the present situation from becoming acute. The statement is as follows:—

"The attitude of the British Government and the speech of the Imperial Chancellor, as well as the short statement made by Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, are intimately connected with one another. At a time when the situation had reached an acute stage, and a rupture of relations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh appeared imminent, since the war party in Russia seemed to be gaining the upper hand in spite of the disinclination of the Czar and of his Ministers, the British Cabinet let it be known in Paris and St. Petersburgh that England was not disposed to take part in a war which she considered in the circumstances to be objectless and contrary to her interests.

"In consequence of this categorical announcement, Russia had to choose between compelling her French ally to proceed with her alone against the Triple Alliance, and giving way and resorting to an international exchange of views. The feeling of Government circles in France, moreover, was thoroughly opposed to a war, and forward action on the part of France without English backing did not commend itself even to the chauvinists. Hence the eager efforts of French diplomacy to intervene at St. Petersburgh and in the Balkans; hence, above all, the peaceful and moderate speech of M. Poincaré, which could with justice be regarded as a symptom of the *détente*. France was opposed to war both from economic and military considerations.

"The Imperial Government were aware of these representations on the part of England—the motives for which were immaterial so far as Germany was concerned—and additional significance was thereby lent to the energetic statement of the Chancellor in regard to Germany's readiness to fulfil her obligations as an ally. Since the true state of affairs was known both in St. Petersburgh and Paris, the two Governments had to obey the *mot d'ordre* of their maritime ally and friend. The Imperial Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could therefore quite rightly speak of 'relations of special confidence' with England and 'gratifying intimacy,' since preceding events justified the conclusion that the British Government were in earnest in their desire for the maintenance of peace—a desire which was shared by the German Emperor, who both personally and by means of German diplomacy, had done all that lay in his power to bring about an honourable settlement."

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN

[53140] No. 287.

Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

Sir, *Manchester, December* 12, 1912.

I AM desired by the board of directors of this Chamber to express their earnest hope that, at the proper time—of which, of course, His Majesty's Government are the best judges—you will exercise your influence to secure that, whatever tariff changes may be brought about as a result of the present conflict, the position of exporters to Turkey shall not be prejudiced by the imposition of any higher duties than those which are levied at present, and, further, that the present equal position of all foreign traders in relation to the Turkish customs should, if possible, be maintained. If,

however, the institution of differential duties of any kind should ensue, my directors trust that His Majesty's Government will make it a stipulation that most-favoured-nation treatment for Great Britain should be accorded. This country has every moral claim to such treatment, seeing that no customs duties are imposed in this country except for purposes of revenue.

I have, &c.
WALTER SPEAKMAN, *Secretary.*

[53244] No. 288.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 110.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, December 13, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 136 of 10th December: Protection of Ottoman banks.

I took similar action to my French colleague's yesterday.

[53224] No. 289.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 111.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, December 13, 1912.*

SERVIAN Government have, through the agency of the Banque franco-serbe and Servian Mortgage Bank, negotiated a loan with a group of French banks for 18,000,000 fr. for six months at 6½ per cent. The loan to be issued at par.

They have, I hear, still some 40,000,000 fr. in hand.

[53225] No. 290.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 112.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, December 13, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 71 of 20th November.

Austrian consular official sent down to investigate Prisrend and Mitrovitza consular incidents has returned and reports that far too much importance has been attached to both cases, which practically resolve themselves into nothing more serious than gross tactlessness on the part both of the consuls and military authorities, and are not worth pursuing further.

He states that in the Ljuma valley practically only Serbs remain. The houses of the Moslem Albanians have in almost every instance been burnt and destroyed, and the owners either killed or driven out.

[53128] No. 291.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 113. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, December 13, 1912.*

THE Austrian Minister told me yesterday in strict confidence that he hears that there is a possibility of Baron Burian, formerly Minister of Finance, being sent to London during the Ambassadors' conference is assist Count Mensdorff.

[53251] No. 292.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, December 13, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 138 of 11th December.

Prime Minister, whom I have just seen, tells me that he received information a short time ago to the effect that Austrian Government were hesitating between accepting

the invitation to the Ambassadors' conference and presenting demands to Servia more or less in the form of an ultimatum. As the former has been chosen, danger has probably been temporarily averted, and he considers it advisable to refrain from making the declaration as suggested in your telegram officially, as it might only serve to irritate Austria, who wishes to have negotiations *tête-à-tête* with Servia. It has already been stated [group undecyphorable: ? by an] Austrian paper that for Servia to refer Austria to the Powers will be an unfriendly act. There is, on the other hand, also the danger that it might be interpreted as result of successful intimidation, and encourage Austria to believe she can drive as hard a bargain as she chooses. There is already considerable anxiety here as to what Austrian ideas on limits of Albania may turn out to be, and lest Servia be shorn of a considerable amount of territory she has occupied. Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will, under the circumstances, be instructed to make the statement casually in conversation with Austrian Minister. Prime Minister hopes that if Austria realises at the conference that the feeling of the Powers is unanimously against too hard a policy towards Servia she may desist. But should any demand be made on the Servian Government in the meantime he will reply that until peace is concluded and it is seen what arrangements are made with Turkey it is impossible to discuss any territorial questions, which must be left for the revision of the Great Powers. He will take no step without first consulting the allies and the friendly Powers. He suspects that Austria contemplates forcing some secret convention upon Servia containing guarantees for her behaviour towards Austria in the future. Austrian Government of course fear a customs union between the Balkan States, and Prime Minister recently indicated to Austrian Minister that the more Austria endeavours to block Servia's free ogress upon the Adriatic the more likely is Servia to seek a customs union with her allies in order to obtain an advantageous outlet by another route. At the same time he said that Servia would be quite willing to have a commercial treaty with Austria on a more liberal basis than the present, and pointed out that it was the Austrian, not the Servian, Government who had imposed all the limitations in existing treaty.

[53248] No. 293.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 717.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 13, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1102 of 12th December.

"Hampshire" can be spared.

[53249] No. 294.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 484.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 13, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 469 of 4th December.

Servian Government have strongly urged on Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the importance of Dibra being left to Servia. From a conversation which his Excellency has had with Italian chargé d'affaires, he gathers that Italy would favour idea of the Drin River being fixed as future frontier of Albania, and he therefore would prefer, if possible, that Dibra should not be included in Albania as he originally suggested.

[53250] No. 295.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 485.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 13, 1912.*

AUSTRIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs having told Russian Ambassador that public opinion in Austria would insist on his securing guarantees with regard to the future attitude of Servia, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for Austrian Ambassador and pointed out danger of such a proposal. His Excellency said that

when even international treaties were broken it was ridiculous to expect that a mere promise to maintain friendly relations would never be violated. Many causes had served to indispose Servia against Austria, and healing of time would alone remove them. He reminded Austrian Ambassador that it had taken Russia fifteen years to obliterate impression left in the minds of the Bulgarians by faults of Russian agents who had acted as if Russia wished to make Bulgaria a Russian dependency. Austrian agents at Belgrade had committed similar mistakes, and were such guarantees now to be asked for, the impression would gain ground that Austria was determined to keep Servia dependent on her. This would be deplorable, and might have serious consequences at a moment like the present.

His Excellency would be very grateful if you could say something at Vienna in above sense.

[53233] No. 296.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 231. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 13, 1912.*

PEACE negotiations.

My telegram No. 222 of 9th December.

Prime Minister told me yesterday that the programme of the allies had undergone no change from that which I reported in my telegram of 5th November, except that they would agree to autonomy of Albania. Delegates were to insist on the programme of the allies, and I gather that there was no elasticity in their instructions.

The Prime Minister was evidently unaware of Turkish programme, but he does not expect much from Ottoman Government as regards concessions at the commencement of negotiations.

Representatives of the Triple Alliance here have informed their Governments that the allies cannot fight any more, and will accept very reasonable conditions. Military attachés' reports to their chiefs tally also with above.

It is not my opinion. I believe that if Turkey does not cede all Macedonia and Adrianople the war will be resumed.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[52343] No. 297.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 232. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, December 13, 1912.*

QUESTION of access of Servia to the Adriatic (see my telegram No. 201 to you of 30th November).

M. Baernreiter, who, as you are aware, has acted as intermediary in the matter already, has been invited by Prime Minister to come to Belgrade with a view to discussing unofficially question of Servian access to the sea with him.

The pourparlers referred to in my above-mentioned telegram between the representatives of Servia and Austria have come to an end.

This is the last endeavour that Servia will make to negotiate this question direct with the Austrian Government. M. Baernreiter is a person well known to the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

[53306] No. 298.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 180.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, December 13, 1912.*

I HAVE learnt very confidentially that Italy and Germany have already agreed on programme of instructions to their representatives in London at approaching discussion. They hope that line adopted will satisfy all parties, including Russia,

Austria [group omitted; ? and Servia]. General line as regards latter involves provision for her absolute political, economic, and commercial independence under European guarantees. It is not yet ascertained whether Austria will agree, but I understand efforts are being made to secure her adhesion.

[53255] No. 299.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 13.)

(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, December 13, 1912.*

I LEARN on excellent authority that Bulgarians contemplate bringing back here General Todoroff's division, 45,000 strong.

This is, in my opinion, very much to be deprecated in the general interests of the town, which is already dangerously overcrowded, and it will enormously increase difficulty of administration rendered already sufficiently chaotic by constant friction between Greeks and Bulgarians.

[53946] No. 300.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 291.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 13, 1912.*

THE Italian Ambassador told me to-day that the Marquis di San Giuliano considered that it would be satisfactory if the Roumanian representative was consulted by the meeting of Ambassadors only when questions which concerned Roumania were being discussed. He understood that this met my view also.

I replied in the affirmative.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[53947] No. 301.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 292.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 13, 1912.*

THE Italian Ambassador informed me to-day that the Marquis di San Giuliano, in speaking about the Ægean islands, understood that I had contemplated certain alternatives: that they should be handed over to Greece for her administration, or that they should remain under the suzerainty of the Sultan; and he was inclined to think that the best solution would be to group them into an autonomous unit under the suzerainty of the Sultan. The Ambassador himself saw objections to this, and thought that perhaps a way might be found by making the suzerainty of the Sultan very nominal, and handing over the islands to the administration of Greece, the King of Greece holding them as vali, or in some other nominal capacity, from the Sultan—in other words, an Eastern Roumelian solution.

I said that this suggestion might be useful. The difficulty about an autonomous unit under the suzerainty of the Sultan was, of course, that owing to the autonomy there could not be any Turkish troops or control, and it was difficult to see what was to happen if the autonomous unit declared its annexation to Greece. But, in any case, I did not think that we could come to a definitive solution of the question of the islands until the allies had settled their terms of peace. Greece must first make her demands upon Turkey.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[53708] No. 302

Minute by the Earl of Onslow

COUNT TRAUTTMANSDORFF came in this afternoon and said he had had a telegram from Vienna to say that the difficulty at San Giovanni di Medua about the post office had been satisfactorily settled and the Montenegrins had given way. The only thing they had insisted on was that no communication should be sent into Scutari by the Austrian post. The Austrian Government quite admitted that this was reasonable, and the incident is considered as closed.

Foreign Office, December 13, 1912.

[53352] No. 303.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 45.)

Sir, *Cettinjé, December* 3, 1912.

LAST week a decree was published by which the King announced his intention of assuming the chief command of the army, with General Janko Vukotitch, who has hitherto conducted the operations in Old Servia, as his chief of the staff. This step has, it is understood, been taken in consequence of the discontent now rife in the forces under the immediate command of the Crown Prince, who has been the nominal general-in-chief. The ill-success with which the operations to the east of Scutari have been conducted, the want of supplies and of technical knowledge on the part of the leaders, have led, it is rumoured, to protests which have necessitated to the King's personal intervention. The Montenegrins, to the estimated number of several hundreds who have returned from the United States, have been the first to express their complaints. These men, accustomed to organisation and method, have been outspoken in their comments on the prevailing inefficiency. Dissatisfaction has been increased by contact with the Servian troops, and the contrast afforded by their superiority both as regards equipment and training. Accustomed to entertain a high opinion of their own military qualities the Montenegrins have been humiliated to find that they alone of the allies have failed to secure any striking success. There has been no lack of courage on their part, and the blame is accordingly laid to the door of the Government, if not on the King and his family.

The difficulties of the situation have been increased by the ambiguous attitude of the Malissors. It was, I think, confidently hoped that on the successful occupation of their territory some pronouncement would be made in favour of annexation to Montenegro. But nothing of the kind has occurred, and it is doubtful if, once the Turks were expelled, the King could find much active support among the tribes, with the exception possibly of the Hoti and Gruda, in immediate proximity to the frontier.

Of partisans in Scutari itself little is to be heard. Surprise is expressed at the favourable reception given to suggestions of Albanian autonomy not only in Austria, but also in the press of other countries, especially in France and England. The contention put forward here and urged by the King himself and those in immediate contact with him is that the Albanians, animated solely by tribal feelings and without any ties of religion or national literature, are unable to form a separate nation, and should, therefore, be absorbed into the State systems of their neighbours. The enclosed extract from the "Cettinski Vjesnik" gives expression to the views which the authorities here are anxious to urge for general acceptance. Allusions made to the wrongs suffered in the past by the Slavs at the hands of the Albanians suggest the possibility of injustice should the former now become masters.

There are signs of a recrudescence of the standing jealousy between this country and Servia. The Servians complain that the Montenegrins reached Medua first by means of trickery in delaying their march, and refuse to allow the Montenegrins to enter Alessio. They have learnt that some communications have recently passed between Austria and the King, and they may feel alarm lest the latter in his efforts to get possession of Scutari on any terms may go the length of accepting a customs union with Austria. Such a measure might modify Austrian opposition in so far as based on commercial grounds, preventing, moreover, a similar union between the two Slav States and the possible absorption in time of the weaker of them by the stronger.

I have, &c.

J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure in No. 303

Extract from the "Cettinski Vjesnik."

THIS absence of any national idea among the Albanians can easily be understood when it is remembered that in the time of the Turks the term Albania was only understood to mean the name of a province, and that in history the first and last sign of an Albanian national existence occurs when John Castriota and his son George opposed the Turkish invasion round Kroia at a time when Scutari was the capital of the Zeta. With that exception the Albanian has for long been in the service of the Asiatic invader, and has perpetuated his name in the history of the Serb people as the exterminator of the Serbs in Old Servia.

Under the domination of the Turks the Albanian element served the expansion of Islam, just in the same way as it served in the coast-lands the Catholic propaganda, supported by the policy of Venice. It is owing to them that the Serb element, which was still so strong in the middle of the fifteenth century, that we find a Slav printing press at Scutari under the Venetian domination, disappeared little by little, losing both its language and its orthodox faith.

The Albanians, not having a history of their own, have no literature of their own, not even an alphabet, and consequently no unity in language or any common tie; only religious fanaticism and tribal feeling bring them hand in hand together, so that they live continually in mutually hostile camps.

And it is this chaos, over which Islam is enthroned supreme, which Europe wishes to put on the same footing as the Balkan peoples from which Slav apostles have gone out to the whole of Slav Christianity, nations which have had strong States of their own, which have flourished with their own culture before the Asiatic invasion, not to mention Old Greece, the cradle of all European culture; peoples which from the beginning of the nineteenth century began to struggle against the Turks in historical revolutions till they had laid the foundations of their present States, not to mention Montenegro, which was never once enslaved, struggling for centuries for the freedom of the last foot of Serb territory and for the Cross; peoples, in short, which have accomplished their whole duty not only to their race but to humanity, freeing their brothers from the slavery of Asiatic barbarism.

[53344] No. 304.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 199. Confidential.)

Sir, *Athens, December* 6, 1912.

I WAS confidentially informed yesterday evening that M. Coromilas had been warned by the Italian and Austrian Ministers that Vallona and the island of Saseno must not be annexed by Greece, and his Excellency had said that, Saseno being one of the Ionian Islands, it properly belonged to Greece, although she had not hitherto exercised her rights over it.

The treaties of 1815 and 1863 speak of "the Ionian Islands and their dependencies," the earlier one citing the treaty between Turkey and Russia of the 21st March, 1800, for a description of the dependencies. At the moment of telegraphing to you last night (No. 125), I had not found the latter instrument among the archives, but I have since discovered it in a work of reference in my own library. It is certainly in favour of the Greek contention, unless the rights claimed under it have lapsed by disuse. The island is said to be uninhabited, but to be used by shepherds, to whom the rights of pasturage are leased by the Turkish authorities. If it were fortified it would command the entrance to the Bay of Vallona, said to be the best harbour in the Adriatic; otherwise, it is of no value. In some maps Saseno is marked as Greek.

I do not think the possession of Vallona itself is seriously desired by the Greeks; they would be content if their land frontier started to the south of that town, so as to include Capo Glossa (Linguetta) and the Akrokeraunian range.

I have, &c.

F. ELLIOT.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[53345] No. 305.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 200. Confidential.)

Sir, *Athens, December 6, 1912.*

YESTERDAY morning's newspapers announced the signature of an armistice between Turkey and Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro, Greece being left out of it. It being M. Coromilas's reception day, I asked him at once what were the facts.

His Excellency said that, owing to the deficiency of means of communication by telegraph, it was not until the 4th that he heard of the armistice having been signed on the 2nd instant. For the same reason it was impossible to communicate with the Greek delegate who had only arrived at the scene of the negotiations in time for the third sitting, and he had been obliged to act like an old-time diplomatist, interpreting the views of his Government on his own responsibility. M. Panas had done quite right in refusing to sign the armistice. Indeed, M. Coromilas had himself enquired of the Servian and Montenegrin Governments what were their views on the subject of an armistice, and simultaneously with the news of the signature had received their replies, which entirely concurred with his opinion that the armistice was a mistake, and that hostilities should be pressed on vigorously, without prejudice to negotiations for peace, as had been done by the Italians. It was therefore evident that the Bulgarian plenipotentiary, whom those two Governments had authorised to represent them, had acted contrary to their wishes.

M. Coromilas said he did not understand the attitude of the Bulgarian Government. It was so obvious that to press on the war with energy was the best way to obtain peace. Immediately after the capitulation of Salonica the Greek Government had offered to transport 60,000 Bulgarians, 30,000 Greeks, and 30,000 Servians to Dedeagatch, to be used in a joint action, either on the Chataldja lines, or on the Dardanelles forts by land. The Bulgarian Government had declined, and had preferred to keep their men where they were not wanted. He told me confidentially that he believed the influence of Austria was being used to induce Bulgaria to show leniency to Turkey, and he would not be surprised if, under the same influence, Bulgaria were to abandon her claim to Adrianople (to which Russia, he knew, would have raised no objection), and were to seek compensation elsewhere, at the expense of her allies. Salonica was evidently what was in his mind.

Apart from the mistake of giving Turkey any breathing time, M. Coromilas's objection to the armistice being signed by the Greeks was that it would have allowed Yannina and the parts of Epirus still occupied by the Turks to be revictualled from the sea, whereas now they are hemmed in from every side. More important still would have been the opening of the Dardanelles to the passage of Turkish troops and coal.

I have the honour to enclose herewith an article from the "Messager d'Athènes" of the 4th instant,* which bears every appearance of being a communiqué, and which shows that the abstention of Greece from the armistice is by no means a proof of dissensions between the allies.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[53346] No. 306.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 201.)

Sir, *Athens, December 7, 1912.*

M. VENIZELOS told me this morning that he had practically decided to go to London himself to conduct the negotiations for peace. He had received through a private channel a message from M. Gueshof that he would be glad if they could meet there, and he was now only waiting for the King's sanction to do so. I said I was delighted to hear it, because the conduct of the negotiations by two such eminently peace-loving men could not but be beneficial. I was glad, too, that incidentally he would have an opportunity of making your acquaintance. He said he was looking forward to that, and he was glad that London had been chosen as the seat of the

* Not printed.

conference, as the atmosphere there was one of benevolence towards the Balkan States. I remarked that I believed the suggestion had come from Turkey, so everyone was satisfied.

I said I feared he might find some difficulty with the Bulgarians, especially over the disposal of Salonica. He said it would be grossly unfair if Salonica did not remain Greek, as Greece would then be cut off from the Chalcidic peninsula, which was purely Greek. I said that internationalisation had been talked of, and also that it should become a free port. The first M. Venizelos regarded as impracticable; the second he would readily agree to, notwithstanding the competition which would thereby be set up with the trade of the Pirœus.

The other Greek members of the conference (though presumably they will not all be plenipotentiaries) will probably be M. Skouloudis, a man of large and moderate views, formerly Minister for Foreign Affairs, but having long abandoned active politics because he could find no one to share his ideas as to the necessity of the internal development of the country; M. Streit and M. Gennadius, ministers at Vienna and London; General Danglis, Chief of the General Staff; and M. Politis, a professor of international law at the Sorbonne. The reason of the inclusion of two such distinguished international lawyers as M. Streit and M. Politis is, M. Coromilas informs me, that it is intended in the treaty of peace, or simultaneously with it, to settle a number of questions, such as that of nationality, which have troubled the relations between Turkey and Greece for many years.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[53347] No. 307.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 202.)

Sir, *Athens, December 7, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 194 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the only official bulletin concerning the progress of the war which has been issued during the past week has been the following announcement by the Ministry of Marine:—

"*December* 1.—The advance of the troops in Chios proceeds slowly and surely. The Turkish troops have been surrounded. The 'Macedonia' bombarded and destroyed the monastery of the holy fathers, which the Turks had converted into a magazine and used as their base. The bombardment was effected at a range of 10,000 metres, and its success is due to the perfection of the Bethlehem guns with which the 'Macedonia' is armed."

M. Venizelos told me to-day that, both in the islands of Chios and Mitylene and in the highlands to the west of Florina, the reduction of the Turkish troops who have withdrawn before the Greeks will be mostly left to time and weather to bring about.

Operations against Yanina will be pressed. A division was transported from Salonica to Epirus last week, and His Majesty's consul at Corfu telegraphs to-day that 3,000 troops have left for Santi Quaranta.

The summons of the recruits of the 1912 class, which was deferred until the 14th instant, has again been postponed *sine die*.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[53323] No. 308.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 383.)

Sir, *Rome, December 7, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I received a visit this morning from the Bulgarian Minister, who had just returned from a visit to Vienna, where, he told me, he had found to his regret a very warlike spirit prevailing and a conviction in military circles that war would come in the spring, while means would be found to drag on negotiations through the winter. I said that I hoped we need not attach too much importance to a mental attitude which was natural and appropriate to soldiers, and that

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I trusted the negotiations, which would be shortly initiated in London, would lead to definite results which would discount any fears for the spring. M. Rizof said that if peace could be definitely concluded between the allies and Turkey he would have no misgivings, but if hostilities were renewed he feared after all that had occurred that Austria-Hungary would take advantage of her opportunity. Servia had been singularly maladroit. If she had only kept quiet till the end she might have gained her point in having access to the sea at, say, San Giovanni di Medua, without great opposition, as a compensation for renouncing larger ambitions. By advancing impossible pretensions at an inopportune moment she had provoked a sort of veto, and had prejudiced the future relations of the Balkan States with Albania, which had been made to believe that Austria and Italy were the authors of her autonomy and that it was to them and not to the real liberators, the Balkan League, that she must look in future. Similarly, in the consular question, Servia had done all she could to prejudice the good opinion of the Powers, and there was a renewed feeling of irritation against her in Austria. Greece had also, by an unnecessary and ill-advised bombardment at Vallona, done harm to the cause of the allies.

The great difficulty, in M. Rizof's opinion, was the question of Salonica. He said he did not think Bulgaria would consent to its being given to Greece. A solution might be found in constituting it a free port, but the existence of Macedonia depended on Salonica, and if there were a division of Macedonia all parts must equally have access to the market and the sea. He gave me to understand that it was considered in Bulgaria that the Greeks had got there first by strategy rather than by force of arms, and that they had not behaved squarely to their ally. They had, in fact, been in such a hurry to anticipate the Bulgarians that they had left a Greek division in the lurch to be cut to pieces by the Turks, and they had arranged for the capitulation on terms which they had never disclosed. A great parade had been made of the thousands of rifles and the guns which the Turkish army had surrendered, but, in reality, they were only handed over to the Greeks to be kept till the end of the war, when, under the terms of the capitulation, they were all to be restored to Turkey. The Bulgarian Government had throughout maintained a strict reserve and had appreciated the importance of not prejudicing final issues by premature discussion, but circumstances had obliged them to expose what had taken place at Salonica.

He was much exercised to know how far Italy would go in supporting Austria, and said that his view of the state of the public mind in this country was that they would give diplomatic support, but that any attempt to force Italians to march with Austria in arms would create a serious situation. There are, as I have already pointed out, indications which justify this view.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[53260] No. 309.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 1047.)
Sir,

Constantinople, December 8, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith two despatches from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica reporting on the assumption by the German consulate-general of the protection of Ottoman subjects in that town.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 309.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 163.)
Sir,

Salonica, November 27, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to subjoin copy of a notice which appeared in the local French paper "Indépendant" of the 24th instant :—

"Les Ottomans sous la protection allemande.

"Le consulat d'Allemagne en notre ville nous informe, avec prière de publication, que, par ordre du Gouvernement Impérial d'Allemagne, il est chargé de la protection des sujets ottomans.

"Pour toute réclamation de n'importe quel genre, les sujets ottomans qui ne pourraient pas s'arranger avec les autorités actuelles doivent se présenter à ce consulat Impérial en formulant leur réclamation par écrit et en double exemplaire, en ajoutant les noms des témoins, ainsi que les autres moyens de preuves.

"Il est désirable que les intéressés se servent autant que possible de l'intermédiaire de leurs autorités religieuses respectives."

I understand that this notice was published by the German consulate in this place in accordance with instructions received by it from the German Embassy in Constantinople. In consequence of it large numbers of Turks have flocked to the German consulate, as indeed they have been doing to all the foreign consulates ever since the Greeks came in, to lay before it their various complaints of violence and arbitrary treatment at the hands of the Hellenic authorities, and considerable friction has arisen between the latter and the consulate as a result of their refusal to recognise the Germans' right of intervention. A particular grievance of the Greeks appears to be that German "passports," or "passe-avants," have been issued to Turkish officers in mufti, who have thereby endeavoured to evade the measure of deportation to Greece which was decreed against them on the 24th instant, as reported in my despatch No. 161 of that date.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 309.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 164.)
Sir,

Salonica, November 28, 1912.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch of yesterday's date, concerning the claim of the German consulate in this place to assume the protection of Ottoman subjects, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the local papers to-day contain two further references to this question. The first of these is a notice inserted, at the request of the German consul, to the effect that his office will issue no further passports to Ottoman subjects, "seeing that the office of the prefecture is authorised to issue such passports." The second, headed "Un incident" and ending with the words "communiqué officiel," runs as follows :—

"Le bureau de la presse nous communique qu'il y a quelques jours le consulat allemand de notre ville a délivré un passeport à un major turc de la garnison de Salonique qui se rendait à Constantinople et qui avait, comme tous ses camarades, prêté serment de ne plus prendre les armes au cours de cette campagne. Dans ce passeport la qualité de cet officier est passée sous silence. Arrêté par la police du port, l'officier a été fouillé et trouvé porteur de plusieurs lettres démontrant sa qualité militaire et son intention de se rendre à Constantinople et de là sur le théâtre de la guerre. Le communiqué ajoute que le consulat étant au courant de tout cela a manqué ainsi aux dispositions de la neutralité."

The deduction to be drawn from these two communications is that the German consulate has allowed itself to be placed in the wrong, and, at the moment when all the Balkan States appear inclined to treat the representatives of all the foreign Powers somewhat cavalierly, I cannot help regarding this incident as a somewhat unfortunate one.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[53261] No. 310.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 1048.)
Sir,

Constantinople, December 8, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, enclosing a memorandum concerning acts of violence committed upon the Mussulman population of the vilayet by Bulgarian troops.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 310.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 166.)

Sir, *Salonica, December 3, 1912.*

WITH reference to the latter portion of my despatch No. 161 of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to enclose herewith a memorandum containing certain details which have been communicated to me from various more or less trustworthy sources concerning acts of violence committed upon the Mussulman population of this vilayet after the entry of the Bulgarian troops.

Your Excellency will understand that, under the existing circumstances, when all circulation in the interior other than purely military movements is practically suspended, it is extremely difficult to obtain any information as to what is going on behind the cordon of troops by which we are surrounded, and it is impossible to accurately control that which succeeds in filtering through. No doubt, however, seems to exist in the mind of any unprejudiced observer here that such incidents as those recounted in the enclosed memorandum fairly represent what is going on over a large section of this country where Bulgarian and Mussulman populations are found intermingled.

The series of murders related by Mr. Vice-Consul Morgan as having been perpetrated in so relatively accessible a place as Cavalla, confirmed as they have been by numerous other eye-witnesses who are personally known here, together with the accounts which are beginning to reach us from prefectly trustworthy sources at Dedo-Aghatch, helps to lend probability to stories which, being based on less incontrovertible evidence, one might otherwise be more or less inclined to discredit. Moreover, the language said to have been employed in regard to these matters in the highest Bulgarian quarters here is such as to have given rise to an impression that the extermination of the Mussulman element in Macedonia is systematic, and forms part of a deliberate and approved policy. "Such things," General Petrof is more than once reported to have explained, "are necessarily inseparable from a state of war." The Bulgarians, moreover, attempt to justify, or at least explain, their conduct by talking of "reprisals," and referring to the provocation afforded by the Turks, whose line of retreat—as at Kresna, Plevna, Bairakli Djouma, and numerous other places—was, doubtless, only too often marked by indiscriminate slaughter and destruction of property. But this line of argument, however comprehensible it may be in itself, implies a complete surrender of the principle of the moral inferiority of the Crescent to the Cross.

The leaders of Mussulman opinion here are advocating the dispatch of an international commission for the purpose of enquiring into and reporting upon the whole question. I am not sure that this idea is of entirely spontaneous growth, and I am rather afraid that such a commission could now hardly be organised in time to be of much practical value in preventing bloodshed. It would, however, perhaps have a salutary effect in enlightening European opinion as to the real state of affairs, and establishing for the benefit of the friends and admirers of the lesser Balkan States that the methods of the Christian victors have been characterised by no less callous barbarity than those traditional with the "hopeless and unspeakable" Turk.

It is even possible that it might have the further effect of bringing home to the military authorities the sense of their responsibility for the actions of their irregular auxiliaries.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 310.

Memorandum on various Massacres and other acts of Violence reported to have been committed against the Mussulman Population by the Bulgarian Regulars or Irregulars in the Eastern portions of the Vilayet of Salonica subsequent to their Occupation by the Bulgarian Troops.

ONE of the districts from which the most detailed information concerning Bulgarian savagery has been received is that immediately to the north of Salonica, comprising the kazas of Avret-Hissar and Doiran.

In the nahié of Rajanovo, for instance, it is confidently asserted that scarcely a male Mussulman has been left alive. The village of Rajanovo itself contained about

eighty Turkish houses. Many of these, including the gendarmerie barracks, were burned, and all their male inhabitants slaughtered, the corpses being thrown into the wells. Of the entire population of this village, there are now said to survive only some sixty women and children, who are in the neighbouring Christian village of Dolni-Todorak. At the next village, Planinitza, about thirty Mussulmans were massacred in a house adjoining the Mosque. In both these instances the Christian "pop" (village priest) is said to have taken an active part in the proceedings, but the chief rôle was filled by a young Macedono-Bulgarian, about 27 or 30 years of age, said to have been hitherto studying "belles-lettres" in Paris. At Kurkut, or Korkidovo, a large village situated about 6 miles to the east of Avret-Hissar, all the male population, together with a considerable number of women and girls, are declared to have been collected in the Mosque and some neighbouring barns. Three bombs were first thrown amongst them, but, as these failed to explode, the buildings were set on fire and all the inmates burned to death. The only survivors from this village are said to be some sixty girls, of whom ten are about 15 years of age, and the rest small children from 18 months upwards, who are collected in Mutlovo, an adjacent Christian village, the inhabitants of which are in possession of most of the looted property of their victims. The "étudiant en lettres" above alluded to, is said to have declared that the number of the latter amounted to 400, but it is placed by others at nearly twice that figure. Another village in the immediate neighbourhood named Shatchili, was completely plundered, but I have no information as to loss of life. In the town of Avret-Hissar itself, 110 Turks are said to have been "executed" up to the 15th November. These were largely disbanded soldiers or deserters and refugees from the surrounding country, who had sought comparative safety in the town.

A little further to the east of this district the Bulgarian villagers of Vurlun or Virlandja attacked their Mussulman neighbours of Vakouf Mahalesi, and looted all their cattle and stores of grain. I have no report of actual murder from this place, but the Turks were turned out of their houses and severely ill-used, one person receiving a bayonet-wound, and another a ball from a revolver. The Bulgars of the neighbouring hamlet of Gurdji, or Gurdina, subjected to identical treatment the Turks of Kilkish Mahalesi, setting fire also to the farm of a certain Ali Bey.

As previously reported (see my despatch No. 161 of the 24th ultimo), throughout the districts of Kilkish, Doiran, and Ghevgheli, nearly all the leading Mussulmans have been put to death in one form or another, their property pilfered or destroyed, and their farms and dwelling-houses burned. Their women also have been subjected to indignity and often worse. If not actually subjected to violence, their veils have been torn off, and their clothes rent from their backs in the search for money or other hidden valuables.

In the more immediate vicinity of Salonica, a Mussulman village of fifty houses was completely sacked by Bulgarian soldiers, assisted by the Greco-Bulgarian villagers from Kupoudjilar, Kiretch-Keui, and Hortiach, who carried off the entire live-stock of the village, comprising 250 head of cattle, 5,000 goats, and 3,000 sheep. A neighbouring village named Essendi, or Seneli, went through a series of adventures. First of all the Greek bandit Mitcho carried off all its cattle. Next the villagers of Kiretch-keui came down and drove out the inhabitants, whom they then endeavoured to persuade to embrace Christianity as the sole means of escaping further dangers. Failing in this endeavour, they are said to have given vent to their dissatisfaction by subjecting the women and girls of the village to every species of indignity. They then compelled the Turks to pay them 12 piastres a-head for permission to return to their homes, which in the meantime had been completely sacked. The above events have been duly recorded in a petition presented to the Prefecture of Salonica on behalf of the inhabitants by the Moukhtar Bairam Agha, and a certain Mehmed Vassif Effendi. A certain Ibrosh Aghi who had been sent with three other villagers to parley with the people of Kiretch-keui, is in hospital at Salonica, suffering from wounds inflicted on him by the latter.

After the occupation of Drama by the Bulgarians on the 5th November, as reported in the enclosure to my despatch No. 156 of the 15th, the military authorities are declared to have sanctioned a general pillage of the Mussulman portions of the town. The local Christians were formed into a sort of militia and entrusted with the disarmament of their Mussulman fellow-townsmen. A British subject who arrived here from Drama about a week after the events, declared that he himself had witnessed scenes of savagery which fell little short of those enacted at Adana in 1908. A wholesale butchery of Turks commenced. All those in whose houses arms were found were marched off towards the municipality, ostensibly for the purpose of interrogation,

but were mostly cut down *en route*. Even those Bulgarians who had themselves sought refuge in Mussulman houses during the brief preceding period, when the town had been in the occupation of the Turkish troops, were not restrained by any feelings of gratitude from taking part in this work.

Nearly all the wounded soldiers discovered in the town were finished off by the Christian mob, which pursued the retreating troops and Mussulman refugees, slaughtering all whom they could overtake. Of some 1,500 Mussulmans who endeavoured to escape to Cavalla, barely half are believed to have reached the latter place. For eight or ten days afterwards the road is stated to have been thickly strewn with unburied corpses, particularly in the neighbourhood of Doxat, a large village situated about half-way between Drama and Cavalla. According to the evidence of the British subject above cited, even women and girls were hacked to pieces in the streets.

[53262] No. 311.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 14.)

(*No.* 1049.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 8, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copies of four despatches which I have lately received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir, containing a survey, which may also be of some interest to the War Office, of the military operations which culminated in the fall of Monastir on the 19th November.

I have addressed a despatch to Mr. Greig, approving his conduct in these very difficult circumstances.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 311.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 78. Confidential.)

Sir, *Monastir, October* 29, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to communicate to your Excellency the following information:—

October 26.—Three hundred and thirteen soldiers (Anatolians or Albanian volunteers) and five officers sent from Monastir to Kumanovo.

Sixty Albanian volunteers, fifteen waggons of provisions, two waggons of tents, and one waggon of ammunition sent from Monastir to Sorovitch.

October 27.—One thousand three hundred Albanian volunteers arrived at Monastir (1,000 from Dibra, under Mersim Dema, 200 from Ochrida, under Eyyoub Sabri, and 100 from Resna, under Niazi).

About 550 miscellaneous survivors of Kumanovo, 150 wounded soldiers, 17 waggons of damaged artillery, 13 waggonloads of damaged military vehicles, 20 waggonloads of oxen, and 12 waggonloads of provisions arrived at Monastir from Salonica.

October 28.—One thousand five hundred Malissores, of Dibra, arrived here under Khaireddin Bey Pustina, and 300 under Shukir Bey, of Dibra.

Nine hundred and twenty Albanian volunteers, with Mersim Dema, Eyyoub Sabri, and Niazi Bey, armed with Martinis and without uniforms, left Monastir for Sorovitch. (Niazi Bey since gone to Neveska, to the south of Florina, where he will, no doubt, be exposed to less danger than at Kailar or Verria, with the alleged intention of dealing with the Greek bands!)

Eighteen waggonloads of damaged artillery arrived here from Salonica.

October 29.—Two thousand one hundred miscellaneous survivors of Kumanovo, with six officers and three waggonloads of damaged military vehicles, arrived here from Salonica.

Besides about 2,000 Albanian irregulars, without uniforms and armed with Martinis, there are at present in Monastir about 3,000 Elbassan and Anatolian reservists.

The survivors of Kumanovo who have arrived here viâ Salonica since the 27th October number about 6 officers and 2,700 men; of whom 150 were wounded. The spirit of officers and men seems to be utterly broken. Many have deserted and are in hiding.

Other troops of the VIth Army Corps who took part in the Kumanovo operations have arrived at Perlepé by way of Kuprilu. Reports as to their numbers vary between

10,000 and 15,000. They are said to have about twenty guns belonging to various batteries and regiments; but, according to all accounts, ammunition is scarce.

As reported in my telegram No. 59, the commander of the Monastir redif division, Mehmet Ali Bey (now Mehmet Ali Pasha), who returned to Monastir on the 27th instant from Kuprilu, stated that the Monastir redif division suffered severely at Kumanovo, and that the Monastir, Ochrida, Resna, Florina, and Kirchevo battalions were annihilated. He also reported the almost total loss of the artillery of the 17th and 18th divisions.

The truth seems to be that the Albanian redifs bolted, causing a panic, and that the number of killed was comparatively small. The highest estimate that has been quoted to me of the losses at Kumanovo of the VIth Army Corps was 3,000 killed.

I have not been able to satisfactorily test Mehmet Ali Pasha's statement regarding the artillery of the 18th division, but what he said of the 17th division is probably true.

It is, however, to be observed that since the 26th instant thirty-eight waggonloads of damaged artillery have arrived here from Salonica; it is unknown to what extent these may have contributed to the artillery reported to be at present at or in the neighbourhood of Perlepé.

As reported in my telegram No. 26, the commander-in-chief of the western army, Ali Riza Pasha and his staff arrived here on the 26th instant from Salonica. They remain here.

The Albanian volunteers, whose arrival here was reported in a previous paragraph, had no rifles of their own; or, if they have any, preferred not to bring them to Monastir.

The authorities offered them old-pattern Mausers (with a magazine for nine cartridges), which they refused. After clamouring for rifles of the newest pattern, the stock of which is completely exhausted, they were induced to accept Martinis.

It is generally believed that the sole object of these irregulars is to obtain rifles, and that the majority of them will desert at the first opportunity. Meanwhile, their presence in Monastir in considerable numbers and very little under control is a source of uneasiness to both Christians and Moslems.

So far as can be ascertained from the little reliable news obtainable, the Greek column from Larissa, advancing by way of Elassona, and the column from Trikala, marching by way of Kalabaka–Velemisti–Dizkata, united on the 23rd instant near Serfidjé, which they occupied without opposition; an inferior Turkish force, defeated with serious loss at Mount Melusa, and again in the Sarandoporon Pass, retiring in great disorder towards Karadzalar (north-east of Kozhani), where it is believed to have been reinforced by nine battalions of Castamouni redifs and two batteries of field-guns dispatched from Karaferia.*

From Sarandoporon to Karadzalar the progress of the Turks seems to have been one continuous flight. The commandant at Kozhani made a tardy and ill-timed attempt to reinforce the retreating Turks and to enable them to make a stand at Serfidjé by dispatching a force of Dibra redifs and two batteries of field-guns, with orders to occupy the high land of Demir Kapu, commanding the junction of the Elassona and Diskata roads a little south-west of Serfidjé. But this reinforcement, on reaching the Bistritsa bridge, ascertained that the town was already evacuated and withdrew.

On the 26th a Greek force from Serfidjé of unknown strength, but said to include a cavalry brigade, entered Kozhani unopposed, after dispersing a Dibra redif battalion encountered on the way. The Turks retired to the heights west of the Kozhani–Kailar road.

Since the occupation of Serfidjé, the movements of the main body of Greeks has been a matter of speculation. When last heard of it was on the Inje Karasou, between Serfidjé and Karaferia, as reported in my telegram No. 61.

* The united strength of the Larissa and Trikala columns, of which the former was the larger, is believed here to have been about 70,000 men.

Both sides lost heavily in the Sarandoporon Pass. The losses of the Goreha, Castoria, and Starovo battalions were especially heavy. Twenty-one out of a total of twenty-four guns are said to have fallen into the hands of the Greeks. The Turks attribute their defeat to the superior numbers of their opponents, to their inferiority in artillery, to shortage of machine-gun ammunition, and to panic caused by the flight of large numbers of Albanians.

After the evacuation of Serfidjé and before its complete occupation by the Greeks a fight seems to have taken place in the town between Christians and Moslems, and a considerable number of persons are believed to have been killed and wounded on both sides. It is understood that several Christian prisoners were killed.

In an encounter with the Trikala column at Dizkata the Nasolitch redif battalion is reported to have been decimated.

Another Greek column is reported to have occupied Grevena on the 22nd, and more recently Lapsista (Naselitch) and Satista. But details are lacking, and there is an inclination to suppose that these places have merely been cut off by Greek bands.

Yet another Greek column, advancing towards Yanina, is said to have met with a reverse at Louros.

Two Greek bands are reported to have appeared in the hills immediately west of Monastir.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

Enclosure 2 in No. 311.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 79. Confidential.)

Sir, *Monastir, November 2, 1912.*

AS reported in my despatch No. 77, a Greek column occupied Kozhani on the 26th, and the Turks withdrew to the heights west of the Kozhani–Kailar road.

On the 28th the Greeks, probably reinforced, were reported on the high ground immediately north-east of Kailar, which was occupied the same day after a distant exchange of fire with some Turkish artillery. On the morning of the 29th the Greeks, continuing their march towards Sorovitch, encountered and dispersed a small Turkish force at Nalbandkeny, capturing four mountain-guns. The composition of this force is unknown. It is said to have consisted mainly of Albanian redifs and volunteers. Five hundred wounded, mainly Albanians, have arrived here.* Sorovitch, evacuated, was occupied by the Greeks on the morning of the 30th; and almost simultaneously another Greek column† appeared at Posideri, a few miles west of Florina, the surroundings of which are infested with Greek bands.

On the 28th, with Kailar occupied and Sorovitch threatened, Monastir was in danger, and Ali Riza Pasha decided to reinforce the insignificant force opposing the Greek advance with part of the troops assembled at Perlepe.‡

Since the 30th these troops have been arriving in a continuous flow. They are sent by rail to Florina, beyond which point the line is no longer safe. Food was scarce at Perlepé, and they are in a wretched condition. Many of them are without rifles. Knapsacks and greatcoats, and, in most cases, the whole personal equipment, have vanished. They enter the town without any attempt at formation. Many of the first to arrive deserted and sold their rifles for a few medjidiehs. Gendarmes are now posted permanently at the corners of all the side-streets, and incoming soldiers are herded through the main thoroughfare to the barracks and thence to the railway station. In the panic at Kumanovo the men, in many cases, fired on their officers, some of whom, for self-protection, cast off their badges of rank and put on the uniform of the rank and file, in which they arrived here.

In marked contrast is the cheerful bearing of the Albanians, who have as yet taken no part in the fighting. But no one seems to have any further belief in their fighting value, least of all Javid Pasha, who is said to be taking precautions against the infection of his other troops in the next battle by their anticipated indiscipline and flight.

The force sent from Perlepé to oppose the Greeks consists of 10,000 to 15,000 infantry, 150 cavalry, and about twelve guns. The infantry is officially described as fifteen battalions.

Without taking into account the force under Hassan Tahsin Pasha, which retired from the Sarandoporon Pass through Serfidjé to Karadzalar (north-east of Kailar), as to the whereabouts of which there is no reliable indication, the troops opposing the Greek advance on Monastir may be roughly detailed as follows:—

Six thousand men who retired from Sorovitch, and may at present be holding the Kirli Derbend. They probably include the 18th Nishanji battalion, the 1st battalion of the 54th regiment, and they may have six of the mountain-guns from Dibra;

* It is difficult to explain the resistance offered by the very inferior Turkish force at Nalbandkouy unless the purpose was to gain time for the completion of defensive works further north, in the Kirli Derbend.

† It was perhaps this column which occupied Grevena, Naselitch, Satista.

‡ As reported in my despatch No. 77 the troops at Perlepe were the debris of the VIth Army Corps from Kumanovo, now said to number 18,000 to 20,000 men with a few guns and little ammunition. Between Kenprilu and Perlepe there are also reported to be portions of the VIth Army Corps amounting to about five battalions. They are expected to make a stand in the Babuna district against a Servian force supposed to be descending from Kenprilu

Two thousand Anatolian redifs from Monastir;
One hundred and fifty cavalry; and
Ten thousand to 15,000 infantry, with twelve guns and two machine-gun companies from Perlepé.

That is, a total of about 18,000 to 23,000, with perhaps eighteen guns and two machine-gun companies, or a total of at least 30,000 to 35,000, with more artillery if it includes Hassan Tahsin Pasha's command.

The principal officers of this force are Javid Pasha, commanding the VIIth Army Corps; Mehmet Ali Pasha, commanding the Monastir redif division; and Mustapha Kerimi Pasha, commanding the 17th Nizam division.

The opposing Greeks are said to be considerably stronger in every respect, especially in artillery.* They are also supported on all sides by well-armed bands of irregulars, and have given arms to the Christian population of the districts through which they have passed.

Nor are the Turks likely to be considerably reinforced. For the 1,000 or so soldiers (mainly Elbassan redifs) still in Monastir provide a bare margin of safety against the bands of Greek, Bulgarian, and Servian irregulars in the hills on every side. Amongst other bands one of about 250 men is near Megarovo, to the north-west of Monastir, and another of about the same strength is near Makovo, in the Morihovo district, in the north-east of Monastir, where arms are reported to have been distributed broadcast amongst the Christian population. The Kirchevo region is said to be full of Bulgarian and Servian bands.

It would also be rash to weaken the troops holding the Kenprilu–Perlepé–Monastir road against an expected Servian descent. In fact, for all that is known, the Serbs may be here before the Greeks, by way either of Perlepé or Kirchevo.

It is anticipated that an attempt will be made to hold the Kirli Derbend (north of Sorovitch). If that position is forced from the south, or turned by a Greek force approaching, as is suspected, on the east from Vodhena and Ostrovo, a stand will probably be made at Banitsa, where Javid Pasha is reported to be entrenching so as to command the railway and the junction of the Sorovitch–Monastir and Vodhenir–Ostrovo–Monastir roads.

The second Turkish line of defence runs from Kelenik eastwards astride the railway. Yet a third line of defence runs from Negochani eastwards, likewise across the railway. It is held by such redif battalions as Mehmet Ali Pasha has been able to reorganise.

In the event of defeat, the only retreat open to the Turks offering any hope of more than temporary escape would be into Albania by the Resna road. Even that will be closed, if meanwhile the Serbs break through on the Perlepé road; or if another Servian force has arrived by way of the Treska Valley and Kirchevo or by way of Kalkandelen and Kirchevo. Many bands of irregulars are said to have appeared round Giyavato, the key to the Resna road.

With the approach of their enemies the attitude of the Moslems towards the Christians has undergone a remarkable change. They are now in terror of the treatment which, they conceive, may await them if the town is occupied, and especially if fighting takes place in the streets. More than the Greek or Servian soldiery, or even than the rapacity of the Albanian irregulars, they dread the reprisals of the Christians of the town itself. Dignity and patriotism have taken flight with astonishing suddenness. Headed by three leading notables, by the mufti, who is insisting on the iniquity of profitless and wanton bloodshed, and by the Ulema, they induced the spiritual heads of the Christian communities to join in petitioning the military authorities to abandon the idea of defending the town.† Failing in that, they succeeded in coming to an agreement with the Christians who are in equal fear of pillage or massacre by the Moslem riff-raff and Albanians, to reciprocally abstain from agression in all circumstances.

In the course of these negotiations the Christians, with the support of the consuls,

* Wounded soldiers who have arrived here report that the Greeks are using machine-guns mounted on motor-cars, and that they cause great havoc.

† They invited the members of the consular corps to associate themselves with this request, but they were unanimously of opinion that in view of the comparatively strong Turkish force still in being action of the kind on their part would be open to misinterpretation.

With a view to the measures necessary for the protection of the lives of their subjects and their property the consuls collectively requested the vali to inform them whether the military authorities propose as a last resort to defend the town itself, and were answered in the affirmative.

obtained a valuable concession, the release of the persons arrested in the circumstances reported in my despatch No. 73. These persons, in number more than 1,000, were confined in the barracks, and would have been in a precarious position in the event of a bombardment or of disturbances.

Notwithstanding this, all communities, especially the Moslems, are still in a state of great anxiety. The shops have several times been closed abruptly on false alarms. Many Moslems, including the president of the criminal court, the public prosecutor, and several officers, have asked for shelter at this vice-consulate in the event of bombardment or conflict.* Many Christians have also applied. The latter are resolved to defend themselves desperately if attacked. Many who have no better weapons have brought petroleum to be thrown over their assailants and fired with "Bengal matches."

The unwarlike attitude of the officials and Moslem non-combatants has annoyed Ali Riza Pasha, who is at present declaring his intention of making of Monastir a Plevna.

The Moslem refugees from the districts occupied by the Greeks are said to number between 12,000 and 20,000. Numbers of them are accommodated in the mosques.

I have, &c.

C. A. GREIG.

Enclosure 3 in No. 311.

Vice-Consul Craig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 80. Confidential.)

Sir, *Monastir, November 16, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following account of the events of the past few days:—

The Greek troops marching on Monastir, as reported in my despatch No. 79 of the 2nd instant, proved much weaker than was anticipated and greatly inferior to Javid Pasha's force. They amounted to 10,000–12,000 men of the 5th division, with twelve field guns, and two squadrons of cavalry commanded by an officer named Mathiopoulo. It occupied Sorovitch, and passing unopposed through the Kirli Derbend, took up a position at Cherovo, compelling the Turks to abandon the railway south of Florina. On the 3rd instant Javid Pasha, then at Banitsa with the 16th and 18th divisions, sent the 17th division and the Monastir redif division, forming his right wing, towards Sorovitch, by way of Vrtolom, Leskovets, and Negovani, whilst the 6th Nishanji regiment occupied Gornichevo on his left. The same day he himself advanced towards Cherovo. The attack, begun on the 3rd, seems to have been renewed on two sides on the 4th, when the Nishanji regiment from Gornichevo occupied the hills east of the Greek position. This move decided the issue, for the Greeks mistook the Nishanjis for a larger force, evacuated Cherovo, and retired towards Sorovitch. In spite of heavy losses they retired through the pass in good order, but near Sorovitch they realised that their escape was threatened by the Turkish right wing, a panic ensued, and they fled towards Kailar, abandoning all their artillery at the Nalbandkeuy bridge. Their destruction might have been complete had Javid Pasha disposed of any considerable body of cavalry. As it was the pursuit slackened at Nalbandkeuy, and appears to have ceased altogether near Kailar.

Javid Pasha estimates the Greek losses at 1,500 to 2,000 killed. He states that the Turks had only sixty men killed. He captured twelve guns,† large numbers of rifles, and a quantity of hospital stores. Seventeen Greek prisoners, including a non-commissioned officer, have arrived here.

Javid Pasha returned to Monastir on the 7th instant with the 16th and 18th divisions, leaving the 17th division at Kailar, and the Monastir redif division at Eksisou. The latter is now reported to be between Banitsa and Ostrovo, and a Greek column of unknown strength is said to be between Vladova and Ostrovo. Vodhena is occupied by the Greeks, who are using the railway between Gida (and perhaps Salonica) and Vladova. The Turks have destroyed a portion of the line between Pateli and Ostrovo.

* The one hope to which the local Moslems still cling is an intervention of the Powers, especially of England.

† Eleven of these guns are in good order, and are, it is understood, being used against the Serbs.

By the 3rd instant it was vaguely known here that a force including all or part of the Vth Army Corps, under Karasaid Pasha, was retiring on Monastir by way of Kuprilu and Perlepé, and that the VIIth Army Corps under Fethi Pasha was approaching by way of Kalkandelen and Kirchevo, and that both were retreating before Servian or Serbo-Bulgarian columns, the strength of which was quite unknown.

The following is a brief account of what is at present known of the progress of the two armies:—

1. The VIIth Army Corps, under Fethi Pasha, after repeated engagements between Kalkandelen and Kirchevo, evacuated the latter place on the 5th instant, withdrawing by way of Pribilchi. On the 8th it reached Kukurechani, a point only 6 miles north of Monastir.

2. The force under Karasaid Pasha, after taking part in a series of engagements to the north of Perlepé, evacuated that place on the 5th, retiring to Topolchani, where a fierce encounter took place on the 6th. On the 5th, 6th, and 7th, Karasaid's troops were arriving here in utter confusion, and on the 8th the remnants of his command were camped at Orizari on the outskirts of this town.

The return of Javid Pasha to Monastir on the 7th instant with the 16th and 18th divisions from the pursuit of the Greeks was dictated by the disastrous course of the northern campaign. It is believed that credit is due mainly to him for the effort which has made further resistance possible.

To restore in some degree the confidence of the troops opposed to the Serbs, the soldiers left at Kailar and Eksisou after the successful Greek campaign have been gradually drafted into the battalions under Fethi and Karasaid Pasha and replaced by fugitives from Kirchevo and Perlepé; the rifles distributed amongst the Moslem population of Monastir have been called in and given to soldiers who had thrown away their arms in the flight; 2,000 gendarmes have been formed into four battalions; order* has to some extent been re-established amongst the demoralised mob to which the three armies assembled here were reduced; and a plan has been worked out with a view to the defence of Monastir and keeping open a line of retreat by the Resna road.

The position taken up by the Turkish troops during the past few days is believed to be as follows:—

The left, commanded by Javid Pasha, consists of the Istib division and four battalions of gendarmes, with two machine-gun companies, and seven field-guns. It is rumoured that part of the Jakova division is also with the Turkish left. The exact distribution of these troops is unknown, but units are reported to be at Gijevat, Gopesh, Lera, Provalets, and Oblakovo.

The centre, under Fethi Pasha, is believed to extend roughly from Lisohai to Kukurechani. It consists of troops of the VIth and VIIth Army Corps, with most of the available artillery, estimated at about thirty guns.

The right, under Karasaid Pasha, appears to extend from Kirklina to Karaman, its extreme right guarded by the extensive swamps along the bank of the Cherna Karasou. It consists of troops of the Vth and VIIth Army Corps, with about twenty guns.

A reserve of a few regiments is at Orizari and Sviyeti Nedyela, close to Monastir.

It has become impossible to ascertain at all accurately the strength of the Turkish troops. The following is perhaps not very wide of the mark:—

(a.) Troops round Monastir—	
1. Troops of the Vth Army Corps	15,000
2. Troops of the VIIth Army Corps	10,000
3. Troops of the VIth Army Corps—	
The 16th division (Ishtib)	7,000
The 18th division (Bitra)	5,000
(b.) Troops south of Monastir—	
4. The 17th division at Kailar	7,000
5. The Monastir redif division between Gornichevo and Ostrovo ..	[illegible]
Total	49,000

* The difficulty of reorganisation is enhanced by the shortage of officers. Over 50 per cent. are believed to be lacking owing to casualties and desertion. The Istib division is said to have only seven officers.

The Turks estimate the strength of the Serbs at 60,000, with an immense superiority in artillery.

The Servian advance has probably been delayed by a heavy fall of snow on the 7th and 8th. The bulk of the columns approaching by way of Kalkandelen–Kirchevo and Kuprilu–Perlepé have joined hands, and Servian troops are now arriving at Petilap, a spot only 9 miles north of the most advanced Turkish trenches. Another force, probably detached from the Kalkandelen–Kirchevo column, is threatening Gopesh, and appears to be already in contact with Javid Pasha, firing being heard to-day in that direction. Firing is also audible east of Novak on the extreme Turkish right, tending to confirm the belief that the Serbs or Bulgarians are approaching east of the Cherna Karasou as well.

There is not a single officer in Monastir, who regards a prolonged resistance as possible.

The wounded are being sent to five regular hospitals in Monastir and to seven schools, two orphanages, and the military club. There are now about 2,500 patients. Accommodation of a kind remains for about 1,500. The temporary hospitals are in many cases destitute of beds, medicines and instruments. In the event of a protracted campaign their condition will be appalling. All the civilian doctors of the town have been given the temporary rank of army medical officers.

The food supply of the Turkish troops is disgracefully mismanaged. The town is full of soldiers begging for bread, although the military authorities state that they have ample supplies for months. Several battalions are said to have been left long periods without food during damp and cold weather. The prices of all food-stuffs are rapidly nearing famine figures. Great distress will prevail unless communications are speedily re-established, for the influx of Moslem refugees from the districts occupied or threatened by the allies and the presence of large bodies of troops have more than doubled the normal population of the town. The outskirts of Monastir are strewn with dead animals, forage being scarce.

Order has been maintained—or has maintained itself—surprisingly considering the position. Apart from the pillaging of a few bakers' shops by starving soldiers, there has been in Monastir no incident whatsoever to record.

In the outlying districts many villages have been partly or entirely destroyed by the combatants, and by the Greek, Bulgarian, Serb, and Moslem bands.

Reports are continually coming in of acts of violence and revenge inevitable at such a time in a country where animosities of race, religion, and language have so long been rife. In most cases it is impossible to verify these reports, but a list of cases believed to be genuine is given in the enclosure to this despatch.

On the 12th instant Eyyoub Sabri Bey left Monastir for Ochrida for the purpose of raising Albanian bands against the Serbs. Mehmet Pasha of Kalkandelen, who arrived here with Fethi Pasha, has gone with him.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

Enclosure 4 in No. 311.

Diary of various Incidents in the Neighbourhood of Monastir.

October 20.—Haralambos, the Bulgarian priest of Velmei (kaza of Ochrida), and Tséli Naoum Grozdnof and Mitzi Naoum, Bulgarians of Lazhani (kaza of Ochrida), seized by a number of Moslem notables from Khoroshista, Ochrida, and Delagojda, who conveyed them to Pesochani, where they were kept for three days without food and tortured from time to time by the application of hot eggs to their feet and armpits. They were then sent to Monastir and imprisoned. Haralambos is known to have long had suspicious relations with the Bulgarian committee. Mehmet Ali, of Ochrida, a committeeman, appears to have played the principal part in this incident.

October 28.—The Greek monastery of Bukovo (kaza of Monastir) plundered by Albanian irregulars.

October 29.—Lambush Nestorof, of Struga; Heracli Philipchef, of Ochrida; Ivan Groupchef, of Ochrida; and Kristo Teodorof, of Prisoviani, murdered by gendarmes between Resna and Gijnat.

These men had been apprehended during the recent wholesale arrests of Bulgarians and Greeks suspected of having relations with the bands, and were at the time of their murder being conveyed to Monastir for imprisonment.

The Committee of Union and Progress, and especially Niazi Bey, is believed to have inspired this outrage.

October 30.—Jabiani and Kalenik, Bulgarian villages in the kaza of Florina, sacked by Albanian irregulars.

Kotori Zir and Kotori Bala sacked and burnt by Albanian irregulars. Both are Christian villages in the Florina kaza.

October 31.—The Moslem village of Mahalla, in the kaza of Florina, destroyed by a Greek band under Liondef, in revenge for the destruction of Kotori Zir and Kotori Bala. Several of the inhabitants were killed. The Greek band seems to have possessed a mountain gun.

Porodin, an Albanian village in the kaza of Monastir, plundered by Albanians from Ostrets.

November 2.—Banitsa and Zaparkani, important Christian villages in the kaza of Florina, burnt during Javid Pasha's advance against the Greeks. The Turks say that the Greeks, who had stored a quantity of straw in these villages, fired it when they retreated, and so caused the conflagration. The truth probably is that the Turks burnt them because they were a resort of Greek bands.

November 3.—The Bulgarian leader Tchaoulef, with a strong band, destroyed a Turkish patrol of ten men between Ochrida and Kirchevo.

November 3–5.—Cherovo, Sorovitch, Eksison, Negovani, Leskovets, Ostrovo, and Patelli destroyed during Javid Pasha's campaign against the Greeks.

The Turks seem to be systematically destroying villages which have sheltered irregular bands—a necessary military measure.

November 9.—Encounter at Novak (kaza of Monastir) between Turkish troops and a Bulgarian band from the Morihovo district. The band seems to have possessed a mountain gun.

The village took fire during the encounter and several houses were burnt.

November 10.—Kukurechani, Mogila, and Dogrijani, Bulgarian villages in the kaza of Monastir, destroyed partially by Turkish troops.

The local authorities accuse the Serbs of wholesale plunder, massacre, and outrage at Kirchevo and Perlepé, and at the Moslem villages of Varbovets, Erekovtsi, Kuntlartzi, and Moussentsi (all in the Perlepé district).

They state that at Kailar the Greeks deliberately burnt thirty Moslems' houses, as well as the konak, municipal offices, and the offices of the Régie, and that they butchered twenty non-combatant Moslems; and that they set fire to the hospital at Naselitch, burning the inmates alive.

In the course of his Greek campaign Javid Pasha disbanded most of the Albanian irregulars, whose indiscipline proved incorrigible. The remainder, who are mainly from the Dibra district, are gradually returning to their homes, which are, they believe, threatened by the Serbs.

Enclosure 5 in No. 311.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 81. Confidential.)
Sir,

Monastir, November 28, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency on the events of the past few days as follows:—

November 16.—Throughout the day the Serbs were taking up positions round the whole Turkish front. The Servian artillery at Chernobok, near Mogila, and at Novak engaged the artillery of the Turkish centre and right. Shrapnell from Mogila began to fall among the reserves at Orizari. By the evening the Turkish centre and right appeared to be roughly separated from the Serbs by the Cherna Karasou except at Tirn on the extreme right, which was occupied towards midday by Serbs who crossed the river from Trap. The Turks in consequence advanced a battery to a point almost due west of Tirn, and fighting continued at that point till evening, both Turks and Serbs standing in water in many places up to their knees.

The only news of the operations on the Turkish left was to the effect that Oblakovo and Sekirani were occupied by the Serbs.

Ali Riza Pasha, commander-in-chief of the western army, fearing the turning of

his right flank, gave orders that the engines in Monastir railway station should be kept ready to leave at a moment's notice with as much rolling-stock as possible. He himself left in the night by rail for Florina. Several villages were on fire east of Monastir beyond the Cherna Karasou.

A Turkish retreat was considered imminent.

November 17.—The Turkish left was reported to have retired, after some hard fighting, from its first line towards Gijavat and Kajhani.

The Serb attack on the Turkish right was rapidly developing, numerous batteries having been placed in position during the night east of the river at Trap, Vlaklar, Meglenchi, Dobromir, and Biljanik. Against this attack the Turks were holding the line Kuraman–Chekriksi in the midst of the swamps.

By evening their artillery fire had become feeble, and there was a brisk fusillade across the river.

Towards the Turkish centre, too, the Serbs were closing in.

The batteries at Mogila were pushed further south, and a few shells fell, without doing much damage, in the suburbs of Monastir.

Shevket Bey, commanding the 7th Cavalry Brigade, left for Kenali (south of Monastir) with the remaining cavalry, about 150 sabres.

November 18.—The batteries at Mogila and east of the river continued to bombard the Turkish right evidently with effect. Towards midday parties of soldiers entered Monastir in flight.

Early in the afternoon the Turkish artillery on the extreme right ceased firing, and masses of Servian infantry were visible in the swamps this side of the river. By 2 P.M. the retreat of the Turks from Orizari was in full progress, and before nightfall they had vanished towards Florina. A few Turks continued to resist until late in the evening in a hopeless position in the swamps near Chekriksi. Their fate is unknown.

Soon after the departure of the troops the vali, in answer to enquiries made by the consular corps, showed us a letter addressed to him by Zekki Pasha, stating that all the positions round Monastir had been evacuated and that the whole of the western army was retiring towards Florina.

The same evening the consular representatives were approached by a deputation representing the various communities who were anxious to treat for the surrender of the town through our medium. We were, however, unanimously of opinion that such a step on our part was unnecessary, and our action was accordingly confined to advising the deputation as to the manner of handing over the place.

November 19.—In accordance with our advice white flags were hoisted early in the morning over the barracks and other Government buildings, and a deputation consisting of the mayor, the mufti, and the heads of the several communities proceeded with a white flag to the nearest Servian outpost, through which they communicated with the competent authorities.

About midday Servian troops entered Monastir and proceeded to the barracks amidst scenes of great enthusiasm.

Others camped in the neighbourhood of the town.

His Royal Highness the Crown Prince, commanding the 1st Army, arrived on the 20th from Perlepé with Prince Alexis.

With the Servian army arrived M. Gendich, a former Minister of the Interior, and the British, Italian, French, and Russian military attachés.

By the 22nd a Provisional Government had been formed, consisting of a military governor, an assistant military governor, a chief of police, and a prefect. An acting mayor has also been appointed, assisted by a committee of five advisers and a secretary. The acting mayor is a Serb. The committee is composed of a Moslem (the ex-mayor), two Serbs, a Bulgarian, and a Greek. The secretary is a Serb.

The vali and other Turkish officials have been allowed to remain at large.

During the first few days of the occupation the streets were inadequately patrolled and the state of public security left much to be desired. Several shops were pillaged and private houses broken into and their owners molested. This state of things culminated in an attempt by soldiers to forcibly enter the house of an Austrian subject in the main street, in consequence of which the consuls requested the authorities to place sentries by the houses of their subjects. This has been done and the patrols have been increased.

After the departure of the Turkish troops and before the arrival of the Serbs, the Christian inhabitants of Monastir plundered the barracks and military depôts, stealing thousands of weapons.

One of the first acts of the Provisional Government has been to collect as many of

these as possible. On the 22nd instant notices were issued that persons failing to give up any arms in their possession within twenty-four hours would be punished.

The Greeks have established a Provisional Government at Florina. M. Navroulis, lately Greek consul in Monastir, is acting as governor of the town.

When the Turks retreated on the 18th, Fethi Pasha,* with the troops of the centre, proceeded by way of the Chemnitsa Valley towards Prevalets, and seems to have joined forces with the left under Javid Pasha, who had for four days been holding the positions guarding the retreat by the Resna road with tenacity.

Their forces retreated together by way of Malovista, striking the Resna-Gorcha road near the northern extremity of Lake Presba, whence they proceeded south.

The troops of the Turkish right wing and the reserves at Orizari and Sviyeti Nedyela retreated with Zekki and Karasaid Pasha to Florina, where they were probably joined on the 19th by the 17th division from Kailar and the Monastir redif division, which was retreating before two Greek divisions on the Vodhena-Ostrovo road.†

From Florina this portion of the Turkish army is reported to have retired by way of Pisoderi and Biklista towards Gorcha, where it is believed to have been joined by the forces of Javid and Fethi Pasha. Nothing certain is known of the further movements of the Turks.

The independent cavalry division under Prince Arsène, advancing from Perlepé, east to the main road, and of the Cherna Karasou, which it crossed at Brod—too late to take the retreating Turks in flank—reached Florina on the 20th about the same time as the two Greek divisions.

The present distribution of the Greek troops in this district is as follows:—

The 4th and 6th divisions are at Florina.
The 3rd division and a cavalry regiment are at Castoria.
The 8th division is near Yanina.

The present distribution of the Servian troops in this district is as follows:—

"Morava 1st ban" at Kristopher (on the outskirts of Monastir).
"Morava 2nd ban" at Resna, Ochrida, and Struga.
"Danube 1st ban" at Monastir and Dobromir (8 miles north-east of Monastir).
"Drina 1st ban" at Klestina (a few miles north of Florina).
"Timok 2nd ban" at Orizari (a suburb of Monastir).
The independent cavalry division at Kenali (south-east of Monastir).

According to Servian official statements, the Turks lost about 6,000 killed and wounded, and 3,000 men captured round Monastir.‡ 1,500 Turks surrendered at Florina.§

The Serbs admit a loss of about 3,000.

Allowing for casualties, surrenders, and desertions, the strength of the Turks who fought at Monastir is now unlikely to exceed 30,000 men. Fifty-one guns were abandoned round Monastir. Javid Pasha saved all his artillery, but it amounts to only seven field-guns (captured from the Greeks) and a few mountain-guns. The troops who retreated under Zekki and Karasaid had only three batteries of field-guns.

The Christians captured by the Serbs are to be sent to their homes. The Moslems will probably go to Nish.

The arrival of a foreign army was received by the Christians of Monastir with every sign of joy, but the occupation is becoming daily less popular. There is scarcely a Serb in the kaza of Monastir, and the old questions of race and language will die hard. Initial prejudice is finding, too, a legitimate grievance in acts of pillage by Servian soldiers.‖

* The Servian military authorities state that the body of Fethi Pasha, dead of wounds, was found after the Turkish retreat near the village of Kazhani.

† The Monastir redif division, although it had no artillery, fought two actions to delay the Greek advance a little west of Ostrovo on the 17th and near Gornichevo on the 18th. The Turkish losses in these encounters are estimated by the Greeks at about 500 men killed.

‡ The fiercest fighting was on the Turkish left, where both sides had most of their casualties. Out of a total of about 8,000 casualties on the Servian side Javid Pasha was responsible for about 2,500.

§ The commander-in-chief of the western army was officially reported to have surrendered with them, but this is now denied.

‖ It is fair to state that efforts are being made to prevent further incidents and that soldiers who have molested Moslems are being punished.

The following table shows the ethnical distribution of the male population of the kazas of Monastir, Florina, Perlepé, Kirchovo, and Ochrida*:—

Kaza.	Moslems.	Bulgars.	Greeks.	Serbs.	Vlachs.	Jews.
Monastir	14,235	29,215	17,321	..	1,461	2,176
Florina	8,243	8,393	13,106	..	336	2
Perlepé	8,446	17,500	2,386	5,500	95	..
Kirchovo	8,600	6,399	..	5,400	..	..
Ochrida	10,225	17,156	1,971	780	163	..
Total	49,751	78,663	34,787	11,680	2,055	2,178

His Royal Highness Prince Constantine, who commands the Greek forces at Florina, visited Monastir on the 25th and was most enthusiastically received by the people. He returned to Florina on the 26th. He was accompanied by General Danglis, his chief-of-staff.

The latter, whilst here stated, that according to the original agreement between the allies, the new northern frontier of Greece would run from the mouth of the Skoumbi on the Adriatic, following its course so far as possible, to Lin on the western shore of Lake Ochrida, and thence to Gopesh through Peshtani and Krushei. From Gopesh it would proceed by Lisolai to Rasinbey on the Cherna Karasou, and thence—marching so far as possible with the river—to Krivolak.

There is an impression in Servian military circles here that Monastir will not fall to the lot of the Serbs.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

For many confirmatory details in connection with the foregoing despatch I am indebted to Major Thompson and Major Cunliffe-Owen, attached to the Servian and Greek forces respectively.

[53263] No. 312.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 1050.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 8, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna reporting on the threatening attitude of the Greeks towards the Turks at Sparta in the vilayet of Konia, and on the insufficient armed force at the disposal of the authorities.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 312.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 144.)
Sir, *Smyrna, December 3, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Oriental Carpet Manufacturers (Limited) have received a letter from their agent at Sparta, in the Konia vilayet, dated the 28th November, in which it is stated that on the 23rd November a party of Turks had attacked houses and shops occupied by Greeks.

The authorities restored order and punished the parties. On the 26th November the authorities arrested a Turk named Kaiserli Mehmet, who had made a speech in a café calling upon the Turks to attack the Christians.

* This table was drawn up in January last in view of the elections by the Committee of Union and Progress, which was then anxious to secure the election of a Serb deputy for Monastir. The figures are therefore likely to be as favourable as possible for the Serbs.

On the 27th November an attempt was made to set fire to the Greek shops with petroleum. The authorities acted energetically, and the parties were imprisoned and flogged.

In confirmation of this report, a telegram has since been received by the Greek Archbishop of Smyrna from the Church Council at Sparta as follows:—

"The feelings of the Turks here are very excited. Stone throwing, breaking of holy articles, and gunshots by night in the Christian quarters have frightened the community."

Although the authorities are evidently desirous of maintaining order, they have, I understand, very few gendarmes at Sparta.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[53264] No. 313.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 1051.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 9, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 985 of the 21st ultimo, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copies of two despatches from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, on the subject of the alleged anti-Jewish excesses in that town.

I would draw your attention to the discrepancy between the attitude of the Grand Rabbi here, as reported in my above-mentioned despatch, and that of his colleague at Salonica. It would seem that the Zionist schemes in regard to Salonica, shadowed by the Grand Rabbi's action here, by the language of Mr. Israel Zangwill in London, and by various press articles, have miscarried. If the idea has not been abandoned altogether, the means for making it effective have at any rate undergone a change.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 313.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 162.)
Sir, *Salonica, November 27, 1912.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's despatch No. 30 of the 21st instant, transmitting copy of one addressed by your Excellency to Sir Edward Grey on the subject of the complaints made by the Grand Rabbi against the conduct of the Greek troops in Salonica, and calling for my observations in regard to his Eminence's statements.

On the 23rd instant I received from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State a telegram instructing me to report at once whether there had been any extensive outrages on Jews since the Greek occupation of this place; to which I replied that, though there had been no special outrages on the Jews as such, there had indeed been innumerable cases of plundering and of robbery from the person, of which Israelites as well as others had been victims.

The subject of this indiscriminate plundering of Ottoman subjects was dealt with in my despatch No. 151 of the 12th November (paragraphs 18 and 19).

As regards the specific cases mentioned in the newspaper extracts left with your Excellency by the Grand Rabbi, I do not happen to be able to confirm any of them in particular. I saw the statements in the "Independant" when they appeared, and had no reason to doubt their accuracy, but during the period referred to such incidents were so frequent that there was no possibility of attempting to keep count of them. Europeans indeed were generally respected, but hardly anyone wearing a fez escaped being held up, and numerous cases occurred amongst Israelities and others of foreign nationality who have been accustomed to retain the Turkish head-dress. One such case was that of a British subject, who was relieved of his watch and chain and some 3*l.* in cash. The Persian consul was likewise deprived of his watch.

This barefaced robbery in the streets by day ceased shortly after the arrival of the Cretan gendarmes, though at least two instances were reported to me in which these

much-advertised keepers of the public peace themselves caught the general contagion and "held up" inoffensive passers-by. The housebreaking and other acts of violence by night have, however, not even yet come to an end. Last night, amongst other things, a small grocer's shop in the main thoroughfare of the town was broken open and looted of all its contents.

Most frequently the soldiers carrying out these exploits have been accompanied, guided, and in all probability instigated, by resident Greeks, who placed their local knowledge at the service of the invaders, and no doubt availed themselves of this easy opportunity of paying off old scores or venting their personal spite.

As regards the last paragraph of the enclosure in your Excellency's despatch, whilst I have heard that many ladies were afraid to leave the house or send their female servants across the street, I have not heard of any case of violation amongst the Jews, though, as stated in my immediately preceding despatch of the 24th instant, some outrages of this nature have recently been reported to me from the Mussulman quarters. Nor is there any foundation for the statement that the Grand Rabbi of Salonica had been seriously wounded, beyond the fact that a number of soldiers once penetrated into his official residence.

Insults and uncomplimentary utterances as regards their religion have frequently been complained of by the Jews, and I have even heard of instances of boycotting, but this is not surprising, as anti-Semitism is rampant amongst the Greeks, and the relations between the two communities here have never been particularly cordial.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 313.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 167.)

Sir, *Salonica, December 3, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 162 of the 27th ultimo, concerning the alleged outrages on Jews by the Greek troops in occupation of Salonica, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a letter addressed by the Grand Rabbi of this place to Prince Nicolas, the acting commander of the troops, which was published in some of the local papers yesterday.

The publication of this letter, which was presumably not altogether spontaneous, may be regarded as an act of reciprocity for the official *démenti* issued by the Crown Prince to a story circulated by the Greek papers, two or three days after the entry of the Hellenic army, to the effect that a number of soldiers had been poisoned by Jewish restaurant keepers—a story which caused considerable resentment amongst the Israelite community, fearful of the echoes which it might produce in Greece and Russia.

The present rabbi, who is a man of no little energy and intelligence, has worked hard during the two or three years that he has been here to maintain good relations between the two communities, and his very considerable influence will no doubt always be exerted in the interests of harmony. There can, however, be no doubt that the Jewish community of Salonica looks forward to a perpetuation of the Greek régime with a total absence of enthusiasm, if not with serious apprehension.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 3 in No. 313.

Extract from the "Indépendant" of December 2, 1912.

ON nous communique la lettre suivante que le Grand Rabbin de Salonique a adressée à son Altesse le Prince Nicolas :—

"Altesse, "*Salonique, le 26 novembre*, 1912.

"Je viens d'être informé que certains organes de la presse anglaise et de la presse française ont publié des nouvelles de Constantinople et de Salonique, d'après lesquelles les soldats grecs auraient pillé et détruit des synagogues israélites de notre ville, violé des jeunes filles israélites, et répandu la terreur parmi mes ouailles. Ces mêmes journaux ajoutent qu'à la suite de cet état de choses je me serais adressé aux

Ambassadeurs d'Angleterre et de France à Constantinople pour demander leur protection.

"Il est de mon devoir, et je dois à la vérité, de venir vous déclarer que le Rabbinat de Salonique n'a fait et n'a même pensé faire la moindre démarche auprès d'aucune Ambassade à Constantinople; de plus, le Grand Rabbinat n'a écrit la moindre chose au Grand Rabbin, ni à qui que ce soit à Constantinople depuis l'entrée de l'armée hellénique à Salonique.

"Quant aux plaintes qui se sont produites et portées chez moi les premiers jours de l'occupation, et parmi lesquelles il n'y a pas de relatives à la destruction et au pillage de synagogues, soit de la part de militaires, soit de civils, je déclare formellement que j'ai porté ces plaintes directement auprès des autorités hellènes, lesquelles, j'aime à le constater, se sont prêtées avec beaucoup d'empressement et la meilleure bonne volonté à y porter remède, afin de rétablir l'ordre dans la ville. C'est grâce à l'attitude bienveillante des autorités, que je ne saurais assez remercier, que l'ordre a été rétabli et que quelques jours après l'occupation, mes ouailles n'ont plus eu à m'adresser des plaintes.

"En autorisant votre Altesse à faire de ma présente lettre l'usage qu'elle jugera bon, je la prie, &c.—LE GRAND RABBIN DE SALONIQUE."

[53276] No. 314.

Sir. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 96. Very confidential.)

Sir, *Bucharest, December 9, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Bourchier, who is going to London at the request of the Bulgarian and Greek Governments to assist the delegates of the allied Powers in the peace negotiations, called upon me this evening and gave me some interesting information about M. Danef's visit, which he said had been arranged as the result of private pourparlers between himself (M. Bourchier) and his friend M. Take Jonesco, and about the Bulgarian attitude towards the Roumanian claims.

M. Bouchier said that Bulgaria was quite ready to grant a strategical rectification of frontier, but not one involving any appreciable loss of territory, such as the cession of Silistria. She would also be willing to accord the Koutzo-Vlachs ecclesiastical, as well as school, autonomy.

M. Bouchier thinks that Roumania lost an opportunity of getting better terms before the war. An assurance of benevolent neutrality would have made Bulgaria generous as regards Roumania's requirements.

Things have changed since then, and M. Bouchier does not think that Roumania would be able to obtain directly from Bulgaria more favourable terms than those indicated above except by mobilisation or threat of force. In Bulgaria's exhausted condition she would probably yield to a show of force, as she realises that she is not in a position to enter on another campaign. M. Bouchier has to-day strongly urged upon his friend M. Take Jonesco, the Minister of Interior, who except for M. Majorescu is the only minister who counts as regards foreign policy, that it would be most impolitic for Roumania to have recourse to such extreme measures, for by extorting territorial concessions she would be creating the elements of profound hostility and might expose herself to great danger, for if she ever found herself in difficulties, the desire for revenge would be so strong that Bulgaria would not hesitate to recover not only the ceded territory, but also the entire Dobrudja, which is largely peopled by Bulgarians. On the other hand, should Roumania show a spirit of moderation and consideration in the present negotiations, she could in the future count on Bulgarian support against Austria-Hungary should the opportunity arise of giving effect to Roumanian aspirations in Transylvania.

M. Danef will doubtless have spoken to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to the other political personages whom he sees during his visit somewhat on these lines.

M. Bouchier tells me that he found M. Take Jonesco by no means so conciliatory towards Bulgaria as he had been before he took office. His Excellency has to count with the unpopularity which the Government would incur if they accepted terms less favourable than the country expected. Nevertheless, it would seem from reading between the lines of the King's speech, translation of which I forwarded in my immediately preceding despatch, that Roumania, before resorting to any show of force,

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intends at any rate to wait to see what comes out of the negotiations between the Great Powers for the general settlement of the many questions raised by the victory of the allies. In the King's speech the following passage occurs:—

"We have the right to expect that this attitude will have favourable results for our good relations with the Balkan States as newly constituted, and that our interests will be respected.

"Roumania is regarded as an important factor in the European concert, and her voice will be heard at the time of the final settlement of the questions raised by the Balkan crisis.

"The confidence which the nation has always placed in the recognised bravery of her soldiers is fully warranted. The army is in a position to justify this confidence. It is ready at any moment to do its duty. The new credits which will be asked for to supply the needs of the army will find their justification in your enlightened patriotism."

It is perhaps a fair inference from the sequence of these paragraphs that in the event of the failure of direct negotiations with Bulgaria, an appeal to the Powers would precede any show of force.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[53267] No. 315.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 1054.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 10, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1025 of the 4th instant, relative to alleged massacres perpetrated by Turks in certain Christian villages in the neighbourhood of Keshan, I have the honour to report that I have now received a *note verbale*, a copy of which is enclosed herewith, from the Sublime Porte protesting against alleged massacre of Moslems by the Bulgarians in the same districts.

I have instructed the acting British vice-consul at the Dardanelles to endeavour to obtain precise information as to what actually occurred, and to furnish me with a further report on the subject.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 315.

Note verbale.

D'APRÈS les informations officielles parvenues à la Sublime Porte, les villages musulmans de la région de Charkouy, Murefté, Kéchan et Malkaré sont livrés au pillage et à l'incendie par les Bulgares, qui vont même jusqu'à en égorger les habitants, avec les femmes et les enfants.

Le Gouvernement Impérial ne peut laisser passer, sans protester de la façon la plus énergique, ces atrocités commises au mépris de toutes les règles du droit et de la civilisation.

Il est persuadé que le Gouvernement britannique ne peut rester indifférent en présence de ces scènes de carnage qui ensanglantent une partie du territoire de l'Europe, et qu'il lui suffira de faire appel à ses sentiments d'humanité pour qu'il veuille bien aviser aux dispositions nécessaires pour les faire cesser.

Sublime Porte, le 7 décembre, 1912.

[53268] No. 316.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 1055.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 10, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 996 of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the policy of the Government in dealing with the members of the committee suspected of attempting to provoke a rising or a revolution has been somewhat modified during the last few days. Many of those who had been arrested have been already released after, it would appear, a more or less perfunctory enquiry. Moreover, the court-martial has been reconstituted and is now composed of men who have a reputation for much greater moderation than their predecessors.

It is generally believed that the period of rest enjoyed at the lines of Chatalja by the army since the last engagements has been employed in political intrigues and in putting forward the idea that the Turkish army is by no means defeated and will be ill-disposed to accept any but honourable terms of peace. In these views they have been well supported by the officers newly arrived from Asia Minor, who, not having participated in the disastrous retreats, are encouraging the belief that the army is still capable of a forward movement.

This will undoubtedly increase the difficulties of the Government in their peace negotiations and the Cabinet has probably been well advised in selecting in some of the delegates men like the Ottoman Ambassadors in Berlin and Rome, who have heretofore been identified to a certain extent with committee politics.

The enclosed translation of an article in the "Tasvir-i-Efkiar," supposed to have committee inspiration, gives an indication of the tendency towards further resistance which is arising and the hopes so strongly expressed that peace will not be made in a hurry would seem to be unfortunate.*

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[53372] No. 317.

Mr. E. Grant Duff to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 44.)
Sir, *Budapest, December 10, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of an article from the "Pester Lloyd" of the 7th instant, entitled, "The Macedonian Question and Roumanian Interests."

My Roumanian colleague informs me that this article was published by his request, and that he supplied the details given.

I have, &c.
EVELYN GRANT DUFF.

Enclosure in No. 317.

Extract from the "Pester Lloyd" of December 7, 1912.

THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM AND ROUMANIAN INTERESTS.

THE unexpectedly rapid advance of the Balkan armies has accelerated the work of the European Chanceries, and has given to the exchange of views now in progress regarding various points of the Eastern question a more distinct form.

One of these points is the attitude of Roumania which European diplomacy unanimously recognises as being a matter of first-class importance. It must not be forgotten that the Bulgarians would not be before the gates of Constantinople if the Roumanian army had come into action, and that the mobilisation of the powerful Roumanian forces might even now change the situation in so many ways.

The views of Roumania were summed up a few weeks ago in an inspired article of the semi-official newspaper of the new Roumanian Government. According to that publication the attitude of Roumania is guided by three principles:—

* Not printed.

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1. Love of peace which must in no sense be identified with cowardice. In this respect the policy of Roumania seems parallel with that of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

2. The second principle is determined by the interest of Roumania in the matter of territorial changes which will be made in favour of the Balkan States. It will be remembered that Count Berchtold in his *exposé* laid particular stress on this real interest of Roumania, and that it was also recognised unconditionally by M. Sazonof. The visit which M. Danef is about to pay at Bucharest seems designed in part to clear up this point because on that occasion the intentions of the Bulgarian Government in respect of the rectification of the Dobrudsha frontier will be made known. It is to be hoped that the Cabinet of Sophia will see the necessity of showing themselves grateful to Roumania, and will offer her a pledge of friendship, and thus do all that is possible to lay the future relations of the two States on a foundation of bed-rock.

3. The third point to which in Bucharest they assign special weight is the question of the Roumanians in Macedonia over whom for the last forty years Roumania has exercised a natural protectorate, and who will in consequence of the new situation in the Balkan Peninsula now be under Greek, Serb, or Bulgarian rule quite irrespective of the autonomy of Albania. In his report in the Austrian Delegation, Marquis Bacquehem quite rightly stated that "the fate of this population has been the subject of continued care on the part of the Roumanian Government, and Roumania has undertaken duties which she cannot neglect."

What is in reality the significance of the Roumanian element in Turkey, and what is in fact the Macedonian-Roumanian question?

Throughout European Turkey the Wallachs form at times little groups, then large colonies and sometimes even compact masses of population. They constitute a special race speaking a dialect closely resembling the written language of Roumania and distinguished by high intelligence and important property qualifications. In the towns they are bankers, merchants, lawyers, and doctors, in the villages and hamlets workmen and publicans, in the plains and on the slopes of Pindus shepherds who follow the patriarchal life of their forefathers. Numerous travellers and ethnographers have studied the Wallachs, among others Pouqueville, William Martin, Leake, Victor Bérard, &c. The most remarkable work dealing with them is by a Greek, Rhangabe, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1856 in the Athenian periodical "Pandora" he wrote:—

"The Roumanians of Macedonia, Epirus, and Thessaly are the descendants of colonists who came from Roumania. If you compare their features, build, and character you will at once come to the conclusion that they are of Latin origin. They number 600,000."

This statement in the mouth of a Greek diplomatist is the more valuable as it is just the Greek diplomatists who deny the existence of the Wallachs, or at least try to depreciate their importance as a national element.

It may be that the figure 600,000 is inaccurate. In Roumania they are as inclined to put it higher as elsewhere to lower it. According to credible statistics, there are about 550,000 Wallachs in the vilayets of Monastir, Salonica, Janina, Kossowa, and Scutari. Their most important centres are: Monastir, Krushova, Gopas, Ochrida, Moloviste, Blaho-Clissura, Hrupiste, Tirnova, Margarova.

In all these place Wallachs are found in compact masses, and in most have their own schools. In some important centres, as Monastir, Janina, Salonica, &c., they possess institutions for higher education, gymnasiums, lycées, commercial schools, &c. The number of pupils was a few years ago 6,000, in about 100 schools, and the upkeep of these schools costs the Roumanian budget annually from 70,000 to 80,000 lei, not including extraordinary amounts for building schools and churches, which, for instance, in 1904, were covered by a credit of 24,000*l*. Further, the Roumanians had about 100 churches, in which 70 priests read the service. The most important of these churches are at Krushova (where there is a fine cathedral), Gopas, Ochrida, Moloviste, &c. In 1905 the Roumanian Government, after overcoming great difficulties, were able to open two chapels in Monastir and Salonica.

The relatively small number of Roumanian churches at first sight is surprising, but the explanation is simple. The Roumanian religious propaganda is of comparatively recent date. It began in 1860, and only really developed in 1890. A clever Wallach schoolmaster, named Apostol Margarit, took the matter up, it was gradually extended by the Roumanian State, and the more it developed the more it encountered the determined resistance of the Greek propaganda and policy. The Wallachs, who in Turkey

were confused with the Greeks under the general name of "Romiis" (orthodox), were for a long time considered by the Greeks as part of their national capital. The confusion of nationality and confession, which has always existed in Turkey, favoured Greek aspirations, as they saw in the Œcumenical Patriarch the most precious support of the Hellenist propaganda. It was only with the greatest difficulty that the Roumanian schools could be founded as purely secular institutions; but when it was proposed, as inevitable, to provide them with churches, the efforts of the Roumanians encountered the unconditional resistance of the Phanar. As Roumanians are very religious, and hold stoutly to their confession, the Greek bishops had recourse to the most reprehensible means to retain the Roumanians in the fetters of pan-Hellenism. In this connection a number of very typical instances will be given. In Magarova a priest snatched the wafer from the mouth of a child communicant because it went to the Wallach school. In another village the Greek bishop christened a child a second time, after it had already been baptised by a Roumanian priest, and that is one of the most sacrilegious offences known to the Christian Church. In Veles the Greek priest refused to bury a Roumanian. In Monastir, at a Roumanian funeral, riotous scenes took place, and these were incited by agents of the Greek bishop. The attitude of the Greek bishops was considered so outrageous, even by the Turks, that at length the Sublime Porte demanded the removal of several of them, among others Hakimos Foropulos, of Monastir, and Agatangelos, of Grebena.

In spite of these difficulties the Roumanian propaganda gained ground, and in May 1905, subsequent to the incident brought about by the Vali Osma Pasha, at Janina, which nearly caused a breach between Roumania and Turkey, the Sultan issued an iradé by which the Roumanians were recognised as an independent nationality, and were given the same rights as the other nationalities of the Turkish Empire. At the same time the Roumanians were permitted to celebrate the mass in their mother tongue. The iradé of 1905 might have served as the bridge to a compromise between the Wallachs and the Patriarchate as the Roumanian settlements had no desire but to remain within the bosom of the Œcumenical Church, of course on condition that they should have their own schools, churches, and clergy; but the Patriarch Joachim III, who was badly advised and influenced by Greece, declared war on the Roumanians instead of bringing peace to his flock. He hurled excommunications against the clergy and congregations of the Roumanian party, and when he saw that the anathemas of the Church could not hinder the peaceful development of the Roumanian propaganda, he called to his assistance the Greek bands which were ostensibly organised to fight the Bulgarian komitajis, but in reality were directed against the defenceless Wallach villages.

In Negovan the Roumanian priest with three relatives was literally torn to pieces by a Greek band. In Florina, Tirnova, Vodena, Grebena attacks on Roumanians increase in number daily. In Gramatikova the brothers Calea, two Roumanian notables, were found murdered, and on their breasts was fixed a notice threatening supporters of the Roumanian propaganda with a similar fate. And what is more serious, the chiefs of these bands were not common brigands but officers of the Greek army on leave; Zega was really Captain Melas, Nidas was Lieutenant Kalomenopulos; in the same way Sub-Lieutenants Kiontos, Leontios, and Stavrianopulos, when they were captured by the Turkish gendarmerie, were compelled to reveal their real names and rank.

These incidents contributed a good deal to aggravate the diplomatic conflict which resulted in the autumn of 1905 in the rupture of relations between Roumania and Greece. Although subsequently diplomatic relations were renewed between the two States the spirit of revolution continued to ferment in the Roumanian mind, and was directed against the unjust persecutions which the apostles of Roumanian ideas have had to tolerate from the Greeks in Macedonia. It is then not surprising if public opinion at present in Roumania is more susceptible than ever, and if it shudders at the fresh outrages which the Greek troops, or at least their irregulars, have committed in Macedonia and Epirus. In Beril, a rich distinguished Roumanian named Toli Hagi Gogu was robbed, reduced to beggary, and also imprisoned. In Turia, Demeter Ciema, director of the Roumanian schools, was murdered with refined cruelty; in Grebena and Palcohori priests and notables were murdered. The terrorised population of Perivoli, Abela, and Samarina left their homes and fled to the mountains.

If such facts are at any time calculated strongly to disquiet public opinion in Roumania, they are all the more serious in the present circumstances. It should never be forgotten that the nations of the Balkan alliances have to thank the benevolent neutrality of Roumania, and of Roumania alone, that they were in a position to try the fortune of war, and that they, and above all the Greeks, obtained unhoped-for successes.

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The war was embarked on in the name of Christianity, not as a war of conquest but to obtain better and equal treatment for all Christian subjects in European Turkey. In view of the magnitude of the declared object of the war, Roumania could not act as an impediment to the realisation of aspirations as noble as they were abstract. She did not mobilise one soldier, and thus enabled the Balkan States to free the Christians of Macedonia and Epirus. Whatever may be the ultimate result of this war, whether the Greeks retain Salonica or not, whether the Servians extend the frontiers of their country to Monastir or not, one elementary duty the belligerents will have to fulfil, that is, they will have to respect the Roumanians in Turkish territory and treat their freedom as a kind of sacred thing, for these Roumanians are natural protégés of Roumania, and, at the same time, living tokens of that country in these far-off lands. To harm them constitutes not only an offence against private law, and more than an abuse of military law—it is a political crime.

And this crime may turn against those who have committed it. In fact, if when nothing has been finally arranged such outrages can occur, what must one expect when territories which are only occupied become the property of the conqueror under a future treaty? What confidence can Roumania have in the promise of "equal treatment" on the part of these modern crusaders when thirty years of past and thirty days of present persecution of the Wallachs have enlightened public opinion in Roumania as to the worth of the new Christian régime which was supposed to abolish the barbarous Turkish Government. Will it be thought strange in such circumstances if that public opinion, either by the voices of its orators or by the authorised words of its diplomatists, insists that the whole of Macedonia, in the same way as Albania, shall be declared an autonomous province and Greek or Servian influence withdrawn. The division of Macedonia already appears very difficult to accomplish. The Bulgarians have left Uskub to the Servians, but everyone knows that that place is almost exclusively inhabited by Bulgarians; and if it is the seat of a Servian bishopric, this is due entirely to the byzantinism of the Œcumenical Patriarch, who has found it advantageous to play off the Servians against the Bulgarians. And who can forget the celebrated polemic of Jastrebow against Ofeikow and Goptschewitch against Shopow, who both wished to show, in face of fact, that Uskub was Servian. Monastir, similarly, is more a Bulgarian-Wallachian town, and the Greeks there are rapidly disappearing; of 37,500 inhabitants, 10,000 are Slavs, 10,500 Mohammedans, 7,000 Wallachs, 5,000 Jews, and only 50 Greeks. In spite of these facts, the Greeks hope to retain Monastir when Macedonia is divided.

This chaos of races is assuredly not calculated to lighten the problem, and even if the limits of the different Balkan States in the case of the adjacent districts can more or less accurately be decided, the complications become greater as you approach the centre of Macedonia.

A natural anxiety for the future accompanies the justified protests of public opinion in Roumania. What, it is said, will happen to the hundred Roumanian schools, churches, teachers, clergy; what will become of the national capital, sacrifice, and effort which Roumania has sunk during the last forty years in Macedonia?

A portion will fortunately fall to the Albanian Free State which is to be constituted, and there at least will the Roumanians, who are on the best of terms with the Albanians, have scope to develop. But the larger number of the Roumanians live in Macedonia and Epirus. What fate is awaiting them, and what guarantee is offered that they will not only be protected from persecution, but will be allowed to progress under the motherly care of Roumania?

This is one of the delicate points of the Macedonian question, and the Balkan Alliance will do well not to complicate it by unjust persecution of the Wallachs, as this would call forth a hostile and even dangerous feeling in Roumania. The Balkan States are about to increase in extent, not indeed alone through the victories of their armies, but thanks to those nations which have rendered such successes possible. If all Europe recognises Roumania's right to moral and material compensation, the Balkan Alliance should lose no time in showing themselves thoroughly grateful.

They should not allow themselves to be so intoxicated with success as to deny the existence of or undervalue others, and they should not forget that the question of the balance of power in the Balkans—according to the speech of the Marquis Bacquehem—must be decided not only on the Dobrudsha frontier, but in the heart of Macedonia.

And, lastly, may they not forget that in a decision of these questions other factors besides their armies must be considered: Justice, the unanimous support of the Powers, and the innate strength of the Roumanian monarchy.

[85344] No. 318*.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(*Received December* 14.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, December* 14, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, paraphrase of a telegram, dated the 14th instant, relative to the movements of ships, &c., in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 318*.

Consul-General Spence to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Trieste, December* 14, 1912.

FOLLOWING information cannot be verified, supplied by friend on "Piccolo" newspaper's staff:—

"20,000 more men, said to be destined for Dalmatia, embarked here to-night. Rumours of a demonstration to be shortly made on coast of Albania by Austrian and Italian ships combined."

[53342] No. 318.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 14.)

(No. 516.)

Sir, *Paris, December* 13, 1912.

IN accordance with the authorisation contained in your telegram No. 775 of the 12th instant, I had an interview this afternoon at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with M. Gout, who is in charge of the question of the interests of the foreign holders of bonds of the Ottoman Debt. M. Gout began by enquiring whether I had any observations to make as to the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to the report of the French commission appointed to examine this question, which was communicated to you by M. Cambon on the 21st November. I informed M. Gout in reply that I had no instructions beyond an authorisation to enter into conversation with him. After briefly running through the main points of the above-mentioned report, M. Gout said that he had had an interview with the German Councillor this morning in regard to this question, and that it had been arranged that a representative of the German bondholders, probably Herr Helfferich, should come to Paris to discuss the matter with the representative of the French bondholders. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would follow the example of the German Government and send a representative of the British bondholders—Sir Henry Babington-Smith, for instance—to Paris who would discuss first with M. Revoil, and then with himself, if necessary, the report of the French commission, point out any objections which His Majesty's Government might have to their conclusions, and endeavour to come to a mutual agreement. Should such an agreement be come to, the fact would be duly officially noted by M. Poincaré and His Majesty's Ambassador.

M. Gout begged me to urge the importance of sending the expert from London at an early date, in order to get the matter settled, if possible, before the Christmas holidays, when many people, including himself, would be leaving Paris, perhaps for some time.

I mentioned to M. Gout that I understood that you considered that it would be expedient that the representatives of the bondholders at Constantinople should first submit their views before any decision is taken in regard to the question. He replied that he did not share that opinion, for the representatives of the bondholders at Constantinople would, from their position and surroundings, probably be inclined to be too Turkish in their sympathies and claims, while in France and England, &c., no considerations would be taken into account save those concerning the true interests of the bondholders.

I have, &c.
E. D. CARNEGIE.

[53341] No. 319.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 14.)

(No. 38.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, December* 13, 1912.

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 37 of 12th December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to say that, M. Mano having for personal reasons to take leave of absence, Roumanian Government desire one of their most experienced diplomats to take charge of legation, and propose to send M. Misu, Minister at Constantinople, who would be further charged to consult M. Danef about matters affecting their respective countries. Minister for Foreign Affairs would be glad to know what course His Majesty's Government would prefer should be followed in accrediting him.

Should he be furnished with a provisional letter of credence, or could he be presented by present chargé d'affaires? Minister for Foreign Affairs would be grateful for early reply.

[53320] No. 320.

Mr. Vaughan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 39. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, December 13, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 64 of 12th December.

Secretary-general called this evening to say that Roumanian Government were anxious that no misapprehension should arise as to their attitude with regard to Ambassadorial conference. M. Misu was being sent to London in order that he might continue discussions with M. Danef, although he would be fully qualified to take part in conference if invited.

Roumanian Government wished to act correctly and not to create impression that they were soliciting an invitation. Should such invitation be extended to them by the Great Powers they would gladly accept it in view of the many questions vitally affecting Roumania which would be discussed. Among other subjects he casually mentioned Dardanelles and the means of communication with the Adriatic and Ægean.

It is clear that what the Roumanian Government would really like is for their representative to be admitted to the deliberations of the Ambassadors at any rate on all questions affecting Roumanian interests and not for him to act in a purely consultative capacity.

I gather that they have received some sort of encouragement in their hopes to participate in the conference from the Triple Alliance.

[53466] No. 321.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 177. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, December 14, 1912.*

BOTH Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Under-Secretary of State saw Nizami Pasha on his way through to London. They have always been somewhat anxious as to the probable attitude of Turkey at the peace negotiations, and his Excellency's language has made them still more so. He said that Ottoman Government were determined to keep Adrianople, and would reject any conditions of peace which included its cession. Turkey had 300,000 fresh troops, and if allies proposed unacceptable conditions she would break off negotiations and resume military operations, taking the offensive instead of resting as hitherto on the defensive.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed Nizami Pasha that Germany desired peace, and would view rupture of negotiations with great regret. He warned his Excellency of the danger of holding such language in London, and advised him very seriously to adopt a more moderate tone.

[53459] No. 322.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, December 14, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 13th December.

In speaking of possible economic demand on the part of Austria, Prime Minister referred to private arrangement between Great Britain and Servia, under which the latter engaged not to enter into a customs union with any but the Balkan States (see Anglo-Servian Commercial Negotiations *procès-verbal* No. 5).

[53460] No. 323.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, December 14, 1912.*

I HEARD at Ministry for Foreign Affairs yesterday that a pontoon train arrived at Semlin.

[53452] No. 324.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 720.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 14, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 715 of 11th December.

In a conversation this afternoon with my Austrian and my German colleagues they told me that both Osman Nizami and Mahmud Shevket had insisted very strongly that retention of Adrianople was essential for existence of Turks in Constantinople, as Tchataldja could not be permanently garrisoned with sufficient troops, and that if delegates refused this hostilities would recommence.

My colleagues thought that Turkish delegates might agree to discuss with Greek delegates, but would take no decision till armistice was signed by them. Language of my two colleagues in connection with general situation in Europe and Austrian attitude regarding Servia was distinctly bellicose.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[53471] No. 325.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 181.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, December 14, 1912.*

INFORMATION has reached me from several quarters of secret negotiations for hire of transports by Italian Government. In spite of denials issued by Prefect of Naples, I learn from Genoa that some vessels have actually been retained, and informant states that it is intended to have some in readiness for expedition of 30,000 men for Albania to be transported from Libya should occasion arise, which would, I apprehend, only be if an Austrian expedition were contemplated.

[53449] No. 326.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 233. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 14, 1912.*

MY Italian colleague informs me that M. Danef had a long conversation with Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs on his way to London. M. Danef informed the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the demands of his Government included the cession of Adrianople as a *sine qua non*.

M. Danef has reported that the views of the Austrian Government and those of Bulgarian Government as to the future settlement of South-Eastern Europe are widely divergent. M. Danef further states that he is impressed with Austrian military preparations, which are so extensive that they can, in his opinion, only be aimed at Russia.

(Sent to Constantinople and Vienna.)

[53481] No. 327.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, December 14, 1912.*

MY telegram of 13th December.

Greek and Bulgarian troops all but came to open conflict this morning over closing of office of Bulgarian newspaper, which had attacked Greek administration.

Conflicts of jurisdiction are occurring in district between Salonica and Serres.

A Greek soldier killed a Bulgarian soldier in tramway at Salonica.

Feeling runs very high on both sides.

[53467] No. 328.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 193.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 14, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for the Director of Military Operations:—

"Latest information points to concentration of troops in Lower Dalmatia and in Southern Herzegovina, perhaps in view of possible expedition to Albania by sea."

[53468] No. 329.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 194.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Vienna, December 14, 1912.*

HAVE just seen Count Mensdorff, who says he will reach London Monday night.

[53436] No. 330.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1354.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 14, 1912.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador has brought telegram from M. Sazonof to the following effect:—

In the event of Roumanian interests being dealt with at Ambassadors' conversations, the Roumanian representative in London should, if he desires it, and on each occasion with the assent of the Ambassadors, be invited to give explanations to the conference and to formulate the wishes of Roumania, but without any right to take part in the discussions.

I am ready to agree to M. Sazonof's proposal, but I think it would be well to suggest, if the question is raised at the meeting of the Ambassadors, that we should not discuss Roumanian claims unless Roumania and Bulgaria have definitely failed to settle them with each other.

Roumanian Government are sending their Minister at Constantinople to discuss matters with M. Daneff here.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 777, and Bucharest, No. 65.)

[53320] No. 331.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Vaughan.

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 14, 1912.*

YOU may inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that I do not suppose there will be any disposition on the part of the Powers to enter upon discussion of any question that intimately affects Roumania without consulting her, but that if M. Misu will call at the Foreign Office after he arrives in London I shall be glad to see him next week, when I shall know what the views of the Ambassadors are generally after receiving instructions from their Governments.

[53341] No. 332.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Vaughan.

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 14, 1912.*

SIR G. BARCLAY'S telegram No. 38 of 13th December.

We think M. Misu might be furnished with a credential as Envoy Extraordinary on a special mission. If this arrangement were found agreeable to Roumanian Government, I should be ready to submit M. Misu's name to the King for His Majesty's *agrément*.

[53454] No. 333.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 722.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 15, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from vice-consul at Dardanelles to-day:—

"Turkish ship-of-war 'Medjidiyeh' and six torpedo-boats went out to-day at midday. Guns heard, lasting half-an-hour."

[53455] No. 334.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 723.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 15, 1912.*

ITALIAN ship "Benedetto Brin" left last night and Italian hospital ship to-day.

[53469] No. 335.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 195.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 15, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"Appointment of General Conrad has been followed by fresh movements of drafts from various units and of various arms to the south. Since 10th December 15,000 have gone from Vienna, and at least 5,000 from Budapest to Bosnia and South Hungary. These drafts include men of 1906 class, reservists of the Landwehr, and Ersatz reservists.

"It is stated vaguely that these are only in relief of men allowed to go home, but I can hear of none sent home, and the preparations now being made at Semlin, Peterwardein, Sarajevo, Mostar, Cattaro, and other places for accommodation of fresh troops do not bear out this report, which I think is purposely spread in order to hide real purpose of military activity.

"Situation along Dalmatian coast now is such that an expeditionary force of at least 20,000 men can be embarked and transported to Albania at the shortest notice.

"In Bosnia troops can march at once. In Southern Hungary apparently 25 per cent. more only are required to complete personnel to war strength; and all provision of transport, ammunition, and supply is complete.

"Information from Servian sources here coincides with latest reports sent to me from the War Office, namely, that only Ibar army is in sanjak, and that Servian divisions are still before Adrianople and in Macedonia."

[53470] No. 336.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 196.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 15, 1912.*

SITUATION is not improving; trade is suffering seriously and there is a general demand on the part of public that something should be done to relieve present tension. Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs still professes to be hopeful that the crisis will be settled peacefully, but he hinted to me recently that the present state of things could not continue indefinitely. I am told that the army is practically ready for action and Austria now feels that she is strong enough to insist on obtaining her minimum demands from Servia even if Russia were to threaten intervention.

I still believe that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs desires to await conclusion of the peace negotiations before settling his account with Servia, but should these be dragged out indefinitely, or break down completely and war be renewed, I fear that public opinion will compel him to act without further delay.

It has occurred to me that should Ambassadors in London rapidly come to a unanimous decision with regard to future of Albania and her sea-board, public here may demand Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that he should invite Powers to notify this decision to Servia coupled with a request that as military situation does not require Servia to maintain any longer troops on the Adriatic they should withdraw them without further loss of time. Until the Adriatic question is settled in a practical manner Austria will not begin demobilisation, and the tension here and in Europe will continue undiminished.

[53456] No. 337.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 234. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 15, 1912.*

PROGRAMME described in telegram from Constantinople No. 715 of 11th December is without doubt combined work of Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Governments drawn up with German approval.

If Ottoman Government refuse to concede all Macedonia, together with Adrianople to the allies, war will be continued.

In the Throne speech read yesterday by Prime Minister at the opening of Sobranje following passage occurred: "Let us hope that negotiations will be terminated by conclusion of a treaty which will give legitimate satisfaction to allies."

[53478] No. 338.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(Telegraphic.) *Bitolje, December 15, 1912.*

SINCE Servian occupation of Monastir on 19th November, service of the Public Debt in this district has been suspended. My French colleague and I have repeatedly suggested to the local Servian military authorities that the service should be allowed to continue, and that proceeds should be temporarily sequestered by them. They recognise that this suggestion is reasonable, and have twice telegraphed to head-quarters recommending that course. Their messages have apparently been ignored, and loss of revenue is becoming considerable.

My French colleague has communicated similarly with his Government.

[53477] No. 339.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 15.)

(Telegraphic.) *Bitolje, December 15, 1912.*

I AM informed that Servian column, after occupying Elbasan, has effected a junction near mouth of River Skumbi with another Servian force from Durazzo.

[53579] No. 340.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 143.)
Sir, *Sophia, December 9, 1912.*

THERE is little to report since my despatch No. 136 of the 3rd instant, announcing the signature of the armistice between the allies and the Turks.

As I had the honour to inform you subsequently by telegraph, the Greek Government refused to associate themselves with their allies in the signature of the armistice protocol, although reserving the right to send representatives to the peace negotiations in London. This action on the part of the Greek Government was taken with great calmness by the Bulgarian Government, who are accustomed in their dealings with

their astute allies to expect on their part actions based on motives of self-interest not always entirely compatible with their promises.

The choice of London as a site for the conduct of the peace negotiations is entirely acceptable to the Bulgarians, and has formed the subject for an article in the official organ "Mir," in which it is pointed out that Great Britain is almost the only Great Power not possessing immediate interests in the Balkans, and that no better choice could therefore have been made. "The selection of London," the article continues, "which will provoke neither suspicion nor jealousy, was obviously the most suitable in view of the present international situation. In London the plenipotentiaries will be removed from any outside influence, and will be able to examine the situation calmly, and arrive at a complete *entente* for the conclusion of peace."

"The fact that the Greeks have not signed the armistice protocol changes the situation in no respect," the "Mir" continues, "the allies are fully aware that their strength lies in their union, and will under no condition allow themselves to be tempted into a course of action that might entail the weakening of their alliance."

The Bulgarians originally suggested Sophia as the meeting place for the negotiators, a suggestion which was not acceptable to the Greeks, who made the counter-proposition that London should be selected.

It is difficult, however, to see here any trace of disappointment at the non-selection of this capital for these important negotiations.

The result is that the focus of interest has been removed to London, and that Sophia will resume her appearance of deserted quiet which has for the last two months been to some extent disturbed by a swarm of reporters, whose inability to obtain news as to what was really transpiring was in many cases only equalled by the fertility of their invention.

The population of Sophia is naturally somewhat apathetic, and very little excitement has at any time been evinced on the occasion of past victories; it must, on the other hand, be remembered that the families of the soldiers at the front have had little or no opportunity of expressing their grief at the loss of any relatives in the war, for not only has no official news been transmitted home regarding the casualties, but wounded soldiers in Sophia have been strictly forbidden, under the direst penalties, even to mention the names of those whom they may have personally seen killed or wounded.

The acquiescence of the Bulgarians in this system is a further proof, if any were needed, of the spirit of the people, and of their confidence in their leaders, whom they consider as ably prosecuting the war of liberation against a hated enemy. "Now that the iniquities of the Congress of Berlin," to quote the words recently appearing in the "Mir," "have been repaired," they hope to live as good neighbours with the Turks "in a friendship dictated by their common interests."

The delegates to the London Conference have been selected, and consist of—

M. Danef, President of the Sobranje;
General Paprikoff, Bulgarian Minister at St. Petersburgh;
The Bulgarian Minister in London; and
Colonel Jostoff, as military expert.

Of these gentlemen, M. Danef, who had among other acts the distinction of drafting the armistice protocol in the form in which it was eventually accepted, left yesterday morning, the 8th December, for London, *viâ* Bucharest, where he will discuss, as far as time allows, the attitude of Roumania towards the allies.

It seems unlikely that he will have time to come to any final arrangement, but his visit possesses, none the less, considerable significance. He was accompanied by M. Bourchier, the "Times" correspondent in this capital, whose long experience of the Balkans and intimate connection with Bulgaria has earned for him in an exceptional measure the confidence of the Bulgarian Government. It is understood that he undertook the present journey at the special request of M. Take Jonesco, the Roumanian Minister of the Interior.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[53619] No. 341.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 388.)

Sir, *Rome, December 11, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a French translation from the "Italie" of an article published in last night's "Tribuna," stating that the Italian and Austrian Governments, as the result of a long and friendly discussion of the Albanian question, have come to the conclusion that the wishes of the inhabitants with regard to the establishment of an autonomous and independent Albania should be met, and that the new State should be neutralised on the model of other neutralised States in Europe, and its neutrality, if possible, guaranteed by all the Great Powers.

This article has all the appearance of being officially inspired, and is so regarded by the rest of the Italian press.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

Enclosure in No. 341.

Extract from the "Italie" of December 11, 1912.

LES désirs légitimes exprimés par les Albanais ont été accueillis avec bienveillance en général par les Puissances, qui, après avoir proclamé le principe de la nationalité dans les Balkans, ne pouvaient certes faire une exception négative pour l'Albanie.

De plus, les deux Puissances les plus directement intéressées, pour divers motifs, au sort de l'Albanie—c'est-à-dire l'Italie et l'Autriche—les ont prises en considération spéciale.

D'après nos informations, que nous avons des raisons de croire exactes, les Gouvernements italien et autrichien, après une longue discussion qui s'est passée de la manière la plus amicale à ce sujet, non seulement ont accueilli favorablement les vœux des Albanais, correspondant du reste à leurs propres intérêts, mais ont, en outre, étudié le moyen par lequel la création d'une Albanie autonome et indépendante puisse être valablement garantie même pour l'avenir.

Les deux Gouvernements sont arrivés à la décision que la meilleure garantie à ce sujet pouvait être dans la neutralisation de l'Albanie, appliquée selon des exemples existants déjà dans d'autres États neutralisés en Europe prévoyant, en outre, que la neutralité de l'Albanie soit mise, si possible, sous la garantie de toutes les Grandes Puissances.

Cette solution, qui correspond plus particulièrement aux désirs de l'Italie et de l'Autriche, n'aurait, d'après nos renseignements, rencontré jusqu'alors aucune opposition de la part des autres Puissances.

[53505] No. 342.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 365.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, December 11, 1912.*

THE improvement in the political situation, on which I reported in my despatch No. 347 of the 27th of last month, has been steadily maintained during the past fortnight, so far at least as that situation is under the control of the Russian Government. The proposal of His Majesty's Government for a meeting of Ambassadors has been welcomed and encouraged by M. Suzonof as calculated to accelerate a settlement and to eliminate all danger of war; while, in order to smooth the way for its deliberations, he has brought all his influence to bear at Belgrade, in order to induce the Servian Government to moderate their attitude. His efforts in this direction have been crowned with success, as Servia, it would appear, is now willing to leave the question of her economic access to the Adriatic in the hands of the Powers.

While adhering to the alternative scheme which he had put forward for the neutralisation of the Albanian ports, M. Sazonof was unwilling to take the initiative in laying it before the meeting of Ambassadors. He was afraid that such action on his part might be represented as a direct negation of Servia's well-known aspirations,

and he would therefore, he said, prefer to wait till Austria had had her say on the subject of a Servian port. It would then be time enough for us to decide on the question of an alternative proposal. Subsequently, however, he suggested that the port question should be relegated to a back place, and that the Ambassadors should commence their proceedings by discussing the future status of Albania.

Albania, his Excellency contended, should be made an autonomous province of Turkey under, preferably, a Turkish or Egyptian Prince or Governor-General; it should comprise the territory included within a line, which starting from Khimarra on the coast should skirt the shores of Lake Ochrida and follow the course of the Black and White Drins to the River Boyana and the Adriatic, while it should be deflected so as include Dibra and a small tract of country to the east of the Black Drin; all the ports on its coast should be neutralised and the commerce of all nations placed on an equal footing; the administration of these ports should be left in the hands of Turkish or Albanian officials, but the Powers should sign an international Act guaranteeing the execution and maintenance of the above conditions, so as to prevent any one Power acquiring for itself any privileged position within its territory. Were the Albanian question to be settled on the above lines all danger of an acrimonious discussion of a Servian port would be eliminated, and the Ambassadors would then only have to consider how to provide for Servia's access to Durazzo—as the most conveniently situated of these neutralised ports—by means of an international railway, and how to guarantee her full liberty to export and import free of duty whatever she liked, including munitions of war. The latter, his Excellency explained, would of course be liable to seizure at sea in time of war, but could not be touched when once they had arrived in port. It was very important, he considered, that England, France, and Russia should come to a preliminary understanding on all the above questions before the Ambassadors actually met, as well as on those dealing with the future status of the Ægean Islands and of Mount Athos.

M. Sazonof's attitude with regard to the question of whether the meeting of Ambassadors was to be held in London or at Paris has been one of complete disinterestedness. At first he expressed himself in favour of Paris, owing to his being under the impression that it was M. Poincaré's great ambition to preside over an international conference, and because he did not wish to disappoint him. Accordingly, when the Austrian Ambassador first hinted that his Government might prefer London, M. Sazonof at once said that if Count Berchtold imagined that M. Isvolsky as the representative of Russia would be allowed to influence the course of the negotiations his Excellency was very much mistaken. It was he, M. Sazonof, and not M. Isvolsky who directed Russia's foreign policy, and the latter would have to carry out the instructions which would be sent to him from St. Petersburgh. His Excellency, however, at the same time told me that the matter was one of absolute indifference to him, provided always that we could explain matters satisfactorily to M. Poincaré, should London after all be decided on. When, a few days later, Count Thurn informed him of the reply which his Government had returned to your proposal, his Excellency told me that he considered that the question was now definitely settled in favour of London, and that he personally preferred that capital to Paris. He consequently was much surprised when, on the receipt of your telegram No. 1341 of the 8th instant, I mentioned that the impression prevailed at Paris that the Russian Government were insisting on the Ambassadors meeting there instead of in London. His Excellency remarked that the story must have been invented by the French Government to serve their own ends, and at once acquiesced in your proposal that the Ambassadors in London should be invited to meet with the least possible delay.

What has struck me most in M. Sazonof's attitude during the past fortnight is the serene calm with which he has accepted things which would, a few weeks ago, have aroused his indignation. The successive journeys of the chief of the Austrian general staff to Berlin and Bucharest; the feverish activity with which Austria has been pushing forward her military preparations; the hints conveyed in certain journals at Vienna and Berlin that Russia was abandoning Servia under Austro-German pressure; the German Chancellor's speech and the renewal of the Triple Alliance have all left him completely unmoved. He even sometimes went so far as to explain away their import. Austria's nervous apprehension of war accounted for what she was doing; neither she nor Germany had during the present crisis exercised any pressure on Russia, so the newspaper gossip was untrue; the Chancellor's speech was peaceful enough and the renewal of the Triple Alliance quite natural. Once and once only in the course of our conversation did he allow any expression of annoyance to escape him, when, in speaking of the Chancellor's speech, he described it as truly German. Even

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then, however, he spoke more in sorrow than in anger. He sympathised with M. Bethmann Hollweg, who had had to say what must have been repugnant to his real feelings, for if the voice was his the words were the words of M. Kiderlin Waechter. He intended, he added, to take the first opportunity of repeating this to the German Ambassador. Count Pourtales, however, has not so far given him the occasion of expressing this sympathy with M. Bethmann Hollweg, as ever since the speech was delivered his Excellency has not once visited the Foreign Office.

This almost unnatural calm on M. Sazonof's part, contrasting as it does so sharply with his attitude of a few weeks ago, is very difficult to explain. I can only suppose that his Excellency is acting under the Emperor's express orders, and that His Majesty has reasons for desiring to avoid anything in the shape of international complications at the present moment. Satisfactory as it is to know that the Russian Government are animated by such pacific sentiments, it is open to question whether the object which they have in view will necessarily be attained by what M. Sazonof described as reading Germany a moral lesson by the moderation of their language. Austria's attitude has of late savoured almost of provocation, and though soft answers are said to turn away wrath, they may, if persisted in, create the impression that Russia is so wedded to peace that she will put up with anything that Austria, supported by Germany, may choose to do. Should such be her present belief, Austria is cherishing an illusion which will one day be rudely shattered.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[53485] No. 343.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir E. Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 1059.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 12, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Consul-General at Salonica reporting on the attitude of the Greek authorities towards the Ottoman Public Debt.

At the time of writing this despatch Mr. Lamb had not received the instructions which I conveyed to him in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 1089 of the 4th instant.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 343.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 168.)
Sir, *Salonica, December 4, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the nazir and inspector of the Ottoman Public Debt applied to me yesterday for advice in regard to the service of their administration, which they informed me had been practically suspended since the occupation of this district by the allied troops.

Shortly after the entry of the Greeks into the town a military guard was posted at the office of the Debt and also over the salines of Kitros and Touzla and the Greek authorities promised their support, in accordance with the stipulation contained in paragraph 6 of the "Protocole-Annexe" of the 9th November, which says: "Le service de la douane pourra jusqu'à nouvel décision continuer à fonctionner sous le contrôle de l'autorité hellénique. De même pour la Dette publique et la Régie des Tabacs." The service of the Debt in the interior, however, was necessarily interrupted by the withdrawal of all officials and the state of complete anarchy which ensued. Even in Salonica itself the sale of stamps and the perception of the spirit duties practically ceased owing to the inability of the employés of the Debt to enforce their control. The sales of salt also have been greatly reduced and a contraband trade is believed to have sprung up.

In accordance with telegraphic instructions from their respective Governments, my French and German colleagues have addressed a written communication to the military authorities established in Salonica, copy of which they have also communicated to M. Ractivan, as commissary of the Hellenic Government, drawing their attention to the

international status of the administration of the Public Debt. M. Ractivan has assured my colleagues, as he has also myself, in reply to verbal enquiries, that the Greek Government is determined to respect the rights of the Debt subject to its own right of control and of proportional participation in the surplus revenues, in succession to the authority which it has replaced. With this proviso M. Ractivan declares himself disposed to give the administration every assistance in his power for the regular performance of its service.

With a view to this he has proposed to authorise the continued enforcement of the Stamp Law, subject to the application of a Greek surcharge on the stamps employed, and to afford the administration the same support as it was accustomed to receive from the Ottoman authorities, putting a sequester on that proportion of the surplus revenues that should normally revert to the Government.

I observed to the minister that I was under the impression that the major portion of the surplus revenues of the Debt were already specially affected under international guarantee and that in any case it might be impracticable to separate the "quote-part" of any particular province or district, but in the absence of any instructions in regard to it I could only transmit his declarations to your Excellency.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[53487] No. 344.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 1061.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 12, 1912.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 507 of the 5th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica replying to the questionary of the Committee of Imperial Defence with regard to the effects of the war on the life of the country.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 344.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 170.)
Sir, *Salonica, December 6, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith, in the form of a separate memorandum, replies to the questionary transmitted to me on behalf of the Imperial Defence Committee in your Excellency's circular of the 13th ultimo, and to be, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 344.

Memorandum on the Effects of the War on the Trade, &c., of Salonica in reply to Enquiries of the Imperial Defence Committee.

1. THE commerce of Salonica, already seriously restricted in consequence of the prolongation of the Italo-Turkish war, was brought to an almost complete standstill on the outbreak of the present hostilities. In view of the extreme uncertainty of the outlook, and of the practical suspension of all credit by the banks, no one ventured to send forward orders for fresh goods, and even of those that arrived to previous order merchants were shy of taking up the bills of lading except in the case of such as were in immediate demand.

A complete stop was of course put to all Servian transit trade, and very considerable quantities of goods already landed, or even on the line, remained in suspense, and had eventually to be either returned to their port of origin or reshipped by way of Fiume. Some remained on the railway until after the entry of the Greek troops into Salonica, when transit warehouses and even loaded trucks were broken open and pillaged by the soldiery. About 800 tons of British goods in transit were in the

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custom-house at the commencement of the war, and their reshipment has only recently been completed.

Many trades were seriously hampered, and some offices at least partially compelled to close, as a result of the withdrawal of a large proportion of their workers in response to the call to arms. This was perhaps less manifest in Turkey than in the other Balkan States, since non-Mussulmans over 28 years of age were not affected by the mobilisation orders, and a very considerable proportion of the rest paid the price of exemption.

2. All goods traffic on the railways was suspended from the commencement of the mobilisation, and the passenger and postal services were also disorganised and came to a stop almost immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. The submarine cable had been cut by the Italians in October 1911, and the land lines were cut one after the other as the enemy advanced—that to Constantinople holding out till the 2nd November, though, owing to the enormous pressure thrown upon it, the transmission of private messages became precarious at a much earlier date. The public has consequently been practically deprived of telegraphic communication for over a month.

3. No *moratorium* was officially declared here, but in the absence of all payments from the interior a state of affairs tantamount to a *moratorium* speedily established itself. On the entry of the Greek forces all the existing courts of law were set aside, and nothing has so far been substituted for them, so that the recovery of debts, even in the execution of judgments previously obtained, is now impracticable.

4. The Mussulman element of the population responded promptly, though with no appearance of enthusiasm, to the summons. The general dissatisfaction with the existing Government, and the violence of the party feeling engendered, especially by the iniquitous manner in which the elections had been conducted in the spring of this year, seem to have weighed heavily on the public mind.

The non-Mussulman elements naturally showed the greatest reluctance to come out, and every man who could possibly raise the sum demanded paid the exemption fees. The sympathies of the Christian elements being entirely with the enemy that they were supposed to fight against, their presence in the ranks could only be a source of weakness and demoralisation. Desertions were naturally numerous.

5. I am not aware of any special arrangements existing to secure the return of reservists from abroad. In all probability no such return either occurred or was calculated on. The Mussulman, or at least the Turkish, element of the population of this country does not emigrate to any considerable extent, and certainly no non-Mussulman who was abroad would have returned for the purpose of serving in the war.

6. Requisitioning was resorted to on a very large scale, especially as regards beasts of draft or burden and carts or waggons. The Ottoman communities, doubtless recognising the hopelessness of resistance, accepted the seizure of their property with resignation. The Turkish authorities systematically under-estimated the values in issuing their "bons" or receipts for eventual repayment, even when that formality was not entirely dispensed with; but, in the absence of all serious probability of recovery, this point was regarded as of little importance.

On the entrance of the allied troops, fresh commandeering was resorted to and was extended even to the property of foreign subjects; but in most of these cases the efforts of the consulates were successful in obtaining either restoration or compensation.

Naturally this wholesale commandeering has exercised an adverse influence on agriculture in all the countries affected, as also the withdrawal of nearly all the able-bodied population has caused a serious shortage of agricultural and other labour. In many districts, moreover, even seed-corn is not available for winter sowings, and next year's harvests are seriously compromised.

7. Under the Turkish military organisation the "cadres" of reserve battalions remain "en permanence," and officers of the reserve consequently do not return to civilian occupations, whilst the bulk of better-class reservists in the rank and file habitually buy their exemption.

The friction contemplated by this question consequently does not arise in Turkey

8. It could not be said that the denudation of the country of military forces was the cause of increase in crime. On the other hand, both the Turkish troops in their retreat, the allies in their pursuit, and more especially the irregulars operating in the wake of the latter have committed every sort of crime from petty pilfering to wholesale massacre.

9. Martial law has been enforced by the Turks since August, but it was re-declared by the Greeks on their entry into Salonica at the beginning of November.

Main provisions:—

Shops to be shut by sunset.
No one allowed out after 11 P.M.
Populace must not carry arms, and must give up those already in its possession.
Meetings of a political nature not allowed.

The disarmament ordinance gave rise to serious misgiving amongst the Mussulman population, which regarded it as a prelude to general pillage and massacre, but in consequence of various representations that were made it has not yet been strictly enforced.

10. Turkey is entirely dependent on foreign countries for all supplies of arms, ammunition, and explosives, and for a large proportion of its clothing, although of late years an increasing number of boots and uniforms have been made in the country, partly from native and partly from imported materials. The food of the army, consisting mainly of bread, meat, and butter for cooking, is largely drawn from the country; nevertheless, owing partly to defective organisation and partly to the deplorable condition of the roads, the commissariat arrangements of the forces in the field entirely broke down.

11 and 12. For the reasons indicated in Nos. 1 and 7, the professional classes are less directly affected by a state of war in Turkey than in most other countries, and there is little or no substitution of female for male workers, though naturally the share of agricultural labour falling habitually to the former is considerably increased.

13. Drunkenness is non-existent in the Turkish army, and there was little or no indiscipline noticeable amongst troops on their way to the front. Great slackness of discipline, however, due largely to the insufficiency of officers, very shortly manifested itself in wholesale desertions from the ranks.

14. The native press was strictly forbidden to publish any news whatever concerning military movements or the progress of military operations, beyond the officially communicated and generally purely imaginary records of victory. There were no foreign newspaper correspondents with the Turkish armies in this region excepting during the few days immediately preceding the surrender of Salonica, at which period there were no means of telegraphing news. The Turkish troops had practically no means of communicating with their families during the course of hostilities. I may perhaps mention that it came within my knowledge that Bulgarian soldiers, if permitted to write home at all, were not allowed to give any indication of the place from which their letters were written or dispatched.

16. The Turkish means of communication between the armies in the field and their head-quarters were extremely defective. The Macedonian army corps were supplied with wireless telegraphy installations, and one such was erected, taken down, and re-erected at Salonica in the early days of the war, but I believe that it was never brought into operation. For one reason, the motor broke down almost immediately it was installed, and there was no one capable of repairing it, and, for another, I believe there was no other station installed in time to get into correspondence with it. Two aeroplanes were likewise engaged by the Turks, but were not able to render any effective service. The Greek head-quarter staff, on the other hand, from the frontier right up to the gates of Salonica, was almost constantly in direct telegraphic communication with Athens.

17. News of any description is habitually received in this country with apparent apathy. The more educated Turks, however, welcomed all favourable rumours with childish credulity, followed by fits of extreme dejection on the inevitable disillusioning. Christians, of course, were particularly careful to disguise their real feelings under a mask of complete indifference.

19. As mentioned above (No. 13), men deserted by the hundred, and there is only too good reason for believing that even officers quitted their regiments in considerable numbers, especially when in the vicinity of a larger town.

20. This question does not arise with a Turkish army in the field.

21. Subscriptions were opened here for the relief of the families of men who had been called out with the reserves, and also for the sick and wounded. Ladies' committees were also formed for the purpose of preparing linen, &c., for the wounded at the base hospitals. There could be no question of dispatching comforts to troops at the front.

22. The exportation of grain and cattle was prohibited. A large number of the subjects of the four belligerent States left the country at the commencement of hostilities, either

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spontaneously or at the direction of their own consular authorities, but there was no order of expulsion made against them, as had been the case with Italian subjects earlier in the year.

23. I am not aware that there was ever any question of such a guarantee even being considered in Turkey.

24. The rights of foreigners were in general respected by the Turks. Even "enemy" subjects were, as stated above, not subjected to any particularly hostile treatment, except that those who elected to leave the country at the commencement of the war are said to have been frequently mulcted of considerable sums by the police at the moment of their embarkment, under the pretext of collecting arrears of municipal or other taxes. On the entry of the allied troops there were frequent instances of trespass on the rights of neutrals by the military forces, who were apt to be intolerant of consular intervention, but the civil officials were generally found to be fairly conciliatory.

[53488] No. 345.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 1062.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 12, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 688 of the 27th of last month, I have the honour to report that material reductions in the number of the various naval detachments landed from the foreign men-of-war have been gradually carried out during the last few days.

With the exception of a small French detachment stationed at their hospital in the distant Chichli quarter, for whom it would be more difficult to regain their post in the possible event of the disembarkation again becoming necessary, the number of the sailors now on shore has been reduced to the minimum necessary for the maintenance of signal communication with the ships in the harbour and for ordinary sentry work in the buildings and gardens of the respective embassies and consulates. Where this minimum has been exceeded, the retention of a somewhat larger number has been due, as in the case of the British detachment, to the necessity of retaining men to look after the arms which it has been thought advisable to leave ashore. The advisability of this is explained by the fact that, should necessity arise, it will be more convenient to disembark unarmed men than again to apply to the Porte for permission to land an armed detachment.

The British detachment now on shore thus amounts to a total number of forty bluejackets and marines, thirty of these, including wireless operators and signallers, being retained in the embassy, and the remaining ten being stationed at the consulate.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

GEORGE KIDSTON.

[53489] No. 346.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 1063.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 12, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1016 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica reporting on the administration by General Andreef of the districts occupied by the Bulgarian troops.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 346.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 169.)

Sir, *Salonica, December 6, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 160 of the 24th November, I have the honour to report that General Andreef, of the Bulgarian army, has arrived here to take up his residence as "administrator of the districts occupied" by the Bulgarian troops.

The Greeks are understood to be much incensed at this official's having been established in Salonica, seeing that neither the town nor any of the immediately surrounding districts are regarded by them as being in Bulgarian occupation. There seems, however, little doubt that the choice of Salonica as General Andreef's place of residence was deliberate and intended to emphasise the fact that, from their own point of view, the Bulgars are in joint occupation of this town. There is also direct conflict between the two authorities in regard to the occupation and administration of the district to the north-east of Salonica. The higher Greek authorities are also said to have expressed considerable annoyance at not having been duly kept informed, as they declare, of the progress of the armistice negotiations at Tchataldja and to assert that these somewhat severe "pin-pricks" are part of a series of deliberate attempts on the part of the Bulgarians to provoke a quarrel.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

P.S.—Copies of this despatch are being forwarded privately to His Britannic Majesty's Legations at Athens and Sophia.

H. H. L.

[53507] No. 347.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 367.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, December 12, 1912.*

I HAD the honour in my despatch No. 361 of the 5th instant to inform you that the Russian press had on the whole received with calm the recent speech made in the Reichstag by the German Chancellor. This calm has since then, with few exceptions, been maintained by the press in the comments made by it on the European political situation and on the current events of international interest.

M. Poincaré's speech has not been greeted with much enthusiasm here. It is considered to have been somewhat colourless, and the Opposition organ, the "Bourse Gazette," goes so far as to deduce therefrom that Russia can only hope to obtain from France diplomatic support, and that she must rely on her own strength in whatever she might wish to do. In this connection I may here observe that the feeling appears to be growing in military circles in St. Petersburgh that Russia will not meet with support from England if she be compelled to draw the sword on behalf of Servia.

The announcement of the renewal of the Triple Alliance has failed to cause any excitement in the press, although it is commented on at length by various organs. The "Novoe Vremya" observes that the haste shown in the making of this announcement can only be explained by the desire to remind Europe once more of the solidity of the Triple Alliance. It points out that that Alliance was originally intended exclusively for the protection of Germany, but that German statesmen of the present day have allowed its control to pass into the hands of Austria. It reiterates its conviction that Germany will only fight if the life of Austria be actually threatened, and considers that therefore there is no cause for alarm at the renewal of the Triple Alliance.

The "Novoe Vremya" of yesterday's date publishes a leading article on Austrian diplomacy, which, it declares, was convinced that Turkey would prove victorious, and which had built all its plans on that conviction. That was why Austria had induced the Roumanian Government not to take any part in the war, but quietly to wait till the moment arrived when Roumania could safely and profitably take action. The war had not justified Count Berchtold's anticipations, and Austrian diplomacy had consequently lost its head, passed from one demand to another, and continued to breathe threats.

If the press had maintained an attitude of comparative reserve the same cannot be

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said of other circles in Russia. On the 6th instant a meeting of the Progressive deputies of the Duma discussed the question of Russian and Slav interests in the forthcoming peace negotiations in London. It was unanimously resolved that, in the event of a conference being arranged, Russia must only take part therein after having previously obtained the assent of the participants to the following :—

1. Questions as to restrictions of the conquests made by the victors not to be discussed.

2. No rights to compensation of non-belligerent Powers to be recognised, and no discussion of claims to compensation to take place at the conference.

3. To admit to the conference representatives of the Balkan States which have fought against Turkey, and to grant such representatives equal rights.

On the 7th instant the Slavonic Society gave a banquet to the Bulgarian Minister here, at which M. Stolypin presided, and which was attended by about one hundred persons. M. Bobchef mentioned the great sacrifices and services which Russia had rendered to the Balkan States in the past. Speeches were delivered in a highly patriotic strain and full of Slav sentiment, and stress was laid on Russia and the Balkan States being of one blood and having a common destiny. A telegram of greeting was subsequently dispatched to the King and Queen of Bulgaria.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[53634] No. 348.

Sir V. Corbett to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 56. Confidential.)

Sir, *Munich, December 13, 1912.*

SOME surprise has been aroused here by the pessimistic articles which have lately appeared in the French press on the subject of Austro-Servian relations. The Prime Minister assured me last week that he saw no cause for renewed anxiety; on the contrary, all his information went to show that the Austrian Government would not raise inconvenient individual points independent of a general settlement of the Balkan problem. Since then, and especially since the appointment of Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf, he has seemed less confident, and a day or two ago he exclaimed with some impatience "Que veulent-ils enfin, ces Autrichiens?"; his tone implied that Germany was getting tired of being kept perpetually on the qui vive about questions in which she was not directly concerned.

I should perhaps add that there are a great many persons now in Munich who are either subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or possess estates there. Among them I am bound to say that there is very considerable nervousness and constant complaints of the damage done to their affairs and interests by the mobilisation now going on in Austria.

I have, &c.
VINCENT CORBETT.

[53714] No. 349.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received December 16.)

Sir, *Admiralty, December 13, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of letter dated the 26th ultimo, with its enclosures, which has been received from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, respecting the proceedings of His Majesty's ships in Turkish waters.

It is requested that the enclosures to the letter from His Majesty's ship "Medea," which are forwarded in original, may be returned when no longer required.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 349.

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

Sir, *H.M.S. "Inflexible," Bashika Bay, November 26, 1912.*

IN continuation of my letter dated the 17th November, 1912, I have the honour to submit for their Lordships' information reports on the proceedings of His Majesty's ships under my command.

2. *Salonica.*—A full report from "Medea" of the present state of affairs is enclosed (Enclosure No. 2). As reported in my telegram of the 25th instant, the Greeks have been causing the arrest of Turkish officers and deporting them to Greece. I am informed that the number of officers so deported amounts to 550 and that deep resentment is felt amongst the Mussulman population as to this violation of the terms of surrender. The reason of this action is ascribed in one report to a contemplated rising, and in another to Turkish officers having taken steamers to Constantinople, to resume active service. Large numbers of Greek and Bulgarian troops are reported as leaving by steamer and train to join the Bulgarian forces before Chatalja, and this should improve the state of affairs at Salonica.

3. The Austrian ship "Zrinyi" left Salonica on the morning of the 24th November, but the "Maria Theresia" remains as also do the Italian ship "Ammiraglio di Saint Bon," the French "Bruix," and the Russian "Uraletz."

4. *Constantinople.*—A report from the "Hampshire" as to the state of affairs at Constantinople is enclosed (Enclosure No. 3). I have detached from it the detailed orders as to landing parties for my information in the event of being ordered to Constantinople myself. Landing parties from all ships were disembarked on the 18th November for the protection of the lives and property of neutrals and remain on shore. At present the town is quiet. No news as to the fighting at Chatalja reaches me from Constantinople. Special precautions are being taken to guard against cholera.

The Austrian ship "Admiral Spaun" left the Dardanelles at 8 A.M. on the 25th November and steered southward at high speed. The "Aspern" was reported yesterday as expecting to leave.

5. *Smyrna.*—There have been no disturbances and none are considered probable. The "Yarmouth" is the only one of His Majesty's ships remaining at Smyrna.

6. The Austrian ships "Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand," "Radetzky," "Uskoke," and "Wildfang" have left Smyrna and were sighted in the Doro Channel at 10 P.M. on the 24th November steering southward.

7. *Bashika Bay.*—His Majesty's ship "Inflexible" arrived on the 25th November, and the transfer of officers and men from "Good Hope" was at once commenced, but was interfered with by bad weather. It was completed this afternoon, and "Good Hope" left at once for Portsmouth, calling at Malta and Gibraltar.

8. Mail communication is being kept up by destroyers from the Pireus, and fresh provisions are being sent from the contractor at Smyrna in a steamer chartered by him for the purpose.

On the night of the 21st–22nd November the German collier "Nova Hugo" went ashore at the south end of Tenedos Island. I sent a destroyer to report whether there was any danger to life, and, as there was not, I left the matter in the hands of the salvage company whose steamer was quickly on the spot. As the steamer was taking coal to the "Goeben" at Constantinople I informed the German admiral by wireless, through "Hampshire." I believe the collier is still on shore, and stormy weather has been almost continuous since she grounded.

10. *Dedeagatch.*—The French ship "Jurien de la Gravière" proceeded to Dédeagatch on the 25th November, and her captain informs me by wireless that the town is being terrorised by comitajis (bands of irregulars), who have made prisoners of all the Mussulmans after having massacred about 300 of them. I have no confirmation of this.

11. *Turkish Islands.*—The Greeks took possession of Mitylene on the 22nd November, and the British vice-consul at Chios reported that seven Greek men-of-war were off Chios on the 24th November; I am informed that the Turkish garrison on being called upon to surrender refused, but I have received no further information, and the consul-general at Smyrna has no new as to the state of affairs in Chios.

12. *Coast of Syria.*—Reports from the "Barham" show that a state of ferment exists, and that it would take little to cause serious disturbances. In accordance with

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their Lordships' orders the "Black Prince" left Smyrna at 1.0 P.M. on the 26th November at ordinary speed for Beirout, where the captain has orders to consult with British consul-general, and take such steps as may be necessary to protect British lives and property. "Barham" and "Prometheus" have been visiting the principal ports on the coast.

13. A statement showing the disposition of British and foreign ships in Turkish waters and the neighbourhood is enclosed. (Enclosure No. 1).

I have, &c.

A. BERKELEY MILNE, *Admiral.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 349.

Commander Keane to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

Sir, *H.M.S. "Medea," Salonica, November 24, 1912.*

IN continuation of my No. 64 I have the honour to inform you that as far as the situation affects the lives and property of British subjects I have little to add to reports already forwarded to you by wireless telegraphy.

Explosion of Powder Magazine.

The following is a detailed account of the explosion which took place on the 13th as given to me by the consul-general.

"On the 13th at 8 P.M. one of the powder magazines situated at Zietunglik, in the vicinity of the camping ground of the Turkish soldiers, blew up. The explosion, which could be distinctly heard all over the town, and which broke windows 2 miles distant, was caused by an electric battery, of which the pile was subsequently discovered near the scene of disaster. The casualties were 26 killed and 250 wounded, some of the latter having died since. The explosion caused regrettable disorders in the Vardar quarter, where the riff-raff of the town forgather, and which has of late added to its unsavoury reputation through the influx of thousands of starving refugees from Macedonia.

"The formidable detonation caused by the explosion served to awake the dormant resentment of the Turkish mob, exasperated to the utmost degree by the unwarranted and overbearing attitude and ruthless cruelty of the Greek and Bulgarian forces, and shots were fired at the Greek soldiery. These were not slow in answering, and volleys were poured into the crowded cafés, causing an indescribable panic. Those who were only wounded were finished off with the bayonet, and the soldiery got completely out of hand. It is not yet known what the actual losses were, but a Britisher himself saw two Greek and 17 Turkish corpses without penetrating far into the affected area. There is, therefore, every probability that the casualties were considerably more numerous than the above figures. The noise of the explosion also caused a stampede of horses, which charged down a narrow street near the Regie des Tabacs, and so frightened the Greek soldiers, that thinking they were Turkish cavalry they poured volley after volley into them."

General Conditions in Salonica.

The following report on the general conditions existing in Salonica is submitted in case it may be of interest:—

Population.

The original population of the town was roughly	150,000
This has been added to by a civil and military element as follows:—	
Refugees from the interior	50,000
Turkish troops who surrendered to Greece	25,000
The Greek army	45,000
The Bulgarian army	40,000
Making a grand total of	310,000

(More than double the number usually to be housed and fed.)

The refugees were Turkish inhabitants of the villages in the interior. When they first came in they were housed in various mosques, churches, and empty buildings,

many of them, including women and children, having to sleep out in the open though there was a heavy frost at night. The Mayor of Salonica, Osman Said Bey, was in charge of the refugees, and he managed to supply most of them with bread at first, but his supplies failed when the Greek and Bulgarian troops came in. Housing was eventually found for most of them, but no special steps were taken in the way of sanitary precautions, though the people themselves have no idea of even the simplest rules of cleanliness.

A few of the refugees have been sent away; the Ellerman liner "Orchis," of Liverpool, took 1,500 on the 21st November, probably to Asia Minor. Many of the refugees now in the town are starving, and with all of them food is very scarce.

The water supply of town is very good so long as it remains untampered with. It is in the hands of a Belgian company.

The French Sisters of Charity, helped by a committee of ladies, of whom the Queen of Greece is president, are distributing food to the refugees as fast as they can collect it. The war-ships in harbour are sending all their scraps and broken victuals ashore for the same purpose.

The Turkish prisoners are kept in various buildings under Greek guards, and some in camp to the west of the town, the officers being allowed out on parole. The provisions, &c., for the men are brought in by fatigue parties of the Turks under armed Greek escort. Some of the prisoners have been sent away by sea to Greece and the Greek islands, and the remainder are to follow as soon as possible.

The Greek army, about 45,000 strong, have been quartered about the town—in barracks, public buildings, and empty private houses. Three divisions of the Greeks have left again for the fighting near Monastir, amongst them being all their highland troops.

The Bulgarian army, 40,000, have been divided up, a large number remaining in camp outside the town. Those in town have occupied some large schools and the old Turkish barracks. Large numbers have camped out in the grounds around these buildings, the big square in front of the barracks being full of Bulgars and their small mountain ponies. 30,000 Bulgars are now being embarked in Greek transports for Dedeagatch, on their way to help the main Bulgarian army at Chatalja or Adrianople. This exodus of troops will relieve the congestion considerably, but still the overcrowding will be great.

Sanitary Condition.

The sanitary condition of the town, before the war, was quite good for an Eastern town, there being a good water supply and a sewage system draining into the bay. Since the introduction of the extra 160,000, the conditions have rapidly become worse. Neither soldiers nor refugees seem to have any idea of sanitation. In the Turkish prisoners' camp there were not even any field latrines, and in the town many back streets have been largely used as latrines. The Bulgarian soldiers are reported to have been drinking the water from shallow wells outside the town, which are notoriously unsafe.

Sickness and Disease.

Fortunately no cases of cholera have occurred as yet. There have been several cases of small-pox which have been housed in some small isolation sheds outside the Greek Hospital. There is no vaccine lymph to be had here, but some has been wired for from Athens. As showing the way in which the Greek authorities conduct such affairs, I was told the following facts by the officers of the British Red Cross Mission who now occupy half the Greek Hospital:

When they (the British Red Cross) arrived, and the place was turned over to them, they were told that there four cases of small-pox in the isolation hospital: three men and a woman. When the medical officer went down to see them there was some difficulty in finding the key and getting in. On entering, the three men were found dead in their ward, having died of starvation; the woman in the female ward was alive, but before they could supply food to her she had slipped out and disappeared into the town. All four cases had been locked up and left for about five days.

Of the military cases in the various hospitals the majority are medical. There is very little surgical work, the wounded being comparatively few and their wounds slight. Most of the cases are due to starvation and exposure, and consist of pneumonia, enteric, dysentery, and acute rheumatism.

The Greeks have far more men sick than the Bulgarians. The Greeks mountaineers are not here, and I think the patients are mostly town-bred men, who

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have failed to stand the hardships of soldiering. Many of them can never have been fit for enlistment, and if there was any medical examination it must have been very casual.

The Bulgarians seem to me to be men of finer physique, and for the most part countrymen.

During the Greek advance from Ellassona onwards the men were usually forty-eight hours in advance of their transport, and suffered much from the continued shortage of food. The hospitals (temporary and permanent) are all full to overflowing, hundreds of the cases being nothing more than sheer collapse from fatigue and hunger.

Hospital Accommodation, &c.

Hospital.	Ordinary Accommodation.	Patients now under Treatment.
	Beds.	Beds.
Turkish Military	1,500	2,000
Turkish Municipal	500	1,000
Italian	250	400
Greek	200	400
French	37	37
Hirsch Jewish	40	200
Greek Orphanage	(?)	1,000
Total (at a rough estimate) ..	..	5,037

The Turkish Military Hospital ("Croissant-Rouge") is a fine building, was occupied at first by Bulgarians, who turned the patients out; it is now again in use as a hospital. A good many of the Greek wounded are here.

The capacity of the Turkish Municipal Hospital is, as stated above, but no further details have as yet been obtained.

The Italian Hospital, now in the hands of the Greeks, with Greek doctors. There are no wounded men here, all the 400 patients being medical cases. There are three English nursing sisters here, two from the London Hospital, and eight from Charing Cross. The building is a good one, and well fitted up.

The Greek Hospital: Half this building is run by the Greek Red Cross Service, and half by the British Red Cross, under Colonel Delmé-Radcliffe and Major Houghton. It is very much over-crowded, and nearly all their cases are medical. In the grounds of this hospital is the small isolation hospital, where the small-pox cases are being treated.

The French Hospital is kept by the Sisters of Charity and the patients treated by an Italian doctor. A marine from His Majesty's ship "Africa" was sent in here with a broken thigh; he is doing well, and is quite comfortable.

The Hirsch Hospital (Jewish) is occupied by the German Red Cross Service, and the attending is done by German and English nurses. There are four London Hospital sisters there. There are no wounded in this hospital; all the cases are either pneumonia, enteric, or dysentery. The Hirsch Hospital is well designed, and quite up to date in all its appliances, it is said to be the best equipped hospital in Salonica.

The Greek Orphanage, which is a magnificent building and will easily hold 1,000 beds, is in use chiefly for convalescents; it stands in beautiful grounds of its own, and is an excellent place for the purpose.

Pilotage Service.

The following is the history of the pilotage question, since the public apology which took place on board the "Bruix" on the 14th November:—

On the 14th, at 4 P.M., Captain Delage and I, representing the captains of the neutral war-ships present, the British consul-general, representing the consular body, visited the newly-appointed Greek Minister of Justice, M. Ractivan, at the Government offices. The consul-general put the whole question of the pilotage before M. Ractivan, and said that as these boats had been taken over from the Turks in order to prevent the latter sinking them and thus leaving no safe means of access and egress to Salonica harbour, it was therefore considered by the Salonica representatives of the Powers, and the captains of the neutral ships present, that these pilot-boats should be dealt with as the Turks intended dealing with them, i.e., sunk.

M. Ractivan did not agree with this view, and a stormy conversation took place between him and the consul-general. However, we parted as friends and left M. Ractivan under the impression that these pilot-vessels would be disposed of as stated.

On the 15th a meeting of consuls and captains took place on board the "Oleg," as a result of which a communication was addressed to the commander-in-chief of the Greek forces (Enclosure No. 3) to which a reply was received (Enclosure No. 4).

On the 19th a meeting of captains took place on board the "Bruix" to further consider the question of the eventual disposal of the pilot-boats, and a communication was sent by Captain Delage, in the name of the captains present, to the Ambassadors at Constantinople through the French admiral there (Enclosure No. 5). At the same time, a letter was sent to the commander-in-chief of the Greek forces (Enclosure No. 6).

The state of affairs now in regard to pilotage of ships through the minefield is as follows:—

The Greeks are in possession of the minefields and the signal stations at Cape Karu. All the pilotage is conducted by the Greeks, but at an extra precaution the neutral war-ships are employing the Turkish pilots on board their ships on passing through the minefield, the pilot-boats flying the French flag being utilised only for transporting the pilots to and from the minefield.

The pilot-boats and pilots remain under the protection of the neutral war-ships and instructions are being awaited from Constantinople as to their eventual disposal.

Ships in Company.

French: "Bruix."
Austrian: "Maria Theresia."
Italian: "Ammiraglio di Saint Bon."
Russian: "Uraletz."

I have, &c.
GEORGE M. KEANE

P.S.—There should be considerable improvement in the state of affairs when the Bulgarians have left Salonica. They are now leaving in large numbers.

The Bulgarian irregular troops are to remain. They are led by the famous brigand Sandansky, who has expressed his determination to exterminate the Turkish population. It is said that Sandansky is the perpetrator of the powder magazine explosion.

G. M. K.

Enclosure 3 in No. 349.

Procès-verbal No. 1.

MM. les commandants des navires de guerre présents sur la rade de Salonique, réunis aujourd'hui, 15 novembre, 1912, à bord du croiseur de la marine impériale russe "Oleg" afin de statuer sur la question du pilotage à l'égard des neutres pour l'entrée et la sortie dans la baie de Salonique, ont pris d'un commun accord les résolutions suivantes:—

"Il est décidé d'un commun accord entre les commandants des navires de guerre présents sur la rade qu'en l'absence de toute notification de l'organisation par l'autorité hellénique d'un service de pilotage présentant des garanties complètes de sécurité pour l'entrée et la sortie dans le Golfe de Salonique, le service de pilotage assumé jusqu'à ce jour à l'égard des neutres par les navires de guerre étrangers, momentanément interrompu, sera repris aujourd'hui même à 14 heures sous pavillon français, comme par le passé.

"Afin d'assurer l'entière sécurité de ce service de pilotage, il est indispensable que l'autorité hellénique notifie au commandant de rade toutes les modifications survenues

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ou qui pourraient survenir dans l'état de la passe ainsi que celles qui y pourraient être apportées."

Desquelles réunion et résolutions le présent procès-verbal a été dressé et signé par les commandants réunis.

DRAGUTIN von PRICA,
Commandant S.M.S. "Maria Theresia."
GEORGE M. KEANE,
Commandant H.M.S. "Medea."
R. ZELENTSKY,
Commandant l' "Oleg."
M. DELAGE,
Commandant du "Bruix."
GINOCCHIO, GOFFREDO,
R.W.J. "Saint Bon."

Enclosure 4 in No. 349.

Prince Nicolas of Greece to Commander of Russian Cruiser "Oleg."

Mon Commandant, *Salonique, le 4 novembre*, 1912.

JE vous remercie de la communication que vous m'avez faite, ainsi que des résolutions prises par MM. les commandants des navires de guerre en rade de Salonique, au sujet de la question du service de pilotage dans la baie de Salonique.

J'ai immédiatement communiqué le contenu de votre décision au Capitaine Lambros, inspecteur du port de Salonique, auquel j'ai intimé l'ordre de s'entendre personnellement avec vous au sujet de ce service.

Veuillez, &c.
NICOLAS, *Prince de Grèce,*
Général-Major, Gouverneur militaire de Salonique.

Pour copie conforme :
M. DELAGE.

Enclosure 5 in No. 349.

Commander of French Cruiser "Bruix" to French Rear-Admiral at Constantinople.

Amiral, *Salonique, le 19 novembre*, 1912.

AU moment où la capitulation de Salonique a dû être envisagée, les autorités ottomanes ont informé le corps consulaire qu'elles allaient faire procéder à la destruction des bâtiments affectés au service du pilotage. Les représentants du Puissances qui avaient des bâtiments de guerre au mouillage mirent opposition à ce projet. Ces bâtiments ne pouvaient se laisser bloquer en rade et l'accès mouillage devait rester libre aux bâtiments de guerre des Puissances neutres.

Une entente s'établit entre les représentants de l'État ottoman et le "senior officer" des commandants des bâtiments présents sur rade, au nom de tous les commandants.

Le service du pilotage devait être continué, comme par le passé, par le même personnel, mais neutralisé sous pavillon français.

Les officiers et les marins de la marine militaire ottomane qui armaient ces bâtiments furent conservés à bord, pour que les garanties de sécurité fussent les mêmes qu'antérieurement.

Les bâtiments devenant neutres, furent armés commercialement ; le port de la tenue militaire fut interdit ; les armes et munitions de toute nature, les emblèmes ottomans furent mis en dépôt à bord du "Bruix."

Le service commença à fonctionner dans ces nouvelles conditions le 7 novembre, à 2 heures du soir.

Le 12 novembre une agression inqualifiable—puisqu'elle s'adresserait à une bâtiment neutre, qui venait de remplir à l'instant une mission amicale pour le Gouvernement hellénique, en reconduisant à bord d'un bâtiment de guerre, un officier de marine de cette nationalité—a entraîné une interruption du service du pilotage du 12 au 16 novembre pour le commerce, des dispositions particulières ayant été prises pour faire

conduire les officiers ottomans pilotes à bord des bâtiments de guerre pendant cette période.

Depuis le 12 novembre le chef du pilotage et les pilotes sont embarqués sur le "Bruix."

En prévision du moment où le service du pilotage ne sera plus utile, c'est-à-dire lorsque les mesures prises par les autorités hellènes assureront l'entrée et la sortie des bâtiments neutres à toute heure du jour. Il est opportun de se préoccuper des conditions qui devront être faites au personnel et au matériel ottomans utilisés par les Puissances.

Les représentants du Gouvernement hellénique prétendent avoir des droits sur l'un et sur l'autre.

Les représentants des Puissances ne sauraient accepter cette manière de voir.

J'ai engagé particulièrement le pavillon français en accordant sa protection au personnel et au matériel ottomans, pour le service des Puissances neutres.

Bien que les bâtiments affectés au pilotage n'aient pas une grande valeur (voir état annexé), il n'est pas possible de ne pas les considérer comme un dépôt qui nous a été confié par la Turquie et dont nous restons comptables vis-à-vis d'elle, puisque nous nous sommes opposés à leur destruction.

Le retour au point de départ* serait la destruction par le détenteur actuel, opérant au nom du possesseur légitime ; cette solution ne me paraît pas à l'abri de toute critique, et je ne m'y résoudrai pas sans un ordre formel.

Si l'on admet que ces bâtiments doivent être conservés, en vue d'une remise ultérieure au légitime possesseur, je demande des instructions à ce sujet pour prendre à temps les mesures utiles.

Pour le personnel, il me semble équitable de la considérer comme en dehors de la capitulation de Salonique ; il doit donc être rapatrié en Turquie, libre de tout engagement.

Les dépenses indispensables pour l'utilisation des bâtiments pilotes et les vivres du personnel ont été réglées par le "Bruix" sur états de liquidation séparés pour permettre les recours ultérieurs éventuels.

Le personnel ottoman au service des Puissances n'a touché aucune solde depuis le 3 novembre.

Les états des sommes dues à ce personnel, qui s'est toujours montré très actif et très zélé, pour satisfaire à toutes les exigences d'un service souvent chargé et difficile à assurer, vu l'état du matériel, sont joints au dossier.

Les Puissances estimeront certainement nécessaires que des services rendus à leurs bâtiments de guerre et de commerce soient rétribués et que les officiers et marins retenus† à Salonique ne doivent pas souffrir d'un état de choses qu'ils ne pouvaient se dispenser de subir.

M. DELAGE.

Enclosure 6 in No. 349.

Procès-verbal No. 2.

MM. les commandants des navires de guerre présents sur la rade de Salonique, réunis aujourd'hui, 20 novembre, 1912, à bord du croiseur cuirassé "Bruix" de la République française, ont arrêté au sujet du pilotage les points suivants :—

Pour prouver leur désir de déférer aux intentions du Gouvernement hellénique de prendre en main la direction du pilotage de Salonique, tout en s'assurant les garanties indispensables à la sécurité des bâtiments de guerre neutres, les commandants acceptent d'utiliser les services d'un bateau-pilote spécial portant le pavillon grec.

Ce bâtiment serait mis à leur disposition sur demande formulée deux heures à l'avance ; il serait affecté uniquement à l'entrée ou à la sortie du bâtiment de guerre considéré.

Pour conserver tous les éléments de sécurité qui leur sont nécessaires, au égard à l'importance des bâtiments qui leur sont confiés, les commandants estiment que jusqu'à nouvel ordre il est nécessaire de prévoir encore l'utilisation des pilotes ottomans. Ces

* Cette solution n'est envisagée ici que parce qu'elle a déjà été mise en avant par M. le consul général d'Angleterre.

† Par lettre du 10 novembre, 1912, j'ai demandé que le Ministre de la Marine ottoman fût informé de la situation spéciale faite à ce personnel par la décision des Puissances.

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pilotes prendront passage sur les bâtiments de guerre entrant ou sortant, qui les recevront ou les remettront aux bateaux-pilotes, naviguant sous pavillon français.

Sous réserve de l'acceptation de ces nouvelles conditions par leurs Gouvernements respectifs, ces dispositions resteront en vigueur jusqu'à ce que les passes de Salonique aient pu être rendues libres à la navigation, à moins que des circonstances imprévues n'amènent à modifier ces dispositions.

KOUDAKA,
Commandant le "Zrinyi."
M. DELAGE,
Commandant du "Bruix."
GINOCCHIO,
R.W. "Saint Bon."
GEORGE M. KEANE,
Commander H.M.S. "Medea."

Enclosure 7 in No. 349.

Captain Hunter to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

Sir, *H.M.S. "Hampshire," Constantinople, November 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward the following report of proceedings of His Majesty's ships at Constantinople. My last report was forwarded per steam-ship "Clara," which sailed at 4 P.M. on the 15th instant.

2. *November* 15.—"Goeben" arrived, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Trummler. He is an old friend, whom I have not seen since 1895. He greeted me with much cordiality. It is especially desirable that good relations should exist between British and German, as, in the event of serious trouble in the town, the Germans, who are on the right of the British, would be our natural support. There is no change in the situation, and all is quiet.

3. *November* 16.—No change in the situation, and all quiet.

4. *November* 17.—The firing of heavy guns was heard throughout the forenoon. Two American officers who were out at the Turkish lines reported that the "Barbarossa" was shelling the Bulgar left, and that the land batteries were engaged.

5. At noon a request was received to have the detachments ready to land by 2 P.M., and this was done. Four days' provisions have already been stored at the embassy and the American Embassy (the American Ambassador having offered the use of some accommodation), also Admiral Trummler offered to arrange to house some of our men in a German *pension* next to the American Embassy. The two latter positions are on the left of our line, and the British Embassy in the right centre.

6. At 2·30 P.M. a meeting of senior officers was held on board the "Léon Gambetta," when the rear-admiral informed us that a meeting of the Ambassadors was to be held at 4 P.M., and he anticipated that the international force might land about 5 P.M. or 5·30 P.M.; but at 7 P.M. a message was received that the landing would probably take place at 5 A.M., and at 10·30 P.M. a message was received definitely fixing 5 A.M. as the time of landing.

7. The cholera among the troops, I imagine is spreading very rapidly. On Old Seraglio Point to-day a large number of fugitive troops were assembled, and all day we have seen from the ship dead and dying being carried away; they were obviously cholera cases, and not wounds. By the evening the point was clear of men.

8. *November* 18.—At 4·55 A.M. the signal was made to land. The British, Austrian, Italian, and Spanish landed at the arsenal. There is plenty of wharf room, but only one gate into and out of the arsenal, and our men did not get up to the embassy until 7 A.M. The numbers landed and distributed are as follows:—

	Officers.	Small-arm Rifles.	Marines.	Signalling and Wireless Telegraphy Ratings.	Others.
"Hampshire's": All at British Embassy	15*	210	59	6	40
"Weymouth's"—					
At British Consulate	2	22	..	1	5
At American Embassy and Club ..	5*	65	25	5	37
	22	297	84	12	82

Total ranks and ratings landed: 497

* 1 medical officer.

The American Embassy and Club are adjacent buildings.

"Weymouth" landed four Maxims and "Hampshire" two.

9. A wireless station has been erected at the embassy as an alternative to visual, as visual signalling is difficult, the embassy house not being in sight of the ship.

10. The men are at present confined to their quarters, but all the petty officers are being taken in groups by the interpreter through the part of the town confided to us. Both ships' companies are being victualled from "Hampshire." Fleet surgeon of "Hampshire" is in charge of arrangements, and has issued instructions *re* cholera and the prevention of contracting the disease.

11. I have also got the use of the Greek consulate, and in the event of patrols having to be put into the streets this will afford shelter to the men on the right of our line.

12. His Excellency the Ambassador has placed at our disposal his greenhouse for use as a cholera hospital for men on shore, and this will make an excellent place. For cases occurring on board, a portion of the upper deck will be housed in, preparations having been made to do this quickly. The French admiral is endeavouring to find a place ashore for the establishment of a lazaretto. Further accommodation is in the English hospital, which already contains two cases, and has had one death from cholera.

13. With the landing the following movements took place:—

"Scorpion" to Bebek.
"Colchide" to Beujuk Déré.
"Coatit" to Therapia.
"Loroloy" to Hayder Pacha.
"Victor Hugo" to Moda.
"Weymouth" off the old wall (seven towers) of Stamboul, being between Koum Kapon and Yedi Koulé.
"Admiral Spaun" to San Stefano.
"Koubanetz" is being held in readiness to proceed to the head of the Golden Horn.

14. It was reported in the evening that there was a state of "stalemate" on the Chatalja lines, the Turks holding their positions, but neither side being able to advance. All remains quiet in the town. A good deal of firing was heard to the westward during the day.

15. *November* 19.—The "Weymouth" took up her new position off Stamboul. I kept her until this morning, as the reason for her movement was not urgent enough to warm up her turbines hurriedly, nor to order her to get out of an inside billet in a very strong tide after dark.

16. I have given instructions that in future distilling is to be done at the temperature of boiling water, in accordance with your signal 1608 of the 18th instant.

All quiet.

17. *November* 20, 8 A.M.—"Benedetto Brin" arrived. Ships dressed ship, Turkish ensign at the main, in celebration of the Feast of Bairam.

18. Instructions issued by the French rear-admiral and my orders for the British detachment landed are attached.

19. I have closed this letter of proceedings in order that it may be forwarded by R.F.A. "Petroleum," which is expected to-day.

I have, &c.
CUTHBERT HUNTER.

[53836] No. 350.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 488.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 15, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 485 of 13th December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs seems to be satisfied with the explanations which he has received from Vienna, and gathers that all that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs aims at is the amelioration of the Austro-Servian commercial relations.

His Excellency said that news which he had received from Berlin and Belgrade was also satisfactory, but that he was alarmed by the present intractable attitude of the Turks. He had instructed the Russian Ambassador to tell them that, if they persisted in it, the Russian Government would have to change the friendly attitude which they had shown them hitherto. He said that we had been living in a state of nervous tension long enough, and would not tolerate an indefinite prolongation of the war with all its dangerous possibilities. He evidently thinks that the Turks ought to accept the peace conditions proposed by the allies, and hinted that, were the war to recommence, Russia would have to exercise serious pressure at Constantinople.

He hears that the German Government are giving good advice, and hopes that you will tell the Turks they must be reasonable.

He spoke very pessimistically of the differences existing between the Balkan States, and said that he had addressed a serious warning to them.

[53546] No. 351.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 129.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, December 15, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has sent to say that, as Turkish fleet shows signs of coming out of the Dardanelles, it would be better for foreign ships of war not to cruise at night between Lemnos and the Dardanelles. The same warning has been given through Greek Legation in principal capitals.

(Repeated to commander-in-chief, Mediterranean fleet.)

[53764] No. 352.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 235.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 16, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 16th December: Peace negotiations.

Prime Minister has just called. He has asked me to telegraph to you that M. Danef saw German Minister for Foreign Affairs in Berlin and informed him that cession of Adrianople was a *sine qua non* for the conclusion of peace. The latter stated that he would use his influence with the Turkish Ambassador at Berlin to induce him to advise his Government to yield.

The German Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for the Bulgarian Minister at Berlin yesterday and told him that he had found the Ambassador very stubborn, but he was not without hope that the Ottoman Government would give way eventually.

Sent to Constantinople.)

[53744] No. 349*.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received December 16.)

(Confidential.)
Sir,

Admiralty, December 16, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, paraphrase of telegrams, dated the 14th and 15th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 349*.

H.M.S. "Hampshire" to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Pera, December 14, 1912.*

DEPARTURES: "Emanuele Filiberto" and "Benedetto Brin" (both Italian); the former for Naples.

Enclosure 2 in No. 349*.

H.M.S. "Hampshire" to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Pera, December 14, 1912.*

ARRIVAL: "Benedetto Brin" (Italian).

Enclosure 3 in No. 349*.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *December 15, 1912.*

TURKISH cruiser "Medjidieh" is reported by master of "Tewfikieh" to have engaged eight Greek destroyers on the 14th instant outside Dardanelles. "Etna" (Italian) was also there. The destroyers retired, but the result was not ascertained.

Enclosure 4 in No. 349*.

H.M.S. "Hampshire" to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Pera, December 15, 1912.*

ARRIVED: "Hugo," "Stenne," "Nora" (German colliers).
Sailed: "Re d'Italia (hospital-ship).

[53774] No. 353.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 236.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 16, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 228 of 11th December.

King left Kirk Kilisse yesterday, and will visit Demotika and Dedeagatch, Drama, and Serres. Ministers are opposed to His Majesty's proceeding to Salonica, but it may be difficult to stop him.

He is travelling in his own train, and has obtained permission from the Ottoman Government for it to proceed to Kirk Kilisse viâ Adrianople to fetch him.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[53748] No. 354.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 197.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 16, 1912.*

BELGRADE telegram No. 107 of 10th December.

Professor Masaryk came to Vienna a few days ago and at his own request was received by Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. The professor declares that he was charged by the Servian President of the Council with most favourable offers, especially economic, to Austria-Hungary. The professor complains that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs listened to what he had to say but made no observation in reply.

As there is a tacit understanding between the Powers that they should abstain from individual negotiations with the Balkan States pending the conclusion of the peace, it seems to me that his Excellency acted quite correctly in not entering into secret negotiations through the professor, who is of all persons who could have been selected by Servia the most unsympathetic to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It is also possible that the Minister for Foreign Affairs declined to enter into such negotiations on the ground that the Servian President of the Council might let out the fact of them being carried on, and so arouse the suspicion of certain Powers that Austria-Hungary was seeking to obtain privileged economic position in Servia to the detriment of the interests of other Powers. I have some reason to believe that all that Austria-Hungary will demand is the maintenance of the open door in the newly acquired territories and the safeguarding of vested interests there.

[53763] No. 355.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 198.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 16, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"I learn that further detachment of 10,000 men is to be sent viâ Trieste to South Dalmatia at once.

"His Majesty's consul at Sarajevo reports arrival of fresh troops in Bosnia, including reservists of Landwehr and Honved. Artillery from Brunn arrived at Vienna yesterday for practice on the Steinfeld, and will probably proceed to Bosnia soon.

"Artillery from four corps of Budapest has been sent south.

"Szabadka and Zombor are reported full of troops. Reports concerning serious trouble with troops and reservists in Bohemia are now verified. Unrest in the southern Slav provinces as result of Austrian inaction, being attributed there to weakness, is said to have been increased lately. From a good private source I learn that General Conrad represented to the Emperor the extreme importance of obviating any chance of exposing any detachment to defeat by the Servians, as any Servian victory, however small, would start a rising which would spread from Cattaro to Agram. He said that he must have 300,000 men with which to invade Servia (should that be necessary), and 100,000 others to hold Slav provinces.

"Austrian General Staff believe that Servians are concentrating in the sanjak, but all information here points the other way.

"The number of battalions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Dalmatia is about 140. Total number of troops under arms is 850,000."

[53776] No. 356.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, December 16, 1912.*

MY despatch No. 80.

M. Yovanovitch left for Vienna this morning, and there is reason to hope that his presence there may exert a favourable influence on the present relations. He has been instructed to say that Servia desires to live in friendship with Austria, and that her wish for a port on the Adriatic is due to no political reasons, but merely because it is of vital importance to Servian commerce.

Austrian monitors are patrolling the Danube and Save, constantly approaching Servian shore to take photographs. They have already damaged two Servian barges. The search-lights from Semlin play upon Belgrade nightly.

Prime Minister thinks that this is not by order of the Austrian Government but that military authorities possibly hope to provoke an incident by these petty annoyances. The strictest orders have been issued to all Servian authorities to take no notice of such provocation.

[53768] No. 357.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 178.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, December 16, 1912.*

A SEMI-OFFICIAL communiqué in to-night's "North German Gazette" expresses regret that at a moment when success of Ambassadors' meetings depends upon mutual confidence between the Powers leading French papers should continue their anti-German campaign. It protests especially against their statements that Germany is encouraging Turkey to continue the war, "and to that intent had influenced choice of Turkish delegates," and calls attention to other mischievous insinuations.

[53769] No. 358.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 724.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 16, 1912.*

VICE-CONSUL at Dardanelles reports that whole of the Turkish fleet left this morning for Ægean Sea, and later that heavy firing was heard from direction of Tenedos.

[53756] No. 359.

Mr. Vaughan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Bucharest, December 16, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 67 of 14th December.

The King of Roumania being now desirous of appointing a permanent successor to M. Mano, who will not return to London, Minister for Foreign Affairs enquires whether the appointment of M. Misu as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary would be agreeable to the King and to His Majesty's Government.

[53478] No. 360.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 16, 1912*

MONASTIR telegram of 15th December.

Please inform consul of instructions sent you in my telegram No. 140 of 12th December, and bring contents of his telegram to notice of Servian Government if your French colleague takes similar action.

(Repeated to Paris and Constantinople.)

[54055] No. 361.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 615.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 16, 1912.*

I SPOKE separately to-day to the French, Russian, Italian, and German Ambassadors about our forthcoming conversations as to a Balkan settlement.

I found that they all expected and desired the conversations to be secret. In this I entirely agreed.

I suggested that, if after the first two days the conversations were going well, we might agree upon a communiqué to the press, stating that this was so, without mentioning what had actually been discussed.

I proposed that the conversations should be just as conversations between Ambassadors and myself, except that they would be "à six" instead of "à deux"; but that when we had come to a unanimous decision on a given point, a "rédaction" should be made of it in French, which should be agreed to by the Ambassadors at the next meeting for their approval.

Our objective for this week should be a unanimous recommendation to our respective Governments as to the Albanian and Servian questions. If we could succeed in achieving that, the Governments might then announce that they had received this unanimous recommendation, and the anxiety of Europe would be relieved.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[53397] No. 362.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 286.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 16, 1912.*

THE Italian Ambassador, in the course of conversation with Sir A. Nicolson on the 9th instant, gave to him confidentially the substance of an interview which he has had with M. Madjarof, Bulgarian Minister here, in regard to the peace negotiations.

M. Madjarof contends that, Bulgaria having been the chief sufferer in the campaign and having borne the real brunt of the war, and as without her neither Servia nor Greece would have been able to accomplish much and bring Turkey to terms, his Government should have a preponderating voice in the peace negotiations, and that if her views do not prevail she should make peace herself with Turkey, leaving the others to act as they think best. Bulgaria would not, *à aucun prix*, permit Salonica to pass into Greek hands or Bitolia (Monastir) into Servian hands, the latter having a predominant Bulgarian population.

In reply to a question M. Madjarof said that he thought that there were difficulties in the way of the internationalisation of Salonica, but he saw no objection to its being a free port.

* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 421), Sir R. Rodd (No. 293), and Sir E. Goschen (No. 309.)

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Bulgaria would ask for Adrianople, but if Turkey were difficult the matter might be arranged amicably.

M. Madjarof said that he was only expressing his personal views, but the Marquis Imperiali gathered the impression (1) that Bulgaria would be firm about Monastir (of which the Servians are now in possession) and Salonica, and (2) that Bulgaria had come to some kind of secret understanding with Turkey.

M. Madjarof enlarged on the desire of Bulgaria to be on the best possible terms with Turkey. In reply to an enquiry as to what attitude Bulgaria would assume in case Austria and Servia came to difficulties, he said that King Ferdinand's relations with the Court of Vienna would make it difficult for him to adopt one of hostility.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[54057] No. 363.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 294.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 16, 1912.

I REMARKED to the Italian Ambassador to-day that I hoped the representatives of the six Powers might come to an agreement unanimously about the questions of Albania and of Servian access to the Adriatic; but then it would remain to be seen whether Austria would demobilise.

The Ambassador informed me that the Marquis di San Giuliano considered that, if Austria were to make a demand upon Servia for the reduction or limitation of the Servian army, this would not be consistent with the agreement that Servia was to be politically and economically independent. His information from Vienna was to the effect that Austria did not contemplate making any such demand, but that she would expect Servia to declare in a clear and unequivocal manner the intention of being a good neighbour to Austria. Perhaps the incident of the consul and of railway transit through Servian territory for Austrian goods to Salonica might be the occasion for this. The Marquis di San Giuliano thought that if we, France, and Russia were to put some pressure on the Servian Government to secure such a declaration, the effect would be useful. Italy, as we knew, had worked for moderation in Vienna.

I said that we on our side had worked for moderation in St. Petersburgh, and so had France, just as Italy had done in Vienna. In Belgrade I had, within the last few days, urged the Servians to agree to accept whatever decision the Powers reached unanimously with regard to Servian claims.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[54056] No. 364.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 310.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 16, 1912.

THE German Ambassador, in speaking to me to-day of his instructions for the forthcoming conversations of Ambassadors, told me that they included the complete independence, political and economic, of Servia, a commercial *débouché* for her on the Adriatic, with a port and a railway to this port, the exact conditions of which might be settled by the Ambassadors, and which should be free and unimpeded for all times and all circumstances.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[55902] No. 365.

Conference of St. James.

PROTOCOLE No. 1.

Séance du 3 (16) décembre 1912.

LA Bulgarie, la Grèce, le Monténégro et la Serbie d'une part, et la Turquie d'autre part, ayant décidé d'entrer en négociations en vue de la conclusion de la paix, ont envoyé à Londres leurs plénipotentiaires qui, sur l'indication du gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, se sont réunis le 3 (16) décembre 1912 au Palais de Saint-James.

Etaient présents :

Pour la Bulgarie :

S. E. M. le Dr. Stoyan Danov, président du Sobranié ;
S. E. M. Michel Madjarov, ministre de Bulgarie à Londres ;
S. E. M. le Général Stéphane Paprikov, ministre d'Etat.

Pour la Grèce :

S. E. M. Eleuthérios Vénizélos, président du conseil des ministres et ministre de la guerre ;
S. E. M. Étienne Skouloudis, ancien ministre des affaires étrangères ;
S. E. M. Jean Gennadius, ministre de Grèce à Londres ;
S. E. M. Georges Streit, ministre de Grèce à Vienne.

Pour le Monténégro :

S. E. M. Lazare Miouchekovitch, ancien président du conseil des ministres ;
S. E. M. le Comte Louis de Voïnovitch, ancien ministre de la justice ;
S. E. M. Jean Popovitch, ancien chargé d'affaires du Monténégro à Constantinople.

Pour la Serbie :

S. E. M. Stoyan Novakovitch, ancien président du conseil des ministres ;
S. E. M. André Nicolitch, président de la Skoupchtina ;
S. E. M. Milenko Vesnitch, ministre de Serbie à Paris.

Pour la Turquie :

S. E. Réchid Pacha, ministre du commerce et de l'agriculture, ancien ambassadeur de Turquie à Rome et à Vienne ;
S. E. le Général Osman Nizamy Pacha, ambassadeur de Turquie à Berlin ;
S. E. le Général Salih Pacha, sénateur, ministre intérimaire de la marine.

Assistaient également les conseillers techniques et les secrétaires suivants faisant partie des délégations bulgare, grecque, serbe et ottomane :

MM.

le Colonel Constantin A. Jostov, chef de l'état-major de la 3ème armée bulgare ;
le Dr. Michel Popoviliov, professeur de droit international à l'université de Sophia ;
Stéphane G. Tchaprachikov, secrétaire du cabinet politique de Sa Majesté le Roi des Bulgares ;
Michel Miltchov, conseiller de légation bulgare ;
le Général Panaghioti Danglis, chef de l'état-major de l'armée hellénique ;
le Dr. Nicolas Politis, professeur de droit international à l'université de Paris ;
Constantin Dimaras, consul général, ancien consul général à Andrinople ;

Jean Pappas, chef de section au ministère des affaires étrangères hellénique ;
le Capitaine Jean Métaxas, } de l'état-major de l'armée hellénique ;
le Capitaine Athanase Exadactylos, }
le Capitaine Antoine Criézis, de la marine hellénique ;
Alexandre C. Vouros, 1er secrétaire de la légation de Grèce à Londres ;
Jean Stavridis, consul général de Grèce à Londres ;
Michel Tsamados, } secrétaires au ministère des affaires étrangères hellénique ;
Alexandre Rizo-Rangabé, }
Jean Caradja, }
Pierre Métaxas, }
le Général Pierre Boïovitch, chef de l'état-major de l'armée de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Héritier de Serbie ;
le Lieutenant-Colonel Jivko Pavlovitch, de l'état-major de l'armée serbe ;
Slavko Y. Grouitch, chargé d'affaires de Serbie à Londres ;
le Colonel Ali Riza Bey, de l'état-major de l'armée ottomane ;
Diran Bey Noradounghian, 1er secrétaire de l'ambassade de Turquie à Paris.

Les plénipotentiaires entrent en séance à midi.

Sir Edward Grey, secrétaire d'État pour les affaires étrangères de la Grande-Bretagne, prend la parole en ces termes :

"Messieurs,

"Sa Majesté le Roi, mon Auguste Souverain, a daigné me charger d'être auprès de vous l'interprète de Ses sentiments de bienveillance. Le Roi est heureux, messieurs, de vous accueillir dans Sa capitale et désire vous exprimer Ses vœux les plus sincères pour le succès de votre tâche.

"C'est pour moi également un devoir des plus agréables que de vous souhaiter la bienvenue au nom du gouvernement de Sa Majesté et de vous faire part du plaisir que nous éprouvons à vous voir parmi nous.

"Sa Majesté, désirant faciliter vos travaux par tous les moyens possibles, a mis à votre disposition les salles du Palais de Saint-James dans lesquelles nous nous trouvons ; j'ose espérer qu'elles seront conformes à vos besoins. Le gouvernement ne manquera pas de son côté de faire tout son possible pour vous assurer ce qui pourrait vous être nécessaire.

"Vous trouverez, si je ne me trompe, ici en Angleterre une atmosphère de calme et d'impartialité favorable à la tâche qui vous est échue et dans ces salles où vous allez délibérer vous serez, pour ainsi dire, sur un vrai terrain neutre où il n'y aura de politique que la vôtre.

"Toute négociation de paix après une guerre comporte des difficultés. Il ne m'appartient pas d'en apprécier la nature dans le cas actuel et elles n'ont pas manqué, je suppose, d'être l'objet des instructions précises de vos gouvernements. Aucune tâche n'est plus noble que celle qui vous est confiée, de vaincre ces obstacles et de faire aboutir vos efforts et vos travaux dans une œuvre de paix et de conciliation.

"C'est ainsi que vous arriverez à poser les fondements sur lesquels une sage et prévoyante politique ne manquera pas d'assurer la prospérité morale, économique et nationale de vos pays. A défaut d'une politique faite de sagesse et de modération, les gains de la guerre ne valent rien pour les générations futures, mais avec une telle politique les pertes occasionnées par la guerre peuvent être réparées et l'amertume faire place à la réalisation des bienfaits de la paix.

"Il ne me reste, messieurs, qu'à vous souhaiter le succès dans la tâche qui vous attend, et à vous assurer non seulement que la sympathie bienveillante de tous vous est acquise pour le but de votre réunion, mais que la paix qui sortira de vos délibérations vous ralliera le respect de l'Europe tout entière."

M. Novakovitch lit ensuite le discours suivant :

"Monsieur le Ministre,

"Je suis sûr d'exprimer les sentiments des délégués à cette conférence en priant votre Excellence d'agréer nos remerciements pour les paroles de bienvenue par lesquelles elle a bien voulu nous accueillir. Je désire aussi exprimer notre reconnaissance de la gracieuse hospitalité que Sa Majesté le Roi a daigné nous accorder, ainsi que le gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique. J'ai l'honneur de prier votre Excellence de vouloir bien être auprès de Sa Majesté l'interprète de nos

sentiments de profond respect et de vive gratitude et de vouloir bien aussi faire part au gouvernement de Sa Majesté de notre reconnaissance."

M. Danev lit le discours suivant :

"Monsieur le Ministre,

"Notre première parole en ce jour historique doit être l'expression de notre profonde gratitude pour l'accueil si hospitalier que Sa Majesté le Roi et la noble nation britannique témoignent aux représentants des peuples balkaniques.

"En choisissant la capitale de l'Empire britannique comme lieu de nos délibérations, nous avons été surtout guidés par le ferme espoir que l'atmosphère pacifique qui entourera ici nos travaux ne pourrait qu'être propice au succès de notre mission. La pensée directrice de tous nos efforts sera de ne rien épargner pour l'élaboration d'un instrument de concorde qui assurera à la péninsule des Balkans—si éprouvée dans le passé—une paix durable et formera pour ses peuples le point de départ d'une ère de tranquillité et de progrès.

"Messieurs,

"En témoignage de notre respect pour Sir Edward Grey et de notre reconnaissance pour la belle hospitalité que nous trouvons dans ce généreux pays, je vous propose de nommer Sir Edward Grey président d'honneur de notre conférence."

M. Vénizélos lit, à son tour, le discours suivant :

"I am confident that I give expression to the sentiments of all the delegates to this conference when I assure your Excellency of our deep sense of gratitude for the generous hospitality extended to us by His Majesty's Government and for the truly regal manner in which it has pleased His Majesty the King that we should be received in this ancient and historic palace.

"All this more than justifies the choice of this great capital as the seat of our deliberations ; and I may be permitted to express the hope that, in surroundings so congenial and in an atmosphere so calm, we shall be able, with the help of the Almighty, to reach that long-desired goal of a lasting peace to which your Excellency referred.

"We are deeply thankful for your words of welcome, and we offer to your Excellency personally our heartfelt acknowledgment for your encouragement of and sympathy with the important task that lies before us."

Réchid Pacha prononce les paroles suivantes :

"Monsieur le Ministre,

"L'accueil si hospitalier et si cordial que nous réserve l'Angleterre et les nombreuses amabilités dont on nous entoure si gracieusement nous touchent profondément.

"Ces prévenances dont nous sommes l'objet et auxquelles nous sommes très sensibles renforcent dans nos cœurs les sentiments d'amitié que nous avons toujours éprouvés pour la noble nation anglaise.

"Aussi est-ce un agréable devoir pour moi que de prier son Excellence Sir Edward Grey, au nom de la délégation ottomane, d'être auprès de Sa Majesté le Roi l'interprète de nos sentiments de respectueuse et vive gratitude et de vouloir bien agréer pour lui-même et le gouvernement britannique l'expression de notre sincère reconnaissance."

M. Mionchekovitch enfin s'exprime ainsi :

"Monsieur le Ministre,

"Je m'associe de tout cœur aux paroles prononcées par mes collègues des pays alliés et je vous prie, de mon côté et au nom des autres délégués monténégrins, d'être l'interprète auprès de Sa Majesté le Roi de notre profonde gratitude pour l'accueil si bienveillant qu'Il a daigné nous témoigner. En même temps, veuillez agréer vous-même, monsieur le Ministre, l'expression de notre reconnaissance de cette bonne et large hospitalité, ainsi que de l'intérêt que le gouvernement de Sa Majesté veut bien nous porter."

Sir Edward Grey remercie les plénipotentiaires du compliment qu'ils ont bien voulu lui faire en lui offrant, par l'entremise de M. Danev, la présidence d'honneur de la conférence et se rend avec empressement au désir de leurs Excellences ainsi exprimé.

La séance est levée à midi ¾.

[53802] No. 366.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 203.)

Sir, *Athens, December 9, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of a despatch received to-day from the British military attaché with the Greek field forces reporting on the military situation during the last week of November.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 366.

Report by Major Cunliffe-Owen.

(No. 6.)

THE situation for the last week has remained as follows:—

1st division returned to Salonica partly by rail and partly by march.
4th and 6th divisions still at Florina and Resna respectively.
5th division at Kozani.
3rd at Kastoria.
Cavalry in touch with the Turks at Koritza.

The latter are the remains of the Monastir army under Javid Pasha which retreated viâ the west of Presbas, and of the detachments opposing the Greeks who retired viâ Florina.

The Turks are variously estimated at 15,000 to 20,000 men in all.

Four more guns were recently found abandoned here, which makes the total captured by the Greeks twenty-three (not twenty-four, as previously stated).

The prisoners have now been sent down to Salonica.

The town here is in a most insanitary condition, and no steps whatever are taken to regulate the water supply nor to dispose of the bodies of animals and men which lie in all directions. Neither are there any latrine arrangements whatever, the men easing themselves wherever so inclined.

The commander-in-chief visited Monastir early in the week and the military attachés a few days later.

No regular field postal service has yet been established with Salonica, and no wires other than official can be sent.

Future operations are not yet decided upon, but a regiment and a mountain battery from the 4th division have just left to reinforce the division at Koritza.

F. CUNLIFFE-OWEN.

Florina, November 30, 1912.

[3803] No. 367.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 204. Confidential.)

Sir, *Athens, December 9, 1912.*

M. VENIZELOS called upon me yesterday and told me that he had received another private message from M. Gueshof, saying that he would not go to London because neither the Servian nor the Montenegrin Prime Minister could go. M. Venizelos had answered that, having decided to go, he could not now change his plans, and he hoped M. Gueshof might see his way to meet him in London a little later. As regards himself, as the idea of his going had become public property, it would cause a bad impression if he were to abandon it; besides, he would be glad to make your acquaintance and that of other statesmen and diplomatists. If the negotiations dragged, he would leave the other plenipotentiaries to finish them, and would return here.

I asked M. Venizelos whether any understanding had been come to between the allies before the war began as to the partition of Turkey. He said there was none, except a provision for a slight rectification of frontiers and for the application of

reforms—for reforms were really the aim and object of the war, nobody having even dreamt of the overwhelming success which was actually achieved. I asked him if there was any truth in the rumours that the Bulgarians were going to give up their claim to Adrianople, and he said he was much afraid there might be, and that the question of Salonica would therefore become more difficult. He repeated the arguments reported in my despatch No. 201 of the 7th instant, adding that he was prepared to give up to the Bulgarians Serres, Drama, Cavalla, and other places in which the Greeks were in a majority.

M. Venizelos's suspicions of the Bulgarians carry him so far as to make him suspect, in consequence of the newspaper reports that food is being supplied to Adrianople, that although the published terms of armistice stipulate that there shall be no revictualling of that fortress, there may be a secret understanding between Bulgaria and Turkey to the contrary effect.

The Greek Mission will be composed as reported in my despatch above referred to. Its members (except Messrs. Streit and Gennadius) leave Athens to-day and are due to arrive in London on the 12th instant.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[53804] No. 368.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 205.)

Sir, *Athens, December 9, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum by Beaumont on the Albanian question, with which his residence in Montenegro has given him special opportunities of acquainting himself.

I entirely agree with Mr. Beaumont's conclusions. The creation of an autonomous Albania, congenitally incapable of independent existence, will merely preserve one of the hotbeds of intrigue and dissension which it was hoped the destruction of the Turkish Empire in Europe was sweeping away, but which it suits Austrian policy to maintain. There is some reason to believe that Italy supports Austria in this policy only because she considers herself bound by the agreement of 1900, to which I referred in my despatch No. 184 of the 18th ultimo, an agreement concluded in circumstances of which no one could have foreseen the development into the present situation.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 368.

Memorandum by Mr. Beaumont on the Albanian Question.

IT has always been the policy of Austria to keep the Balkan States as weak as possible, and to sow the seeds of dissension among them, and her irritation at the prospect of years of patient intrigue and preparation in Albania being wasted is natural enough. But is that sufficient reason for so cynical a disregard of others, as her "hands off" to Servia shows?

So far from being unreasonable the claim of M. Pashitch to the coast-line between Alessio and Durazzo seems to err rather on the side of moderation.

The Albanians themselves do not want independence. The only nationalist leader, Ismail Kemal Bey, is an adventurer with no following. It is more than likely that he is in the pay of Austria, and, in any case, his pretensions, encouraged by Austria and Italy in their own interests, may be disregarded. Most of the native chieftains, like Issa Boletin, disclaim any wish for autonomy.

Albanian aspirations are defined by the demands of the insurgent beys formulated last year and again this summer. These risings were a revolt against the Young Turk process of what Mr. Marling has aptly described as "Turkification by steam-roller." The Albanians were loyal while Abdul Hamid reigned, and they would have been equally loyal to the new régime had the new régime continued the old policy, *i.e.*, not asked them to pay taxes, nor tried to enrol them in regiments in Asia Minor, nor to suppress all their ancient privileges, while doing nothing for them in return.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Mr. Marling summed up the aims of these risings in his despatch No. 723 of the 27th August last:—

"The Albanians desire to revert to the old indulgent régime of four years ago, with the difference that that special régime is to receive . . . . legal recognition."

As the Austrians and Italians know, but as does not appear to be so well known in England, everything needed for a successful independent existence is wanting in Albania.

There is no national cohesion; the Ghegs are divided against the Tosks, the Christians against the Mussulmans, one tribe against its neighbour, and even one family against another by interminable blood feuds.

There are no clearly defined boundaries; in the north the Albanians merge imperceptibly in to Serbs, in the south into Greeks, in the east into Bulgars.

They have no historical traditions, and their national heroes, like Scander Beg, were merely insurgents against Turkish authority.

They have no education; their language is so primitive that it contains no expressions for abstract ideas, and has only a few hundred words. In the north they understand, if they do not speak, Servian, and in the south knowledge of Greek is almost universal.

While it is a country the Government of which would require very heavy expenditure only to maintain order, to say nothing of developing its resources, it is among the poorest in Europe; the task of the Minister of Finance of an independent Albania will be an unenviable one.

If it were annexed to Austria, or any progressive and wealthy country, something might be made of it, but as international jealousies make that an impossible solution some other must be found.

Neither Servia nor Greece is anxious to enter into so undesirable a possession; but a partition of it between them is the most likely, perhaps the only, way to preserve the future peace of the Balkans. Such a partition would affect the legitimate interests of none of the Great Powers—even the disadvantage to Austria is a question which is open to discussion. The example of Crete ought to be a warning against the creation of a small semi-independent State, unable to stand alone.

Greece has already many thousand Albanian subjects who are contented and law-abiding citizens. The Servian Government have shown by their military organisation an administrative capacity which would justify leaving them in possession of what they have already conquered, in an incredibly short time, seeing the difficult nature of the country through which their troops had to march.

There is a rough dividing line between the Ghegs and the Tosks, running from the south of Durazzo to the mountains west of Monastir. Greek influence extends north of this line; and south of it, except in a few towns and villages it is already predominant. The southern watersheds of the Skumbi and Black Drin would make a fairly good natural boundary between the two countries. This would give the Ghegs to Servia and the Tosks to Greece.

With regard to Montenegro, the claim to Scutari is not a very good one, but the possession of the Boyana and part of the Drin valley are of vital importance for its development. They are its front door, while Antivari is only a postern gate—commanded by Austrian guns—Montenegro as now constituted scarcely justifies its existence, and indeed can scarcely continue to exist. The lower reaches of the Drin and the southern and eastern watershed of the White Drin would form a natural dividing line between the Montenegrins and their Servian cousins.

Unfortunately the Turkish negotiators, knowing the effect of such a reservation, rather than from conviction or interest in the ultimate fate of Albania, may make its independence a condition of peace. This ought, if possible, to be guarded against, and it would simplify the peace negotiations if they were limited to defining the line west of which the Porte would be ready to abandon its sovereignty, and to the settlement of such questions as a war indemnity and adjustment of the Turkish debt in the ceded provinces, which might be set off against each other.

The partition of the spoils might be left to subsequent negotiation between the four allies, and on an agreement being reached, this might be presented to an European conference for ratification or modification.

It will be a curious object lesson in history if Albania is to become independent, while Poland and Lithuania, Bosnia and Croatia, Finland and Bohemia remain geographical expressions.

The following description by a French traveller of the port on the Adriatic which

Austria has forbidden Servia to take, lest it should one day become a Servian or Russian naval base, may be of interest: M. Victor Bérard, in "La Turquie et l'Hellénisme contemporain" (Paris, 1893), writes of Durazzo:—

"Ce pauvre port . . . . n'est qu'un marais sans profondeur: quelques voiles dalmates, deux caïques turcs et un vapeur italien suffisent à le remplir";

and of San Giovanni di Medua:—

"Les eaux noires de vase et empestées de miasmes que le Drin et la Boiana jettent dans ce cirque de rochers."

H. D. BEAUMONT.

Athens, December 9, 1912.

[53806]

No. 369.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 207.)

Sir,

Athens, December 12, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from the British military attaché with the Greek field forces, who has returned with the other attachés to Salonica, reporting the position of the army on the 9th instant.

I have, &c.

F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 369.

Major Cunliffe-Owen to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 7.)

Sir,

Salonica, December 9, 1912.

I BEG to report that the military attachés returned to Salonica from Florina on the 3rd instant, the Greek army head-quarters arriving on the day following.

The army is now disposed as follows:—

Cavalry Brigade: One regiment west of Florina, about Biklista and Koritza; One regiment still at Serres, in occupation of that place with the Bulgarians.

1st Division: Salonica.

2nd Division (less one regiment) to Santi Quaranta, with a view to co-operation with the force in Epirus against Janina.

The detached regiment has gone to Khios.

This division left Salonica about the end of November.

3rd Division: Kastoria (south of Florina).

4th Division (less one regiment and one mountain battery): Salonica. The regiment and battery are believed to be still with the cavalry by Biklista.

5th Division: Kozani.

6th Division: Florina and Rosna.

7th Division: Salonica.

One Bulgarian brigade still remains in joint occupation of Salonica.

According to information here, it does not appear as if the Greeks have joined in the general armistice.

The military attachés remain at Salonica for the present.

I have, &c.

F. CUNLIFFE-OWEN.

[53820] No. 370.

Consul Raymond to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

Sir, *Corfu, December 12, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the 4,000 troops that left here last week for Santi-Quaranta returned to-day, owing, it is said, to their finding a superior force in that vicinity.

I have, &c.
GEORGE RAYMOND.

[53821] No. 371.

Consul Raymond to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

Sir, *Corfu, December 13, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the 4,000 troops that arrived here yesterday from Santa-Quaranta are now leaving for Prevesa and Chimarra.

I have, &c.
GEORGE RAYMOND.

[53770] No. 372.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 725.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 16, 1912.*

FOLLOWING received to-day from Dardanelles:—

"Turkish fleet returned at 2.
"No sign of damage whatever.
"Battle lasted two hours. Turks kept under the guns of forts.
"Fleets apparently out of range of each other."

[53771] No. 373.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 726.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 16, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 709 of 8th December.

Public Debt have advanced to Government 300,000*l.* at 7 per cent, on sum to be eventually made over to them under Turco-Italian Treaty of Peace. This enables Government to pay one month's salaries.

[53773] No. 374.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Athens, December 16, 1912.*

GREEK naval commander-in-chief reports naval action lasting an hour off Dardanelles this morning. No damage to Greek ships. Turkish fleet retired into straits.

[53772] No. 375.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 487.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 16, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1354 of 14th December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that there must be a misunderstanding. He had never intended that the differences between Roumanians and Bulgarians as to rectification of their frontier should be discussed by Ambassadors, as he hoped that his efforts to induce them to settle this point in a friendly spirit would be successful. All that he had suggested was that Roumanians should be allowed to explain their wishes concerning future position of Koutzo-Vlachs in Albania.

[53780] No. 376.

Vice-Consul de Garston to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Ragusa, December 16, 1912.*

THREE Austrian Lloyd ships arrived at Gravosa to-day bringing over 1,800 troops to that port. Understand that four other transports are simultaneously landing Austrian troops at the port of Metkovic and at Cattaro. To-morrow morning another chartered vessel will arrive at Gravosa with further reserve troops, and on 18th December the "Urano Carinthia" and the "Gastein," the latter from Fiume, will land another 2,400 trained men at Gravosa. All classes of the reserves have been called to the colours in this district, and the opinion prevails here that war is certain and imminent.

Great numbers of Turkish refugees have passed through here, escaping from atrocities perpetrated by the Balkan allies in Albania.

[53940] No. 377.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 179.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, December 17, 1912.*

ITALY has proposed a formula to her allies' approval to the following effect:—

Albania to have complete independence, with a coast-line from Durazzo to the south of Valona, and a land frontier to be delimited according to geographical and ethnological requirements.

In order that the political and commercial independence of Servia may be ensured, the Powers are favourably disposed to an arrangement which would give her access to the Adriatic by means of railway leading to a free port outside Austrian territory, either in Montenegro or Albania, with guarantee that the said port is to be at her complete disposal under all circumstances, both in peace and war time.

Germany and Austria have accepted this formula, the latter only proposing that San Giovanni di Medua should be substituted for Durazzo as a starting point of the coast-line.

Under instructions, the Italian Ambassador has suggested to the German Government that Ambassadors should be instructed to hold no official communication with the peace delegates, and that the two sets of negotiations should be completely independent of each other.

[53941] No. 378.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 199.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, December 17, 1912.*

SEMI-OFFICIAL "Fremdenblatt" published this morning a communiqué stating that the consular incident at Prisrend was not so serious as was supposed by popular rumour. Servian military authorities are stated to have committed breaches of international law for which communiqué states the Servian Government will be asked to make amends, and will doubtless do so.

Text by post to-day.

[53954] No. 379.

Mr. Vaughan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, December 17, 1912.*

VICE-CONSUL at Constanza reports presence of one Turkish transport embarking horses and war material.

[53959] No. 380.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, December 17, 1912.*

GREEKS have been engaged with Turkish troops under Javid Pasha outside Korytza, and have even suffered some losses. They, however, hoped to enter Korytza yesterday.

[53836] No. 381.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1356.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 17, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 488 of 16th December.

I shall do all I can to exercise influence in this direction as soon as difficulties arise between the delegates here. At present they have not come to close quarters in their negotiations, and have not consulted me.

[53756] No. 382.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Vaughan.

(No. 69.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 17, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 40 of 16th December.

M. Misu will be quite agreeable to the King.

[53436] No. 383.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 419.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 17, 1912.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF read to Sir A. Nicolson on the 13th December a telegram from M. Sazonof to the following effect:—

In the event of Roumanian interests being dealt with during the Ambassadorial conversations, the Roumanian representative should be permitted on the occasion to state the views of Roumania and her case, but without a deliberative voice.

Sir A. Nicolson told Count Benckendorff that he would submit the question to me. Sir A. Nicolson could inform his Excellency that the Roumanian Government were sending their Minister at Constantinople to discuss matters with M. Danef here. The latter had not had time when at Bucharest to go into the question properly.

Sir A. Nicolson would only remark that, as regards the Roumano-Bulgarian frontier question, if the Roumanian representative were permitted to explain to the Ambassadors the Roumanian case possibly M. Danef might solicit permission to state the Bulgarian case, which would enlarge somewhat the scope of the Ambassadorial conversations.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52937] No. 384.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 15.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 17, 1912.*

THE Roumanian Minister told Sir A. Nicolson on the 9th December that he would be glad to know whether the approaching meeting of the Ambassadors would occupy itself with certain questions of interest to Roumania. He added that, in making this enquiry, he was not making an official communication.

In reply to a remark by Sir A. Nicolson, M. Mano said he did not refer to the question of frontier rectification with Bulgaria, but, amongst other questions, to the future of the Koutzo-Vlachs in Macedonia and to the Straits.

Sir A. Nicolson told him that one could not tell beforehand whether the *causeries* of the Ambassadors would enter into the points he mentioned. The idea was to exchange views round a table instead of over the telegraph wires, as the latter method led to confusion and delays. There were questions of interest to the Great Powers, and they consequently desired to converse on them amongst each other quietly and quite informally, and had no desire to give the meeting the character of a conference.

M. Mano asked where the Ambassadors would meet.

Sir A. Nicolson replied that the meeting would take place in London or Paris—more likely at the former place.

M. Mano evidently came to *tâter le terrain*, and it is probable that he went away with the idea that Roumanian participation had not been contemplated by His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[54360] No. 385.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 103.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 17, 1912.*

AT the meeting of the Ambassadors this afternoon it was agreed that our proceedings should be kept secret, in the sense that no communiqué should be made to the press until we judged it opportune to make an agreed communiqué, and that meanwhile each representative should regard our proceedings as conversations of which he would make his own report to his Government, putting on record such points as had been definitely agreed upon.

After some conversation, it was agreed to discuss the Albanian question first.

The Austrian Ambassador stated that the view of his Government was that Albania should be autonomous and "viable," that is to say, large enough to have a separate existence.

The Russian Ambassador added that the autonomous Albania should be guaranteed and controlled exclusively by the six Powers under the sovereignty of the Sultan.

The word "exclusively" was suggested by the Italian Ambassador.

It was left undecided whether "sovereignty" or "suzerainty" should be the word finally selected.

After some general discussion as to whether there should be any Turkish troops

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 621), Sir E. Goschen (No. 311), Sir R. Rodd (No. 295), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 421).

allowed in Albania, it was agreed that the Governments of Austria and Italy should be invited to indicate their general views on the organisation of Albania.

It was then agreed that the autonomous Albania should be neutralised.

The next step was to discuss the limits of Albania. On this it was agreed "que les frontières de l'Albanie autonome et du Monténégro au nord et de la Grèce au sud seront en tout cas limitrophes." We were unable to be more definite, as the Austrian Ambassador contended that the frontiers of Albania and Montenegro must remain as they are at present, Austria considering that no territory inhabited exclusively by Albanians should be detached from the future Albania, and urging that the territory now called Albanian on the north came emphatically within this category.

The Russian Ambassador declared that he could not associate himself with this point of view, seeing that it implied "une ingérence" in the negotiation of Montenegro and Turkey. He would, therefore, bring it to the cognisance of his Government.

Finally, we proceeded to discuss the question of Servian access to the Adriatic. It was obvious that, whether the frontiers of Montenegro and Servia were to be varied or not, so long as they remained limitrophe there could be no territorial access for Servia to the Adriatic. This point, therefore, was not discussed, and no mention was made of it. It was agreed that "un accès commercial sera réservé à la Serbie à un port albanais libre et neutre, desservi par un chemin de fer international sous un contrôle européen et sous la garde d'une force spéciale internationale, avec liberté de transit pour toute la marchandise, y compris les munitions de guerre."

It is apparent that Austria objects to allowing Montenegro to have Scutari, and that Russia would support the Montenegrin claim in this respect. The German and Italian Ambassadors did not commit themselves on this point. The Servian difficulty, on the other hand, has completely disappeared as far as access to the Adriatic is concerned.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[52364] No. 386.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

Foreign Office, December 17, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to my letter of the 10th instant, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Board of Trade, copies of correspondence, as marked in the margin,* respecting the detention of the steam-ship "City of Chios" at Constantinople.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople reports that this vessel was recalled by His Majesty's consul-general from Rodosto on the 4th November, that she arrived at Constantinople on the 5th November, and that until the 30th November she lay there at his Excellency's disposal.

On the last-named date, at 3 P.M., the master was informed in writing by His Majesty's consul-general that she might proceed; on the 2nd December she was, however, still awaiting sailing orders from the owners, and she does not appear to have sailed till the 3rd December.

Sir E. Grey would be glad to be furnished with the advice of the Board of Trade as to the steps which should now be taken to settle the claim for demurrage. He desires to know whether this should be dealt with by negotiation with the owners alone or whether the several firms interested in the cargo should also be asked to submit their claims to His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* Ellerman Lines, December 6; Messrs. Methven, Son, and Co., December 6, 1912.

[55902] No. 387.

Conference of St. James.

PROTOCOLE No. 2.

Séance du 4 (17) décembre 1912.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Bulgarie :

MM. Danev, Madjarov et le Général Paprikov ;

Pour la Grèce :

MM. Vénizélos, Skouloudis, Gennadius et Streit ;

Pour le Monténégro :

MM. Mionchekovitch, le Comte de Voïnovitch et Popovitch ;

Pour la Serbie :

MM. Novakovitch, Nicolitch et Vesnitch ;

Pour la Turquie :

Réchid Pacha, Osman Nizamy Pacha et le Général Salih Pacha.

LA séance est ouverte à 11 heures ½, sous la présidence de M. Danev, conformément à la décision préalable de la conférence que la présidence sera exercée alternativement par les premiers plénipotentiaires, par ordre alphabétique des Etats représentés à la conférence.

Le Président donne lecture des pleins pouvoirs des plénipotentiaires bulgares et, sur son invitation, les chefs des autres délégations, dans l'ordre alphabétique, lisent ensuite chacun les leurs.

Il est décidé, sur la proposition du *Président*, qu'un secrétaire par délégation assistera aux séances de la conférence.

Sont désignés à cet effet :

Pour la Bulgarie :

M. Stéphane G. Tchaprachikov, secrétaire du cabinet politique de Sa Majesté le Roi des Bulgares ;

Pour la Grèce :

M. Alexandre C. Vouros, premier secrétaire de la légation de Grèce à Londres ;

Pour la Serbie :

M. Slavko Y. Grouitch, chargé d'affaires de Serbie à Londres ; et

Pour la Turquie :

Diran Bey Noradounghian, premier secrétaire de l'ambassade de Turquie à Paris.

La délégation monténégrine ne désigne pour le moment aucun secrétaire.

Après vérification des pleins pouvoirs, le Président constate que les pleins pouvoirs des plénipotentiaires ottomans ne les autorisent à négocier qu'avec la Bulgarie, le Monténégro et la Serbie, et qu'il n'y est pas fait mention de la Grèce. Il invite les délégués ottomans à s'expliquer sur cette question.

Réchid Pacha déclare que c'est pour la première fois que le gouvernement hellénique exprime le désir de négocier la paix. Les plénipotentiaires ottomans, n'ayant pas de pouvoirs pour négocier avec la Grèce, sont obligés d'en référer à leur gouvernement.

M. Vénizélos remarque que ce n'est pas la Grèce qui a pris l'initiative de la conclusion de la paix, mais bien Kiamil Pacha, en s'adressant à Sa Majesté le Roi des Bulgares et, par son entremise, à tous les alliés. Il propose de commencer les travaux de la conférence de suite et qu'entre-temps les plénipotentiaires ottomans pourraient demander de nouvelles instructions à Constantinople.

Réchid Pacha dit que l'armistice était demandé en vue de la conclusion de la paix et que la Grèce ayant refusé de signer l'armistice, on ne pouvait supposer qu'elle désirait traiter de la paix. Pour cette raison, les pleins pouvoirs ottomans ne font pas mention de la Grèce.

M. Novakovitch déclare que les délégués bulgares, monténégrins et serbes ayant qualité pour parler au nom de la Grèce également, il serait possible, pour éviter toute perte de temps, de commencer immédiatement les négociations.

M. Mioushkovitch dit que le commandant de Scutari a refusé de prendre en considération la communication du ministre d'Allemagne à Cettigné lui notifiant l'armistice; il s'ensuit que l'armistice n'existe pas en fait entre le Monténégro et la Turquie, ce qui n'empêche pas le Monténégro de prendre part aux négociations actuelles.

Réchid Pacha explique que cela provient des difficultés de communication. Il promet de télégraphier à Constantinople pour attirer l'attention de son gouvernement sur ce fait.

Le Président, revenant sur la question des pleins pouvoirs, déclare que les États balkaniques se présentent comme un bloc et que l'omission de la Grèce dans les pleins pouvoirs des délégués ottomans empêche de poursuivre les négociations.

Réchid Pacha est d'avis contraire, car si le bloc existe, il y a des intérêts non communs dont on pourrait commencer la discussion immédiate; par exemple, les points auxquels la Grèce n'est pas intéressée.

Osman Nizamy Pacha appuie cette façon de voir et demande à réserver la discussion des *desiderata* de la Grèce.

M. Nicolitch est d'avis qu'il vaut mieux avant tout faire hâter l'arrivée des pleins pouvoirs des plénipotentiaires ottomans concernant la Grèce.

Le Président est du même avis et croit qu'il serait plus logique de se réunir plus tard, étant donné qu'il est difficile de procéder maintenant, au cas où les alliés présenteraient leurs demandes en une formule unique.

Réchid Pacha déclare qu'il s'en référera à son gouvernement, mais du moment qu'il s'agit d'une formule unique au nom du bloc balkanique, on pourrait la présenter de suite pour que la délégation ottomane puisse en prendre connaissance.

Le Président fait observer que si l'on admet la discussion immédiate de la formule, il faut que les plénipotentiaires de la Grèce y prennent également part. La délégation ottomane y consentirait-elle?

Réchid Pacha dit ne pouvoir y répondre avant de prendre connaissance de la formule.

Osman Nizamy Pacha pense qu'il serait bon de connaître la formule pour la transmettre à Constantinople et recevoir une réponse, afin de ne pas perdre du temps.

M. Vénizélos estime que les plénipotentiaires helléniques étant munis de pleins pouvoirs en bonne et due forme, c'est plutôt à la délégation ottomane qu'il faudrait s'en prendre pour tout retard.

Réchid Pacha déclare que ce ne sont pas les plénipotentiaires ottomans qui ont soulevé cette question préalable. La délégation ottomane n'a de pleins pouvoirs que pour négocier avec ceux qui ont signé l'armistice. La Turquie ne désire aucunement perdre du temps et pour cela demande à connaître la formule.

Le Président dit que c'est lui, en sa qualité de président, qui a soulevé cette question préalable, vu que les pleins pouvoirs des délégués ottomans diffèrent de ceux des autres plénipotentiaires. Il ajoute qu'il serait préférable de régler cette question avant de commencer les travaux.

M. Madjarov demande en quel *minimum* de temps les délégués ottomans pourraient recevoir une réponse de Constantinople.

M. Nicolitch est d'avis que les délégués ottomans doivent traiter avec tous les alliés.

Le Président demande à quoi pourrait servir de faire connaître de suite la formule du bloc, si au bout de deux jours, par exemple, le gouvernement ottoman n'autorisait pas ses délégués à traiter avec la Grèce.

Réchid Pacha remarque que de cette façon de procéder pourrait résulter une perte de temps.

Le Président en convient, mais tient avant tout à régulariser la situation. Aucune personne de bon sens ne pourrait avancer de bonne foi que les alliés désirent traîner les négociations.

M. Nicolitch fait observer qu'au cas où l'on ne régulariserait pas la question des pleins pouvoirs on pourrait s'exposer à des difficultés.

Le Président remarque qu'il ne connaît ni congrès ni conférence où l'on n'ait commencé par régulariser les pleins pouvoirs des délégués.

Réchid Pacha déclare que du moment qu'on ne peut contester les pleins pouvoirs des délégués ottomans, il ne voit pas de raisons pour lesquelles la formule ne serait pas présentée.

Le Président réplique qu'on ne peut présenter la demande d'un bloc dont un des éléments n'existe pas aux yeux des plénipotentiaires ottomans.

Après avoir résumé les débats, le Président propose d'ajourner la séance à jeudi, 6 (19) courant, à 4 heures de l'après-midi, pour permettre aux délégués ottomans de demander à leur gouvernement des instructions complémentaires.

Il en est ainsi décidé.

Le Président présente, touchant la procédure à suivre, les propositions ci-après:

1. Le protocole, rédigé en commun par les secrétaires, portera la signature du Président de la séance à laquelle il se réfère; il sera en outre signé par les secrétaires.

2. Sir Edward Grey sera prié de désigner un fonctionnaire de son département pour faire partie du secrétariat dont il prendra la direction et pour servir ainsi de trait d'union entre la conférence et le gouvernement britannique.

3. Toute proposition destinée à figurer au protocole devra être présentée par écrit.

4. L'ordre du jour de chaque séance devra être fixé et communiqué d'avance.

5. Les discussions seront tenues secrètes.

6. A l'issue de chaque séance un communiqué sera fait à la presse. Un comité pris dans le sein de la conférence sera chargé de la rédaction de ce communiqué.

La conférence donne à l'unanimité son adhésion à ces propositions.

La séance est levée à midi ¼.

Le Président:

DR. ST. DANEFF.

Les Secrétaires:

S. TCHAPRACHIKOV.
A. C. VOURos.
S. Y. GHOUFTCHI.
D. NORADOUNGHIAN.

[54043] No. 388.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 371.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, December 14, 1912.*

SINCE writing my despatch No. 367 of the 12th instant, I noticed a distinct change in the tone of the Russian press, which has become more warlike.

The "Sviet" publishes a leading article entitled "Peace or War," and very hostile in tone to Austria and Germany. It declares that threats will not frighten Russia, and that if the central Powers want war they can have it. It then goes on to say that the immediate and total withdrawal of Russian gold from the German banks might cause Austria and Germany to talk less loudly. This procedure was already advocated some time ago in the "Novoe Vremya," as I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 361 of the 5th December.

The "Novoe Vremya" points out in an article of great length that the question of Durazzo is only a pretext, the real question at issue being immeasurably greater. The success of the Balkan League had created on the southern frontier of Austria a new Slav force not subject to Austrian diplomacy. Each of the States of the league owed to Russia its existence as an independent State, and only in unison with Russia could their future national development take place freely and peacefully. Russia must with all her might support the cause of Slav independence, and she could thus gain for herself allies in the Balkans. In that case Austria would not dare to attack her, as to do so with an allied force in her rear amounting to half a million of men would be an act of State suicide. Moreover, the possession of trusty and powerful allies in the Balkans would mean half the settlement of the Straits question, which was of such decisive importance for all Russian commerce and industry in the south. Austrian diplomacy was now trying to wrest the Balkan peoples away from their natural centre of gravity, *i.e.*, Russia; and Austrian military preparations constituted a threat not only to Servia, but to all the Balkan peoples. The peace negotiations had, moreover, assumed a very unfavourable aspect, and Osman Pasha's statement that the Turkish delegates were going to London not to make peace, but to show that Turkey could continue the war, assumed an entirely new significance when Austrian diplomacy threatened the allies with war on two fronts. The article concludes by observing that the question of a Servian port on the Adriatic, apparently an Austro-Servian question, is in reality a purely Russian question.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[53967] No. 389.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 524.)

Sir, *Berlin, December 16, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the following paragraph appears in a prominent position in the semi-official "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" to-night:—

"The conversations of the Ambassadors which begin in London in the course of this week are generally looked forward to with confidence and have a decidedly peaceful tendency. Their success will largely depend on the degree of confidence manifested by the Powers towards each other. We can, therefore, only express our regret that leading French newspapers, headed by the 'Temps,' even now continue their agitation against Germany, who is accused, above all, of inciting Turkey to continue the war. It is thus asserted in Friday's number of the 'Temps' that Germany exercised an influence prejudicial to peace on the choice of the Turkish delegates. The grant of a concession for a metropolitan railway in Constantinople to a German consortium is further alleged to be connected with supplies of German arms. The venomous intention underlying such statements is particularly obvious, since the 'Temps' must have known that the French Ottoman Bank also belongs to the consortium. This action on the part of the 'Temps' and other respectable French organs is especially regrettable at such a moment as the present, when the

Powers are coming together for the peaceful discussion of the situation. Anyone who takes up any issue of these papers will see who is the disturber of the peace."

I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.

[54097] No. 390.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 489.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, December 18, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs is very pleased with reception accorded by Duma to statement made by President of the Council on Balkan situation.

As he tells me that he has sent translation of all its important points to foreign press agencies I am not telegraphing the substance.

[54096] No. 391.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 727.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 18, 1912.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador to-day, on instructions from his Government, informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government had been very unfavourably impressed by the unconciliatory language held by Turkish delegates to Ministers for Foreign Affairs at Berlin and Paris, and warned his Excellency that the uncompromising attitude which the delegates appeared to be going to adopt could not but bring about a renewal of hostilities, which would have a disastrous effect for Turkey.

Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that declarations so far made had been merely of the nature of conversations, that Turkey was prepared to make great sacrifices, and that conciliatory instructions had been given to the delegates.

Russian Ambassador tells me that his language was very categorical but friendly, and that Minister for Foreign Affairs, who promised to convey it textually to the Cabinet, appeared to be much impressed.

Subsequently, in a private conversation, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the main point was to retain Adrianople as a military necessity. Russian Ambassador argued that as Bulgarian army had reached lines of Chatalja without the fall of Adrianople this theory was exploded. Minister for Foreign Affairs argued that every Turk was in favour of retention of Adrianople, and its cession would unite the entire opposition against Government.

French Ambassador and German Ambassador are to see Minister for Foreign Affairs to-morrow. Former says that he is instructed to use much the same language as his Russian colleague, but also to point out that, if peace is not concluded at once, danger of serious disturbances in Asia Minor will become very great. German Ambassador has informed French Ambassador that he will speak in the same sense, and says that he has already advised abandonment by Turkey of Adrianople as a peace condition.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[54101] No. 392.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 215.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, December 18, 1912.*

TURKISH debt.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has told me that proposal made by French official, reported in my despatch No. 516, is not in accordance with his present views, which he will communicate at an early date. He begs that no action should be taken meanwhile.

Despatch follows.

[54099] No. 393.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 237.
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, December 18, 1912.*

BULGARIAN Government have appointed General Vassof Military Governor-General of the province of Thrace, with residence for the present at Kirk Kilisse.

As Military Governor-General of portion of Macedonia occupied by Bulgarian troops they have appointed General Volkof, who is to reside in Salonica.

[54100] No. 394.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 238.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 18, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 236 of 16th December.

King of Bulgarians passed Serres and Drama yesterday, and is now due at Salonica. News of his arrival there has not yet reached Sophia. This visit is undertaken against the wishes of the Ministers. It has been found impossible to keep His Majesty quiet at Kirk Kilisse.

Result of meeting of the two Sovereigns at Salonica is being awaited by the Cabinet with some anxiety.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[54067] No. 395.

Consul Faber to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(Telegraphic.) *Fiume, December 18, 1912.*

TWENTY-FOUR thousand troops shipped to Dalmatia since Sunday.

[54052] No. 396.

Vice-Consul de Garston to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 18.)

(Telegraphic.) *Ragusa, December 18, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram of 16th December advising the arrival of six steam-ships with 4,200 Austrian reserves at Gravosa, ten further transports are bringing additional reinforcements of another 10,000 reserves into Dalmatian ports, who will all be landed by to-morrow with [group undecypherable] stores, baggage, equipment, and horses. Every available building has been taken up for the troops.

[54211] No. 397.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 145.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 18, 1912.*

SERVIAN chargé d'affaires informs me privately that Servian delegates are instructed to abandon claim for direct access to Adriatic if that be decision of the Powers. In this event, to make it easy for Servian opinion, especially for the army, he hoped the wish of the Great Powers would be clearly expressed. He asked my advice. I said the instructions were wise, and I was glad to hear of them. I would certainly do all I could to secure that it should be made clear that Servia was deferring to the wish of the Powers, and I hoped the Powers would also guarantee something in the way of commercial access to a free port for Servian commerce, and thus accompany any decision to which they came with an offer that Servia could honourably accept.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 1357, and Paris, No. 781.)

[54513] No. 398.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.[*]

(No. 105. Secret.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 18, 1912.*

TO-DAY the Ambassadors again met in the Foreign Office, and discussed in the first instance what should be the eastern limits of Albania.

The Austrian Ambassador indicated that if other points as regards the littoral were satisfactorily settled, Prisrend might go to Servia; and there appeared to be general agreement that further south Lake Ochrida should be the boundary of Albania. But the instructions of the Austrian Ambassador were too vague to enable a line to be drawn, even approximately, on any map. He was therefore requested to obtain a map, if possible, with a line traced upon it that would show the view of his Government as to what the boundary should be.

We then passed to the question of the Ægean islands.

The Russian Ambassador said that his instructions were that Lemnos, Tenedos, Imbros, and Samothrace should not be in the possession of any Power except Turkey. Autonomous institutions in these islands would, however, be indispensable for the guarantee of the population.

I said that while I raised no objection in principle, one or two questions occurred to me. For instance, if the first use which these islands made of their autonomy was to declare their annexation to Greece, what would happen?

The Russian Ambassador replied that he assumed that there would have to be some Turkish troops in the islands to maintain the Turkish flag.

I observed that there might be a revolt against the flag, the Turkish troops might attack the islanders, who were Greek, and I asked what would happen then. If the Powers were to interfere, they would reproduce a Cretan question.

The Russian Ambassador said that he would refer these points to his Government.

I suggested that, without prejudice to the Russian proposition, we might record some unanimous decision about the neutralisation of the islands, and the following decision was agreed to:—

"Quel que soit le *statu* futur des iles de la Mer Égée, nous sommes d'avis qu'elles doivent être neutralisées sous la guarantie des Puissances."

The French Ambassador said that he was instructed to raise no objection to the cession of all the islands to Greece, and he observed that the object of Russia in wishing to reserve four islands near the mouth of the Straits for Turkey would be accomplished by their neutralisation, even if they went to Greece. The Russian Ambassador doubted if this would be sufficient protection against blocking exit from the Straits.

It was understood that this part of our conversations did not apply to Crete, which would go in full sovereignty unconditionally to Greece.

The question of Salonica was raised. None of the Ambassadors had any territorial conditions to make.

The Austrian Ambassador said that he was instructed:—

"Que les conditions du port de Salonique et du chemin de fer y conduisant soit réglées à manière de garantir nos intérêts commerciaux."

He explained that freedom of commercial access would be a common interest, and no one made any objection to his stipulation.

The French Ambassador said that he was instructed that:—

"A ce qui concerne Constantinople, nous sommes fermement attachés au maintien du *statu quo*. Cette ville devrait donc demeurer en possession de l'Empire ottoman. La Turquie devra, en outre, conserver en Europe un territoire longeant la Mer de Marmara et les Dardanelles."

The Russian Ambassador said that though this was not mentioned in his instructions, he knew that it represented the view of his Government also.

No one raised any question or objection on this.

[*] Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 625), Sir E. Goschen (No. 313), Sir R. Rodd (No. 297), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 426).

I observed at the end of our sitting that if we adjourned on Friday (the 20th instant) without making any communiqué to the press, it would be supposed that we had come to a deadlock, or at least had made no progress. This would produce a very bad impression. I suggested, therefore, that the Ambassadors should ask their Governments to authorise some such communiqué as the following:—

"Que nous avons recommandé unanimement à nos Gouvernements respectifs le principe de l'autonomie de l'Albanie et une proposition garantissant l'accès commercial à la Serbie à l'Adriatique. Les six Puissances sont tombées d'accord sur ces principes."

The Ambassadors all agreed to do this.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[54544] No. 399.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 106.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 18, 1912.

THE German Ambassador informed me, just before the meeting of Ambassadors this afternoon, that he had had a visit from the first Servian delegate. He told me what had passed.

As this corresponded with what the Servian chargé d'affaires had come to tell me this morning, I told the Ambassadors the substance of my telegram No. 145, to Sir R. Paget.

The Italian Ambassador suggested that it would be worth while for the Ambassadors to ask their respective Governments for authority to let the Servian Government know the decision to which we had come about Servian commercial access to the Adriatic.

The Ambassadors thought that it would be well if this decision was communicated by me to the Servian chargé d'affaires in London.

I said that I should be prepared to do this if all the Governments authorised it.

I also told the Austrian Ambassador of the complaint that the Servian chargé d'affaires had made about the Austrian gun-boats.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[54514] No. 400.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 314.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 18, 1912.

I TOOK an opportunity of saying to the German Ambassador to-day that, having done so much to promote the agreement about Servian access to the Adriatic, I could do nothing about the claim of Montenegro to Scutari. If there came to be a difference between Austria and Russia on that point I must, after all that had happened respecting Servian access to the Adriatic, support the Russian Ambassador as regards Montenegro and Scutari. It was a point that had been unforeseen, and that I had not yet discussed with the Russian Ambassador; but I thought that, in all fairness after the settlement of the Servian access to the Adriatic, it was for Germany and Italy to do their part in getting over the difficulty about Scutari if it arose.

The German Ambassador did not dispute the fairness of this proposition.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 624), Sir E. Goschen (No. 315), Sir H. Rodd (No. 299), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 427).

[54362] No. 401.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 41.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 18, 1912.

THE Servian chargé d'affaires spoke to me to-day of the menacing movements on the part of Austria. Some Austrian gun-boats came so close to the Servian shore that they had damaged a bathing-place, and there was danger that an incident might be provoked. Servia would do all she could to avoid such provocation. He was apprehensive too that, when Servia put forward in the peace negotiations a demand for access to the Adriatic, an Austrian ultimatum would be sent to her. He asked me for information.

I said that I had no information to this effect. Count Mensdorff had said nothing since his return from Vienna to modify the information which I had previously received about the attitude of Austria. I promised to tell Count Mensdorff what the chargé d'affaires had said about the threatening movements of Austrian gun-boats.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[54361] No. 402.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 46.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 18, 1912.

DR. DANEF came to see me to-day. He showed me the demands which the allies thought of making *en bloc* on Turkey. They included the cession of all the Turkish dominions in Europe west of a line from the Black Sea to the Ægean that would leave Adrianople to Bulgaria. This meant the cession of Albania, the independence and organisation of which would subsequently be arranged between the Balkan States and the Great Powers. It meant also a cession of the Ægean Islands, and the removal of the last vestiges of Turkish authority in Crete. He said that he showed me these terms in case that I could give any advice as to how they might be viewed by the Great Powers.

I said that the Great Powers would certainly require to decide the status, the organisation, and the limits of Albania.

Dr. Danef thereupon said that he would propose to modify the terms by making a reserve that, when the Turkish territory was ceded, the limits and organisation of Albania should be left to the decision of the Great Powers.

I told him that this would be much preferable to his first alternative, and would avoid arousing difficulties with the Powers about Albania.

As he pressed me about the Ægean Islands, I said that I did not know what difficulties some of the Powers might raise; Dr. Danef himself had pointed out that certain of the islands commanded the Turkish coast, and that Turkey would be defenceless if they were ceded. The only solution which occured to me at the moment was that the islands should in some form be neutralised under the guarantee of the Powers, so that, whoever administered them, they should not be made into a place of arms, or fortified, or used for ships of war or for other warlike purposes.

Dr. Danef asked me whether, if the Turks refused the terms of peace, I would exercise influence with them in favour of their yielding.

I said that, especially as London had been chosen as the place for the peace negotiations, I must be neutral. I could not be a partisan of one party or the other. If I had to say anything to the Turks, it could only be that, if they broke off the negotiations and continued the war, and got the worst of it, they must not expect the Powers to intervene in their favour. The Turks might, however, have hopes of doing better if they resumed the war; and, if so, what I said would not influence them. All I could do would be to impress on them that, if they lost in the fighting, there could be no intervention in their favour.

Dr. Danef said that, if the peace negotiations were broken off and the war continued, the terms now proposed by the allies would be increased, and the question of the Straits would be raised. He was content that it should be made clear to the Turks that, if they went on fighting, they did so at their own risk.

I told him that this was the position which I should take up if need be. It was one which applied also to Bulgaria.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Dr. Danef readily admitted this, but he seemed confident that the Turks could not make headway if the war was resumed, and he appeared to think that Nazim Pasha himself knew that they could not make headway, for it was he who had wished to discuss terms of peace and an armistice.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[54515] No. 403.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 298.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 18, 1912.

AFTER having taken an opportunity to-day of speaking to the German Ambassador about Scutari in the sense recorded in my despatch of to-day to Sir E. Goschen, No. 314, of which a copy is enclosed,* I spoke in the same way separately to the Italian Ambassador.

The latter said that he regarded the question of Scutari as very embarrassing, owing to the relationship of the King of Montenegro, and the fact that he would be very persistent on the point, but the Ambassador did not differ from what I said.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[53342] No. 404.

Foreign Office to Secretary to Council of Foreign Bondholders.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 18, 1912.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, for the confidential information of your council, the accompanying copy of a memorandum,† which has been communicated to His Majesty's Government by the French Ambassador, embodying the conclusions of a commission appointed by the French Government to study the situation of the Turkish bondholders in consequence of the war.

Sir E. Grey understands that a representative of the German bondholders, probably M. Helferich, has been deputed to enter into discussion with this commission on the subject in question, and I am to enquire whether you desire to send a representative to Paris for the same purpose. I am to add that Sir E. Grey has reason to suppose that such a step would be welcomed by the French Government. He should proceed at once to Paris if the council decide upon this course.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[54115] No. 405.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 526.)
Sir, *Paris, December* 18, 1912.

TO-DAY being M. Poincaré's usual reception day, I called on his Excellency, and in the course of conversation mentioned that, in accordance with the suggestion which he had made to Sir Francis Bertie, I had been authorised to enter into conversation with one of the officials of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the interests of the foreign holders of bonds of the Ottoman Debt. I briefly repeated the gist of the proposals made to me by M. Gout, and said that I had not yet received an answer from you in regard to them. M. Poincaré replied that M. Gout had not represented the views of the French Government quite correctly. His wish was to confine the discussion of the question entirely to the officials of the two Governments, and he would be very pleased if a British official expert came to Paris, should it be necessary. He, of course, had no objection to meetings taking place between representatives of the British and French bondholders, but it was probable that their opinions would not

* No. 400. † [50220].

[54250] No. 406*.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received December 19.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, December 19, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, paraphrase of a telegram, dated the 19th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 406*.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Malta, December 19, 1912.*

FOLLOWING arrangements submitted for approval, with reference to Admiralty telegram No. 327, viz.:—

"Weymouth" to remain at Constantinople until Sir G. Lowther satisfied no more need for presence of a ship; but, subject to his concurrence, "Hampshire" to leave Constantinople 26th December.

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harmonise altogether with those of the two Governments. His Excellency stated that the German Government was taking the initiative in this question—he did not say in what way—and that he would communicate to me in writing the views of the French Government in two or three days. He begged that in the meantime no action should be taken on M. Gout's proposal, as I had the honour of reporting to you in my telegram No. 215 of to-day's date.

I have, &c.
LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE.

[54188] No. 406.

Council of Foreign Bondholders to Foreign Office.—(Received December 19.)

Sir, 17, *Moorgate Street, London, December 18, 1912.*

WITH reference to our letter of the 20th ultimo and your reply of the 6th instant respecting the Turkish debt, I have the honour to inform you that the Council of Foreign Bondholders learn from Sir Adam Block that the Greek authorities in Salonica have consented to allow the officials of the council of administration of the Ottoman Public Debt to continue the encashment of the ceded revenues, but it is reported that they intend to put a sequestration on the proportion of the revenues which revert to the Ottoman Government.

The Council of Foreign Bondholders beg to point out (1) that the service of the debt for the current year is still short of about £ T. 100,000, and (2) that the share of the Turkish Government in the surplus, if any, at the end of the year is assigned in the first place to the service of the 4 per cent. loan of 1904, and secondarily to that of the Bagdad Railway loans.

Sir Adam Block adds that he has asked His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to inform the British consul-general at Salonica of the above, but it appears that communications with the latter place are interrupted.

If Sir E. Grey can conveniently do so, the council venture to ask that the British consul-general at Salonica may be instructed to inform the Greek authorities that the revenues are ear-marked, and that they are not entitled to sequestrate them.

I have, &c.
JAMES P. COOPER, *Secretary.*

[54242] No. 407.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 200.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 19, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for the Director of Military Operations:—

"I hear from a good source that a few days ago the Emperor forbade calling out of any further reservists."

[54257] No. 408.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Athens, December 19, 1912.*

MY telegram of 16th December.

British ship from Constantinople called Lemnos, and reported "Barbarossa" practically destroyed; Admiral killed. Two other Turkish ships damaged.

[54264] No. 409.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 182. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, December 19, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs showed me to-day report of Italian Ambassador on the progress of the conference, which he considered satisfactory.

There were two points he was anxious about: (1) That the question of Scutari, which was most likely to present difficulties, should be deferred to the last, believing that, if all the other points are settled, it will be easier to conclude outstanding ones. (2) Dignity and importance of Christmas holidays are not so understood abroad as in England. To prevent any commentary a communiqué should be issued before the meetings were suspended announcing that good progress had been made, and that the suspension was really solely for the Christmas holiday.

[54140] No. 410.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, December 19, 1912.*

KING of Bulgaria arrived Salonica yesterday afternoon.

[54111] No. 411.

Vice-Consul Berner to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 19.)

(Télégraphique.) *Bari, le 19 décembre, 1912.*

VU que haute assemblée Ambassadeurs Grandes Puissances va examiner question peuples balkaniques, nous Albanais jugeons arrivé moment faire valoir nos droits nationaux. Nous attendons donc avec grande anxiété votre décision fondée sur intégrité la plus complète d'Albanie, unique solution apte garantir paix, équilibre balkanique et développement civil, qu'Europe même nous a cruellement dénié pendant des siècles. Après proclamation notre indépendance et Gouvernement provisoire, il est absolument nécessaire que MM. les Ambassadeurs commencent leur œuvre juste humanitaire par s'imposer contre cruauté qu'on exerce sur populations notamment de Scutari, qui, voulant être albanaises, vont mourir de lente agonie par privation moyens nécessaires vie, les innarrables souffrances des mêmes enfants albanais, exténués par faim, sévis par maladies, parlent par nos bouches, ce même cri proteste, pour peuple qu'après avoir payé son contribution, le sang généreux, pour obtenir sa rédemption, voit nouvelles oppressions, menaces par des petits États pas plus civilisés que lui. A vous, aux Ambassadeurs et à votre nation, qui a toujours brillé pour œuvres humanitaires, nous confions revendication nos justes postulations.—Au nom de tous les chrétiens et mahométans d'Albanie, les réfugiés à Bari, Loro, Askiku Gion Daragiati, Filip Graja, Ahmet Jeulli de Scutari, Gerim Begoolli d'Ipek, Menib Dorhatha de Telova, Ernest Kolendy de Janina, Gurasin Filip fom Stamola de Scutari.

[54101] No. 412.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie.

(No. 784.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 19, 1912.*

WE had already suggested to the Council of Foreign Bondholders that they should send a representative to Paris. If Herr Helferich is going to Paris on behalf of the German bondholders, it would seem fair that the British bondholders should take part in the discussion; but I have asked the council to suspend action until I receive definite information on this point. I am inclined to think that it is premature to open an official discussion with the French Government, but will await further information promised by M. Poincaré.

[54483] No. 413.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 428.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 19, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 423 of to-day to Berlin.

You had better not mention my conversation with Austrian Ambassador to Minister for Foreign Affairs unless he mentions it to you.

[54483] No. 414.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No 423.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 19, 1912.*

I OBSERVED to Austrian Ambassador that proposed communiqué respecting result of conversations of Ambassador this week ought to have a wonderfully reassuring effect upon European opinion. It was, however, very important that Austrian Government should take some means of showing that, in their opinion, the situation was ameliorated.

I spoke of anxiety caused by constant reports of mobilisation in Austria. Reports that I had received from our consuls for days past of movements of troops were alarming, but I had made no mention of them, regarding them as precautions on which it was not for me to comment, and relying upon what Ambassador had told me of Austrian attitude. If, however, after announcement of progress made by conversations of Ambassadors the mobilisation proceeded undiminished public opinion would become more anxious than ever. Ambassador said he did not like to report to his Government that I had mentioned mobilisation. I said I had not mentioned mobilisation except as an illustration of public anxiety, and he agreed to report that, in my opinion, if his Government could find some means of showing that it considered the situation ameliorated in consequence of the decisions come to by the Ambassadors it would complete the reassuring effect on public opinion.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of what has passed, and say that I do not distrust intentions of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that I realise what a delicate matter it is, and that German Minister for Foreign Affairs himself can no doubt appreciate and judge better than I can whether it is necessary or desirable to say anything further at Vienna. I have no object except to relieve public anxiety generally and avoid anything that would prevent diplomatic situation from continuing to improve.

(Repeated to Vienna, No. 427.)

[54096] No. 415.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1110.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 19, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 727 of 18th December: Turkish attitude at Peace Conference.

You should speak equally decidedly in same sense as your Russian, French, and German colleagues, and inform them of your instructions.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 1359; Paris, No. 783; and Berlin, No. 422.)

[54541] No. 416.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 296. Secret.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 19, 1912.*

THE Italian Ambassador said to-day that he had reported to Rome what I had said to him, to the effect that I hoped that Italy would use her influence in Vienna to get over the difficulty about Scutari, and that if the question became acute I must give my support to the Russian Ambassador. The Marquis di San Giuliano had replied that

he hoped that I would gain time on this question. He realised what an upset it would make in Montenegro if she was not to get Scutari, and he wished to gain time for three reasons:—

1. That he might have time to let his influence work in Vienna;
2. That the development of the military situation might possibly give a different aspect to the question;

[On this I said that I supposed he meant that Montenegro might take Scutari, and so be in actual possession. The Ambassador confirmed this interpretation.]

3. That, if everything was settled favourably, it would be more easy to induce Austria to give way about Scutari.

I said that the Russian Ambassador had already spoken to me seriously about Scutari. I had urged that the difficulty had not yet become acute, and that we should not discuss it at the meeting of Ambassadors until after the Christmas holiday.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[54540] No. 417.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 104.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 19, 1912.

THE Austrian Ambassador told me to-day that he had to put before me some general considerations which he might perhaps mention later at the meeting of Ambassadors. Austria could hardly ask for actual guarantees of good behaviour from Servia, but she could not agree to be exposed by Servian unfriendliness to scares and sudden armaments every three or four years. When Austria's neighbour was Turkey, regulated by European treaties, there was no risk of aggression. The Balkan States were now to take Turkey's place, and they, especially Servia, should be equally unaggressive. It was, however, not easy to fix the points on which demands could be made for Servia to show friendliness. A treaty of commerce would be one way, and it ought not to be disagreeable to Servia, because it would be as advantageous to her as to Austria.

I said that we had no reason to oppose a treaty of commerce between Austria and Servia, so long as the "open door" was preserved.

Count Mensdorff said that Austria would certainly not ask for any exclusive privileges; but she wished to have a real treaty of commerce—a thing which she had not at present.

I observed that I understood Count Mensdorff not to make any special demand on any given point. The objection to guarantees was that they might not be consistent with Servian political independence; and I gathered from what he said that this objection was the reason why he did not suggest actual guarantees.

This he confirmed.

I said that there had been some anxiety lest Austria might issue an ultimatum to Servia; but that, short of an ultimatum or of a demand for guarantees inconsistent with national independence, I would use all the influence I could to persuade Servia that she should behave like a good neighbour to Austria. I hoped he would consider that, in saying this, I had received what he said in a sympathetic spirit.

He replied that he would report what I had said, and that it was sympathetic.

I added that any influence which I could use would be little by itself; but I saw no reason to suppose that other Powers would not be equally sympathetic in influencing Servia to observe a friendly attitude of good neighbourhood towards Austria.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[54543] No. 418.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 622.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 19, 1912.

M. CAMBON spoke to me to-day of the anxiety caused by Austrian mobilisation, and of the difficulty which might arise respecting the possession of Scutari by Montenegro. He expressed views which entirely coincided with mine.

I told him what I had already said to the German and Italian Ambassadors about Scutari, and as to Austrian mobilisation. I told him what I proposed to say to the Austrian Ambassador this afternoon. This was subsequently recorded in my telegram, No. 425, of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[54542] No. 419.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 425.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 19, 1912.

COUNT BENCKENDORFF spoke to me to-day about the difficulty as to Scutari. I told him what I had already said to the German and Italian Ambassadors on this subject, and I also told him of what I had said to Count Mensdorff this afternoon about Austrian mobilisation.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[55902] No. 420.

Conference of St. James.

PROTOCOLE No. 3.

Séance du 6 (19) décembre 1912.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Bulgarie :

MM. Danev, Madjarov et le Général Paprikov ;

Pour la Grèce :

MM. Vénizélos, Skouloudis, Gennadius et Streit ;

Pour le Monténégro :

MM. Miouchekovitch, le Comte de Voïnovitch et Popovitch ;

Pour la Serbie :

MM. Novakovitch, Nicolitch et Vesnitch ;

Pour la Turquie :

Réchid Pacha, Osman Nizamy Pacha et le Général Salih Pacha.

LA séance est ouverte à 4 heures ½, sous la présidence de M. Vénizélos.

Le protocole de la séance précédente, lu par le secrétaire, M. Tchaprachikov, est adopté.

M. Dance annonce que pour donner suite au désir exprimé par la conférence, Sir Edward Grey a désigné comme secrétaire anglais, au service de la conférence, M. H. Norman, secrétaire d'ambassade de 1re classe.

Réchid Pacha propose d'exprimer les remerciements de la conférence à Sir Edward Grey pour cette nomination.

Le Président annonce que Sa Majesté le Roi daignera recevoir les plénipotentiaires, sauf ceux qui sont accrédités à Sa Cour, le samedi prochain à midi, et que, en vue de la

prochaine interruption des séances parlementaires, les fêtes qu'on a l'intention d'organiser en l'honneur des délégations sont remises jusqu'à la rentrée des Chambres.

Il fait part à la conférence que le gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique a eu l'amabilité de faire des arrangements spéciaux en vue de faciliter l'expédition des télégrammes et de la correspondance des délégations.

M. Danev observe que, malgré la décision prise à la séance précédente de tenir les délibérations de la conférence absolument secrètes, des informations paraissent avoir été données à la presse. Il exprime l'espoir que des indiscrétions regrettables de ce genre ne se renouvelleront plus.

Le Président demande à Réchid Pacha s'il a reçu les instructions qu'à la séance précédente il a déclaré devoir demander à son gouvernement.

Réchid Pacha répond que les instructions du gouvernement ottoman sont parties de Constantinople mardi soir, par voie de Constantza, par courrier spécial, qui vraisemblablement n'arrivera à Londres que demain, vendredi, dans la soirée.

En présence de cette communication, la conférence décide de s'ajourner à samedi, 4 heures, afin, ajoute le Président, de laisser aux délégués ottomans le temps de prendre connaissance des instructions qu'ils auront reçues.

La conférence maintient le même ordre du jour.

La séance est levée à 4 heures ¾.

Le Président :

E. K. VENISELOS.

Les Secrétaires :

H. NORMAN.
S. TCHAPRACHKOV.
A. C. VOURos.
S. Y. GROUÏTCH.
D. NORADOUNGHIAN.

[54273] No. 421.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 105.)

Sir, *Belgrade, December 9, 1912.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 32 of the 25th ultimo, transmitting copy of a letter from the All India Moslem League on the subject of the alleged extermination of Ottomanised serbs by the Servian army in Macedonia, I have the honour to state that I have been unable to obtain any further information beyond that contained in my despatch No. 87 of the 21st ultimo.

Some observations bearing upon the question will also be found in Mr. Vice-Consul Peckham's despatches Nos. 8 and 9 of the 16th and 25th November respectively.

There is, unfortunately, reason to believe that gross excesses and cruelties were committed by the column under the command of General Zhivkovitch which operated in the Sanjak of Novibazar and the western part of the vilayet of Kossovo.

I have &c.

R. PAGET.

[54283] No. 422.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 208.)

Sir, *Athens, December 14, 1912.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 300 and to Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 213, both of the 10th instant, I have the honour to report that on the 11th instant I reminded M. Coromilas that it was customary in war to treat as private property funds deposited in banks, even if the latter are privileged, and pointed out that the Greek military

authorities would incur responsibilities if they laid hands on the funds of the agencies of the Ottoman Bank in towns occupied by their troops.

The French Minister, who had previously received similar instructions by post, was unable to execute them until yesterday, when he spoke in the same sense. M. Coromilas's answer was the same to both of us, namely, that nothing had been touched at the Ottoman Bank at Salonica, except certain funds belonging to a Turkish Government account, and that no objection had been raised by the bank officials to their confiscation. The same thing, he said, had, he understood, been done at Monastir and Uskub.

I have, &c.

F. ELLIOT.

[54274] No. 423.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 107.)

Sir, *Belgrade, December 14, 1912.*

I SAW M. Pasitch yesterday and informed him of the advice you had given to the Servian chargé d'affaires that Servia should be careful to make it clear that all that was being done in the course of military operations was not permanent, but only provisional, and I communicated to him your additional recommendation that in order to avert danger from Austria his Excellency should make a declaration that as regards her claims Servia is prepared, if there be dispute, to leave them in the hands of the Great Powers and accept whatever agreement they may come to unanimously.

M. Pasitch then told me that according to information he had received the Austrian Government had been hesitating last week between accepting the invitation to the Ambassadors' conference and presenting peremptory demands to Servia. This had caused him to ask for your advice. Fortunately the danger seemed for the moment to be averted by the fact of Austria participating in the conference, and in view of this he thought it would be advisable to defer for the present making the declaration you suggest officially. It would be time if Austria pressed for some statement of Servian intentions. He would then reply that until peace was concluded and it is seen what the terms are with Turkey no territorial questions could well be discussed, and that the ultimate arrangements about territory would rest with the Powers. He would take no step without consulting the allies and the Powers of the Triple *Entente*. Austria knew well enough from articles published in the official press and from assurances given to several of the foreign representatives that Servia is willing to submit to the decision of Europe. It was, however, unquestionably Austria's determination to have negotiations *en tête-à-tête* with Servia, and hence a declaration, which would tend to stultify her purpose, might cause irritation at Vienna. Indeed, an Austrian newspaper had already stated that for Servia to refer Austria to the Powers would be considered an unfriendly act.

Previous to seeing M. Pasitch I had spoken to my Russian colleague of your instructions, and as he seemed to think that possibly a spontaneous declaration made now by M. Pasitch might be interpreted by Austria as the result of her intimidation and encourage her to think she can drive a hard bargain with Servia we agreed that it would be best that the Servian intention of submitting to the decision of the Powers, whilst being conveyed to the Austrian Government through an official mouthpiece, should be conveyed as undemonstratively as possible.

In view, therefore, of the objections which had been respectively raised by M. Pasitch and M. de Hartwig I suggested that, as the Austrian Minister was in the habit of visiting the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs almost daily, perhaps the latter might casually in conversation make the desired statement. In this suggestion M. Pasitch concurred, and said he would instruct M. Yovanovitch accordingly.

The Servian Government are not unnaturally a good deal disappointed and preoccupied at the fact that their present reasonable attitude on the Adriatic port question should not yet have been successful in diminishing the Austrian military preparations. They fear these are being maintained to place the monarchy in a commanding position to impose Austrian ideas concerning the delimitation of Albania, and also to force upon Servia the distasteful conditions of some *modus vivendi* agreeable to Austrian interests. The overtures in this direction of Austrian unofficial agents,

such as Professor Masaryk, are, M. Pasitch informs me, becoming constantly more pressing.

Although this method of proceeding on the part of Austria scarcely commends itself to a sense of fair play and is not likely to bring her much benefit in the end, it must be remembered that a hostile Servia, unfettered by any conditions, would be capable of causing serious inconvenience and prejudice to Austrian enterprise and trade in the Balkan Peninsula, and, secondly, that semi-mobilisation has come to be the accepted state in which Austria argues with Servia. As the position of the two countries towards one another is such that other Powers cannot satisfactorily understand and arrange all their differences for them, it is not only more or less recognised here that Austria is entitled to negotiate *en tête-à-tête* with Servia, but it is believed that, notwithstanding her present participation in the Ambassadors' conference, she will somehow succeed in this purpose, and that the sooner this happens the greater the chance of peace in Europe.

The objection to such a *tête-à-tête* is, of course, the uncertainty as to what conditions Austria may seek to impose, and whether these might not conflict with the interests of the other Powers. The Servian Government, however, are well aware of the tendency of such schemes as a customs union between Austria and Servia or Austria and the Balkan States, and are by no means desirous of encouraging them. M. Pasitch, moreover, himself called my attention to the declaration made by Servia during the negotiations of the Anglo-Servian Treaty in 1907 (see *Procès-verbal* No. 5), viz., that Servia would not enter into a customs union with any but the Balkan States, and there subsequently seems little reason to apprehend that any negotiations between Austria and Servia would result in detriment to our commercial interests. Austria's chief preoccupation seems to be lest the Balkan States form a customs union without her inclusion, and M. Pasitch has somewhat adroitly turned this preoccupation to account by stating to the Austrian Minister that the more Servia's free egress upon the Adriatic is obstructed the more likely is Servia to seek a customs union with her allies, in order to obtain an advantageous outlet by another route. He stated at the same time that when the present Austro-Servian Commercial Treaty expired he would be very glad that it should be superseded by a treaty on a more liberal and advantageous basis for both countries. He felt obliged to point out, however, that the limitations in the present treaty had been devised by the Austrian Government, not by Servia.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[54278] No. 424.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 304.)
Sir, *Rome, December* 15, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Egyptian Prince, Ahmed Fuad Pasha, uncle of the reigning Khedive, has arrived in Rome after a visit to Vienna.

Prince Fuad, who was educated in Italy and is well known here, has constituted himself a sort of apostle of the Albanian cause, and has been giving interviews to representatives of the press. He is reported to have said that in order to ensure the future of Albania it must be made independent and not merely autonomous, and that Albania could not decline to accord to Servia the freedom of a port in Albanian territory. He was himself at the disposal of the Albanian people, and believed, if he were called upon by them, he would not be altogether inadequate to the mission of ensuring their future prosperity with the assistance of Italy and Austria-Hungary, the friends of Albania.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[54276] No. 425.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 169.)
Sir, *Belgrade, December* 17, 1912.

CERTAIN statements in Sir F. Cartwright's telegram, No. 197, and in my telegrams, Nos. 49 and 80, appear to be in direct conflict.

It seems incredible that M. Pashitch and M. Yovanovitch should deliberately

fabricate the statement, several times repeated to me, that the Servian Government was being approached through unofficial channels by the Austrian Government, and that they should further accompany the statement with circumstantial information concerning schemes submitted to them by various supposed Austrian agents. But, on the other hand, Sir F. Cartwright's information indicates that no proposals of this nature have originated with the Austrian Government.

I do not desire for a moment to champion the veracity of Servian officials, but, since the revelations in connection with the Vassitch affair, it is only fair to say that the statements of Austrian officials are, perhaps, even less worthy of credence and confidence than those of Servians.

The least offensive conclusion to arrive at in the present instance would probably be that Professor Masaryk has had no mandate from either Government and has allowed himself to be carried away by imagination and his own eagerness to play the rôle of negotiator. It will also be remembered that I have mentioned, besides Professor Masaryk, another deputy and a Dr. Redlich, as acting in the capacity of intermediaries, and therefore, whilst Count Berchtold may have been unwilling to discuss matters with Professor Masaryk, who is unsympathetic to him, it does not follow that he may not have desired to sound the Servian Government unofficially through one of the others in whom he may have more confidence.

If it be a fact that Austria desires no privileged economic position in Servia, the continuance of her military precautions becomes still more difficult of explanation.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[54277] No. 426.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 110.)
Sir, *Belgrade, December* 17, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of an interesting despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub, commenting upon the present conditions in his district generally.

I might call special attention to those portions which deal with the probable formation of bands in the future, and with the antagonism between Serbs and Bulgars.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 426.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 14. Confidential.)
Sir, *Uskub, December* 12, 1912.

A FEW personal impressions of public opinion here may not be amiss at the present juncture.

For Servia the arch-enemy is not Turkey but Austria. Servian victories in Macedonia, and other recent events, have not increased this hatred—that is impossible—but they have distinctly increased confidence in the event of an Austro-Servian war. Two or three times I have heard the opinion: "We have taken the measure of both Austria and Turkey, and consider Austria the weaker country of the two." There also seems to be the feeling, "Now is our chance, our men are seasoned, but have had time to recoup since Monastir, our artillery is in good order and is better than the Austrian, and we can arm our third ban with Turkish Mausers." With regard to the artillery, I hear that a representative of the house of Creusot was here lately to overhaul the Servian cannon, and reported that they were all in excellent condition. I do not believe that the Servians have lost a single gun in the war, on the contrary, they have gained some; they express themselves content with the Turkish cannon, and—more important—have several Greek Creusots which they recaptured from the Turks at Monastir. As I have already had the honour to report to your Excellency (my telegram No. 8 of to-day), the men now being sent up the line believe that they are going to fight Austria, and go with a right good will.

I have traced a certain amount of discontent with Bulgaria. "People believed in Bulgaria and not in us, yet from the beginning we reinforced Bulgaria with men, horses, and money. So far we have done all the big fighting" (this conveniently ignores Lozengrad and Lule Burgas), "and now, if hostilities recommence with Turkey, we are to take all responsibility for Adrianople, which will be a tough fight, while the Bulgarians will fire a few shots at Chatalja, and have the best of the triumphant entry into Constantinople."

Greece comes lower in their estimation. "The Greeks do nothing but lounge in the cafés of Salonica, while it was really we who took the town. In the plan of campaign it was their duty to take Monastir, where we had our bloodiest battle, and where we had to fight against Creusot guns, which those cowardly Greek artillerymen had abandoned to the Turks. Now we are going to keep those guns, and we are going to keep Monastir." (This apparently refers to one of the many schemes of partition, by which Monastir was assigned to Greece.)

Of their opinion of Montenegro I have heard little, it has been suggested to me that this is because they consider Montenegro beneath contempt. As it appears that Prisrend as well as Skodra should have fallen to Montenegrin arms, there is a certain amount of justification for this. To judge by M. Pasitch's manifesto (published in the "Mail," of the 25th November), the Servians propose to annex Dyakova, and are hardly pleased at the systematic sack of that town by their allies.

It may seem strange that I note no instance of appreciation for the fighting on the eastern side, or for the exploits of the Greek navy, but I have heard of none.

Towards the Albanians the higher Servian authorities display the most unexceptionable sentiments. "Under our communal system of local government they will have real autonomy." I have already given my reasons for believing that in practice Servian administration will be partial (No. 8 of the 16th November). I have heard no more news of massacres, such as that of the Lyuma Albanians, and am not even certain as to the truth of that, but little or no news is coming in from north of the Sar Planina these days.

From what I can gather the question of the Adriatic port is considered one of life or death to Servia. "If we do not get our outlet the whole object of the war is stultified," was the opinion of an officer of my acquaintance.

Remains the question of the attitude of the peoples of Kossovo towards the Servians. The Ottoman Serbs want annexation, every other element would prefer autonomy. I am dealing with the Albanians in separate despatches, but would add here my impressions on public opinion south of the Sar.

There is, I believe, no doubt that if Uskub sanjak is annexed to Servia, the great mass of the non-Serb urban population will emigrate. There are over 2,000 Bulgar households in Uskub, I am told that perhaps 100 will remain, the rest will leave on the earliest opportunity. The same applies to the smaller communities—Greeks, Vlachs, Jews, and Armenians.

More serious is the question of the rural population. At first I imagined that there would be a partial emigration into Old or New Bulgaria, and that the bulk of the Bulgar peasant population—and nearly all the Christian villages of Uskub sanjak are Exarchist—would stay, *adscripti glebæ*, and become denationalised. But enquiries prove that a much more formidable future awaits us. The Bulgar chetniks here say that under the Servian régime there will be infinitely more bands in "Old Servia" than there ever were under the Turkish, and it appears that they will rest content with nothing short of the Sar Planina–Crna Gora frontier, as planned at San Stefano. The policy will be the old familiar one—propaganda and the hope of provoking European intervention.

It appears that there was recently a meeting held at Sophia to protest against the Servian treatment of Bulgars; that this was in part promoted by the Exarchist Metropolitan of Uskub, and that the censorship now prevents Bulgarian newspapers coming here.

I would offer two possible reasons for this general discontent:—

First, the inhabitants seem to have had exaggerated expectations of the discipline of a conquering army. I tried to point out to one man that no possible discipline would stop looting in war time, and that our own troops had looted in South Africa. "If I had seen it with my own eyes I would not have believed it," was the reply. I have heard of cases where there was evidence enough to secure convictions for long terms of imprisonment, but so deep-rooted is the local distrust of the Servian Government that the natives are most unwilling to come forward to testify. Thus there is established a

sort of vicious circle: the inhabitants will not take action to convict, the soldiers continue looting with comparative immunity, and the more they loot the more they alienate public opinion.

And the rank and file of the army have an unpleasant habit of propagandism. "What are you?" "Bulgar." "No, you are not; you are a Serb." I have also heard of cases of Catholics being abused for describing themselves as "Latin." I quote these cases, not so much as indictments against the Servian army, but because they are alienating the sympathies of the local population, which seems to expect that the civilian shall go scot-free from the horrors of war.

Secondly, I consider that the attitude of the higher authorities has not been so conciliatory as it might have been, and has roused an uneasy suspicion, or rather a firm conviction, that the little finger of Servia will prove thicker than Turkey's loins. I am told that the commandant of Prishtina abused a Mahommedan merchant of that town for keeping his fez on in his presence. As, in point of fact, a Moslem would consider it insolence to uncover before a stranger, this ignorance on the part of a high Servian officer of the elementary customs of the country he was in seems to me little less than criminal.

I have repeatedly pointed out to Servians that I consider that they are making a grave mistake in only publishing notices in Servian, when there is no lack of translators or founts of type for the other languages in use here. One, M. Cavrilovié (ex-Servian consul), assured me that he shared my opinion, and had tried to impress it on his higher authorities, but the general impression seems to be that it is a right of the conqueror, ignoring the fact that it may well lose them a large section of the population, which they can ill afford to spare.

Another serious error was the failure to secure the safety of property from the first moment of the Servian entry here. Thanks to the action of Said Nolia and M. Karayevof, the bazar was, I believe, intact when the Servians entered. It was pillaged subsequently, and a great quantity of Government archives have been destroyed, including those of the law courts and the land registry. Some of this was done by interested persons before the Servians had taken sufficient steps to secure the archives. Some was done, if not by the soldiery, at least with their tacit consent.

It is also said that the authorities have shown a gross partiality towards the Serb villages, never examining them for loot, while pursuing remorseless investigations in Bulgar villages. I also hear that they have shown themselves even more amenable to bribery than the Turks were.

Again, I would insist that I am not quoting these cases as indictments against the Servian army, but as rumours which are alienating the local population. It appears to me that, however well the higher commands may have succeeded in matters of strategy, they have failed signally in the not less important qualities required for the pacification and conciliation of a conquered country.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

[54285] No. 427.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December 20.*)

(No. 222.)

Sir, *Vienna, December 17, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the following official communiqué appeared in this morning's issue of the "Fremdenblatt":—

"The investigation instituted by the Imperial and Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs into the affair of Consul Prochaska at Prizrend by means of a delegate sent from Vienna—an investigation which has been somewhat protracted owing to the great distances and the conditions resulting from the state of war—has now been concluded. The result of this investigation has fortunately proved that no foundation exists for the rumours which were current to the effect that Consul Prochaska had been actually kept a prisoner at his post, or had even been maltreated by the Servian authorities.

"The official complaints made against this consular functionary by the Servian Government, who requested his removal on the ground that shots had been fired from the Austro-Hungarian consulate on the Servian troops when the latter entered Prizrend, have been shown to be entirely groundless.

"On the other hand, the Servian military authorities in Prizrend have certainly been repeatedly in the wrong, from the point of view of international law, in their attitude towards our consulate, our consul, and his staff. The incidents which have occurred in this connection will be communicated to the Servian Government with a request for adequate satisfaction. There is no reason to suppose that this satisfaction will be refused by the Royal Servian Government, whose attitude towards the delegate of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been entirely friendly."

The satisfaction with which this announcement has been greeted here is almost entirely eclipsed by amazement that it should not have been made before. It appears inexplicable that the Austrian public should have been left so long in ignorance of the real facts of a case which has been the principal reason for the intense excitement and hostility against Servia lately prevailing here. As you are aware, the public opinion of Austria-Hungary had been wrought up to a high pitch of exasperation by rumours of the murder or mutilation of Consul Prochaska—rumours the result of which was to intensify greatly the critical character of the situation.

Newspapers of so divergent a character as the "Neue Freie Presse," the "Zeit," and the "Arbeiter-Zeitung," all demand with indignation why the fact of the consul's personal safety—a fact which they urge must have become known weeks ago to the Austro-Hungarian Government—was not communicated to the public without delay in order to avoid the dangerous exaggerations which were published broadcast and which might easily have led to war. The "Neue Freie Presse" uses particularly energetic language on this head. It dismisses as entirely inadequate the reasons given by the official communiqué for what it styles the incomprehensible delay in publishing the facts, which it declares should have been stated weeks ago, in order that the public might have known that the Prizrend incidents were not of a character serious enough to justify an appeal to arms. The "Zeit" observes that there can be no excuse for the failure of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to contradict the fantastic rumours which were put into circulation; while the Socialist "Arbeiter-Zeitung" demands who started these rumours if not the newspapers, which were in close connection with that Ministry? The latter newspaper concludes a most seathing leading article on the subject, with the observation that the effect of the Prochaska affair on the prestige of the Dual Monarchy will equal that of a lost battle.

Apart from these criticisms, great satisfaction is felt that a settlement with Servia of this much discussed affair is now imminent. It is judged from the friendly tone of the communiqué that some understanding has already been reached between the Austro-Hungarian and Servian Governments as to the manner in which satisfaction for the irregular action of the Servian military authorities is to be asked for and accorded.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[54310] No. 428.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 728.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 19, 1912*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 18th December.

To the French Ambassador Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that, while he might appreciate necessity for ceding Adrianople in peace conditions, it was quite impossible to persuade their military authorities that its retention was not indispensable.

Warning his Excellency of a probable danger in Asia Minor, the French Ambassador told his Excellency that it merely hung by a thread to the Empire.

[54365] No. 429.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 729.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 19, 1912.*

FOLLOWING received from Dardanelles to-day:—

"Turkish Minister of War arrived at Maidos this morning."

[54364] No. 427*.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received December 20.)

(Confidential.)
Sir,

Admiralty, December 20, 1912.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, paraphrase of telegrams, dated the 19th and 20th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 427*.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Malta, December 19, 1912.*

YESTERDAY the King of Bulgaria arrived at Salonica.

Enclosure 2 in No. 427*.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Malta, December 19, 1912.*

"MEDEA" sailed from here to-day.

Enclosure 3 in No. 427*.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Malta, December 20, 1912.*

"DUKE OF EDINBURGH" left Malta to-day.

[54385] No. 430.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 730.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 20, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1110 of 19th December.

I have spoken to Minister for Foreign Affairs on the same lines as my colleague. He explained difficulty of the position, which, according to him, was as follows:—

Nazim and Reshid had concluded an armistice which provided for the revictualling of the three invested towns, and verbal assurances were received by these delegates from M. Danef that Adrianople and Dedeagatch would eventually be left to Turkey.

The terms of this armistice were approved by the Cabinet, but when it came to the final signature it was found that the text had been altered [group omitted: ? by] the allies to exclude provisioning of towns, probably owing to Greek objections to the armistice.

However, in view of friendly assurances of Bulgarian delegates and in consequence of belief that the conclusion of a definite peace was only a matter of short time during which necessity for revictualling the fortresses would not occur, delegates unwisely signedthe armistice.

In view of above, retention of Adrianople by Turkey appeared to be assured, and it is exceedingly difficult for the Cabinet now to give way; and his Excellency hinted that the question of Adrianople might have to be referred to the council of Ambassadors in London. He laid stress on the fact that Adrianople was essential to Turkey, not so much on account of defence of Constantinople as for that of the Dardanelles and Gallipoli.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[54377] No. 431.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 239.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, December 20, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 18th December.

Visit of the King of the Bulgarians to Salonica concluded without any untoward incident, much to the relief of the Bulgarian Government. It is officially reported that two Sovereigns embraced and spent half-an-hour together. No important questions were, I hear, discussed, and King of the Bulgarians left for Serres same day.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[54386] No. 432.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 490.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 20, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from Rostov yesterday, viâ Odessa:—

"I hear from reliable source of the general mobilisation of the [group undecypherable: ? Terek] Cossacks.

"District atamans of Don Cossacks received sealed envelopes to be opened 23rd December."

[54387] No. 433.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 118.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, December 20, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 117 of 16th December.

I gathered that, whilst Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs was altogether cordial towards the new Servian Minister at their first interview, he was nevertheless quite

firm on the point that Servia cannot be admitted to the possession of an Adriatic port, although he would be willing to entertain almost any other proposal for affording an outlet on the Adriatic to Servian commerce.

I suggested to the Prime Minister that public opinion in Servia was gradually becoming accustomed to the idea of forgoing port. He admitted that this was partly correct, but said that he still feared an explosion when it came to evacuating places that had been occupied, especially if the limits of Albania were pushed far east and north. It was of great importance to Servia in this connection that Bulgaria should obtain Adrianople, as Bulgaria would then be more liberally inclined and might make a concession to Servia which would to some extent take off from disappointment concerning Albania. (This I much doubt, judging from my conversations with Bulgarian Minister, who says that limits between the Bulgarian and Servian spheres were quite definitely fixed previous to the war.)

According to the Prime Minister's ideas the eastern limit of Albania should be watershed running on the west of and parallel with Lake Ochrida and River Drin to a point about opposite to Matia on the coast where northern limit should come. He maintains that anything east or north of this would include villages with a majority of Serb-speaking population.

[54378] No. 434.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, December 20, 1912.*

MILITARY attaché asks whether he may have leave to proceed to Valona?

[54376] No. 435.

Royal Exchange to Foreign Office.—(Received December 20.)

(Telegraphic.) *Royal Exchange, December 20, 1912.*

FOLLOWING message was received yesterday by wireless at Lloyd's wireless station at Port Said:—

"Turks massacred Christians in Mitylene; number killed unknown. Greeks pursuing Turks after battle village Petras. Part Turkish fleet has been forced run ashore near Dardanelles owing to damage from Greek fleet."

[54264] No. 436.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 554.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 20, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 182 of 19th December.

I am prepared to sacrifice Christmas holidays, and adjournment of meetings of Ambassadors will only be because we have reached maximum of agreement that instructions and information at disposal of Ambassadors render possible at present. Other questions will be resumed after Christmas. I also think it desirable not to hurry question of Scutari, and this is in itself a reason for not meeting next week. You can inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[54893] No. 437.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 109.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 20, 1912.*

AT the meeting of Ambassadors to-day I was authorised to make the following communiqué to the press:—

"Les Ambassadeurs ont recommandé à leurs Gouvernements, qui les ont acceptés, le principe de l'autonomie albanaise avec une proposition garantissant à la Serbie un

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 627), Sir E. Goschen (No. 318), Sir R. Rodd (No. 300), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 429).

accès commercial à l'Adriatique. Les six Gouvernements sont tombés d'accord en principe sur ces deux points."

I was further authorised to make the following communication confidentially to the Servian chargé d'affaires for the information of his Government:—

"Autonomie albanaise garantie et contrôlée exclusivement par les six Puissances sous la souveraineté ou la suzeraineté du Sultan.

"Un accès commercial sera réservé à la Serbie par un port albanais, libre et neutre, desservi par un chemin de fer international sous le contrôle européen et sous la garde d'une force spéciale internationale, avec liberté de transit et franchise de droit pour toutes les marchandises, y compris les munitions de guerre."

Both these communications were authorised in consequence of instructions received by the Ambassadors from their respective Governments since our last meeting.

The Russian Ambassador made the following stipulation respecting the decision come to about Servian access to the Adriatic:—

"Reconnaissance à la Serbie du choix de la direction du chemin de fer et du port terminal.

"Toute garantie au Gouvernement serbe pour la liberté des études nécessaires pour établir son choix et pour celles du tracé du chemin de fer contre les difficultés qui pourraient éventuellement être créées par le futur Gouvernement albanais.

Droit pour la Serbie de participer au contrôle international de la ligne et du port.

I expressed the opinion, in which I understood the Ambassadors generally, certainly the French and Italian Ambassadors, to agree, that there was nothing in the Russian Ambassador's stipulation that was at all inconsistent with the decision to which we had come.

Finally, it was resolved that:—

"Sir E. Grey et les Ambassadeurs de l'Allemagne, de la France et de l'Italie ne soulèvent pas d'objection à la proposition du Comte Benckendorff, et se réservent de la soumettre à leurs Gouvernements respectifs. L'Ambassadeur de l'Autriche-Hongrie ne se prononce pas, et soumettra cette proposition à son Gouvernement."

We had some discussion as regards the eastern frontier of Albania. It was apparent that no settlement could be made simply in principle, the ethnographical principle being so vague; and the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors were therefore asked to produce maps at the next meeting, each with a line showing the views of their respective Governments.

We had now reached the maximum of agreement that the instructions and information in the possession of the Ambassadors rendered possible, and we had come to a unanimous decision in principle about Servian access to the Adriatic and the autonomy of Albania. It was therefore felt that we could do no further work until the respective Governments had had time to digest what we had put before them, and to consider the points which still remained.

I expressed the opinion that it was very desirable that this *réunion* of Ambassadors should not be dissolved as long as any difficulties remained. I thought that this week had shown that we provided a most excellent medium in which difficulties could be discussed.

The opinion seemed to be shared unanimously, and we agreed provisionally to meet again on the 2nd January next.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[54888] No. 438.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 42.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 20, 1912.*

THE Servian chargé d'affaires, in the course of conversation this afternoon, made several complaints about the treatment of individual Servians on Austrian territory.

I said that these were details between Servia and Austria on which I could not enter. As, however, he had on previous occasions expressed Servia's anxiety lest Austria

should be meditating an ultimatum or the exaction of some guarantees, I might tell him, though I had no definite communication of Austrian views to make to him, that, in conversation, the Austrian Ambassador had told me that Austria had no intention of demanding guarantees inconsistent with the political independence of Servia: all she desired was to be sure that Servia would act the part of a good neighbour. After the war, Servian political and economic independence should, I thought, be more than ever assured, provided that she could be a good neighbour to Austria.

The chargé d'affaires began to give instances to prove that Austria was to blame for any friction in the past.

I said that discussion of the past on my part, either with him or with the Austrian Ambassador, would be endless. What I wished to impress upon him was that the Austrian Ambassador asked for good neighbourhood, and not for exacting guarantees; and that, if this represented the view of the Austrian Government, it ought to be easy for Servia as time went on to let it be felt that she did not wish to make trouble for Austria.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[54892] No. 439.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 43.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 20, 1912.

THE Servian chargé d'affaires was instructed to make to me the communication of which he gave me to-day the following *aide-mémoire*:—

"La Serbie est entrée en guerre avec la Turquie pour délivrer ses connationaux et pour assurer une paix durable sur ses frontières, ainsi que son indépendance politique et économique. Après d'énormes sacrifices en vies et en argent, la Serbie, grâce à ses succès militaires, a délivré ses frères et a regagné les territoires sur la Mer Adriatique que la Turquie lui avait enlevés.

"Mais comme l'Autriche-Hongrie a déclaré qu'elle ne pourrait pas permettre que la Serbie conservât les territoires bordant sur la mer que son armée a occupés, le Gouvernement serbe, tenant sérieusement compte de cette déclaration et désirant vivre en paix et en amitié avec son puissant voisin, considère que le moment est arrivé—maintenant que les Ambassadeurs des Grandes Puissances se sont réunis à Londres pour un échange d'idées sur les questions litigieuses soulevées par la guerre—de remettre entre les mains des Grandes Puissances la question de l'accès de la Serbie à la mer, par territoire serbe, et de les prier en même temps de prendre en considération, lors de la solution de cette question, les sacrifices que la Serbie a supportés pour obtenir son indépendance économique et politique.

"*Légation Royale de Serbie, Londres,*
le 7 (20) décembre, 1912."

In return, I informed him that the Ambassadors had unanimously made a recommendation to their respective Governments, which all the six Governments had now approved. I was authorised on their behalf to give him confidentially, for the information of his Government, the following statement:—

"Autonomie albanaise garantie et contrôlée exclusivement par les six Puissances sous la souveraineté ou la suzeraineté du Sultan.

"Un accès commercial sera réservé à la Serbie par un port albanais, libre et neutre, desservi par un chemin de fer international sous le contrôle européen et sous la garde d'une force spéciale internationale, avec liberté de transit et franchise de droit pour toutes les marchandises, y compris les munitions de guerre."

After reading it, he asked me whether it meant that Servian commerce would be free from customs duties.

I replied that it was clearly intended that customs duties should not be levied at the Adriatic port on goods in transit for Servia.

The chargé d'affaires then asked me confidentially for my personal opinion whether, in view of this decision, it would or would not be desirable for Servia to stipulate, in the terms of peace with Turkey, for any territory giving access for Servia to the Adriatic.

I answered that my advice would be that, in the terms of peace, which I understood were to be presented *en bloc* by the allies to Turkey, Turkey should be asked to cede the territory to the west of a certain line, with the exception of Albania: of which the future *status*, organisation, and limits would be settled by the Powers. If I had given this advice before the Great Powers had come to the decision of which I had just told him, he might fairly have asked me how Servia was to be sure of any commercial access to the Adriatic; but, as Servia was now in possession of the unanimous decision of the Great Powers, she would safely leave the question of Albania to them, as far as commercial access to the Adriatic is concerned. By making the conditions of peace as I had suggested, she would avoid any interference with the Great Powers in the actual terms of peace.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[54889] No. 440.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 82.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December*, 20, 1912.

M. VENIZELOS came to see me to-day. He had discussed the future of the four Ægean islands near the Straits with Count Benckendorff, and he was aware of the Russian view. He pointed out that, if the islands went to Greece, Greece would then have no frontier with Turkey from which difficulties could arise; that good relations between Greece and Turkey were in the highest interests of peace; and that to facilitate this should be a reason for letting Greece have the islands.

I said that I raised no question about the merits. We had no interest in making stipulations as to who should have the islands. But it must be for Greece to make her arguments prevail with Russia, whose interests were affected in a way that ours were not.

M. Venizelos emphasised the advantage which it would be if, in the conditions of peace, Turkey agreed not to close the Straits against merchant traffic even in the time of war.

I said that we ourselves wished as strongly as M. Venizelos that the Straits should be kept open. I saw no inconvenience in making the demand upon Turkey, or in its being inserted in the conditions of peace. The difficulty was what to answer to Turkey if, being at war, she said that she must mine the Straits in order to protect Constantinople, unless we would prevent the fleet of her enemy from entering the Straits.

With regard to the terms of peace, M. Venizelos discussed what formula should be adopted about Albania. He was quite willing that the terms of peace should include a statement that the future status and organisation of Albania were left entirely to the Great Powers; but he thought that to put in the terms of peace a similar statement as to the limits of Albania would be to abdicate in advance all right for the Balkan States to have their views respecting the frontiers of Albania, which would also be their own frontiers, considered.

I said that there was nothing to prevent the Balkan States from making known to the Powers their views on this point.

M. Venizelos suggested that, in the terms of peace, a vague formula should be used, to the effect that Turkey was asked to cede everything west of a certain line with the exception of Albania, the future status and limits of which were to be settled later.

I said that I thought this formula would do. We ourselves had no direct interest in this question, and my only object in giving my opinion was to avoid any cause for interference by the Great Powers in the actual terms of peace arranged by the allies. Except as regards the four islands next to the Straits and the question of Albania and its limits, I did not think that the Great Powers would make any difficulties as regards territorial questions.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[54248] No. 441.

Sir Edward Grey to Spanish Chargé d'Affaires.

(Confidential.)

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to the Spanish chargé d'affaires, and, with reference to the enquiry which he recently made at the Foreign Office, has the honour to state that the conversations, which are not a conference, now taking place are between the Ambassadors of the *neutral signatory Powers of the Treaty of Berlin;* Roumania will not be admitted to those conversations, but if any question is dealt with such as the Kutzo-Vlachs in Macedonia or the rectification of the Roumanian frontier the Roumanian representative will probably be consulted. It is, however, hoped that Roumania will settle her territorial points of interest with Bulgaria direct; this is what she is trying to do.

Foreign Office, December 20, 1912.

[54457] No. 442.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 1065.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 13, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that I communicated to Sir Adam Block, for his perusal, Mr. Consul-General Lamb's despatch No. 168 of December 4th on the subject of the treatment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration at Salonica, of which a copy was forwarded to you in my despatch No. 1059 of December 12th.

Sir Adam Block has drawn my attention to the passage in this despatch in which the commissary of the Hellenic Government is stated to have expressed his readiness "to afford the administration the same support as it was accustomed to receive from the Ottoman authorities, putting a sequester on that proportion of the surplus revenues that should normally revert to the Government." Sir Adam points out that the Greek authorities at Salonica are not justified in putting a sequester on any portion of the debt revenues, seeing that there is no surplus of which a part reverts to the Ottoman Government until the receipts attain the amount required for the service of the debt.

The debt is still short by £T. 150,000 of the amount required for this year's coupon, and even when the coupon is assured the Government's share in the surplus is pledged and paid to the Ottoman bank to the amount of £T. 124,000, for the service of the 4 per cent. loan of 1904, and after that the rest of the Government's share in any surplus is assigned to the Bagdad Railway loans.

Sir Adam begged me to instruct Mr. Consul-General Lamb to inform the Greek authorities of the above, but I have advised him that, in view of the uncertainty of wireless communication with Salonica, it would be safer for him to get these instructions sent through the debt's representative in London and the Foreign Office.

In one or two instances lately I have not received replies to enquiries addressed to Mr. Lamb by wireless telegraphy, and, in view of the short time allotted to His Majesty's ships for wireless operations, the service seems to me too precarious to be utilised for matters of importance.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[54462] No. 443.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 1071.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 17, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1048 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copies of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica reporting on further atrocities committed on the Mahommedan population of certain districts.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 443.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 174.)

Sir, *Salonica, December* 11, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 166 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to enclose herewith a memorandum, compiled from notes supplied to me from what I have reason to consider a perfectly trustworthy source, concerning the atrocities committed in the town and neighbourhood of Stroumnitza after its occupation by the Bulgarians and the Serbs. Of all the reports that have reached me from various parts of the interior this is perhaps the worst, and the fact is the more remarkable in that Stroumnitza was not one of those regions where the Turks had behaved with particular cruelty in the past, or where there existed any special reasons for hatred between them and the Rayah population. The Turkish troops, at the time of their retreat, appeared to have burned the villages of Kuklitch and Mokrijevo, killing fourteen inhabitants, and also to have killed twenty-nine villagers of Kostorino, but these are the only instances of the kind of which I have heard in that region. The Christians of Kostorino subsequently avenged their dead, as related in the memorandum, but there seems to have been nothing in particular that could be pleaded in palliation of the excesses perpetrated in the town.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

P.S.—Copy of this despatch has been sent to Belgrade.

H. H. L.

Enclosure 2 in No. 443.

Memorandum on Bulgaro-Serbian Atrocities at Stroumnitza.

THE Turkish troops having been withdrawn from Stroumnitza, and a Bulgarian force with a commander named Mitof having been reported to be approaching, a deputation composed of the mufti, the president of the municipality, and the spiritual heads of the Greek and Bulgarian communities went out on the 23rd to 25th November in order to arrange with the latter for the surrender of the town. The Bulgarians accordingly entered the place without encountering any resistance and remained in possession for a couple of days, during which time thirty-four Mussulmans were murdered in the streets and twenty Turkish and two Greek houses plundered, but order was otherwise maintained.

On the 25th to 27th November, however, the Bulgarians withdrew, and a Servian force of some 500 men under a commander named Jivoin Ghirbitch came in and took their place. That day and the next also passed in relative tranquillity, but on the latter the command was taken over by a Serb named Putschik (?), and the aspect of affairs at once changed for the worse. Between the 26th to 28th and the 13th to 26th November no less than 557 Turks were done to death with every refinement of cruelty, but systematically and with a certain simulacrum of legal form.

A species of tribunal or commission was formed under the presidency of the Serbian commandant and composed of the following seven persons:—

Mgr. Gherassim, the Bulgarian Metropolitan;

A Bulgarian lawyer named Voltchef, who appears to have discharged the functions of civil governor of the town;

Two local Bulgars, named respectfully Mita Bujiklief and Kentchef; and

Three Greeks named Manoush Effendi, Koteho Hadjimano, and Hadji Yovan.

All the Turks in the place between the ages of 20 and 50 were arrested in daily batches and brought before this commission, which examined them separately and then decided their fate by votation. If six out of the seven members of the court declared him to have been a good man, the "suspect" was released, after being relieved of everything of value that he might happen to have upon him. If not, he was conducted to prison. After one or two days' confinement, the prisoners were first stripped to their shirts, then driven at the point of the bayonet to the slaughter-houses on the outskirts of the town, and finally shot or bayoneted to death. Amongst the victims were a number of soldiers (probably redifs) who had laid down their arms, and refugees from Radovishta and Osmanie, who had fled before the advancing foe. Many of these had previously enjoyed an excellent reputation, as, for instance, Ekrem Bey, a lawyer of Radovishta, an old landowner named Hadji Kadir Bey, and Dr. Abeddin. On the other hand several

far less reputable Turks, such as Youssouf Effendi, Kerim Agha, Neshet, Hassan and Selman Effendis, were preserved on account of former friendly relations with the Bulgarian Metropolitan. Many of the victims were atrociously mutilated by their executioners, before or after death.

On the 13th to 26th a Bulgarian named Karamanof was appointed governor of the district of Stroumnitza, and the operations of the terrorist tribunal appear to have been brought to a close. By that time every Mussulman or Jewish shop in the town had been sacked; and of the 800 houses in the Mussulman quarter hardly half a dozen remained intact. The dwelling of a Jew named Samuel Effendi was emptied of its inmates and most of its movable contents and adopted as the Government house by order of the police commissary, Djakoff Effendi. I am informed that before the close of the reign of Patschik large quantities of loot from the Turkish and Jewish shops and houses were collected at the Government house, ostensibly for the purpose of being restored to its owners, but that all the more valuable objects, such as carpets, shawls, tesbihs, clocks, and Sunday clothing were carefully selected, loaded on forty carts, and transported to the railway station for dispatch to Belgrade—whether on Government account or on that of Patschik himself my informant was unable to surmise.

The offices of the Public Debt and of the Régie were saved from destruction by the efforts of the procureur, Midhat Hakki Bey, who also succeeded in preserving the documents in his own department, but the archives in most of the tribunals were burned or otherwise destroyed.

At Radovishta both the Debt and the Régie offices appear to have been pillaged, if not destroyed.

A Bulgarian band-leader named Lefterof, with 200 acolytes, left Stroumnitza about the 26th November for Doiran, where, according to this informant, some 200 Turks were killed. Ninety murders had been reported to me as having taken place at Doiran before that date.

Large numbers of fugitives from the Stroumnitza region, as well as from Radovishta, Osmanie, and other places to the north, in their headlong flight towards Salonica, had got as far south as Doiran when the Bulgars entered that place. They were given assurances of security and ordered to return to their homes; but, as they approached the village of Kostorino, about half-way between Doiran and Stroumnitza, where, as mentioned in the covering despatch, some twenty-nine Christians had previously been murdered by the Turks, the inhabitants turned out and slaughtered men, women, and children without distinction. My informant estimates that between 700 and 800 unfortunates were so massacred, whilst 400 others died of cold or starvation. It is obviously impossible to check this estimate, but my informant himself saw hundreds of corpses on the road.

According to the same informant, the state of affairs at Ghevgheli was not so bad as I had reason to suppose when I cited that place in my despatch No. 161 of the 24th ultimo. The town was first occupied by a party of Serbs under Alexander Gheorgevich, and during the first four days there was much looting of Turkish houses and incidentally ill-treatment of Turks, violation of harems and assaults on Mussulman women. After the fourth day comparative order was established in the town itself, but every sort of violence was committed in the surrounding villages. My informant had records of over 120 murders committed on Mussulmans in that region, 65 of which occurred in the large village of Bogdantchi on the opposite side of the Vardar.

On the approach of the Serbs the Ghevgheli company of gendarmes had been collected and marched to Salonica, where it arrived in good order and reported itself to battalion head-quarters. The town of Tikvesh, however, though situated to the north of Ghevgheli, between that place and Kuprali, was not occupied until later, and the 150 gendarmes from the Tikvesh Kaza, retiring on Ghevgheli, arrived there on the 24th to 26th November only to find themselves prisoners of the Serbs. Four days later they were dispatched under a mixed escort of soldiers and comitajis, nominally for the purpose of being entrained for Belgrade. The belief prevalent in the town of Ghevgheli was, however, that they had been merely taken a little distance up the Vardar Valley and then done to death. It is within my knowledge that the gendarmerie officers at Tikvesh and Ghevgheli had exercised their authority in such a manner as to considerably impair the popularity of the force amongst the Christian villagers (see, for instance, my despatch No. 70 of the 27th May last), and it is conceivable that the comitajis may have been disposed to wreak vengeance on them for past oppression. The point, however, may possibly be capable of elucidation at Belgrade. With these 150 gendarmes are said to have been their commandant, Yuzbashi Said Bey, and Lieutenant Zia Effendi, together with another lieutenant, the Tabour Kiatibi, and an officer of redifs.

[54463]

No. 444.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 1072.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 15, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a despatch, No. 79 of the 4th December, from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout reporting on the increase in the agitation especially among the Moslem inhabitants of Syria in favour of British or Anglo-Egyptian intervention in Syria, or the establishment of a sort of local autonomy. The latter might conceivably take shape on the lines of Ismail Kemal Bey's recent action in Albania.

It is to be hoped that if the present peace negotiations in London are brought to a successful conclusion the agitation in question will die down or weaken in intensity. But the Turcification and anti-Arab policy of the Committee of Union and Progress during the last four years has so alienated the Syrian and other Arab populations that we must be prepared for the eventuality of a distinctly particularist or even separatist movement in Syria, a result to which the Zionist tendencies in the committee have also contributed.

Presuming that His Majesty's Government have no desire for the extension of their responsibilities to the regions in question, I have privately impressed on His Majesty's consul-general the necessity of being especially prudent and circumspect in his attitude in the matter, and also the advisability of being rather negative in dealing with any manifestations of pro-British nature. In view of the existence of a rival pro-French current and the fact that French public opinion and views about Syria may be different from those held in England, any positive acts of His Majesty's consul-general, even in deprecating or discouraging the movement, may easily intensify in the rather peculiar Syrian mind the impression that serious rivalry exists between the French and British, and this at a moment when the two Powers should show a united front in the Near East. Russia takes a special interest in the 300,000 odd Greek Orthodox Christians in Syria and in Lebanon matters my Russian colleague has all along given a free hand to France. It would seem essential that the three members of the Triple *Entente* should keep in line, especially in view of Germany's special interest in Alexandretta and contiguous North Syrian territory.

I am sending a copy of this despatch with its enclosure to His Majesty's agent at Cairo.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

P.S.—I enclose a copy of a telegram received from the Alliance libanaise, Cairo, showing that the Lebanese are aiming at an extension of territory as part of the reforms they require.

G. L.

Enclosure in No. 444.

Copy of Telegram received December 15, 1912, from Cairo.

SEULES les réformes basées sur autonomie effective et extension territoire peuvent rendre au Liban tranquillité et arrêter émigration ruineuse. Toutes réformes sur autre base resteront stériles.—ISKANDER AMOUN, Président Alliance libanaise.

[54464]

No. 445.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 1078. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 17, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1049 of the 8th instant I have the honour to forward to you, herewith, copies of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir, reporting on the present position of affairs in that province.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 445.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 82. Confidential.)

Sir, *Monastir, December* 8, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report as follows on current events in this district :—

The Military Position.

1. *The Serbs.*—The Danube division of the 1st ban under General Bojanovich, the Timok division of the 2nd ban under Colonel Milutinovich, and the Cavalry division under Prince Arsène, have left the Monastir district for Uskub.

General Bolovich, the chief-of-staff of the Servian 1st army, left Monastir by motor for Uskub on the 1st instant, and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, commander-in-chief of the same army, left for Salonica and Uskub on the 2nd.

The Drina division of the 1st ban under General Yourishich is at Perlepé.

The Morava division of the 1st ban under General Boikovich is here.

The Morava division of the 2nd ban under Colonel Nedich is believed to be distributed between Resna, Ochrida, and Struga. It has also a contingent at Dibra. A portion of it has gone to Elbassan. (Dibra was occupied on the 28th without resistance.)

2. *The Turks.*—Javid Pasha joined hands with Zekki Pasha and Karasaid Pasha on the 23rd November at Gorcha, where they seem to have been reinforced by the 17th division under Mustapha Pasha and the Monastir redif division under Mehmet Ali Pasha. There the bulk of the army halted, but numbers of soldiers are reported to have straggled on, subject to no control, towards Valona and Janina. Subsequently Zekki and Karasaid seem to have left Gorcha with a portion of the army, but their present whereabouts is unknown. Ali Riza, commander-in-chief of the western army is supposed to have gone to Valona.

Javid Pasha with a force said to be about 30,000 strong and to include the best of the remaining troops is at Gorcha. He is by no means hopeless of the result of a further encounter with the Greeks. To a British subject who passed through Gorcha a few days ago, whilst proceeding by permission of the Turks from Janina to Monastir, he remarked: "The Greeks have invited me to surrender. They had better come and take me."

According to all accounts, there is no lack of food in Gorcha. But ammunition must be scarce, and the Turks have very little artillery. Of his seven field-guns Javid lost four, which the jaded teams could not get through the heavy mud on the Resna road. He has a few mountain-guns and seven machine-guns.

One of the most serious elements in his position is the dwindling of his force through desertion, which is reported to be taking place on a large scale. This is, no doubt, known to the Greeks. It may account for the inaction of the 3rd division which was sent against him from Castoria with some cavalry more than ten days ago. A Greek staff officer tells me that the reluctance to bring on an action with him is due to his alleged intention, if attacked, of burning Gorcha, which is mainly inhabited by orthodox Albanians.* At the same time his severe handling of the 5th division early in November has probably not been forgotten.

3. *The Greeks.*—The 3rd division is, as before stated, between Castoria and Gorcha.

The 4th and 6th divisions are still at Florina.

The 5th division, which was recently at Kuilar, has gone towards Janina. One of its objects may be to prevent a possible junction between Javid Pasha's troops and the Janina division.

The Ownership of Monastir. Relations between the Serbs and Greeks.

The Greeks set much store upon the town of Monastir and the ancient bishopric of Pelagonia. They attribute its occupation by the Serbs to a miscarriage of their

* There appears to have been no attempt to molest the Christians of Gorcha. Good order seems to have been maintained there, notwithstanding the presence of a large body of troops which must for several days have been in a chaotic condition.

military plans, which, they hold, should not prejudice their claim.* M. Mavroidis, the late Greek consul in this town, who is now administering the Florina district bears out the statement of General Danglis mentioned in my last despatch to the effect that according to an agreement between the allies made before the war Monastir should fall to the lot of Greece. His own present designation is understood to be "Governor of Western Macedonia and Acting-Governor of Florina." He recently spent a day here, and it was remarked that he had no relations with M. Noushitch, also an ex-consul, who has been appointed by the Servian Government as civil governor of Monastir, including the districts of Ochrida, Krushevo, and Perlepé.

The Serbs certainly have given no sign of an intention to withdraw. On the contrary, M. Noushitch tells me emphatically that he is not a temporary governor. He denies that the agreement as to frontiers was as precise as the Greeks aver and anticipates that the southern frontier of Servia will be roughly as follows:—

From the mouth of the Skoumbi on the Adriatic it would follow the course of that river so far as possible to Lin on the western and Peschani on the eastern shore of Lake Ochrida. Passing thence to a point on the western shore of Lake Presba, it would strike through its waters to Popli, and from there to Kenali and Brod on the Cherna Karasou, which it would follow towards Krivolak. (Servian detachments are actually at Kenali and Svezda, which is near the south-western extremity of Lake Presba). This would be a frontier considerably more favourable to the Serbs than that outlined by General Danglis, as reported on the last page of my despatch No. 81 of the 27th November. It would add to their acquisition in this district the area contained by a rough quadrangle bounded on the west by Peschani on Lake Ochrida and Popli on Lake Presba, and on the east by Rasimbey Khan on the Cherna Karasou and Brod on the same river.

The Servian military authorities too are believed to be strongly in favour of keeping all that has been acquired, and the most is likely to be made of the sacrifices in men and money incurred by the campaign south of Perlepé.

To say nothing of ethnical considerations the Greek claim to Monastir is based on tradition and an alleged agreement, whilst the Servian right is of conquest.

Were it conceivable that a partition of this district could in the circumstances be made on a purely ethnical basis, Bulgaria would have an overwhelming claim not only to the kazas of Monastir, Kirchevo, and Perlepé, but also to Ochrida, Florina, and Castoria.†

The whole Christian population is as disinclined as ever to welcome Servian authority. Relations too between the Servian and Greek military authorities are believed to be far from cordial. The respective general staffs would appear to have never harmoniously co-operated. So much so that during the fighting round Monastir the staff of the Servian 1st army fully supposed that the 22nd and 23rd divisions, which had from the first been in the sphere of the Greek operations, were amongst their opponents. The Greeks now accuse the Serbs of encroachment, and the Serbs ridicule the failure of the Greeks to intercept the Turkish retreat from Monastir, their dilatory operations round Janina, and their apparent unwillingness to again face Javid Pasha.

If the attitude of both parties here reflects the feelings of higher authorities, the solution of the frontier question is likely to be difficult.

Position in the outlying Districts.

Rumours of pillage and destruction by Servian patrols in the villages are frequent. It is impossible at present to verify the many reports, and they can only be recorded with due reserve as such. That whole districts have been devastated is certain. Thousands of families of all denominations are homeless and moneyless in the depth of winter. All accounts tend to show that responsibility for this does not rest with the Turkish armies alone. The general belief is that, when all is known, there will be little to choose in the matter of excesses between the Christian and Moslem troops.

Some villages seem to have been laid waste by more than one of the combatants.

* The Greek force which advanced towards Monastir early in November, contrary to its instructions, provoked a division of the Turkish forces and weakened by several divisions the army opposing the Servian columns converging on this town. The Greeks argue that but for this the Serbs would have met with a more prolonged resistance, during which they themselves would have had time to occupy Monastir—according to the plan.

† My Russian colleague appears to be much interested in proving that a Bulgarian claim to these districts would be entitled to a hearing.

Position in Monastir.

Good order now prevails here. The cases of pillage referred to in my last despatch have not been repeated, the carcases which strewed the outskirts of the town have been buried, and efforts are being made to clean and light the streets.

The most genuine grievance of the inhabitants is the continued suspension of the railway service. This is due to the refusal of the Serbs to treat with the railway company on the same terms as the Turks in respect of the section between this town and Florina. For the section between Salonica and Florina the Greeks have accepted the terms of the company. Consequently Monastir is in almost the same position as if Florina were the terminus of the line. Passengers are sometimes able to obtain places in special trains, but goods traffic is entirely suspended still.

The governor, however, informs me that he has arranged for the transfer from the Uskub line of an engine and some rolling-stock, and that communications will be re-established almost at once.

As an outcome of the prolonged interruption of communications, there is a dearth of many necessary commodities. Sugar, petroleum, and salt are no longer regularly purchasable. The following are instances of prices paid during the past few weeks:—

Petroleum: 20 fr. per tin.
Sugar: 23 piastres (4*s.* 4*d.*) per oke (2¾ lb.).
Salt: 16 piastres (3*s.*) per oke.

For the lighting of the streets a supply of petroleum has been brought by road from Kodrilu.

A compulsory tariff of prices for various essential foodstuffs has been issued by the military authorities, but as most of the items mentioned in it were sold out long ago, it is practically a dead letter.

Supplies of flour have not yet run out, and meat and vegetables are still fairly abundant.

Servian money having been freely introduced, notices have been issued fixing the relative values of Turkish and Servian currency.

Two Vlachs and two Jews have now been added to the municipal council. Municipal taxes are being collected.

On the 1st instant a Servian soldier was wantonly shot at and killed by a Moslem from a window in the Turkish quarter. The murderer, an ex-policeman, was immediately shot. In consequence of this a further proclamation was issued calling for the surrender of arms. As a result, numbers of weapons have been thrown into the river. A few houses have been searched.

With a view to the apprehension of Turkish soldiers supposed to be in hiding in the town the moukhtars of the various quarters have had to furnish a list of all persons who, under the Ottoman régime, were liable to military service. The measure does not appear to have led to many arrests.

There are many cases of destitution in Monastir—especially amongst the Moslems. It is not limited to the lower classes. The families of many Turkish officers and officials, who were solely dependent on salaries or pensions, are now penniless. The pupils at certain Turkish schools are in the same position. With a view to their relief, a commission, which is understood to have the sympathy and co-operation of the governor, has been formed under the presidency of the mufti.

Various Notes.

Nhazi Bey, Eyyoub Sabri Bey, and other influential members of the committee—especially in the Ochrida, Resna, and Struga districts—have taken flight and their whereabouts is a mystery.

The death of Fethi Pasha, commandant of the VIIth Army Corps, is confirmed by the Servian military authorities.

The Vali of Monastir, Behjet Bey, has been allowed to proceed to Salonica.

The Bulgarian voivod, Tshaoulef, was arrested at Ochrida by the Servian military authorities on a charge of pillage. He has since been released.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

P.S.—*December* 9, 1912.—Since completing this despatch I am informed by the Servian Governor of Monastir that Elbassan has been occupied by Servian troops, which, advancing still further, have effected a junction with another column from Durazzo near the mouth of the Skumbi River on the Adriatic.

C. A. G.

[54466]

No. 446.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 21.)

(No. 1075.)
Sir,

Constantinople, December 17, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the acting British vice-consul at Cavallo reporting on the relations between the Greeks and Bulgarians in that town.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER

Enclosure in No. 446.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 6/50. Confidential.)
Sir,

Cavalla, December 9, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that the relations between the local Greeks and the Bulgarians now in the town are far from being cordial. The causes are many. Firstly a natural antipathy existing between the two races. Secondly the fact that the Bulgarians in Cavalla have made no secret of their determination to retain Cavalla whereas the Greeks had hoped that it would be included in Greece. Although Cavalla is a Greek town, all the officials appointed up to the present have been Bulgarians. Proclamations are issued in the name of King Ferdinand and are printed in Bulgarian only. The Greek community were invited to send a telegram to King Ferdinand congratulating him on the Bulgarian occupation of the town, but declined to do so. The Bulgarians on their side too seemed annoyed because of the Greek occupation of Salonica. Some of the Bulgarian officers here declared that Salonica was, according to the original plan, to have been occupied by the Bulgarian forces, and that the Greeks broke faith in pushing on towards it and occupying it.

The local Greeks somehow have got hold of the idea that England will help Greece against the Bulgarians and will assist it in obtaining Cavalla for Greece. They have an impression that Bulgaria will take the larger share of the spoils of this present war and will readily sacrifice all its allies in any of their future difficulties.

Prince Boris was to have arrived here on the 5th December. A triumphal arch, decorated with Bulgarian flags only, was built at the entrance of the town. However he did not arrive and it was subsequently learnt that he had arrived at Drama, intending to come on to Cavalla, but, shortly after his arrival at Drama, had returned to Salonica.

Nearly 3000 Moslems have left the town by the "Mahroussa" part for Dardanelles and part for Alexandria.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[54467]

No. 447.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 21.)

(No. 1076.)
Sir,

Constantinople, December 17, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1063 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, reporting on the relations between Greeks and Bulgarians in that town.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 447.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 172.)

Sir, *Salonica, December 9, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 169 of the 6th instant, reporting the arrival and establishment here of the Bulgarian general, Andreeff, I have the honour to report that, in addition to the general, the following Bulgarian officials either are or quite recently have been in the town of Salonica, viz. :—

M. Stovanovitch, who, in addition to being Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs, is well known as political agent of the Bulgarian Government ;
M. Morfoff, Director of State Railways ;
M. Mitroff, chief engineer of the locomotive department ;
M. Salabasheff, head traffic manager on the same ;
M. Sarafoff, a former Director of Posts ; and
Dr. D. Tontcheff, leader of one of the Bulgarian political parties.

The visit of these officials is explained as indicating the intention of the Bulgarians very shortly to establish a postal and telegraphic service in this place, as well as to take into their own hands the administration of the Salonica–Constantinople Junction Railway. There are numerous other signs of a persistent effort on the part of the Bulgarians to strengthen and consolidate their position throughout this district. In the course of the past few days quite a series of disagreeable incidents have occurred between the troops of the two nationalities ; and, as the Greeks have strict orders to show the greatest forbearance and avoid giving their allies the slightest ground for complaint, it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that these incidents are deliberately provoked by the Bulgars.

The Greek Fourth Division has recently returned here from the Monastir line. The Bulgarians also have received some small reinforcements, and I am told that a strong regiment of nearly 5,000 men is very shortly expected by them.

General Danglis, the Crown Prince's chief of the staff, has left here for Athens in order to join MM. Venizelos and Streit, who are proceeding to London as Greek representatives at the coming conference. The following further members of the Crown Prince's staff and suite are likewise leaving shortly for London :—

Lieutenant-Colonel Metaxas ;
Captain Exakaktylos, an officer who was formerly well known in Macedonia as M. Antoniou, under which name he was attached as secretary and director of bands to the consulate of Monastir ;
M. Dragoumis, of the Greek Foreign Office, who accompanied the army as political adviser ; and
M. Contogouris, secretary of legation, lately (I believe) serving at Cairo.

M. Nedkoff, formerly Bulgarian consul at Monastir, has been appointed civil administrator of the district of Strommitza, and M. Dobreff (formerly dragoman to the Bulgarian agency in Constantinople and latterly also employed in the consular service in Macedonia) to a similar post at Drama.

The murders and depredations committed by the Bulgarian bands in the interior of the country appear to continue uninterrupted. Yesterday some 200 mussulman villagers from Guvezne in the kaza of Langaza came into the town reporting that their village was in flames.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[54468] No. 448.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 1077.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 17, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica reporting communication made to Greek and Bulgarian authorities concerning service of the Ottoman Public Debt.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 448.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 171.)

Sir, *Salonica, December 9, 1912.*

I HAD the honour to receive yesterday by wireless telegraphy through His Majesty's ships "Hampshire" and "Yarmouth," your Excellency's message instructing me to inform the authorities in effective occupation of this district that the revenues assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt are under the protection of the Powers.

In carrying out these instructions I have thought it most advisable to follow more or less exactly the procedure adopted by my French and German colleagues, as explained in my despatch No. 168 of the 4th instant. The instructions received by the former were somewhat more detailed than those which your Excellency transmitted to myself, as I understand from him that the terms of the communication which he addressed to the authorities here were practically laid down in them ; but, as I have no doubt that your Excellency is acquainted with the steps taken in this matter by the French Government, I concluded that I ran no risk of exceeding your wishes if I adopted the same phraseology, whilst by so doing I gave to these representations the greater force which results from the appearance of concerted action.

A copy of these communications is annexed hereto for your Excellency's information.

With regard to the latter part of your Excellency's instructions, directing me to convey them to all the vice-consuls in my district, I am unfortunately not in telegraphic communication with any of these officers and only in somewhat precarious postal communication with two (Cavalla and Provesa) out of the six. I will, however, not fail to transmit your Excellency's instructions so soon as any opportunity presents itself.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 448.

Consul-General Lamb to His Royal Highness the Duke of Sparta.

Monseigneur, *Salonique, le 9 décembre, 1912.*

D'ORDRE de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur d'appeler l'attention de votre Altesse Royale sur le fait que les services de la Dette publique ottomane sont indépendants du Trésor ottoman ; que les sommes qu'ils encaissent sont le gage des créanciers européens de la Turquie et que par suite ces services sont sous la protection des Grandes Puissances.

Veuillez, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[*Mutatis mutandis*, the same communication was addressed to the general commanding-in-chief the Bulgarian troops in the province of Salonica.]

Enclosure 3 in No. 448.

Consul-General Lamb to M. Ractivan.

M. le Ministre, *Salonique, le 9 décembre, 1912.*

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que, par ordre de mon Gouvernement, je viens de faire aux autorités militaires en occupation effective des districts appartenant à la province de Salonique la notification suivante, à savoir que :—

"Les services de la Dette publique ottomane sont indépendants du Trésor ottoman ; que les sommes qu'ils encaissent sont le gage des créanciers européens de la Turquie et que par suite ces services sont sous la protection des Grandes Puissances."

Veuillez, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[54469] No. 449.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 1078.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 17, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Cavalla reporting on a bomb explosion which took place in Cavalla on the 2nd December.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 449.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 5/49.)

Sir, *Cavalla, December 3, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a bomb explosion took place yesterday morning in Cavalla. The bearer of the bomb, a young Moslem of about 22, was very seriously injured and is not expected to recover. No further damage was caused by the explosion.

It was at first thought that the Moslem had found an old Bulgarian bomb, and that it exploded while he was handling it. The authorities of the town now say that on investigation the bomb appears to have been of local manufacture, being made out of tin, and that the design of the criminal was apparently the blowing up of a barracks occupied by Bulgarian soldiers near which the explosion took place, and that the design was only frustrated by the premature explosion of the bomb. The investigation is still proceeding. A general perquisition in the Moslem quarter may be expected.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[54470] No. 450.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 1079.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 17, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram which have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, reporting that the vali has suggested that representations should be made to the Greek Government, through His Majesty's Minister at Athens, with a view to securing humane treatment of Moslem women and children at Chios.

This would hardly appear to be a matter in which our interference is possible.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 450.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 80.)

(Telegraphic.) *Smyrna, December 15, 1912.*

VALI asks whether it would be possible to make representations to the Greek Government, through the British Minister at Athens, with a view to securing humane treatment of Moslem women and children at Chios.

[54612] No. 451*.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received December 21.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, December 21, 1912.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, paraphrase of a telegram, dated the 21st instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 451*.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Malta, December 21, 1912.*

TURKISH fleet yesterday, according to report from "Hampshire," having gained confidence from previous engagement with Greeks, went outside Dardanelles.

King Ferdinand left Salonica yesterday.

[54407] No. 451.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 21.)

Sir,

Downing Street, December 20, 1912.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, to be laid before Sir E. Grey, with reference to letter to the Colonial Office of the 17th December, a copy of a telegram from Acting High Commissioner on the subject of the status of Cyprus.

I am, &c.

JOHN ANDERSON.

Enclosure in No. 451.

Chief Secretary, Cyprus, to Mr. Harcourt.

(Telegraphic.) [*Received December 17, 1912.*]

MOSLEM members of Legislative Council uneasy. Have addressed petition to His Majesty's Government praying, in the event of any changes in political status being considered, imperatively necessary that island will be ceded to Great Britain or Egypt. I have been requested to cable. Petition will follow by next mail.

[54505] No. 452.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 21.)

[By Post.]

(No. 216.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, December 20, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 784 of 19th December.

M. Gout having informed me that the Minister for Foreign Affairs wished him to have a further conversation with me in regard to the foreign bondholders of the Turkish debt, I called on him this afternoon. I told him what I had reported to you in my despatch No. 516 of 13th December and of my conversation with M. Poincaré. M. Gout replied that perhaps he had not made himself quite clear in regard to some points. Herr Helferich had not been sent to Paris by his Government; he happened to be here in order to discuss questions affecting the Tobacco Régie, and the German Councillor had proposed to take advantage of his presence to consult him. M. Gout meant to suggest that, if a representative of the British bondholders or some other expert were in Paris, I might follow the German Councillor's example. He had always intended that discussion should be confined to official circles, as wished by M. Poincaré. He said that the report of the French commission had been communicated to the German, Austrian, and Italian Governments. The former was already practically in agreement with the French Government, and the observations of the two latter were expected immediately.

M. Gout said that M. Poincaré had not mentioned to him the written communication which had been promised me by his Excellency (see my despatch No. 526 of the 18th December). He proposed, however, to send me to-morrow for transmission to you a memorandum giving the bases on which the report had been drawn up by the commission. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would find it possible to express their views on the report and on the memorandum at an early date.

[54621] No. 453.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 240. Very Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

Sophia, December 21, 1912.

MY telegram No. 235 of 16th December: Peace negotiations.

In accordance with decision reached in Council of Ministers yesterday, Prime Minister sent for all chiefs of parties now in the capital. He told them that the

Government had definitely decided to insist on the acquisition of Adrianople, and that if the Ottoman Government refused war must be continued.

Chiefs of parties agreed with this policy. Government have come to the conclusion that it will in any case be politic to let negotiations continue for about ten days in order to allow of the complete victualling of the army at the front.

Government have received information that Adrianople is short of fuel and petrol, and that even flour is now being very carefully husbanded.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[54623] No. 454.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 201.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 21, 1912.*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed to me this afternoon his satisfaction with regard to the agreement reached at the Ambassadors' conference as to the autonomy of Albania and commercial port. He said that difficulties would arise concerning delimitation of Albania. Personally he was in favour of creation of an Albania large enough to stand by itself, and he appeared to make it a *sine quâ non* that the seaboard of Albania should touch Greece on the south and Montenegro on the north. Inland he thought frontier should follow line of ethnographical lines. He said that he was receiving petitions from leading Albanians protesting against cession of Janina to Greece and Scutari to Montenegro. As to the fate of Janina he was disinterested; but as regards Scutari he was opposed to its being taken away from new Albania.

With regard to islands, he was of opinion that those near entrance of Dardanelles should remain Turkish as well as those close to the Asiatic shore; remainder might go to Greece as far as he was concerned, but he intimated that it might be advisable for the Powers to declare that they should not be used as naval bases.

As regards cession of Adrianople, he had not given up hope that some solution might be found. He had given advice at Constantinople not to be too exacting, and he had cause to believe that in Turkish Government circles there was disposition to be reasonable. As he thought that Bulgaria would not yield on the question of Adrianople, he thought that she might offer to dismantle fortress.

M. Danef, he said, had informed him that question of Roumanian compensation would not be settled until peace conference had closed its labours.

[54624] No. 455.

Mr. Dering to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 21.)

(No 184.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, December 21, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 554 of 20th December.

I have informed Minister for Foreign Affairs, who expressed satisfaction, but [group undecypherable: ? he] considered communiqué published in London rather too vague, and had telegraphed on the subject to Italian Ambassador in London.

Adjournment for holidays and postponement of Scutari question would enable Italy to make further representations in the interests of peace at Vienna.

Owing to their previous agreements as to integrity of Albania, it was impossible for either Italy or Austria-Hungary, without the other's consent, to agree to any claim by Servia to acquire territory of her own on the Adriatic. He regretted that Servian Minister in Vienna had again spoken of Servia's claim to acquire territory on Adriatic, but hoped that he would by now have received different instructions.

As regards Scutari, there was nothing Servian in population, and he considered that any Servian claim there was untenable. It was different as regards Montenegro. Both Italian and Russian Governments were informed that, should she not obtain Scutari, dynasty at Cettinjé would not improbably be overthrown, an eventuality which neither Italy nor Russia could view with equanimity. I asked him if he believed this information. His Excellency replied that he had telegraphed to Italian Minister at Cettinjé for full report as to its accuracy. Minister had been there a long time and knew well state of Montenegrin public opinion, but no reply had yet been received from him.

[54587] No. 456.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 146.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 21, 1912.*

SERVIAN chargé d'affaires informed me officially that Servia would refer the question of her access to the sea by Servian territory to the Great Powers. I said that to accept the decision of the Great Powers was in best interest of Servia.

I then informed him that I was authorised to give him confidentially, for information of his Government, the following memorandum, which represented the agreement come to between the six Powers:—

"Autonomie albanaise garantie et contrôlée exclusivement par les six Puissances sous la souveraineté ou la suzeraineté du Sultan.

"Un accès commercial sera réservé à la Serbie par un port albanais libre et neutre desservi par un chemin de fer international sous le contrôle européen et sous la garde d'une force spéciale internationale, avec liberté de transit et franchise de droits pour toutes les marchandises, y compris les munitions de guerre."

I pointed out that in substance it gave to Servia economic independence by assuring an outlet for her trade.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 785; Berlin, No. 424; St. Petersburgh, No. 1360; Vienna, No. 428; and Rome, No. 555.)

[55902] No. 457.

Conference of St. James.

PROTOCOLE No. 4.

Séance du 8 (21) décembre 1912.

Étaient présents:

Pour la Bulgarie:

MM. Danev, Madjarov et le Général Paprikov;

Pour la Grèce:

MM. Vénizélos, Skouloudis, Gennadius et Streit;

Pour le Monténégro:

MM. Miouchekovitch, le Comte de Voïnovitch et Popovitch;

Pour la Serbie:

MM. Novakovitch, Nicolitch et Vesnitch.

Pour la Turquie:

Réchid Pacha, Osman Nizamy Pacha et le Général Salih Pacha.

LA séance est ouverte à 4 heures ½ sous la présidence de M. Miouchekovitch.
Le protocole de la séance précédente, lu par le secrétaire, M. Vouros, est adopté.

M. Novakovitch demande la parole sur une question préalable, concernant la violation de l'armistice par les troupes ottomanes à Scutari et lit la déclaration suivante:

"Les délégués serbes sont chargés de protester auprès des délégués ottomans contre les graves infractions à l'armistice commises par les troupes ottomanes qui font des sorties offensives de Scutari et attaquent les positions occupées par les troupes serbes. Les délégués serbes déclarent qu'en cas

de renouvellement de ces attaques les troupes serbes seront obligées de répondre et d'engager le combat, comme elles l'ont déjà fait la première fois. La responsabilité de ces faits retombera sur la Turquie."

Réchid Pacha désire donner des éclaircissements sur cette question. Il déclare qu'à la suite de ce qui a été dit à la deuxième séance à ce même sujet, la délégation ottomane a télégraphié à Constantinople pour que le commandant de Scutari soit averti de la conclusion de l'armistice. En réponse la délégation ottomane a reçu de la Sublime Porte la communication télégraphique suivante :

"Nous avons télégraphié à deux reprises différentes au ministre des affaires étrangères du Monténégro pour le prier de vouloir bien communiquer par un parlementaire au commandant-gouverneur de Scutari une dépêche chiffrée de Nazim Pacha informant celui-ci de la conclusion de l'armistice et l'invitant à s'y conformer, mais son Excellence s'est excusée de ne pouvoir donner suite à notre demande en alléguant que le commandant de Scutari avait déjà une première fois refusé de recevoir une communication au même sujet que le ministre d'Allemagne à Cettigné a voulu lui faire parvenir de notre part et que ledit commandant ne veut recevoir désormais aucune notification de qui que ce soit.

"Les moyens de nous mettre en rapport avec Scutari nous faisant défaut, nous serions obligés aux délégués monténégrins à la conférence de faire parvenir par un parlementaire aux autorités ottomanes de Scutari la dépêche chiffrée suivante de notre généralissime."

Réchid Pacha prie en conséquence la délégation monténégrine de se charger de faire transmettre le télégramme chiffré en question au commandant de Scutari.

Osman Nizamy Pacha recommande cette manière de procéder qui s'impose, vu l'impossibilité de communication directe entre le gouvernement ottoman et le commandant de Scutari, et vu le droit du commandant de refuser de prendre en considération une communication du ministre d'Allemagne à Cettigné.

M. Popovitch, tout en déclarant n'avoir aucune intention blessante pour qui que ce soit, demande s'il n'y a pas, dans le télégramme chiffré, de communications autres que celles concernant l'armistice. Il ne s'agit, ajoute-t-il, que d'une simple garantie morale.

Réchid Pacha répond que le télégramme étant chiffré, il n'en connaît pas la teneur, mais qu'il ne peut y avoir aucune raison de supposer qu'il se réfère à d'autres sujets qu'à l'armistice.

Le Président déclare qu'il prend acte de la demande de la délégation ottomane et que la délégation monténégrine transmettra à Cettigné le télégramme en question, mais qu'elle ne peut naturellement préjuger la décision du gouvernement monténégrin au sujet de sa transmission ultérieure.

Le Président, passant à l'ordre du jour, demande à la délégation ottomane si elle a reçu des pleins pouvoirs pour entrer en négociations avec les délégués hellènes.

Réchid Pacha déclare que la délégation ottomane a reçu des instructions pour entrer en pourparlers avec les délégués hellènes également, mais à une condition. Il rappelle que lors des négociations pour la conclusion de l'armistice à Tchataldja, le projet du protocole contenait une clause de ravitaillement réciproque, mais qu'au dernier moment cette clause a été modifiée et que, comme il y avait lieu de supposer à ce moment que les négociations pour la paix seraient rapides, les délégués ottomans n'ont pas insisté. Maintenant, par le fait même de l'addition des délégués hellènes au nombre des négociateurs, il est apparent que les négociations peuvent être plus longues qu'on ne le supposait et c'est pourquoi il prie les délégués de tous les États alliés d'accepter la condition du ravitaillement des places assiégées. Dans ce cas il déclare que les délégués ottomans seront prêts à négocier aussi avec les délégués hellènes. Il fait appel en même temps aux sentiments d'humanité des délégués et attire leur attention sur la triste situation dans laquelle seront placés les habitants d'Andrinople, surtout les femmes et les enfants, par le fait de la plus longue durée des négociations.

M. Danev désire tout d'abord rectifier une erreur dans l'exposé historique de l'armistice fait par Réchid Pacha. Il est vrai que les délégués ottomans ont parlé de la réciprocité de ravitaillement pendant les négociations pour l'armistice, mais cette réciprocité n'a figuré dans aucun protocole, car il ne l'a jamais acceptée. En outre, il fait remarquer que le ravitaillement des troupes bulgares ne dépend pas des autorités ottomanes, car le droit de faire passer les convois par la station d'Andrinople n'est pour les troupes bulgares qu'une facilité, et par suite la question de réciprocité ne se pose même pas.

Pour ce qui est de la question de fond, *M. Danev* attire l'attention sur les trois points suivants :

1. Les délégués sont réunis ici pour négocier la paix, et c'est pourquoi il faut écarter toutes les questions qui ne la concernent pas directement ;
2. Les délégués bulgares n'ont pas de pleins pouvoirs pour négocier sur la question de l'armistice ;
3. Si les délégués des autres États croient pouvoir ouvrir des débats sur cette question, les délégués bulgares, n'ayant pas de pleins pouvoirs, n'y pourront pas prendre part officiellement.

Réchid Pacha, revenant sur l'historique de l'armistice, rappelle que les Généraux Savov et Fitchev avaient admis le principe du ravitaillement, et c'est pourquoi, quand il s'est rendu à Constantinople, il a déclaré au conseil des ministres que le protocole de l'armistice était accepté et qu'il n'avait plus qu'à retourner à Tchataldja pour le signer. A son retour, cependant, M. Danev a présenté un protocole rédigé par M. Tchaprachikov, dans lequel la clause du ravitaillement n'existait pas. Il a formulé des observations à ce sujet, mais, ne voulant pas soulever de difficultés et désirant accélérer les négociations ultérieures pour la paix, il a signé le protocole tel qu'il était présenté.

Revenant sur la question de fond, il renouvelle sa demande en l'appuyant de nouveau sur des motifs humanitaires et prie la délégation bulgare de demander des instructions, puisque M. Danev a déclaré qu'elle n'en possédait pas.

M. Danev, ne voulant plus revenir sur l'historique de l'armistice, fait observer que l'on est en présence d'un instrument signé par les deux parties. Il répète qu'il n'a pas d'instructions à ce sujet. D'ailleurs, il y a une question préalable à poser : la haute assemblée accepte-t-elle de revenir sur la question de l'armistice ? Après seulement qu'une décision aura été prise à ce sujet la question d'une demande d'instructions pourra se présenter.

M. Vénizélos croit que l'on ne peut accepter la discussion de l'armistice, car il est signé, et que revenir là-dessus ne serait qu'une perte de temps. Entrer dans cette voie mènerait trop loin les débats.

Osman Nizamy Pacha fait observer qu'il ne s'agit pas de la discussion de l'armistice, mais seulement de la clause de la réciprocité. Si elle est acceptée, ce sera la meilleure preuve que personne ne désire traîner les choses en longueur, et dans ce cas les délégués ottomans sont prêts à tout faire pour faciliter les travaux de la conférence et pour les faire aboutir à une solution rapide.

Réchid Pacha observe également qu'il ne s'agit pas de modifier l'armistice, mais seulement d'une concession qui est demandée aux gouvernements des États alliés dans l'intérêt des négociations et dans un but humanitaire.

Le Président suspend la séance pour dix minutes afin de permettre aux délégués des États alliés de se concerter.

A la reprise de la séance,

M. Danev déclare que la demande des délégués ottomans a pour but de changer les conditions de l'armistice signé ; que la délégation bulgare n'a pas qualité pour revenir sur cette question, qui a déjà été tranchée ; et que la conférence elle-même n'est pas compétente pour statuer sur la question ainsi posée. Pour ces raisons il prie le président d'écarter la question comme étant en dehors de l'objet de la conférence et de passer à l'ordre du jour.

Osman Nizamy Pacha répète que les délégués ottomans, en faisant leur demande, l'ont motivée et ont déclaré qu'il ne s'agissait pas de modifier l'armistice, qui reste tel qu'il est et auquel il est demandé seulement d'ajouter la clause de la réciprocité. Les délégués ottomans ont aussi déclaré qu'ils n'auraient pas d'objection à reprendre les négociations, en y comprenant la Grèce, si leur demande était acceptée. Dans le cas contraire, ils seront obligés d'en référer à leur gouvernement et de demander des instructions.

Le Président, résumant, constate que les délégués des États alliés ne se considèrent pas compétents pour revenir sur la question de l'armistice et par suite désirent l'écarter. Quant à la question humanitaire soulevée par Réchid Pacha, elle devrait, sans être écartée, être présentée par une autre voie aux gouvernements respectifs.

Réchid Pacha fait remarquer que les gouvernements intéressés, n'étant pas en relation directe, ne peuvent communiquer que par l'entremise de leurs délégations, et c'est pourquoi la délégation ottomane prie les délégués des États qui ont signé l'armistice d'être auprès de leurs gouvernements respectifs les interprètes de la demande formulée et de faire connaître à la délégation ottomane la réponse reçue.

M. Vénizélos demande ce que ferait la conférence dans l'intervalle.

Réchid Pacha répond que si l'assemblée décide de suite dans le sens de la demande des délégués ottomans, ceux-ci peuvent entrer immédiatement en négociations avec tous les délégués, y compris les délégués hellènes. Si cette décision n'est pas prise, les délégués ottomans sont prêts à continuer les travaux avec les délégués des États qui ont signé l'armistice. Il n'y aura donc dans aucun cas de temps perdu.

M. Vénizélos désire savoir si les délégués ottomans font de la question du ravitaillement une condition *sine qua non* pour négocier avec la Grèce. Que demandent les délégués ottomans aux délégués hellènes pour entrer en négociations avec eux?

Réchid Pacha répond que ce n'est pas à ce point de vue-là qu'il faut se placer. La nature de la demande des délégués ottomans est suffisamment expliquée par le fait que, les négociations pouvant être beaucoup plus longues que l'on ne le supposait, il ne faut pas que les troupes assiégées courent le risque d'être laissées en proie à la famine.

M. Vénizélos remarque que, au fond, les délégués ottomans demandent une modification de l'armistice. Ils la justifient par des considérations de temps et d'humanité. Mais le meilleur moyen d'éviter des longueurs et aussi de satisfaire aux conditions humanitaires est de laisser de côté les questions secondaires et de commencer de suite la discussion de la question principale, qui est la question territoriale. Une fois cette question-là réglée, celles de l'armistice et du ravitaillement pourront être traitées à leur tour et envisagées alors d'une manière plus favorable. Il ne désire pas que la responsabilité des retards retombe sur la Grèce. Il répète: que demandent les délégués ottomans aux délégués hellènes?

Réchid Pacha dit en réponse ne rien demander aux délégués hellènes.

Osman Nizamy Pacha déclare que la question du ravitaillement est d'une certaine importance au point de vue humanitaire. Si le ravitaillement est accordé, les délégués ottomans ne feront aucune difficulté à traiter avec les délégués hellènes. A l'objection que la question du ravitaillement n'est pas de la compétence de la conférence, il répond que la non-acceptation de l'armistice par le commandant de Scutari n'est pas non plus du ressort de la conférence; malgré cela la délégation ottomane s'est empressée d'en saisir son gouvernement.

M. Dance désire poser la question préalable. Il demande que la question du ravitaillement soit écartée et que la haute assemblée passe à l'ordre du jour. Si les délégués ottomans désirent lui adresser une demande privée à ce sujet, il les

entendra avec plaisir, mais pas à la conférence, qui n'a pas à s'occuper de cette question. Il est d'avis que les délégués ottomans doivent demander des instructions à Constantinople sur le point de savoir s'ils peuvent continuer les négociations, en y comprenant les délégués hellènes, sans que la question du ravitaillement soit discutée.

Le Président pose la question aux délégués ottomans.

Réchid Pacha demande la suspension de la séance pour se concerter avec ses collègues.

La séance est suspendue.

A la reprise de la séance,

Réchid Pacha déclare qu'en conséquence de l'attitude des délégués des États alliés, qui veulent écarter la question du ravitaillement, alléguant leur incompétence de la solutionner, les délégués ottomans, désirant faire preuve de bonne volonté et dans le but d'éviter des pertes de temps, acceptent de continuer les négociations, mais seulement *ad referendum*, et demanderont de nouvelles instructions, qui seront pourtêtre reçues lundi prochain.

M. Dance est d'opinion qu'il est impossible d'entamer des négociations sur le fond en les soumettant à la condition du "*ad referendum*." Si les délégués ottomans croient devoir demander des instructions sur la question du ravitaillement, il ne sera pas, à son avis, possible de continuer utilement les négociations avant que cette question soit définitivement réglée. Supposant en effet que le gouvernement ottoman déclare ne pas pouvoir continuer les négociations si la question du ravitaillement est écartée, à quoi bon les commencer?

M. Vénizélos désire savoir à quelles questions a trait le "*ad referendum*"—à la question de l'admission des délégués hellènes aux négociations, ou bien à la question du ravitaillement. Car ce sont là deux questions distinctes qui doivent être disjointes. Il demande si le ravitaillement est une compensation pour l'admission de la Grèce. Si la participation de la Grèce est réglée, on peut commencer de suite les négociations, car il n'y a plus de question préalable. Il n'est pas juste de demander un sacrifice quelconque aux autres alliés en compensation de l'admission des délégués hellènes aux travaux de la conférence.

Osman Nizamy Pacha répond que le ravitaillement n'est pas une compensation pour l'admission de la Grèce, mais qu'il importe de régler avant tout cette première question.

Réchid Pacha observe que la déclaration des délégués ottomans sur l'admission des délégués hellènes a été faite dans un esprit de conciliation et pour faciliter et abréger les travaux de la conférence. Dans le même esprit et à titre de réciprocité, pour ainsi dire, les délégués ottomans espéraient que les délégués alliés accepteraient la demande concernant le ravitaillement. Maintenant que les alliés ont décidé d'écarter la question, les délégués ottomans, en vue de cette nouvelle situation, se trouvent dans la nécessité de demander des instructions à leur gouvernement. Cependant, si la conférence le désire, ils sont prêts, toujours dans le même esprit de conciliation, à continuer les travaux, mais sous réserve de l'approbation ultérieure de leur gouvernement.

M. Novakovitch est d'avis que, vu les déclarations qui viennent d'être faites par Réchid Pacha, l'on ne peut qu'ajourner la conférence. Pour son propre compte, il ne pourrait et ne voudrait pas procéder de la façon proposée par Réchid Pacha. Il est nécessaire, pour pouvoir travailler utilement, que les délégués ottomans possèdent des pouvoirs analogues à ceux des autres délégués et il ne faut pas qu'ils soient obligés d'en référer à toute occasion à leur gouvernement.

M. Dance s'étant associé à cette déclaration,

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Il est décidé d'ajourner la séance au lundi, 9 (23) décembre, à 4 heures de l'après-midi.

La séance est levée à 6 heures.

Le Président:
L. MIOUCHEKOVITCH.

Les Secrétaires:
H. NORMAN.
S. TCHAPRACHIKOV.
A. C. VOUROS.
S. Y. GRGUITCH.
D. NORADOUNGHIAN.

[55467] No. 458.

Memorandum by Mr. Tyrrell.

COUNT TRAUTTMANSDORFF called to-day on behalf of Count Mensdorff to say that the Austro-Hungarian Government had presented yesterday their demands at Belgrade for reparation in connection with the consular incident at Prisrend. The Austro-Hungarian Government asked for an apology from the Servian Government and for a salute to be offered by a battalion of Servian soldiers to the Austro-Hungarian flag at Prisrend and Mitrovitza on the return of M. Proschka, who is to resume his consular functions.

The report furnished to the Vienna Foreign Office by their representative, who was sent to enquire into the incident, had established that the charges brought by M. Simitch against the Austro-Hungarian consul were unfounded. The charges were that he and his consular assistants had incited Turks and Albanians to attack the Servians, and that consular officials had fired on Servian troops from the roof of the consulate.

In making these demands on the Servian Government the Austro-Hungarian Government, who in all their recent official communications had carefully avoided the display of any animus against the Servian Government, continued on this occasion to display the same spirit by confining themselves to asking for the minimum in the way of satisfaction that was consistent with the dignity and authority of the Empire and its consular representatives, and was also in harmony with the peaceful and conciliatory tendencies of all the other Cabinets.

The Austro-Hungarian Government trusted that the Powers would recognise the moderation which they had displayed on this occasion as on previous ones.

W. T.

Foreign Office, December 21, 1912.

[54617] No. 559.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 491.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 22, 1912.*

RUSSIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs, in speaking yesterday of the conference of Ambassadors, expressed hope that you would support him on question of Scutari. It had not been easy for Russia to abandon Servia's claim for a port of her own, and now Austria was coming forward with a fresh and unexpected demand. We ought, he thought, to make a firm stand.

He also told me in confidence that Austria would press for what would virtually be an independent Albania under a Turkish prince, and said that he was strongly opposed to this. There must be something more than a mere shadowy suzerainty in Albania's relations to Turkey, and, though he would not object to appointment of a Turkish prince, the latter must only have title and position of a vali of an autonomous Turkish province.

Announcement that Servia is only to have commercial access to the Adriatic has

been very badly received by the press, and the "Novoe Vremiya," in a violent article entitled "Austria's Triumph," says that Russia has suffered a worse humiliation than in 1909. If any further concessions have to be made to Austria at the expense of Balkan Slavs the Government will be placed in a difficult position.

[54618] No. 460.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 492.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 22, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs called on me this afternoon and said that he had yesterday spoken seriously to Austro-Hungarian Ambassador on the subject of Austro-Hungarian armaments, and had expressed hope that demobilisation order would now be issued. He had [group omitted: ? told] Ambassador that it would be impossible any longer for him to explain them away as a purely defensive measure, seeing that Servia had now stated that she would conform to the wishes of the Powers, and that consequently Austria-Hungary no longer had any reason to fear Russian intervention. Were Austro-Hungarian mobilisation to be continued Russian Government would be forced to take some counter-measures.

On the Ambassador enquiring whether the Russian Government proposed to dismiss their reservists, his Excellency had replied that he could not speak for the Government, but that he was convinced that if Austria-Hungary demobilised the reservists would not be retained with the colours after the 3rd January, new style.

Government, his Excellency explained to me, was empowered by law to keep them up to that date, but if it was necessary to retain them longer an Imperial ukase would have to be issued. He added that from the reports which he had received the internal situation in Austria-Hungary was becoming serious, and, while Russian Government were most anxious for peace, they did not fear war.

His Excellency told me that in conversation with Turkish Ambassador he had again urged acceptance by Turkey of the terms of peace offered by the Balkan States, and had warned him that if war were renewed and the allies suffered a reverse it would be impossible for Russia in the present state of public opinion to maintain her neutrality.

His Excellency fears that agreement between the allies will not outlast conclusion of peace, and thinks that, as Bulgaria has so far refused to submit her differences with Greece to the mediation of the Powers, conversion of Salonica into a free port will be the only solution.

[54619] No. 461.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Athens, December 22, 1912.*

TURKISH garrison Mitylene surrendered.

[54620] No. 462.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 119.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, December 22, 1912.*

MILITARY attaché hears from a staff officer, lately returned from Uskub, that the army, although discontented, is quite resigned to the idea of surrendering Durazzo and territory that may be claimed for Albania, and that no trouble is anticipated in this connection.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[54816] No. 463.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 731.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 22, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 730 of 20th December.

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has spoken to Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs in the same sense, and strongly advised cession of Adrianople. He states that they were much impressed; advice of this nature coming from such a quarter was probably unexpected. They appear to have replied that if all the Great Powers were agreed in this view they would presumably make a joint intimation to the Porte, and then a council of elder statesmen of all parties could be called together to consider matter.

[54637] No. 464.

President of Albanian Provisional Government to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Vallona, le 22 décembre*, 1912.

J'E m'empresse de présenter à votre Excellence l'expression de la profonde gratitude et les remerciements sincères du Gouvernement provisoire ainsi que de toute la nation albanaise pour la décision prise par la conférence des Ambassadeurs sous votre haute présidence en faveur de l'indépendance de l'Albanie. Votre Excellence m'obligerait infiniment en voulant bien faire part aux représentants des Grandes Puissances de la vive reconnaissance des Albanais pour l'intérêt qui nous est porté. Les Albanais comptent particulièrement sur l'Angleterre, flambeau de civilisation et champion de la protection des droits des peuples, pour l'accomplissement de l'œuvre nationale.—ISMAIL KEMAL BEY.

[54702] No. 465.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 144.)
Sir, *Sophia, December 13, 1912.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 195 of the 10th instant, instructing me to take action similar to that of my French colleague in the question of the safeguarding of the funds of the Ottoman Bank, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a *note verbale* dealing with the subject, left by me yesterday with the Prime Minister.

This note is identic with that presented by M. Panafieu, my French colleague.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 465.

Note verbale.

D'ORDRE de son Gouvernement, le Ministre de la Grande-Bretagne a l'honneur d'appeler l'attention du Gouvernement Royal sur la situation qui est faite aux agences de la Banque ottomane situées sur le territoire actuellement occupé par ses armées.

A Serrès, le 13 novembre dernier, les autorités bulgares ont enjoint à l'agence de la banque dans cette ville de verser immédiatement entre leurs mains les fonds appartenant au Gouvernement turc, et, à la suite de cette décision, la Banque ottomane, qui est constituée par des capitaux étrangers et est dirigée par un conseil d'administration franco-anglais, a saisi de la question le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique.

Il a été reconnu que les considérations exposées par la requête de la banque étaient conformes aux principes et aux usages du droit international.

En effet, le règlement annexé à la Convention No. 4 de La Haye, 1907, concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre, dispose dans son article 46 que la propriété

privée ne peut être confisquée, et stipule dans son article 53 que, seuls, peuvent être saisi le numéraire, les fonds et les valeurs exigibles appartenant en propre à l'État.

Or, d'une part, la Banque ottomane, bien que liée à l'État ottoman par un contrat en vue de certaines opérations financières, est manifestement une société civile, ayant un capital appartenant à des actionnaires et une existence indépendante de l'État ottoman. Au regard du droit international, elle est donc une personne privée possédant une propriété privée. Ce caractère des banques, même des banques privilégiées, telle que la Banque ottomane, a été reconnu dès longtemps dans les guerres, notamment au cours de la guerre franco-allemande. Les armées allemandes ont en effet respecté les dépôts de toute nature existant dans les succursales de la Banque de France et constituant la propriété privée de cette société.

D'autre part, les fonds figurant dans les comptes des agences de la Banque ottomane au crédit du Gouvernement ottoman ne peuvent être considérés comme appartenant en propre en ce dernier, en ce sens qu'ils ne figurent sur leurs livres qu'à titre provisoire. La Banque ottomane a en effet avec le Gouvernement ottoman, à son siège central à Constantinople, un compte courant général, au crédit duquel sont portés les encaissements locaux effectués pour le compte de celui-ci, et ce compte courant est actuellement débiteur pour plus de 1,000,000*l.* Les encaissements faits par la banque dans ses agences au crédit du Gouvernement sont donc la garantie, le gage même, des actionnaires de la banque, et, à ce titre, doivent être traités comme la propriété privée de cette société.

En exposant les considérations qui précèdent au Gouvernement Royal, le Ministre de la Grande-Bretagne croit devoir signaler les responsabilités qu'encourraient les autorités bulgares en confisquant les fonds qui se trouvent dans les agences de la Banque ottomane, situées sur le territoire actuellement occupé par les armées Royales. Il ajoute qu'il est autorisé à donner l'assurance au Gouvernement Royal que les fonds déposées dans les agences de la banque au crédit du Gouvernement ottoman ne seront pas remis à ce Gouvernement, l'administration de la Banque ottomane ayant pris l'engagement formel de ne pas s'en dessaisir.

Sophia, le 28 novembre (11 *décembre*), 1912.

[54706] No. 466.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 148. Confidential.)
Sir, *Sophia, December 16, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Prime Minister called at His Majesty's Legation to-day. M. Gueshof asked me to telegraph that the President of the Sobranjé had had an interview with M. de Kiderlen-Waechter on his way through Berlin, and that M. Danef had informed the German Minister for Foreign Affairs that the allies would not conclude peace unless the Ottoman Government agreed to the cession of Adrianople.

M. Danef has reported here that M. de Kiderlen-Waechter seemed surprised at this statement, but when M. Danef had added that the Bulgarian Government had entirely made up their mind on this point, he eventually stated that he would use his influence with Osman Nizami Pasha, the Ottoman Ambassador at Berlin, to persuade him to advise the Ottoman Government to yield. M. Danef then left for London.

On the 14th instant, M. Gueshof continued, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for the Bulgarian Minister in Berlin and told him that he had found the Ambassador very stubborn. He expressed a hope, however, that the Turkish Government would eventually give way if advised to do so by the members of the Triple *Entente*. The Prime Minister did not seem quite to know how much reliance could be placed on M. de Kiderlen-Waechter's offers of assistance in this matter.

M. Gueshof then informed me that he had just received a formal letter from the Austrian Minister, stating that the Austro-Hungarian Government had decided to recall all the Red Cross and other Austrian officials who were at the present time working in Bulgaria, and that they would have to leave by the 22nd instant. His Excellency asked me if I knew of any reason for such action being taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government. I replied in the negative. I have since heard, however, from the Roumanian Minister that the contract made by the Austro-Hungarian Government with the Red Cross doctors and assistants expires at the end

of the year, and they do not intend to renew them. Prince Ghika thought that Count Tarnowski was anxious to make some fuss over the withdrawal of the Red Cross officials in order to show his dissatisfaction at what he considered the stubborn attitude adopted by the Bulgarian Government in the question of Servian access to the Adriatic.

The Prime Minister then alluded to the Roumanian question. He said that, although M. Danef had to some extent broken the ice, he feared that the Roumanian demands would be entirely unacceptable. He particularly mentioned the cession of Silistria, which the Roumanian Government appeared to insist on. How would it be possible, he said, whilst thanking the Bulgarian inhabitants of this town and district for the aid and assistance given by them in the war, to hand them over, together with their town and properties, to a foreign Government? His Excellency added, further, that M. Sazonof had already spoken somewhat in the same sense to the Roumanian Minister in St. Petersburgh. In any case, the matter could not be settled until the war was over.

Lastly, M. Gueshof referred to the position of the King. He stated that His Majesty was eating his heart out at Kirk-Kilissé, now renamed by the Bulgarians Lozengrad; that he was most anxious to go to Salonica, but that the Cabinet was opposed to such a journey. They had, however, withdrawn any objection to His Majesty's visiting Dimotika, Dedeagatch, Drama, and Serres; they had dispatched his own train to Lozengrad viâ Adrianople, so that he could travel in comfort.

The Prime Minister is, however, still anxious respecting the King's movements, and evidently fears that he may proceed to Salonica on his own initiative.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[54707] No. 167.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 149.)
Sir, *Sophia, December 17, 1912.*

IN a despatch dated the 12th December the consular agent at Bourgas reports that the recruits called to the colours on the 2nd November have been sent to the Servian frontier in their civilian kits, where, he surmises, they are to be supplied with Servian uniforms.

I should mention that I have not heard any rumours confirming this movement, which must be accepted with reserve.

He further reports that ammunition continues to arrive from Russia, who has been notably active in this respect during the war.

In a telegram dated the 13th instant His Majesty's vice-consul at Philippopolis reports the arrival of over 1,000 Turkish prisoners, packed together seventy in a truck. Two deaths, later attributed to dysentery, occurred whilst the prisoners were travelling in these trying conditions.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[54708] No. 168.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 150.)
Sir, *Sophia, December 16, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 234 of yesterday's date I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a speech from the throne, delivered by the Premier, M. Gueshof, at the opening of the Sobranjé on the 14th instant.

The speech, after alluding to the successes of the army, and paying a tribute to the valour of the troops, expresses hopes for the satisfactory issue of the present peace negotiations in London, in order to avoid further efforts on the part of the Bulgarian troops "strengthened by fresh reinforcements." The significance of this passage was emphasised in my telegram above mentioned. Satisfaction is expressed at the general sympathy stated to have been aroused by the triumphs of the allies, and the medical help supplied from abroad is gratefully acknowleged.

The speech ends with an announcement of proposed legislative and administrative measures to be applied to the country in "its new limits and conditions."

In connection with the above an article of the "Mir" the Government organ, in its issue of the 13th instant, dealing with the peace negotiations may be of interest. The following is a brief summary:—

"On the establishment of a lasting peace in the Balkans depends the peace of Europe, a fact which has become especially prominent in the present strained condition of international relations. Hence the general desire that peace may result from the negotiations in London.

"In undertaking these negotiations the Balkan Alliance in general and Bulgaria in particular are making the last possible sacrifice, at the desire of Europe, for attaining peace. The suspension of hostilities has been extremely prejudicial to Bulgaria, and it must be clearly understood that if after renouncing the idea of entering Constantinople, a peace commensurate with the sacrifices made is not attained, the war will be continued without further regard for the interests of Europe. Interested press accounts of the exhaustion and losses of Bulgaria and her allies are no more correct that those which prophesied Turkish victories before the war. The allies must not be deprived of the satisfaction of at least having won compensation for the thousands of lives of their kinsmen sacrificed every year by the Turks.

"The truth is that the Balkan Alliance is even more ready for war than before its outbreak. Since then Bulgaria has equipped over a hundred thousand well-trained troops from among the Macedonians and returned emigrants. The health of the army is excellent. The army represents the nation in arms, which to-morrow will return to its homes and ask its rulers to render an account of the sacrifices it has made.

"If an honourable peace is not reached in London, concludes the leading Government organ, it will be sought at Constantinople."

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[54709] No. 169.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 151. Confidential.)
Sir, *Sophia, December 17, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch received from Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon, R.A., D.S.O., reporting on his stay at the head-quarters of the Bulgarian army since the 21st October last in company with the military attachés.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 169.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 9 B. Confidential.)
Sir, *Sophia, December 17, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I returned to Sophia yesterday, after having been attached, with other military attachés, to the head-quarters of the Bulgarian army since the 21st October. All European countries had sent military attachés, except the other Balkan allies and Denmark, but the Portuguese attaché only reached Sophia the day we returned. There were also military attachés from Japan, the United States and the Argentine Republic.

We remained with the head-quarters at Stara Zagora until the 3rd November, when we started for Kilisse. We saw, on the way, the scenes of the actions round that place and Soloku. We reached Kirk Kilisse on the 9th November, remaining there until the 16th, when we went for a tour to Bunar Hissar and Lule Burgas, visited the battle-field and returned viâ Baba Eski. We arrived at Kirk Kilisse again on the 22nd November and remained there until the 6th December, when we left for Sophia viâ Demotica, Semenli, and Karagatch.

From the above it is clear that we saw nothing of the Bulgarian army in the field. The reason for this was that the Austrian and Roumanian attachés were considered as

spies by the Bulgarians. The chief of the general staff, therefore, decided not only to give them no opportunity of seeing military operations, but also to put them in a position in which they would be unable either to keep in touch with what was taking place or to communicate with their Governments.

In order that this plan could be carried out, the remainder of the military attachés had to share the fate of the two who were under suspicion. We were at first given no information that had not already been given to correspondents. When we protested against this we were supplied with details which we later on found to be untrue. We were requested to talk to no wounded soldier, and if officers were seen speaking to us they were often warned that they were to give us no information. We were at the same time the guests of the Bulgarian Government and were fed and housed as comfortably as was possible in the circumstances.

The situation in which we were placed was a difficult one, and resulted in a certain amount of friction, particularly when it was found that certain correspondents and foreign officers, who were not accredited as military attachés, were given facilities that were denied to us. We were, however, always encouraged by promises which were never fulfilled.

As regards officers not credited as military attachés, Great Britain was the only great Power that was not represented. At Chatalja there were two Russian officers and two officers of the French general staff. At Adrianople there was an officer of the Bavarian general staff in uniform, and with a brigade of cavalry there was an Austrian lieutenant. There were also Swedish, Dutch, and Swiss officers with the army.

For the last two years Bulgaria has carried on a policy of absolute secrecy regarding her army. During that period no foreign officers have been allowed to attend any manœuvres, and military attachés who, in the course of a morning ride have paused to watch a regiment at drill, have been asked to move on. This policy is remarkable when it is remembered that for many years Bulgaria has had officers under instruction in Italy, France, Belgium, and Russia. They have availed themselves to the full of all information that they could get from other countries, whilst at the same time giving nothing in return.

I have dwelt on the personal topic of the treatment of the military attachés in order to show how impossible it was to send home reports from the theatre of war. The subject may also have some interest as a precedent for future wars. At the same time by accompanying the head-quarters of the army, information was gained which may prove of use when the history of the war has to be written. It is from this point of view that I have taken such notes as I have been able. They are necessarily in a disjoined form, and would be out of place in this despatch.

On the whole, I think that the Bulgarians were unwise in their treatment of the attachés. We only saw the sick and wounded men, and by so doing we probably formed a more unfavourable estimate of the state of the Bulgarian army than if we had been further to the front. This has resulted in reports being sent to various Governments that the army is exhausted, and is at present worth little as a fighting force. Such reports are bound to react unfavourably on the Bulgarians during the negotiations at present taking place in London.

With a previous despatch I sent a copy of the regulations under which war correspondents were expected to work. One of the first difficulties which confronted the military authorities was that of how to diminish the number of these correspondents. There were more than 100 of them, and the censoring machinery was inadequate for dealing with so large a number. The restrictions on them were therefore severe, and only those, who could afford motor cars, or who were ready to suffer great hardships, saw anything of the war. Gradually the others disappeared as their employers found that the news that they sent home was not sufficient to justify the expense that they incurred.

The difficulty regarding the number of correspondents will no doubt be again felt in future wars, and it seems desirable that countries should themselves devise a system whereby the number that is recommended by the embassies or legations to the belligerents shall be reduced. England sends out more correspondents than other countries, so might possibly take a lead in this matter, and I am addressing a separate memorandum on the subject to the War Office.

The correspondents had, however, their uses. They were freely utilised by the Bulgarians for spreading false information regarding the army, and for showing the events of the war out of their true proportion, and in such a light as to add to the glory of the Bulgarian army.

In many respects the lessons of the war are remarkable, but they are chiefly due to

the state of civilisation in which Bulgaria now is, to the fact that she is an agrarian country, and to the consequent simplicity of the people who form the bulk of her population. If therefore we have much to learn from the war, there is but little that we can imitate. The people of the country have not yet reached the stage of considering that they have rights. They do not feel that because they pay for the army they have therefore the right to know what it is doing. They demand no lists of casualties, and none have appeared. When they do appear they will be heavy, and it will be interesting to see their effect on public feeling.

The discipline of the people enables a great economy to be made in the number of men employed in rear of the army. Along the line of communications from Yamboli to Chatalja very few officers and soldiers are employed on transport duty. Convoys numbering several hundred bullock-waggons are sent from one station to another escorted by three or four armed men when they are in the enemies country, and with no escort of their own.

Most of the soldiers being peasants are unused to comforts of any kind, and though the army has not lived on the country it has done its fighting on a ration of only bread and meat. The habits of the officers are simple, and their poverty does not admit of what we should regard as ordinary comfort in life. When we were marching from Yamboli to Kirk Kilisse we were passed by two generals attached to the suite of the King. They were attended only by two orderlies, were without baggage, and were living on what they could obtain in the villages.

Much of the discipline of the Bulgarian character is due to the centuries that they spent in subjection to the Turks. These centuries are also responsible for the secretiveness which has enabled them to conceal the intentions, movements, numbers, and formations of their army in a manner that has probably never been excelled in any previous war. Secrecy is not only adopted by the Governments and the higher military authorities, it is practised by all classes, and by both sexes, and has been like a wall between the foreigner and the Bulgarian army whilst it was mobilising, concentrating, or operating in the field.

Another military asset of great value in the Bulgarians has been their hatred of the Turks, the intensity of which would be impossible in a more civilised race. When every soldier goes into battle meaning to kill his enemy the battle is already half won.

As regards the higher leadership and plan of campaign, it is generally believed that there were divided councils. General Savof was reinstated and given the direction of the war at the last moment. The plan of operation had been prepared by General Fitchof, chief of the staff. This plan did not contemplate any advance beyond Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse until after these two places had been taken. General Savof's view were different, and at the last moment the plan which has been followed of masking Adrianople, and moving as rapidly as possible on Constantinople, was adopted. This entailed alterations at the last moment in the composition of the various armies and in the plans for their concentration. The army was practically unopposed until it reached Bunar Hissar, and has had unbroken success until it reached Chatalja.

Probably, if the truth is ever known the handling of the troops in battle will be severely criticised. At Bunar Hissar a great battle was begun and nearly lost by attacking with previous reconnaissance and without artillery preparation. Pursuit was never possible, as there were no troops available for the purpose. The cavalry was always unsuccessful. On the other hand, all accounts testify to the bravery and efficiency of the Bulgarian infantry, who had to be restrained rather than pushed on by their company commanders.

General Savof joined the army at Chatalja on the 16th November in order to be present at the attack on the Turkish positions the following day. He stated that he expected to be in Constantinople in eight days, and was confident that the Turkish army was thoroughly demoralised. No official account of the attack on the 17th and 18th November has been given. It was a serious attack made by both the 1st and 3rd armies along the whole of the Turkish positions. Its results are important at the present time owing to the encouragement that they gave to the Turkish forces. The Bulgarians were everywhere repulsed, and for the first time in the war they found barbed wire and the Turks in the properly constructed trenches. The Bulgarian losses at the battle were great, and were computed by foreign officers who were present to be well over 10,000 men.

I was told by a French officer who was present that the Chief of the Staff of the 3rd army informed him that the position could not be taken, and that they had decided not to attempt it again. The Chief of the Staff also added that the health of the army was bad, and that there were ten men sick for every one that was wounded.

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It has been impossible to arrive at the true state of the health of the army. The officer in charge of the British hospital at Kirk Kilisse considered it to be bad, and told me that he had heard that there were cases of dysentery, cholera, small-pox, and bubonic plague with the army. Throughout the campaign sanitary precautions have been absolutely ignored, and the doctors evidently think that it is their duty to look after the sick and wounded and not to prevent disease. No latrines have been made for the soldiers, the entrails of animals killed have been left lying on the ground, bodies of men and horses have been left unburied or, in some cases, buried in the sandy beds of rivers. There are therefore ample reasons for any epidemics which may have broken out.

Probably the reason for this state of affairs lies in an insufficient number of doctors. In any case the medical arrangements at the front were quite inadequate, and even as far back as Kirk Kilisse, where there are many foreign hospitals, wounded men had to wander about from house to house to beg for shelter.

The King was at Kirk Kilisse. His Majesty is well aware of the sanitary defects of his army. He told a Swiss doctor, who was making an inspection for the Red Cross Society, that it was difficult to bring about a reform, as he was surrounded by brutes. The King is very nervous about infection, and no one was allowed to enter his presence without having been disinfected by wetting his boots in some kind of solution. It is no doubt fear of infection that prevented His Majesty from visiting the hospitals.

It does not appear that the Bulgarians have ever made a serious attack on any of the permanent works round the fortress of Adrianople. The artillery of the allies is also too weak, and is kept at too great a distance to make any impression on the forts. The outlying works have been taken; Papas Tepe to the west of Marash, between the left bank of the Arda and the Maritza, and Kartal Tepe, between the right bank of the Arda and the Maritza. The former was found to be untenable, and has, I understand, been evacuated by both belligerents; but Kartal Tepe remains in the hands of the Bulgarians. The object of attacking these works was to seize points from which the town could be bombarded. From Kartal Tepe, however, this cannot be done, though shells can be thrown into Karagatch, the outlying suburb in which the railway station is situated.

Bulgarian officers have always said that Adrianople might fall at any time to want of provisions. I have, however, recently heard from a fairly reliable source that there were three and a-half months' supplies in the town at the commencement of the seige. An officer of the Bavarian General Staff who has been attached to the head-quarters of the besieging army for the past five weeks tells me that the place could be taken at a heavy cost. The investing force is chiefly composed of second line troops, and in order to make a serious attack they would have to be reinforced.

With regard to Bulgaria's power of continuing the war in the event of the peace negotiations breaking down it is difficult to speak with any certainty. The rest that the troops are now having and the advent of the winter will help them to resist disease. They have also where it was possible changed their camping grounds and taken sanitary measures for keeping them clean and for providing pure water.

The country has now reached bedrock as regards men. Those who should have been called up next year for training are already with the colours, and lads of between 18 and 19 years of age, who should have commenced their service in January 1914 are now being drilled in Sophia. They have an immature appearance and are mixed with older men who were, for various reasons, exempted from military service in previous years, but who are now being called up. Casualties have, however, been replaced at the front, and until fresh losses occur there will be no need for further reinforcements.

In one respect the Bulgarians are more favourably situated than previously. Shortage of locomotives has compelled them to rely upon their long line of communications by road from Yamboli to Chatalja for the supply of their army, and the oxen were showing signs of overwork. About the time of the conclusion of the armistice they were able to utilise more locomotives. These had, I understand, been captured somewhere between Dedeagatch and Salonica, but owing to the break in the line they had not been available where they were wanted, *i.e.*, between Kirk Kilisse and Chatalja. Between these two points the railway will be able to take the place of oxen transport in the event of hostilities being resumed.

The reports that have been circulated regarding the construction of a railway between Yamboli and Kirk Kilisse, and of another round the south of Adrianople between Mustapha Pasha and Demotica are untrue.

Bulgaria has recently been placing her orders for field artillery ammunition in Germany, although her guns are made in France. I am told by the agent for the

French firm of Creusot that this was originally done because the German, Austrian, and Swiss Governments refused to allow ammunition from France to pass through their territories. The latest order to the German firm of Erhart is for 27,000 shrapnel. These are, I believe, to be delivered in two months' time. Ammunition from France can now be landed at Salonica or Dedeagatch, but the German firm secured this last order because it undertook delivery in a shorter time by one month than the French firm.

During the time that I have been with the head-quarters of the army I have been much struck by the chauvinistic feeling that prevails among officers. They consider that by the Treaty of Berlin and again after the Servian war they were deprived of territory to which they were entitled by conquest. They are determined that this shall not happen again. They therefore intend to keep themselves in such a state of military preparedness as will enable them forcibly to resist any interference by the Great Powers in the future. It is certain that if Bulgaria does not get what she thinks she is entitled to receive at the conclusion of the present war her only thought will be to prepare in the near future for another war by which she may extend her territories.

I have, &c.
F. LYON.

[54642] No. 470.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 1080.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 18, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1021 of the 2nd December, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Cavalla reporting on number of Moslems killed and on steps taken to secure public order.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 470.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 4/48: Confidential.)
Sir, *Cavalla, November 27, 1912.*

WITH reference to the third paragraph of my despatch No. 2/46 of the 20th November, I have since ascertained that there is no foundation for the statement that more than 100 Moslems had been killed east of the town. Fifty or sixty represents the total of Moslems killed since the Bulgarian occupation. The persons so killed seem not to have been chosen at random but with deliberation, and their deaths were possibly more due to motives of justice than of revenge.

The komitajis have now left the town by orders of the Bulgarian Government. Under their rule the town was kept in good control, and they were guilty of no excesses apart from the facts above mentioned.

The Jewish notables who had been arrested have now been released.

Yesterday a number of Christians and a Bulgarian soldier were publicly flogged for petty thefts, as also a few Moslem refugees who had not obeyed the order that they should return to their villages.

Order seems now secure. All things point to Cavalla remaining a Bulgarian town. A Bulgarian customs director is to arrive from Sophia. The Khedive's yacht "Mahroussa" has arrived with a cargo of flour and rice for the town.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[54644] No. 471.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 1082.)

Constantinople, December 18, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 557 of the 10th instant, transmitting copies of correspondence with the French Embassy and with His Majesty's representative in Paris on the subject of the measures to be taken for safeguarding the interests of the Ottoman Public Debt in connection with the peace negotiations.

Sir Adam Block, the representative of the British bondholders, tells me that the French memorandum enclosed in your despatch has not been officially submitted to the Council of the Debt, but that it has been discussed by various members of the council, and that the general opinion expressed was that it embraced subjects which were out of the competency of that body. The council, on the other hand, have set forth their desiderata, which are restricted to a narrower field, in a series of draft articles and protocols, which have been handed to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs with a view to their eventual embodiment in the treaty of peace. I have the honour to transmit copies herewith, with a copy of Sir A. Block's covering letter. These documents have also been forwarded to the representative of the Debt in London, and, in communicating them to me, Sir Adam begged that I should inform you that the Council of the Debt has neither the right nor the intention of espousing the cause of other creditors or concessionnaires than of those who are affected by the decrees and contracts which the Council of the Debt are called upon to carry out.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 471.

Sir A. Block to Sir G. Lowther.

Constantinople, December 18, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of draft articles and protocols approved by the Council of the Debt, and submitted to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the hope that the Turkish delegates will succeed in obtaining their incorporation in the treaty of peace with the Balkan States.

The first three documents deal with the revenues ceded to the Debt Administration, the fourth and fifth papers treat the question of loans other than those of the decree of Muharrem, and the sixth and seventh documents concern the revenues assigned to the railway kilometric guarantees.

I beg that your Excellency will be so good as to transmit these documents to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Council of the Debt would be grateful if Sir Edward Grey would, when an opportunity offers, use his powerful influence to ensure that these articles and protocols may be included in the treaty of peace which is now being negotiated in London between Turkey and the Balkan States.

I have, &c.

ADAM BLOCK.

Enclosure 2 in No. 471.

Traité de Paix entre la Turquie et les États balkaniques.

(1.)

Avant-Projet d'Article concernant les Revenus concédés à la Dette publique ottomane.

LES droits appartenant aux porteurs de la Dette publique ottomane sur les revenus qui leur ont été concédés en vertu du décret Impérial ottoman du 28 mouharrem, 1299 (8 (20) septembre, 1881), confirmé par le décret-annexe du 22 djémazi-ul-akhir, 1321 (1er (14) septembre, 1903), seront pleinement sauvegardés dans les territoires acquis par les États balkaniques.

Les dispositions nécessaires pour assurer la sauvegarde de ces droits seront prises d'un commun accord.

Jusqu'au jour de l'application desdites dispositions, les susdits revenus continueront d'être exploités et employés comme par le passé, en conformité des lois, décrets, règlements et conventions les concernant. Les États balkaniques accorderont tant au Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane qu'à ses ayants droit leur protection pour l'exploitation des revenus concédés et la marche des services y afférents.

Toute contestation venant à surgir, entre les Gouvernements balkaniques et la Sublime Porte ou le Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, sur l'interprétation ou l'exécution des dispositions prévues au présent article, sera déférée au Tribunal arbitral de La Haye.

(2.)

Premier Avant-Projet de Protocole relatif aux Revenus concédés à la Dette publique ottomane.

Les États balkaniques seront, pour les territoires à eux cédés par la Turquie, substitués au Gouvernement ottoman dans les obligations assumées par ce dernier envers les porteurs de la Dette publique ottomane, conformément au décret Impérial ottoman du 28 mouharrem, 1299 (8 (20) décembre, 1881), et au décret-annexe en date du 22 djémazi-ul-akhir, 1321 (1er (14) septembre, 1903). Dans ces obligations sont compris le remplacement du tribut de Bulgarie (£ T. 100,000), et de l'excédent de Chypre (£ T. 130,000) sur la dime des tabacs, ainsi que l'assignation fixe de £ T. 114,000 remplaçant la redevance de la Roumélie orientale.

2. Dans ces territoires, la gestion, l'administration et l'encaissement des revenus assignés au service de la Dette publique ottomane auront lieu, comme par le passé et suivant les dispositions desdits décrets, déterminant les pouvoirs et attributions du Conseil de la Dette publique. Les sommes qui y seront perçues de ce chef feront partie des revenus généraux de la Dette publique pour être employées de la manière indiquée aux mêmes décrets et dans le paragraphe 6 du présent protocole.

3. En ce qui concerne le revenu du Monopole du Tabac, ce revenu sera géré, dans les territoires cédés, par la Société de la Régie des Tabacs de l'Empire ottoman, conformément à son cahier des charges, jusqu'au , date de l'expiration de la concession accordée à cette société. Le Conseil de la Dette publique s'entendra dès à présent avec les Gouvernements balkaniques pour déterminer de concert le régime légal et économique devant être ultérieurement appliqué au Monopole du Tabac, le produit de ce monopole, dans les mêmes territoires, devant en tout cas revenir entièrement au Conseil de la Dette publique, sous réserve des dispositions du paragraphe 6 du présent protocole.

4. Les revenus assignés au service de la Dette publique ottomane continueront, dans les limites des territoires cédés, d'être exploités conformément aux lois et règlements qui leur sont appliqués actuellement. Ces lois et règlements ne pourront, jusqu'à l'extinction de ladite dette et des créances mentionnées dans l'Annexe 10, être modifiés que par un accord entre les Gouvernements balkaniques et le Conseil de la Dette publique ottomane, ou après l'extinction de la dette régie par le décret de mouharrem et le décret-annexe par un accord entre lesdits Gouvernements et les établissements intéressés.

5. Les Gouvernements balkaniques s'entendront avec le conseil pour prendre les dispositions nécessaires à l'entière application des mêmes lois et règlements dans les susdits territoires. Ils accorderont à l'Administration de la Dette publique et à ses ayants droit la protection militaire indispensable à la gestion des revenus concédés et à leurs divers services locaux. Ils leur continueront l'usage gratuit des locaux gouvernementaux présentement occupés par ces services.

6. Si, après payement de l'annuité fixée à l'article 7 du décret-annexe susmentionné, il est constaté, à la fin de chaque exercice, un excédent dans les recettes nettes générales de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, le conseil versera, déduction faite des assignations indiquées dans ladite Annexe 10, aux Gouvernements balkaniques, une portion des 75 pour cent de cet excédent, établi au prorata des sommes perçues respectivement dans les territoires cédés.

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7. En cas de contestation, venant à surgir entre les Gouvernements balkaniques et le Conseil de la Dette publique ottomane, au sujet de l'interprétation ou de l'exécution du présent protocole ou du décret de mouharrem et du décret-annexe, il sera fait application des dispositions de l'article 19 du décret de mouharrem.

8. Aucune compensation ne pourra être admise en cas de stipulation par les États balkaniques d'une indemnité de guerre, entre cette indemnité et la part de la dette publique ottomane qui demeure à la charge de ces États en raison des territoires cédés. Cette compensation ne saurait davantage s'établir entre les arrérages respectifs de l'une et de l'autre au détriment des porteurs de ladite Dette.

(3.)

Deuxième Avant-Projet de Protocole relatif aux Revenus concédés à la Dette publique ottomane.

En représentation des revenus perçus, soit directement, soit avec l'intermédiaire des agents de l'État, par le Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, en vertu du décret Impérial ottoman du 28 mouharrem, 1299 (8 (20) décembre, 1881), et du décret-annexe du 22 djémazi-ul-akhir (1er (14) septembre, 1903), dans les territoires cédés par la Turquie aux États balkaniques, ceux-ci paieront audit conseil, jusqu'à l'extinction de la dette déterminée aux mêmes décrets en deux versements égaux, le 1er (14) février et le 1er (14) août de chaque année, une somme égale au produit net annuel encaissé dans lesdits territoires, tant par la Dette publique elle-même que par la Société de la Régie des Tabacs de l'Empire ottoman pendant l'exercice 1327.

Le premier versement aura lieu le

Dans ces revenus sont compris la part de la dette sur la dime des tabacs en remplacement du tribut de la Bulgarie (£T. 100,000) et de l'excédent de Chypre (£T. 130,000), ainsi que l'assignation de £T. 114,000 remplaçant la redevance de la Roumélie orientale.

Une partie du produit des anciens revenus étant affectée aux service des créances énumérées dans la liste ci-jointe, les États balkaniques paieront à partir de la date de l'extinction de la dette régie par le décret de mouharrem et le décret-annexe au Conseil de la Dette publique ottomane, ou à l'administration qui lui sera substituée avec le consentement des parties qui ont conclu les contrats relatifs à ces créances, des annuités fixes jusqu'à l'extinction desdites créances. Ces annuités seront égales aux montants appliqués pour le service de ces mêmes créances dans l'exercice 1327. Chacune de ces annuités sera établie, respectivement, au prorata des sommes perçues, dans les territoires cédés, sur les anciens revenus affectés auxdites créances, comparativement aux recettes totales des mêmes revenus.

En outre, les États balkaniques paieront au Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, en raison des immeubles, du sel en dépôt, du tabac et des autres biens de cette administration, ainsi que de la Société de la Régie des Tabacs, une indemnité dont le montant sera arrêté, en cas de désaccord entre lesdits États et le conseil, par quatre arbitres nommés de part et d'autre, lesquels arbitres éliront un surarbitre pour les départager, le cas échéant. Le jugement arbitral sera souverain et sans appel.

2. Le produit annuel sera obtenu en défalquant du total des recettes, recouvrées annuellement, par le Conseil de la Dette publique et par la Société de la Régie des Tabacs, dans les territoires cédés, la part y afférente de leurs frais généraux d'administration, de gestion et de perception, calculée au prorata desdites recettes dans les recettes générales de ces deux administrations.

3. Pour la fixation du montant des frais généraux de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane et de la Société de la Régie des Tabacs, comme de leurs recettes générales et des recettes locales, leurs registres feront foi.

4. Les Gouvernements balkaniques auront respectivement, à toute époque, la faculté de se libérer complètement vis-à-vis du Conseil de la Dette publique et des établissements intéressés, en versant les capitaux des annuités, établis au taux de 4 pour cent, suivant le précédent inscrit à l'article 10 du Traité de Paix italo-turc du 18 octobre, 1912. La Dette publique aura le droit de réclamer à toute époque le versement desdits capitaux. Le même droit est également acquis aux établissements intéressés aux créances mentionnées dans la liste ci-jointe.

5. Pour leurs quote-parts respectives, les États balkaniques devront fournir aux

porteurs de ladite Dette et aux créances susmentionnées des sûretés équivalentes aux sûretés abandonnées.

Dans les États où il existe une commission ou des agents de contrôle financier international, le service desdites quote-parts sera effectué par ces institutions, aux conditions déjà déterminées dans leurs statuts respectifs pour le service des dettes publiques locales.

6. Toute contestation entre les États balkaniques et le Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, portant sur les sûretés nouvelles sera également tranchée par voie d'arbitrage, en conformité des clauses du paragraphe premier ci-dessus.

7. Aucune compensation ne pourra être admise en cas de stipulation par les États balkaniques d'une indemnité de guerre, entre cette indemnité et la part de la dette publique ottoman qui demeure à la charge de ces États en raison des territoires cédés. Cette compensation ne saurait davantage s'établir entre les arrérages respectives de l'une et de l'autre au détriment des porteurs de ladite Dette.

8. Le Gouvernement ottoman, débiteur principal des porteurs, devra leur fournir des garanties additionnelles.

Liste des créances prévues aux §§1 et 4 du deuxième avant-projet de protocole relatif aux revenus concédés à la Dette publique ottomane :—

Emprunt ottoman 4 pour cent, 1904.
Emprunt Bagdad, deuxième série.
Emprunt Bagdad, troisième série.

(4.)

Avant-Projet d'Article concernant la Dette publique de l'Empire ottoman, autre que celle régie par le Décret de Mouharrem et le Décret-Annexe.

De même, seront pleinement sauvegardés les droits des porteurs de la Dette publique ottomane, autre que celle régie par le décret du 28 mouharrem, 1299 (8 (20) décembre, 1881), et le décret-annexe de 22 djémazi-ul-akhir, 1321 (1er (14) septembre, 1903).

Des dispositions spéciales détermineront les conditions auxquelles les États balkaniques auront à contribuer à ladite dette, en raison des territoires cédés.

Jusqu'à leur mise en application, les conventions d'emprunt en vigueur, notamment celles relatives aux gages et affectations, continueront d'être appliquées comme par le passé.

Tout différend survenant entre les Gouvernements balkaniques et la Sublime Porte ou les établissements intéressés et l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, dans les cas où celle-ci aurait fourni sa garantie, au sujet de l'interprétation ou de l'exécution des dispositions prévues au présent article sera soumis au Tribunal de La Haye.

(5.)

Avant-Projet de Protocole concernant la Dette publique ottomane garantie par l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, autre que la Dette régie par le Décret de Mouharrem et le Décret-Annexe.

Les États balkaniques devront supporter, en raison des territoires cédés par la Turquie, une part de la dette publique ottomane, garantie par l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, autre que la dette régie par le décret du 28 mouharrem, 1299 (8 (20) décembre, 1881), et le décret-annexe du 22 djémazi-ul-akhir, 1321 (1er (14) septembre, 1903), dont le montant sera arrêté suivant le rapport existant entre les revenus de ces territoires et le revenu global de l'Empire ottoman, calculé d'après les recettes de l'exercice 1327 (1er (14) mars, 1911–29 février (13) mars, 1912).

2. L'annuité des États balkaniques sera versée, le 1er (14) janvier de chaque année, pour le compte du Gouvernement Impérial à l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, qui sera chargée d'en faire la répartition entre les différentes emprunts. Ce payement aura lieu, pour l'année 1912, le , 1912. Une liste des créances dont les gages sont administrés, en tout ou en partie, par le Conseil de la Dette publique ottomane, est jointe au présent protocole.

3. Il est entendu que la part contributive des États balkaniques à verser à la

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Dette publique ottomane ne sera pas inférieure au montant du produit des affectations spéciales pour les différentes parties de la dette ottomane perçu pendant l'exercice 1327. Pour la fixation dudit montant les registres de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane feront foi. Ce montant devra être appliqué et réparti au service des créances jouissant de ces gages spéciaux selon le mode et le rang qui leur sont concédés actuellement.

4. Sur la demande de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane ou des établissements intéressés, partie ou totalité de ladite annuité sera convertie en capital au taux de 4 pour cent le précédent inscrit à l'article 10 du Traité de Paix italo-turc du 18 octobre, 1912.

Dans ce cas les sommes ainsi capitalisées seront versées pour le compte du Gouvernement ottoman à l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, chargée d'assurer la destination qui leur revient.

5. Aucune compensation ne pourra être admise en cas de stipulation par les États balkaniques d'une indemnité de guerre entre cette indemnité et la part de la Dette ottomane qui demeure à la charge des territoires cédés.

Cette compensation ne saurait davantage s'établir entre les arrérages respectifs de l'une et de l'autre au détriment des porteurs étrangers de fonds ottomans.

6. Les États balkaniques devront fournir des sûretés équivalentes aux sûretés dont le maintien serait reconnu impossible ou impraticable.

Dans les États où il existe une commission ou des agents de contrôle financier international, le service des quote-parts desdits États sera effectué par ces institutions, aux conditions déjà déterminées dans leurs statuts respectifs pour le service des dettes publiques locales.

7. Toute contestation entre les États balkaniques et les établissements intéressés ou l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, portant sur les sûretés nouvelles sera tranchée par quatre arbitres, nommés de part et d'autre, lesquels désigneront un tiers arbitre pour les départager, le cas échéant. Le jugement arbitral sera souverain et sans appel.

8. L'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane sera déchargée et toute obligation quant aux gages détenus par elle et qui ne seraient pas maintenus.

9. Le Gouvernement ottoman, débiteur principal des porteurs, devra leur fournir des garanties additionnelles.

Liste des créances prévues au paragraphe 2 de l'avant-projet de protocol relatif à la dette ottomane garantie par l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, autre que la dette régie par le décret de mouharrem et le décret-annexe :—

Emprunt Osmanié 4 pour cent.
Emprunt 5 pour cent de 1896.
Emprunt 4 pour cent 1901–5.
Emprunt 4 pour cent 1903, Bagdad, 1re série.
Emprunt 4 pour cent 1903, avec garanties spéciales.
Emprunt 4 pour cent 1905, Tedjhizat-i-Askérié.
Irrigation plaine de Koniah.
Emprunt Banque Impériale ottomane 4 pour cent 1908.
Redevance Roumélie orientale.
Avance Banque Impériale ottomane £T. 1,250,000.

(6.)

Avant-Projet de Protocole concernant la Dette publique ottomane, autre que la Dette régie par le Décret de Mouharrem et le Décret-Annexe, ou garantie par l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane.

Les États balkaniques devront supporter, en raison des territoires cédés par la Turquie, une part de la dette publique ottomane, autre que la dette régie par le décret du 28 mouharrem, 1299 (8 (20) décembre, 1881), et le décret-annexe du 22 djémazi-ul-akhir, 1321 (1er (14) septembre, 1908), ou garantie par l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, dont le montant sera arrêté suivant le rapport existant entre les revenus de ces territoires et le revenu global de l'Empire ottoman, calculé d'après les recettes de l'exercice 1327 (1er (14) mars, 1911–29 février (13) mars, 1912).

2. L'annuité des États balkaniques sera versée le 1er (14) janvier de chaque année, pour le compte du Gouvernement Impérial à l'Administration de la Dette

publique ottomane, qui sera chargée d'en faire la répartition entre les différents emprunts. Ce payement aura lieu, pour l'année 1912, le , 1912. Une liste de ces emprunts est jointe au présent protocole.

3. Il est entendu que la part contributive des États balkaniques à verser à la Dette publique ottomane ne sera pas inférieure au montant du produit des affectations spéciales pour les différentes parties de la dette ottomane, perçu pendant l'exercice 1327. Ce montant devra être appliqué et réparti au service des créances jouissant de ces gages spéciaux selon le mode et le rang qui leur sont concédés actuellement.

4. Sur la demande des établissements intéressés, partie ou totalité de ladite annuité sera convertie en capital au taux de 4 pour cent suivant le précédent inscrit à l'article 10 du Traité de Paix italo-turc du 18 octobre, 1912.

Dans ce cas, les sommes ainsi capitalisées seront versées pour le compte du Gouvernement ottoman à l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, chargée d'assurer la destination qui leur revient.

5. Aucune compensation ne pourra être admise en cas de stipulation par les États balkaniques d'une indemnité de guerre, entre cette indemnité et la part de la dette ottomane qui demeure à la charge des territoires cédés.

Cette compensation ne saurait davantage s'établir entre les arrérages respectifs de l'une et de l'autre au détriment des porteurs étrangers de fonds ottomans.

6. Les États balkaniques devront fournir des sûretés équivalentes aux sûretés dont le maintien serait reconnu impossible ou impraticable.

Dans les États où il existe une commission ou des agents de contrôle financier international, le service des quote-parts desdits États sera effectué, par ces institutions, aux conditions déjà déterminées dans leurs statuts respectifs pour le service des dettes publiques locales.

7. Toute contestation entre les États balkaniques et les établissements intéressés, portant sur les sûretés nouvelles sera tranchée par quatre arbitres, nommés de part et d'autre, lesquels désigneront un tiers arbitre pour les départager, le cas échéant. Le jugement arbitral sera souverain et sans appel.

8. Le Gouvernement ottoman, débiteur principal des porteurs, devra leur fournir des garanties additionnelles.

(7.)

Avant-Projet d'Article concernant les Garanties kilométriques des Chemins de Fer traversant les Territoires cédés par la Turquie.

Tant que les conventions relatives aux chemins de fer, traversant les territoires cédés par la Turquie, n'auront pas été modifiés après entente avec les sociétés intéressées, les États balkaniques conserveront à leur charge les garanties kilométriques afférentes aux lignes existant sur lesdits territoires.

Les États balkaniques devront fournir des sûretés équivalentes aux sûretés dont le maintien serait reconnu impossible ou impraticable.

Dans les États où il existe une commission ou des agents de contrôle financier international, le service des garanties kilométriques sera effectué par ces institutions, aux conditions déjà déterminées dans leurs statuts respectifs pour le service des dettes publiques locales.

Jusqu'à ce que de nouvelles sûretés aient été arrêtées, conformément à ce qui précède, les dispositions des conventions en vigueur continueront d'être appliquées comme par le passé.

L'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane sera déchargée de toute obligation quant aux gages détenus par elle et qui ne seraient pas maintenus.

En cas de désaccord entre les Gouvernements balkaniques et les compagnies de chemins de fer intéressées, ou l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, portant sur l'interprétation ou l'exécution du présent article, le conflit sera déféré au Tribunal de La Haye.

[54724] No. 472.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 373.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, December 18, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the reply of the Russian Government to the communication which I addressed to them, in accordance with the

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instructions contained in your despatch No. 402 of the 5th instant, respecting the payment of the indemnity due to M. Zaïmis.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 472.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir G. Buchanan.

EN réponse à l'aide-mémoire en date du 25 novembre (8 décembre), année courante, le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur d'informer l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique qu'il semble au Gouvernement Impérial que les Puissances protectrices de la Crète devraient se considérer moralement responsables des intérêts de M. Zaïmis en sa qualité d'ex-Haut Commissaire de l'île et qu'il serait par conséquent préférable que le payement de l'indemnité qui lui est due soit effectué par elles.

Le montant de cette indemnité comme il a déjà été convenu entre les Puissances protectrices serait versé à titre d'avance au Gouvernement crétois et ajouté à la dette contractée par lui en 1901, dette dont la Grèce aura à assumer naturellement la responsabilité à partir du moment où la Crète sera définitivement annexée au royaume.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 4 (17) *décembre*, 1912.

[54862] No. 473.

Vice-Consul de Garston to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 5. Confidential.)
Sir, *Ragusa, December* 18, 1912.

AS I have had the honour of reporting previously, I now beg to append a list of Austrian transports which have landed, and are at present landing, reserve troops in Dalmatian ports (including Gravosa), with the numbers of officers and men brought by each, between the 16th and 19th instant.

The vessels are all from Trieste and Fiume.

Date.	Name of Steamer.	Number of officers and men.
1912:		
December 16	Prinz Hohenlohe	735
" 16	Tirol	566
" 16	Baron Call	558
" 17	Cadolla	400
" 17	Trieste	..*
" 17	Matyas Kiraly	1,600
" 17	Oceania	1,800
" 18	Carinthia	1,200
" 18	Urano	1,023
" 18	Gastein	1,521
" 18	Almissa	745
" 18	Kupa	795
" 18	Baron Gautsch	360
" 19	Hegedus Sandor	384
" 19	Deak	1,061
" 19	Szechényi	790
" 19	Prinz Hohenlohe	1,250
		14,188

* 2 Horses, 130.

This confirms the information which I had the honour of conveying in my telegram of the 17th ultimo.

Arrangements have been made whereby the families of all reservists called to the colours shall receive subsistence at the rate of 1 crown for each child, and 2 crowns per diem for each adult dependent on such reservists.

The military authorities here and at Gravosa have taken over all suitable buildings, halls, and vacant houses for quartering the troops.

I am informed that 40,000 men have been collected at Metkovic, and that a considerably larger number are concentrated at Trebinje and in and around Cattaro.

The opinion prevails here in all sets that war has been undoubtedly decided upon, and will be initiated whenever the military preparations are considered entirely complete.

I have, &c.
E. M. DE GARSTON.

[54648] No. 474.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 1086.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December* 19, 1912.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 557 of the 10th instant and to my despatch No. 1082 of yesterday, I have the honour to transmit herewith a note which has been communicated to me by Sir A. Block containing observations on the French memorandum on the methods to be adopted for safeguarding the interests of the Ottoman Public Debt in the general settlement after the war. Sir A. Block informs me that this note has not yet been submitted officially to the council here, but is prepared with that object, and may be taken to represent the views of all the members of the council.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 474.

Note sur les Conclusions de la Commission réunie au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de France à l'effet de délibérer sur les dispositions à adopter pour la sauvegarde des intérêts des créanciers de l'Empire ottoman.

Conclusions de la Commission.	*Observations.*
LA commission, estimant que la discussion a dégagé les principes qui pourraient être invoqués pour la sauvegarde des intérêts des créanciers de l'Empire ottoman, a arrêté les conclusions suivantes :—	
I.	I.
La commission, partant du principe de droit public aujourd'hui généralement reconnu qu'en cas de démembrement d'un État, l'État annexant ne saurait prendre possession du territoire annexé qu'avec les charges qui le grèvent, et qu'il doit équitablement supporter une part de la dette publique contractée par l'État démembré, envisageant, d'autre part, le mode selon lequel ces charges doivent être réparties, estime, dans le cas particulier de l'Empire ottoman qu'il n'est ni opportun ni pratique de baser cette répartition sur la spécialisation des gages affectés aux divers éléments de la Dette publique ottomane.	Les conclusions de la commission ne paraissent pas avoir distingué de la dette générale de la Turquie la dette dont le service est assumé par le Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane. Il importe cependant de considérer que la seconde, qui est régie par le décret du 28 mouharrem, 1299 (8 (20) décembre, 1881), et le décret-annexe du 22 djémazi-ul-akhir, 1321 (1er (14) septembre, 1903), a un caractère exceptionnel. En effet, les porteurs de cette dette possèdent, au sens propre du mot et aux conditions spécifiées aux mêmes décrets, divers revenus qu'ils exploitent directement ou par l'entremise de tiers.
	Le Gouvernement ottoman, à la suite de la récente guerre, n'a pu perdre que ce qui lui appartenait. Les États balkaniques n'ont donc pu acquérir présentement des revenus déjà cédés aux porteurs de ladite dette jusqu'à l'extinction de cette dernière;

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en vertu d'actes ayant un caractère nettement international, en raison des stipulations et des négociations qui les ont précédés et de la communication qui en a été faite aux Puissances. Aussi, conviendrait-il en principe, de faire reconnaître par les États balkaniques, que l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane et ses ayants droit continueront d'exercer pleinement, dans les territoires cédés, leurs droits et prérogatives sur les revenus concédés, suivant leurs statuts actuels.

Dans le cas, toutefois, où il y aurait impossibilité absolue de faire admettre l'application de ce régime il faudrait réclamer, à titre d'indemnité, le payement à la Dette publique ottomane par les États balkaniques d'une annuité calculée ainsi qu'il est dit ci-dessous.

2.

En conséquence, les Etats alliés devront supporter une part de la dette publique ottomane proportionnelle aux revenus des territoires cédés conformément au principe déjà inscrit, pour les cessions territoriales antérieures dont ils ont bénéficié, dans le Traité de Berlin de 1878 et dans la convention signée à Constantinople, le 24 mai, 1881.

2.

Il serait indispensable que le nouveau traité précisât la forme et le montant des compensations sans en laisser, comme le Traité de Berlin et la Convention turco-hellénique du 24 mai, 1881, le soin aux représentants des Puissances à Constantinople.

3.

La participation des territoires cédés au service de l'ensemble de la dette extérieure de l'Empire ottoman sera arrêtée d'après le rapport existant entre les revenus de ces territoires et le revenu global de l'Empire ottoman, calculés d'après la moyenne des trois dernières années, suivant le système déjà proposé à la Sublime Porte par une note de l'Ambassade d'Angleterre en date du 6 novembre, 1883.

Cette méthode de calcul de la participation des États alliés à l'ensemble de la dette publique ottomane ne saurait, au détriment des porteurs étrangers, le principe même de la garantie spéciale affectée aux différents emprunts.

Il appartiendrait, au contraire, aux États alliés de fournir pour la quote-part laissée à la charge des provinces cédés des sûretés équivalentes à celles dont le maintien serait reconnu impossible ou impraticable.

Ces sûretés pourraient être recherchées dans l'intervention des organismes de contrôle déjà existants.

3.

Pour ce qui est du mode d'évaluation de l'annuité, la commission prend pour base d'une manière générale le rapport existant entre les revenus généraux des territoires cédés et le revenu global de l'Empire ottoman. Le Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane ne peut, en ce qui le concerne, accepter cette manière de voir, qui pourrait lui être gravement préjudiciable. En effet, le rapport existant entre le revenu global de la Dette publique et ses revenus dans les territoires cédés—lesquels revenus ont un rendement variant considérablement d'une province à l'autre—ne saurait être équitablement comparé au rapport existant entre le revenu global de l'Empire et les revenus généraux des territoires cédés.

Aussi, afin d'éviter tout préjudice aux porteurs de la Dette publique prévue par le décret de mouharrem et le décret-annexe, est-il nécessaire d'assurer à l'Administration de la Dette publique une annuité correspondant exactement au chiffre de ses revenus dans les provinces cédées. Cette annuité devrait être calculée d'après les résultats de l'exercice 1327 (1er (14) mars, 1911–29 février (13 mars), 1912).

Il importe de faire remarquer à cette occasion qu'on ne saurait, du fait de

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l'existence des excédents fournis par les revenus gérés par le Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, tirer argument pour tenter de diminuer le chiffre de ces revenus. Lesdits excédents dont le chiffre, essentiellement variable, ne peut être établi, qu'en fin d'exercice, et ont un emploi déterminé par le décret-annexe, reviennent dans la proportion de 25 pour cent à l'Administration de la Dette publique même. Quant aux 75 pour cent restants qui reviennent en principe au Gouvernement, ils ont déjà reçu, au profit de tiers, des affectations qu'on doit respecter.

D'autre part, le texte du second alinéa du paragraphe 3 présentement examiné, qui prévoit le maintien des garanties spéciales, ne paraît pas concorder tout à fait avec les dispositions finales du paragraphe 1er, lequel semble ne pas admettre la spécialisation des gages.

4.

L'annuité des États alliés sera versée, pour le compte du Gouvernement ottoman, à l'Administration de la Dette publique, qui sera chargée d'en faire la répartition entre les différents emprunts, qu'ils soient gérés ou non par cette administration.

4.

La commission paraît avoir envisagé une extension des attributions de la Dette publique ottomane, qui s'appliquerait à l'ensemble de la dette extérieure de l'Empire ottoman. Le conseil ne pourrait que se prêter à cette solution, qui serait éminemment profitable, non seulement aux porteurs, mais encore à l'Empire ottoman lui-même.

Comment et à quelle époque s'opérera le versement des annuités? Bien que les divers emprunts au service desquels seraient appliquées ces annuités aient des échéances différentes, il serait plus simple d'effectuer le payement desdites annuités au début de chaque exercice, l'Administration de la Dette publique pouvant, au besoin, tenir compte aux États des intérêts de la provision jusqu'aux échéances.

5.

L'annuité des territoires cédés destinée au service des emprunts ottomans pourra faire l'objet d'une conversion en capital, suivant le précédent inscrit à l'article 10 du Traité de Paix italo-turc du 18 octobre, 1912.

Dans ce cas les sommes ainsi capitalisées seront versées pour le compte du Gouvernement ottoman à l'Administration de la Dette publique, chargée d'assurer la destination qui leur revient.

5.

Il importerait de préciser les conditions dans lesquelles s'opérerait la conversion, et notamment de stipuler à qui appartiendrait l'initiative de demander la capitalisation. Le traité italo-turc attribue cette initiative à la Dette publique seule. Il semble qu'il conviendrait de reconnaître le même avantage aux États balkaniques, en leur reconnaissant respectivement la faculté de se libérer complètement de leurs charges en procédant au rachat de l'annuité leur incombant.

6.

Aucune compensation ne pourra être admise en cas de stipulation par les alliés d'une indemnité de guerre, entre cette

6.

Aucune observation à formuler.

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indemnité et la part de la dette ottomane qui demeure à la charge des territoires cédés.

Cette compensation ne saurait davantage s'établir entre les arrérages respectifs de l'une et de l'autre au détriment des porteurs étrangers de fonds ottomans.

7.

Au cas où indemnité de guerre serait exigée par l'Empire ottoman les Puissances se réservent de faire un rappel de la part contributive non encore liquidée des États alliés à la dette ottomane existant en 1871, pour les territoires cédés en vertu du Traité de Berlin.

8.

Il y aurait lieu de demander aux États alliés de participer à l'extinction de la dette flottante ottomane constituée avant la date de l'ouverture des hostilités.

La contribution des États alliés serait calculée en capital d'après la proportion existant entre le revenu global de l'Empire ottoman et les revenus des territoires cédés.

Les versements à intervenir seraient faits par les alliés pour le compte du Gouvernement Impérial dans un établissement préalablement désigné à cet effet et chargé de s'assurer de l'exact emploi de ces sommes.

9.

Les Gouvernements alliés devront reconnaître et confirmer les concessions, quelles qu'elles soient, accordées par le Gouvernement ottoman ou par les différentes autorités administratives sur les territoires cédés.

Il en sera de même des contrats en cours d'exécution conclus par l'État, les villes ou autorités ottomanes.

Les Gouvernements alliés demeureront subrogés à tous les droits et à toutes les charges qui résultaient de ces concessions et de ces contrats pour le Gouvernement ottoman.

10.

Les Gouvernements alliés demeureront subrogés en tout aux droits et obligations du Gouvernement ottoman en ce qui concerne les concessions de chemins de fer.

Les provinces cédées conserveront notamment à leur charge les garanties kilométriques afférentes aux lignes existant sur leur territoire.

Observations

7.

Proposition d'une application difficile. Les obligations qui incombaient aux États balkaniques, en vertu du Traité de Berlin, étant restées lettre morte, peuvent en quelque sorte être considérées comme prescrites. De plus, en ce qui concerne la Bulgarie spécialement, le Gouvernement ottoman en 1909 a renoncé explicitement à la part contributive de cet État.

8.

L'application de cette mesure pourrait se heurter à de nombreux obstacles. Ce qui constitue la dette flottante dans l'Empire ottoman, ce ne sont pas, comme dans les autres États, les déficits budgétaires accumulés, mais un ensemble hétérogène de créances dont la plupart ne sont même pas encore bien établies. Depuis quatre ans que l'on a entrepris d'arrêter le compte de la dette flottante, on en est resté aux simples préliminaires de l'inscription des titres, sans passer à leur vérification. La matière peut donc sembler trop vaste et imprécise pour faire l'objet d'une tractation du genre dont il s'agit entre la Turquie et les États alliés.

9.

Au sujet de cet article, qui ne motive par lui-même aucune observation, il y a lieu de signaler toutefois la nécessité de faire préciser de quelle façon les Gouvernements balkaniques indemniseront la Dette publique des immeubles, du sel en dépôts, du tabac et de tous autres biens que celle-ci et la Régie possèdent dans les territoires cédés.

10.

Il apparaît nécessaire de préciser à qui incombera la gestion du service de celle des garanties kilométriques qui seront laissées à la charge des provinces annexées. Si la Dette doit continuer à assumer ce service il importera de lui confirmer ses précédents pouvoirs. Dans le cas contraire, il conviendra de la décharger des responsabilités qui découlent pour elle de la situation assumée.

Conclusions de la Commission.

11.

Dans le cas où le monopole de la Régie coïntéressée des Tabacs de l'Empire ottoman, qu'il expire d'ailleurs prochainement, ne serait pas maintenu, il y aurait lieu à l'indemnité envers cette société de la part des États alliés.

12.

Les mesures envisagées pour la protection des porteurs vis-à-vis des États alliés n'excluent pas la nécessité, pour le Gouvernement ottoman, en sa qualité de principal débiteur, de fournir de son côté des garanties additionnelles aux porteurs étrangers.

Observations.

11.

Le revenu du tabac appartient à la Dette publique et doit par conséquent être traité au point de vue de l'indemnisation de la même façon que les autres revenus concédés à ladite administration.

En conséquence, les États balkaniques devraient, au cas où la concession accordée à la Société de la Régie des Tabacs ne serait pas maintenue dans les territoires cédés, payer à la Dette publique une annuité basée sur le produit net des recettes de la Régie en 1327. Celle-ci pourrait, dans ce même cas, demander une indemnité en même temps qu'il lui serait fait application des dispositions de son cahier des charges.

12.

Pas d'observation.

[54929] No. 475.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 374.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, December* 18, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the "Novoe Vremya" publishes an article on the political situation which begins with a reference to the autograph letter from the Sultan to the King. It points out that the traditional friendship of Great Britain recalled by the Sultan has, during the last twenty years, resulted in the entire economic life of Turkey having been handed over to Germany. In these circumstances it was difficult to see why England should support Turkey.

The "Novoe Vremya," turning to the general political situation, observes that the formation of the Triple *Entente* restored the balance of powor, and that neither of the two camps into which Europe is divided has dared to test which is the stronger, and it then proceeds to discuss how far it is to the advantage of the *entente* to support a million bayonets which have voluntarily attached themselves to it. Before the war the Triple Alliance had opposed the Balkan League with all its strength, whereas the Triple *Entente* had only supported it half-heartedly. Now that the war was over, was history to repeat itself, and were the Balkan allies to be again left unsupported and exposed to the full force of the Triple Alliance? In Slav questions the whole responsibility of the policy of the Triple *Entente* fell on Russian diplomatists, and if, in the immediate future, energetic pressure were not exercised on Turkey in the sense of concluding a peace advantageous to the allies, it would be a mistake fraught with unpleasant and serious consequences for Russia.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[54756] No. 476.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 375.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, December 19, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith translation of that part of M. Kokovtsof's speech in the Duma yesterday which deals with foreign affairs. The part dealing with matters of internal interest will form the subject of another despatch.

M. Kokovtsof's references to the European political situation met with an excellent reception, and his allusions to Russia's alliance and friendships elicited considerable applause.

The press has as yet not commented at any length on the speech, but the articles which have so far appeared have not been couched in very enthusiastic terms.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 476.

Extract from M. Kokovtsof's Speech in the Duma.

THE military prowess and the rare unanimity displayed by the Balkan peoples could not but find the warmest sympathy in the hearts of all Russians. As a great and Orthodox Power which has made countless sacrifices in the defence of her kindred in blood and faith, Russia cannot remain indifferent to the attainment by the latter of such conditions of existence as will secure—in a manner responding to the brave deeds performed and the torrents of blood which have been shed—their vital interests and peaceful development, and will remove in the future the probability of fresh complications, always dangerous for the peace of Europe.

Mindful of the best traditions of our history, and sharing in this connection the clearly expressed opinion of the Russian public, the Government cannot, of course, but attach the highest importance to the interests of Russia, the protection of which is a sacred obligation and places on the Government a heavy responsibility. Further, the Government cannot but note with satisfaction that it is not necessary for them to change in any way the position they have occupied from the very commencement. Remaining calm amid the excitement and alarm which have frequently arisen, the Government have given no grounds whatever for suspicion of harbouring self-interested designs, or of a desire to increase the tension, and have been guided throughout in their actions by one idea—to stand on guard in the defence of their historic problems and their prestige.

It would be premature to say at the present moment by what method any one separate question, arising from events taking place in the Balkans, will be settled. The fundamental principles by which the Government must be guided when the time arrives to take final decisions are indicated as much by our whole past as by the necessity to link it with the political conditions of the present day. It must not be forgotten that a bond for success—always the root principle of any sound policy—is an endeavour to obtain that which is in fact obtainable without giving way to feelings of sentiment. True to our alliance and agreements with other Great Powers, assured of the support of our allies and friends, we at the same time do not see the advantage, and still less the necessity, of opposing one group of Powers by another. Any Government which would depart from the ground of joint consideration of the vital questions of the modern political situation, placing in the forefront their own direct, and so much the more secondary interests, would take upon themselves a heavy moral responsibility for the possibility of future international complications. The Great Powers have the most serious grounds for endeavouring to avert a further development of the complications which have arrived at a stage threatening the general peace of Europe. The Russian Government are of opinion that the friendly efforts inspiring them, and directed towards this great aim, will assist in the discovery of a method for the peaceful settlement of all the questions touching the interests and just claims of the Balkan States. The Government cannot, therefore, but welcome in the sincerest manner the initiative of the English Government, in inviting the Great Powers to submit to a combined preliminary consideration those questions connected with the liquidation of the war in which their interests are or are not concerned. The

sympathetic reception accorded to this proposal in the European capitals, and the conference of the Ambassadors of the Great Powers, which has already opened in London, must, as we hope, facilitate the peaceful settlement of the present crisis. Imbued by the sincerest desire to co-operate in every possible manner for the preservation of the peace of Europe, the Russian Government express the hope that, with the assistance of the Almighty, their efforts may be crowned with success, and that future events will not touch the vital interests of Russia which they have been summoned to safeguard with all their strength in the name of the honour and dignity of the motherland.

[54665] No. 477.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 224.)

Sir, *Vienna, December 20, 1912.*

THE speeches of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and of the Russian Prime Minister have been received with great interest by the Viennese press, which devotes much attention to the utterances of these two statesmen.

For the speech of the Marquis di San Giuliano, with its eulogy of the Triple Alliance, there is naturally nothing but praise. The "Tagblatt," always a friend of Italy, describes the Marquis's words as an even greater tribute to the solidity of the Triple Alliance than the speech of the German Chancellor himself. After these speeches no one, it declares, can have any doubts as to the indissoluble character of the group of States which extends from the Mediterranean to the Baltic. Any cloud of misunderstanding or suspicion existing between Austria-Hungary and Italy must now, in the opinion of the "Tagblatt," disappear before the sincere intention of both peoples to live in harmony with each other.

The semi-official "Freudenblatt" (which remains silent on the subject of M. Kokovtsof's speech) speaks in similar terms of warmest approval of the utterances of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and devotes a leading article to a eulogy of the benefits of the Triple Alliance both to the interests of its members and to the general peace of the world.

The speech of M. Kokovtsof has met with a very qualified approval here. While welcoming the assurances of Russia's peaceful intentions, the Viennese press takes exception to the veiled reproof which the speech is considered to direct against this country; while considerable resentment is expressed—especially by the "Reichspost"—to the claim put forward by the Russian Prime Minister as to the special interests of Russia as a Slav Orthodox Power in the future as a patron of the Balkan States. The latter, the "Neue Freie Presse" hints, will now be able to dispense with the Russian protection which was necessary to them while Turkey was still predominant in the Balkan Peninsula.

Another point in M. Kokovtsof's speech to which objection is taken here is his insinuation that it is Austria-Hungary's military precautions which are responsible for the prevalent unrest. The "Neue Freie Presse" reminds its readers that the Russian "experimental mobilisation" on the Galician frontier was the origin of Austria's military activity, and that Russia was then affected by a strong current of anti-Austrian opinion, which has now fortunately subsided.

Apart, however, from these criticisms, the press comments in general in an optimistic tone on the Russian Prime Minister's speech, which is regarded as a whole as displaying an attitude favourable to the maintenance of European peace.

I have, &c.

FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[54804] No. 478.

National Bank of Turkey to Foreign Office.—(Received December 23.)

Sir, *50, Cornhill, London, December 20, 1912.*

IN the negotiations now proceeding for the conclusion of peace between Turkey and the Balkan States, questions relating to the financial obligations attaching to the Turkish territories in Europe will no doubt be considered, and it appears to us that

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Secretary Sir Edward Grey may desire to have full information as to the exact nature of these obligations.

One obligation of this character arises from a contract to which we are parties, and we beg leave to transmit herewith a copy of the contract of the 1st (14th) February, 1912, between the Ottoman Government, the National Bank of Turkey, and the Bank of Salonica with reference to an issue of Treasury bills amounting to 1,500,000*.

We would specially call your attention to article 7 of the contract, by which the customs revenues of five specified customs districts, after satisfaction of existing affectations, are assigned exclusively, irrevocably, and inalienably for the payment of these Treasury bills. It will be observed that the five districts include the districts of Salonica and Adrianople.

I have, &c.
H. BABINGTON SMITH.

[54667] No. 479.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 226.)

Sir, *Vienna, December 21, 1912.*

IN my despatch No. 222 of the 17th instant I had the honour to transmit translation of an official communiqué published in the "Fremdenblatt" concerning the investigation instituted by the Imperial and Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs into the affair of Consul Prochaska at Prizrend, and at the same time to report that great indignation had been aroused by the unnecessary delay in relieving the public mind.

The criticisms levelled at the Government action in this matter have been so severe as to compel them to publish a further explanation in the columns of the semi-official "Fremdenblatt," in the hope of allaying the almost universal indignation which is being expressed. It cannot be said that this explanation sheds any further light on the Prochaska affair, or exonerates the Government from the responsibility of having aggravated the violent anti-Servian feeling which is now prevalent in Austria. After recapitulating the contents of the original communiqué, the article of to-day merely reaffirms that, the moment Consul Edl reported that he had met Consul Prochaska, the public were informed through the press that the latter was well and uninjured, and that the very day Consul Edl returned to Vienna with full details of the case, the Ministry hastened to publish an official communiqué with the object of allaying any anxiety which might still exist. It is maintained in the article that nothing more could possibly have been done under the circumstances, and that the affair was a mere incident in the great Balkan crisis which had no real power to influence public opinion, the best proof of which was that the crisis was as bad as ever, despite the elimination of the quarrel with Servia on this one special point.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[54739] No. 480.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 529.)

Sir, *Paris, December 22, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 216 of the 20th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum received from M. Gout containing observations on the conclusions come to by the committee who drew up the report in regard to the interests of the Turkish bondholders communicated to you by the French Ambassador on the 21st ultimo.

I have, &c.
LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE.

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* Not printed.

Enclosure 1 in No. 480.

M. Gout to Mr. Carnegie.

Monsieur et cher Collègue, *Paris, le 21 décembre, 1912.*

JE vous envoie la note que je vous avais promise—sorte de commentaire des propositions de la commission française.

Veuillez, &c.
JEAN GOUT

Enclosure 2 in No. 480.

Aide-mémoire.

LES conclusions auxquelles a abouti la commission française en ce qui concerne la répartition éventuelle de la dette publique ottomane et les garanties qu'il convient de stipuler pour la protection des intérêts étrangers constitués sur les territoires cédés, appellent quelques commentaires :—

Articles 1er, 2 et 3.—Le principe même de la participation des États alliés à la dette publique ottomane, inscrit à l'article 1er, est conforme à de nombreux précédents et ne paraît devoir soulever aucune difficulté. Au contraire, on pouvait hésiter sur le mode à adopter en vue de déterminer d'une façon précise le montant de la participation de chaque État.

Suivant le précédent italo-turc, le dernier en date, la participation des territoires cédés pouvait être fixée, comme pour la Tripolitaine, à une somme représentant la contribution moyenne de ces provinces au service de la dette ottomane, le Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane recevrait, d'après ce système, l'équivalent de ce qu'il percevait autrefois, dans les territoires cédés sur les revenus donnés en gage aux porteurs étrangers.

D'après un second système, voisin de celui-ci, les territoires cédés auraient conservé la charge de tous les emprunts gagés spécialement sur les revenus particuliers de ces territoires, à l'exclusion complète des emprunts garantis sur des ressources étrangères à ces territoires, ainsi qu'à l'exclusion des emprunts jouissant simplement de la garantie générale de l'État ottoman.

La participation des États alliés aurait encore pu être calculée d'après la proportion existant entre les dépenses des territoires cédés et l'ensemble des dépenses budgétaires de l'Empire ottoman, chaque province devant normalement participer dans la mesure de ses ressources, et pour sa part virile, aux dépenses générales de l'Empire et en particulier au service de la dette.

Enfin, cette participation pouvait être calculée d'après le rapport existant entre les recettes générales de l'Empire et les recettes effectuées dans les territoires cédés.

C'est ce dernier système qui, après mûr examen, a retenu l'attention de la commission comme le plus conforme à l'intérêt général des porteurs de fonds ottomans, et en même temps comme le plus équitable vis-à-vis des alliés. C'est le mode de calcul déjà fixé par l'article 10 de la convention du 24 mai, 1881, relatif à la participation de la Grèce à la dette publique ottomane, à la suite des avantages territoriaux recueillis par elle au Congrès de Berlin. C'est également sur cette base que les Puissances ont poursuivi à Constantinople, depuis 1883, le règlement des parts contributives de la dette ottomane déjà mises, par le Traité de Berlin, à la charge des États ou principautés balkaniques (voir la note de l'Ambassade d'Angleterre à la Sublime Porte du 6 novembre, 1883).

En dehors de l'autorité qui s'attache à ces précédents, la commission a été guidée par les raisons suivantes :—

La répartition de la dette basée sur la spécialisation des gages aurait eu le grave inconvénient de nécessiter une ventilation difficile des divers éléments de la dette publique ottomane, certains emprunts étant gagés partiellement seulement sur les revenus des territoires cédés, d'autres ayant pour gage des excédents de revenus calculés sur l'ensemble des perceptions opérées par la Dette publique sur tout le territoire, et non point sur un territoire déterminé. Certains gages sont administrés entièrement par le Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique, et offrent aux porteurs une garantie complète, tandis que d'autres sources de revenus, quoique données en gage, sont restées sous le contrôle immédiat du Trésor ottoman, et on pourrait

faire valoir en ce qui concerne ces derniers qu'une telle sûreté n'est pas opposable aux tiers, aucun dessaisissement effectif n'étant intervenu au bénéfice d'une administration autonome.

D'autre part, la productivité de certains gages, tels les revenus des douanes de Constantinople, pourrait se trouver diminuée d'une façon considérable comme conséquence des cessions territoriales envisagées et des détournements de trafic qui en résulteront au préjudice de cette ville, sans que les alliés soient à aucun degré tenus à compensation dans ce système vis-à-vis des porteurs d'un emprunt gagé nommément sur les douanes de Constantinople.

Basée sur la spécialisation des gages, la participation des États alliés se trouverait sans doute réduite au détriment de l'ensemble des créanciers de l'Empire ottoman.

Invoquer le précédent italo-turc serait, d'autre part, inviter les États alliés à opérer une stricte revision qui les amènerait à ne tenir compte, dans la détermination de leur part, que du montant des recettes réellement affectées au service des arrérages des emprunts, c'est-à-dire déduction faite des excédents que donnent annuellement les revenus gagés et qui sont en partie reversés au Trésor.

C'est pour éviter de telles incertitudes que la commission française a préféré adopter un mode de calcul plus large qui tient compte de l'ensemble de la dette publique ottomane, et détermine, en toute équité, la participation des territoires cédés en raison de leur capacité financière manifestée par leur contribution effective au budget général.

Articles 3, 4 et 5.—Ces articles organisent un ensemble de garanties destinées à assurer l'exécution fidèle des obligations mises à la charge des États alliés. Il paraît d'autant plus légitime de stipuler de telles garanties que, d'une part, à l'exception de la Bulgarie, les États balkaniques ne se sont pas encore libérés des obligations financières analogues mises à leur charge par le Traité de Berlin et que, d'autre part, la situation financière des États alliés les a déjà placés, vis-à-vis des porteurs de leurs fonds d'État, dans l'obligation de fournir des sûretés spéciales.

Il n'y a aucune contradiction à demander que la part des États alliés soit déterminée sur l'ensemble de la dette ottomane, abstraction faite de la spécialisation des gages, et à stipuler ensuite, comme le fait la commission à l'article 3, qu'une garantie spéciale doit être affectée à la sûreté de cette part. La garantie générale des États balkaniques saurait d'autant moins suffire à la sûreté d'obligations actuellement gagées sur des revenus spéciaux que la Grèce, la Serbie, la Bulgarie elle-même, ont été amenées à donner des garanties spéciales aux porteurs de fonds grecs, serbes et bulgares. Il est donc normal que les mêmes organismes de contrôle international qui existent déjà dans ces pays succèdent en quelque sorte à l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane et prennent en main la défense des intérêts des porteurs étrangers.

Une autre garantie résulte de la désignation faite aux articles 4 et 5 de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane pour recevoir et répartir la contribution des États alliés au service de la Dette ottomane. Ce n'est pas dans les caisses du Trésor ottoman que ces versements seront opérés, mais dans celles d'une administration autonome qui en assurera l'exact emploi. La créance ainsi liquidée ne l'est pas au bénéfice de l'Empire ottoman, mais au seul bénéfice des porteurs étrangers, et c'est pourquoi, conformément à l'article 6, aucune compensation ne saurait s'établir entre les arrérages de cette dette et ceux d'une indemnité de guerre, si elle est stipulée.

Mais, la commission française estime que la garantie essentielle résiderait dans la conversion en capital de l'annuité mise à la charge des États alliés, et c'est pourquoi, conformément au précédent italo-turc, elle l'a prévue à l'article 5. La liquidation des obligations des alliés par l'émission d'un emprunt spécial opérerait novation et ce serait aux nouveaux prêteurs d'exiger les sûretés nécessaires en harmonie avec le nouvel état de choses. Les alliés verront d'ailleurs dans une telle combinaison l'avantage de réduire le montant de l'annuité nécessaire au service de leur part, grâce à une réduction sensible du taux d'amortissement qui est très largement calculé dans le cas des emprunts ottomans.

Articles 6 et 7.—Au cas où une indemnité de guerre serait stipulée pour les alliés, il importe que cette créance ne vienne pas éteindre, par voie de compensation, l'obligation résultant de leur participation à la dette publique ottomane. L'intérêt des créanciers étrangers se trouverait ainsi entièrement sacrifié. La nouvelle dette de la Turquie, au titre de l'indemnité de guerre, prendra rang à la suite de la dette extérieure, et non pas concurremment avec elle.

La réserve inscrite à l'article 7, qui prévoit le rappel de la part contributive des États alliés à la dette ottomane mise à leur charge par le Traité de Berlin et non encore liquidée, n'envisage que la possibilité de faire entrer en ligne cet élément d'appréciation au cas où les exigences des alliés paraîtraient excessives aux Puissances.

Il y a lieu d'ailleurs de noter que ce rappel ne saurait être fait qu'à l'encontre de la Grèce, de la Serbie et du Monténégro, un règlement étant intervenu en 1909 en ce qui concerne la Bulgarie.

Article 8.—La dette flottante constitue une part trop importante de l'ensemble de la dette publique ottomane pour qu'il soit possible de l'écarter, *à priori*, du règlement à intervenir; de là les dispositions de l'article 8.

Articles 9, 10 et 11.—Ces articles sont conformes à la pratique constante en matière de cessions de territoires: les droits acquis doivent être respectés. En ce qui concerne le respect des concessions de chemins de fer, il y aura lieu de stipuler expressément que les compagnies intéressées seront remises en possession immédiate des lignes dont l'exploitation leur a été concédée, nonobstant tout règlement qui pourrait d'être envisagé pour l'avenir d'accord entre les intéressés.

La dépossession d'un privilège conféré en vertu d'un contrat régulier crée un droit à indemnité, et c'est ainsi qu'au cas où les États alliés décideraient de mettre fin au monople de la Régie contéressée des Tabacs, sans attendre l'expiration d'ailleurs prochaine (en 1904) de son contrat, celle-ci devrait être indemnisée du préjudice ainsi causé aux actionnaires de cette société.

Article 12.—Il est inutile d'insister sur les considérations inscrites dans cet article. Dans la mesure où les États alliés ne substituent pas leur responsabilité à celle de l'Empire ottoman, celui reste entièrement tenu vis-à-vis des créanciers étrangers.

Ce n'est pas dans un esprit de défiance vis-à-vis des États alliés ou pour leur faire payer le fruit de leur victoire, que la commission française a élaboré les règles qui précèdent. C'est dans un esprit d'équité et en application du principe général qu'un État annexant ne saurait légitimement prendre possession du territoire annexé qu'avec les charges qui le grèvent et en respectant tous les droits constitués au bénéfice des tiers sur ces territoires.

Le 21 décembre, 1912.

[54741] No. 481.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 531.)

Sir, *Paris, December 22, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, extracted from the "Journal officiel" of to-day's date, the text of a statement made in the Chamber of Deputies yesterday by M. Poincaré respecting the policy of the French Government in regard to the Balkan war (2).

His Excellency gave an account of the attempts made to avert the war and of the offer of mediation on its outbreak, explaining the reason for the insertion of a clause declaring the disinterestedness of the Powers. In regard to this proposal, the Austro-Hungarian Government, so M. Poincaré stated, officially informed the French Government, at the beginning of November, that they had no territorial ambitions in view, and that the wishes expressed by them, in connection with certain questions raised by the changes that were foreseen, were not of a kind to compromise the political and economic independence of the Balkan States nor, in particular, that of Servia.

M. Poincaré went on to comment on the meetings of the Ambassadors in London, and announced to the House the decision which had been arrived at with regard to the autonomy of Albania and commercial access for Servia to an Adriatic port. When the moment came for elaborating the scheme resulting from this decision, the French Government would seek to render it as favourable as possible to Servia.

As regards the Peace Conference now sitting in London, M. Poincaré observed that it was "le secret de demain" whether the plenipotentiaries would come to an agreement or not. Should a rupture take place, Europe could not be indifferent to a renewal of hostilities, which would bring with it an added risk of a general conflagration, and a resort would probably again be had to mediation.

M. Poincaré laid particular stress in various passages of his statement on the close co-operation of the French, British, and Russian Governments. The French Government had not associated themselves with any proposals without a preliminary discussion and agreement with the Russian and British Governments. The French Government had considered it to be their elementary duty to show to their ally "une fidélité effective et agissante," and this had been rendered easy by the clear-sighted moderation on the latter's part, which was so positively shown by M. Kokovtzof's recent speech.

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France's relations with England had never been more intimate. A portion of French public opinion had seemed to fear that in some ways the British Government were pursuing, in their relations with other Powers, a policy not entirely in conformity with French policy. The loyalty of the British Government had not, indeed, allowed the French Government to share these apprehensions, "but," M. Poincaré continued, "Sir Edward Grey had, none the less, declared spontaneously that these apprehensions were without any foundation, and that he was as strongly attached as we ourselves to the entente between France and England."

Neither England, Russia, nor France, M. Poincaré added, had sought to complicate the difficulties of the moment by systematically opposing one international group to another.

His Excellency concluded his statement by a peroration, in which he declared with energy that France, while sincerely pacific in her intentions, was determined to defend her interests and rights in the East, and above all to safeguard "cette chose intangible et sacrée qu'est notre honneur national."

His Excellency made a statement of a similar nature, but somewhat shorter, in the Senate in the course of yesterday's sitting, the text of which I also enclose herein (1). He stated in the course of this statement that there was no reason for imagining the existence of any disagreement with England as regards the regions of Lebanon and Syria. The British Government had declared in the friendliest manner that they had no aspirations of any kind there. The French Government were themselves resolved to maintain the ntegrity of the Ottoman Empire in Asia, while firmly holding fast to their traditions and interest in the country.

I have, &c.
LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE.

Enclosure in No. 481.

Extracts from the "Journal officiel" of December 22, 1912.

(1.)

M. le Président.—La parole est à M. le Président du Conseil.

M. le Président du Conseil.—Messieurs, le Gouvernement a pensé qu'il devait, avant la séparation des Chambres, leur faire une communication sur la situation extérieure, et plus particulièrement sur la politique qu'il a suivie, et qu'il a l'intention de continuer à suivre en présence des événements du dehors.

Bien que je sois encore tenu à une grande discrétion et qu'il ne m'appartienne pas, sans un concert préalable, de révéler dans tous leurs détails, soit les conversations engagées depuis plusieurs semaines, depuis plusieurs mois, devrais-je dire, entre les chancelleries, soit celles qui viennent d'être commencées à Londres, je suis en mesure d'apporter du moins au Sénat des renseignements précis sur les desseins que nous nous sommes assignés, sur les méthodes que nous avons employées et sur les premiers résultats obtenus.

Il ne nous est pas un instant entré dans la pensée d'assister en spectateurs indifférents à l'évolution de la crise qui a éclaté dans les Balkans. Ce n'était pas seulement par loyauté vis-à-vis de nos alliés que nous devions surveiller avec attention des faits dont il leur était impossible de se désintéresser; nous n'aurions pas pu, nous-mêmes, sans compromettre notre influence traditionnelle en Orient et sans affaiblir notre autorité de Grande Puissance, fermer les yeux sur des événements qui laisseront sans doute une trace profonde dans l'histoire et changeront en partie la face de l'Europe. ("Très bien! très bien!") Tout ce qui peut modifier, dans le monde, l'équilibre international touche directement un peuple comme le nôtre, qui a conscience des nécessités de l'avenir et qui tient à sauvegarder ses intérêts permanents. (Applaudissements.)

Nous avons donc jugé qu'une politique passive et inerte était indigne de notre pays —("Très bien! très bien!")—et nous avons fait en sorte que nulle part et à aucun moment la France ne fût absente.

Nous avons fait en sorte aussi qu'elle ne fût jamais seule.

Nous avons voulu, en d'autres termes, que, dans toutes les occasions importantes, elle restât aussi étroitement que possible associée à ses alliés et à ses amis. ("Très bien! très bien!")

La force d'une alliance comme celle qui nous unit à la Russie ne dépend pas

seulement des conventions, elle dépend surtout de la confiance et de l'intimité qui président aux relations quotidiennes. (Nouvelle approbation.)

C'est grâce à la continuité de ces rapports diplomatiques que les pays alliés peuvent se rendre des services réciproques, sur lesquels ils ont le droit de compter l'un et l'autre. ("Très bien! très bien!")

M. Kokovtzof a dit, cette semaine, à la Douma de l'Empire, que la Russie était sûre de nous. Elle ne peut, en effet, douter de notre concours, pas plus que nous ne doutons du sien, et nous sommes convaincus qu'à l'épreuve de la crise actuelle notre alliance recevra encore un accroissement de vitalité. (Applaudissements.)

Notre entente avec l'Angleterre se traduit également tous les jours dans les faits, et elle nous a été particulièrement précieuse dans les circonstances difficiles que traverse l'Europe. Nous avons aisément combiné avec nos alliés et avec nos amis une action pacifique qui ne s'est jamais lassée.

Nous n'avons, d'ailleurs, jamais eu l'intention d'agir en dehors des autres Puissances. Avec toutes nous entretenons de bonnes relations, et loin d'opposer la moindre objection à des conversations générales, nous avons été parmi les premiers à en reconnaître la nécessité. ("Très bien!")

Jamais, en effet, plus qu'aujourd'hui, les pourparlers entre les Puissances n'ont été indispensables pour éviter les initiatives dangereuses et les entraînements funestes.

Nous assistons, messieurs, à l'un des événements les plus considérables et les plus gros de conséquences qu'aient depuis très longtemps enregistrés les annales de l'Europe. Cette question d'Orient, qui est restée posée pendant des siècles, comme une énigme redoutable, cette question d'Orient, à laquelle les Grandes Puissances, par une entente tacite, évitaient autant que possible de chercher des solutions radicales et définitives, elle va sans doute se régler maintenant, par une force inévitable, dans le sens qui correspond le mieux aux idées françaises.

C'est, messieurs, une grande chose que cette union des peuples balkaniques, en vue de l'indépendance des nationalités. Ce qui a été longtemps un rêve est devenu une réalité. La pensée qui avait hanté, dès 1844, le célèbre patriote serbe Ilia Garaschanine, celle qui avait inspiré, après 1860, le Prince Michel Obrenovitch, celle qui avait séduit en Occident des hommes tels que Lamartine, Michelet, Victor Hugo, Gambetta, dont je lisais hier ou avant-hier une magnifique lettre, datée de 1874, sur cette question, cette pensée, messieurs, elle a maintenant pénétré la conscience des peuples eux-mêmes, et elles les a poussés à de soudaines entreprises, au nom de la justice et de la liberté.

La France renierait ses traditions de générosité, si elle ne jugeait pas avec sympathie l'œuvre de ces nations grandissantes. (Applaudissements.)

Que les Balkans appartiennent désormais aux peuples balkaniques: Bulgares, Grecs, Serbes, Monténégrins, Albanais, c'est assurément, messieurs, la solution la plus naturelle et la plus équitable. C'est, par conséquent, celle qui présente le plus de garanties de durée et de stabilité.

Dans les conversations qui ont été engagées à Londres entre les Ambassadeurs et qui doivent s'y poursuivre à partir du 2 janvier, ce point de vue sera, je pense, adopté sans difficulté par toutes les Puissances. Dès maintenant, le principe d'une Albanie autonome, sous le contrôle de toutes les Grandes Puissances, y compris la France, est admis. Dès maintenant, aussi, on est d'accord pour laisser à la Serbie, à défaut d'un port sur le territoire serbe, un port franc et neutralisé par où elle aura, sans avoir à payer de droits de douane, toute liberté de transit, cela encore sous la garantie des Grandes Puissances européennes. ("Très bien! très bien!")

Il restera à déterminer le régime et les limites de l'Albanie. Nous veillerons à ce que, dans cette détermination, il soit loyalement tenu compte des intérêts des Grecs, des Bulgares, des Serbes et des Monténégrins.

Et ainsi, lorsque la paix aura été signée entre les alliés et l'Empire ottoman, soit par l'entente des plénipotentiaires, soit sur les conseils de l'Europe, cette paix reposera, je l'espère, sur les bases solides et fournira à ces jeunes et vaillantes nations le moyen de réparer leurs pertes en hommes et en argent, de reconstituer leurs forces et de développer leur prospérité

Quant à la Turquie, après les conquêtes des alliés, elle verra évidemment lui échapper une très grande partie de son territoire européen; mais elle conservera encore en Asie un Empire considérable et florissant, où il ne dépendra que d'elle d'exercer son autorité dans l'intérêt du progrès et de la civilisation. Si elle est bien inspirée, c'est surtout de ce côté qu'elle tournera ses efforts et ses espérances d'avenir, et il lui sera facile de continuer à vivre en bonne amitié avec les Grandes Puissances européennes, et particulièrement avec la France.

Elle sait que, pendant les hostilités, nous avons observé scrupuleusement vis-à-vis

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d'elle nos devoirs de neutralité ; et nous serons heureux de conserver avec elle les excellentes relations politiques et économiques que nous avons toujours eues.

Pour s'épargner toutefois de future difficultés intérieures, la Turquie fera sagement d'écouter avec bienveillance les vœux de quelques-unes des populations qui lui sont soumises. Depuis de longs mois, notre Ambassadeur à Constantinople appuie auprès de la Porte, d'accord avec les Puissances, un projet de réformes en faveur des Libanais ; mais les pourparlers traînent en longueur et rien n'a encore abouti.

Je n'ai pas besoin de dire au Sénat que, au Liban et en Syrie notamment, nous avons des intérêts traditionnels ——

M. de Lamarzelle.—Très bien !

M. le Président du Conseil——et que nous entendons les faire respecter. (" Très bien ! très bien ! ")

Je suis heureux de pouvoir ajouter que c'est tout à fait sans motif qu'on a imaginé l'existence de je ne sais quels dissentiments entre le Gouvernement anglais et nous sur ce point.

Le Gouvernement anglais nous a très amicalement déclaré qu'il n'avait dans ces régions ni intention d'agir, ni dessins, ni aspirations politiques d'aucune sorte. (" Très bien ! ")

Nous sommes nous-mêmes très résolus à maintenir, en Asie, l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman, mais nous n'y abandonnerons aucune de nos traditions, nous n'y répudierons aucune des sympathies qui nous sont acquises, nous n'y laisserons en souffrance aucun de nos intérêts. (" Très bien ! très bien ! ")

Si, messieurs, contrairement au désir de l'Europe, les États balkaniques et la Turquie n'arrivaient pas à conclure la paix, si cette éventualité douloureuse et paradoxale se produisait, que les hostilités, à peu près suspendues aujourd'hui, fussent reprises et que la guerre recommençât dans des régions déjà ensanglantées, eh bien, nous-mêmes nous recommencerions, sans nous laisser décourager, nos tentatives de conciliation et nous ne désespérerions pas de les voir aboutir.

Appuyés sur la confiance des Chambres républicaines, forts du sentiment national, nous continuerions à essayer d'empêcher en Europe la propagation de l'incendie, mais, en même temps, nous demeurerions prêts à maintenir, avec toute l'énergie de notre patriotisme, et à défendre contre toute attaque notre influence et Orient et le prestige du nom français. (" Très bien ! très bien ! " et vifs applaudissements.)

(2.)

M. le Président.—La parole est à M. le Président du Conseil.

M. le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—Messieurs, le Gouvernement a promis à la Chambre de lui donner, avant la fin de la session, les explications qu'elle a le droit d'attendre de lui au sujet de la situation extérieure et de l'action qu'a exercée en ces derniers temps la diplomatie française.

Je remercie deux de nos honorables collègues qui ont depuis longtemps déjà déposé des interpellations d'avoir consenti jusqu'ici à en ajourner la discussion. Je remercie la Chambre tout entière d'avoir permis au Gouvernement, par le crédit qu'elle lui a bienveillamment accordé, de poursuivre son œuvre avec le calme et la vigilante attention qu'exigent les circonstances actuelles. (Applaudissements.)

Lorsque je me suis présenté récemment devant la Commission des Affaires extérieures, je ne lui ai pas caché que j'étais encore tenu à une grande réserve. Je suis forcé de renouveler aujourd'hui cette déclaration. (" Très bien ! très bien ! ") Les négociations commencées à Londres entre les plénipotentiaires des États belligérants, les conversations engagées entre les Ambassadeurs des Grandes Puissances ne sauraient être, dès maintenant, dans le détail, livrées à la publicité, et il ne serait pas sans inconvénient de commenter, au courant même de ces pourparlers, la série des incidents qui se sont déroulés avant la guerre, pendant les hostilités et après la signature de l'armistice.

A quelque discrétion qu'il soit tenu, le Gouvernement a cependant le devoir de renseigner les Chambres sur les directions générales qu'il a données à notre politique étrangère et sur la manière dont il a compris et défendu les intérêts de la France dans une des crises les plus graves qui se soient ouvertes depuis longtemps. (" Très bien ! très bien ! ")

Les événements qui ont éclaté dans les Balkans ont soulevé des questions complexes et difficiles que l'Europe avait bien pressenties, mais que, jusqu'ici, elle avait plutôt cherché à ajourner qu'à résoudre. La politique traditionnelle de notre pays reposait elle-même, en Turquie d'Europe comme en Turquie d'Asie, sur le principe

de l'intégrité de l'Empire ottoman. Le maintien du *statu quo* territorial permettait d'écarter ou de reculer des éventualités pleines d'inconnu, et l'on vivait dans un provisoire qu'on s'habituait presque à considérer comme perpétuel.

Mais l'éveil de nationalités vivaces et entreprenantes, les défauts de l'administration turque, l'inexécution des promesses de réformes contenues dans l'article 23 du Traité de Berlin, les désordres et les violences qui se renouvelaient périodiquement rendaient de plus en plus inévitables des complications dans la péninsule des Balkans. Dès le commencement de cette année il nous avait été facile de percevoir en Macédoine une sorte de malaise et de fièvre latente. Nous nous étions immédiatement entretenus avec la Russie d'une situation qui menaçait de s'aggraver ; nous avions envisagé d'un commun accord toutes les hypothèses et nous avions étudié les moyens d'éviter, s'il était possible, un conflit. Mais la guerre italo-turque entretenait, en se prolongeant, une agitation sourde parmi les populations de Macédoine, et des épisodes sanglants annonçaient de temps en temps qu'un bouleversement pouvait se produire tôt ou tard dans la région balkanique.

Au mois d'avril, nous fûmes informés que la Bulgarie et la Serbie venaient de s'unir par un traité et que la Bulgarie et la Grèce avaient entamé des négociations pour préparer entre elles une autre convention. Les hommes d'État qui avaient conçu ou du moins renouvelé et rajeuni cette grande et féconde idée de l'alliance balkanique avaient d'abord réussi à tenir secrètes les clauses essentielles de ces accords, dont les prévisions ont, d'ailleurs, été largement dépassées par les réalités ultérieures. Mais nous en avons su assez, messieurs, dans le courant de l'été pour redouter une conflagration prochaine, et, dès que nous avons été plus complètement renseignés, nous avons mesuré sans peine l'importance du mouvement qui se préparait.

Nous n'avons pas hésité à faire aussitôt tout ce qui dépendait de nous pour éviter un conflit. N'y eût-il eu, messieurs, qu'une chance entre mille d'obtenir une solution pacifique des difficultés pendantes, nous aurions manqué à la plus impérieuse de nos obligations morales en ne faisant pas effort pour épargner aux populations balkaniques une guerre meurtrière. (Applaudissements sur un grand nombre de bancs.)

Nous avions donné maintes fois au Gouvernement ottoman le conseil amical de ne pas retarder davantage la signature de la paix avec l'Italie. Nous l'avions également engagé à réaliser dans les Balkans les réformes dont le Congrès de Berlin avait consacré le principe. (" Très bien ! très bien ! ")

Mais les semaines succédaient aux semaines et l'impatience des populations intéressées ne cessait de s'accroître.

C'est, messieurs, sur ces entrefaites que, le 14 août dernier, M. le Comte Berchtold soumit aux Puissances une proposition évidemment inspirée par des sentiments identiques à ceux dont nous étions animés. Le Cabinet de Vienne demandait que l'Europe conseillât à la Porte l'adoption d'une politique de décentralisation progressive et qu'elle recommandât en même temps aux États balkaniques d'attendre pacifiquement les effets de cette politique.

Je me trouvais à Saint-Pétersbourg au moment où cette proposition était formulée, et je me mis aussitôt d'accord avec M. Sazonof et avec M. Briand, qui me remplaçait à Paris, pour adhérer aux vues du Gouvernement austro-hongrois. Mais avant que les Puissances eussent définitivement arrêté les lignes générales d'un plan d'action, l'effervescence se développa dans toute la Turquie d'Europe et les esprits les plus optimistes durent comprendre peu à peu l'imminence du péril.

Depuis le commencement de l'année, messieurs, nous avions, sans un instant d'interruption, échangé avec nos amis et nos alliés nos idées sur la situation, et, dans ces conversations quotidiennes, nous nous étions appliqués tout à la fois à maintenir un accord constant entre la Russie, l'Angleterre et la France, et à préparer toutes trois le concert général des Puissances européennes. (Applaudissements.)

Il est superflu, je pense, de répéter que nous avons considéré comme un devoir élémentaire de témoigner à notre alliée une fidélité effective et agissante. (Vifs applaudissements.)

L'honneur et l'intérêt nous commandent également cette conduite. (Applaudissements.)

Notre collaboration, qui a porté sur tous les détails des problèmes à résoudre a, d'ailleurs, été singulièrement facilitée par cette clairvoyante modération dont l'honorable M. Kokovtzof donnait encore, dans son discours de cette semaine, des preuves si positives. (Applaudissements.)

Quant à l'Angleterre, nos relations avec elle n'ont jamais été plus confiantes et plus étroites. Une partie de l'opinion française a paru craindre, en certaines circonstances, que le Gouvernement britannique, dans ses rapports avec d'autres Puissances, ne poursuivît une politique qui ne fût pas en parfaite conformité avec la nôtre.

La loyauté du Gouvernement anglais ne nous permettait, certes, pas de partager ces appréhensions. Sir Edward Grey n'en a pas moins tenu à nous déclarer spontanément qu'elles n'avaient rien de fondé, et qu'il était aussi fortement attaché que nous à la sincérité de l'entente franco-anglaise. (Vifs applaudissements.)

C'est donc en pleine communauté de sentiments que nos alliés, nos amis et nous avons observé la marche des événements.

Mais, messieurs, pas plus que l'Angleterre ou la Russie, la France n'a voulu compliquer, par une opposition systématique de groupements internationaux—(" Très bien ! très bien !")—les difficultés du moment. (Applaudissements.)

Nous avons, au contraire, comme les autres Puissances, pensé que l'espoir d'arriver à un règlement dépendait entièrement de la possibilité d'engager sans retard, sous une forme ou sous une autre, des négociations générales. Et, dès le début, sans nous lasser, nous avons travaillé à préparer ces négociations.

Je n'ai pas besoin de rappeler aujourd'hui à la Chambre dans leurs détails les tentatives qui ont été faites successivement. Elles ont toutes, messieurs, procédé du même esprit, et aucune de celles auxquelles nous nous sommes associés n'a eu lieu qu'après délibération et entente avec l'Angleterre et avec la Russie.

A la veille de la guerre les Puissances ont réussi à combiner leur action pour essayer, par un effort suprême, d'assurer la réalisation des réformes dans les Balkans sans effusion de sang et sans bouleversements territoriaux. Les États alliés eux-mêmes avaient, en mobilisant, déclaré que le seul objet de leurs revendications était l'accomplissement immédiat de ces réformes, et ils n'avaient encore ni conçu les espérances, ni acquis les droits qui se sont trouvés, depuis lors, consacrés par leurs efforts et par leurs sacrifices. (Applaudissements.)

La formule sur laquelle s'était établi l'accord de l'Europe, n'avait donc rien de surprenant pour eux, et si le cours des choses l'a emporté, elle n'a cependant pas été vaine, puisqu'elle a, sur l'initiative de la France, rapproché les Puissances de l'Europe dans une même démonstration pacifique. (Applaudissements.)

Malgré tout, la guerre éclata entre les alliés et la Turquie, et il ne resta plus à la diplomatie européenne d'autre ressource que de chercher à circonscrire les hostilités et à en réduire la durée.

Les Puissances envisagèrent aussitôt la possibilité d'offrir, le jour venu, aux belligérants leur médiation collective, mais, pour que cette médiation ne fût pas inévitablement repoussée par les vainqueurs, il fallait, de toute évidence, commencer par leur garantir qu'aucun des médiateurs ne songeait à s'attribuer en tout ou en partie le fruit de leurs succès. Aussi bien, lorsque la France, en parfait accord, comme toujours, avec l'Angleterre et avec la Russie, a proposé que l'offre de médiation fût accompagnée d'une clause de désintéressement, je puis donner à la Chambre l'assurance qu'aucun des États balkaniques ne s'est mépris sur notre pensée, et qu'ils nous en ont, tous, été reconnaissants. (" Très bien ! très bien !")

Ils n'ont pas supposé, certes, que la France, l'Angleterre ou la Russie allaient sacrifier en Turquie d'Europe leurs intérêts respectifs ; ils n'ont pas supposé notamment que nous songions, en France, à abandonner ce patrimoine moral et matériel dont je faisais passer, l'autre jour, sous les yeux de la Commission des Affaires extérieures, les éléments variés. (Applaudissements.)

Les États balkaniques savent, au contraire, fort bien que nous avons à défendre des droits de toutes sortes dans la Turquie d'Europe et que nous ne les laisserons pas périciter. (Applaudissements.)

Mais ils ont admirablement compris que, tout en réservant ce qui nous appartenait et ce qui ne peut nous être enlevé, tout en respectant aussi les droits et les intérêts d'autrui, nous proposions aux Grandes Puissances de répudier, à la veille d'un partage des Balkans, toute ambition territoriale, et c'était vis-à-vis d'eux un acte de sagesse et de justice. (Applaudissements.)

Au demeurant, messieurs, à peine notre formule de médiation était-elle proposée, que nous avons eu la satisfaction de constater qu'elle répondait aux intentions déclarées de toutes les Grandes Puissances.

Il n'en est pas une seule, en effet, qui n'ait jugé à propos de faire savoir publiquement qu'elle ne projetait aucune annexion de territoire. Je suis même aujourd'hui en droit de dire à la Chambre que, dès le commencement du mois de novembre, le Gouvernement de la république a été officiellement informé que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois n'avait aucune visée territoriale. Le Cabinet de Vienne ajoutait que les désirs exprimés par lui au sujet de certaines questions se rattachant aux changements prévus n'étaient de nature à compromettre d'aucune façon l'indépendance politique et économique des États balkaniques et notamment de la Serbie. (Applaudissements.)

Ces déclarations officielles de toutes les Puissances donneront certainement plus de crédit à l'Europe, vis-à-vis des États balkaniques et vis-à-vis de la Turquie, lorsqu'elle sera amenée à présenter des observations définitives sur les conditions du règlement général.

Je souhaite, messieurs, que l'heure de ce règlement soit proche. Les Puissances ont fait beaucoup pour l'avancer, lorsqu'elles se sont accordées à reconnaître que, les opérations militaires ne constituant pas des faits accomplis, elles devaient toutes s'abstenir de chercher à faire prévaloir leurs points de vue par des mesures isolées pendant le cours des hostilités. Le Gouvernement britannique a pris, de son côté, après nous avoir pressentis, une très heureuse initiative.

M. Jaurès.—Très bien !

M. le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.—La réunion d'Ambassadeurs qui siège à Londres n'a pas, bien entendu, par elle-même de pouvoir de décision ; elle ne constitue ni un congrès, ni une conférence ; elle n'a qu'un caractère officieux et préparatoire ; mais elle rend plus facile et plus étroit le contact entre les Puissances ; elle assure la rapidité des communications et elle permet l'examen préliminaire des questions multiples qui se poseront à la signature de la paix. (" Très bien ! très bien ! ")

La Chambre comprendra que je ne puisse préjuger les solutions à envisager. Mais il m'est permis d'indiquer, dès maintenant, que le travail des Ambassadeurs s'annonce comme très utile à la cause de la paix, et je n'ai pas besoin de dire avec quelle autorité et quelle expérience le représentant de la France participe à la tâche commune. (Applaudissements.)

D'ores et déjà, les Ambassadeurs semblent être parvenus à éliminer l'une des principales causes de discorde européenne.

Ils ont recommandé à leurs Gouvernements le principe d'une Albanie autonome et une proposition garantissant à la Serbie un accès commercial à l'Adriatique.

Tous les Gouvernements sont disposés à accepter ces deux points, et je crois pouvoir dire que la Serbie se ralliera à leurs indications. (Vifs applaudissements.)

Il est entendu, messieurs, car il faut que je complète ici les informations que vous avez pu recueillir, il est entendu que l'autonomie albanaise, constituée sous la souveraineté, ou plutôt, je pense, sous la suzeraineté du Sultan, sera contrôlée par toutes les Grandes Puissances, y compris la France. (" Très bien ! très bien ! ")

Il est entendu aussi que le port ouvert à la Serbie sur territoire albanais sera libre et neutre et qu'il sera desservi par un chemin de fer international sous le même contrôle européen, avec liberté de transit pour toutes les marchandises, y compris les munitions de guerre.

La Serbie bénéficiera, en outre, de la franchise de douane. (" Très bien ! très bien ! ")

Dans la mise au point de cette combinaison, messieurs, nous tâcherons, d'ailleurs, de la rendre le plus favorable possible à la Serbie. On lui assurera, évidemment les garanties indispensables, car, si dans l'intérêt de la paix européenne, on lui demande le sacrifice d'une partie de ses ambitions, il est, du moins, juste et nécessaire de lui procurer tous les moyens de vivre et de respirer. (Vifs applaudissements.)

Il faut, messieurs, nous féliciter de voir les Puissances désormais unanimes dans l'expression de ces pensées. Ce premier accord laisse encore intacte la question infiniment délicate du régime et surtout des limites de l'Albanie, et beaucoup d'autres qu'auront à examiner les Ambassadeurs et qui, d'ailleurs, sont toutes subordonnées au résultat des négociations engagées d'autre part entre les États balkaniques et la Turquie.

Il est malheureusement encore impossible, messieurs, de prévoir quelle sera l'issue de ces négociations. J'ai eu l'honneur de conférer longuement avec les très distingués diplomates qui les dirigent et qui sont tous animés d'un sincère désir d'aboutir à la conclusion de la paix, mais tous aussi très résolus, comme il est naturel, à soutenir les revendications de leurs pays respectifs.

Les représentants des alliés comprennent, d'ailleurs, à merveille toute la force que leur donne la solidité de l'Union balkanique, et ils sont bien décidés à ne pas laisser compromettre par des dissensions fâcheuses l'autorité morale que leurs jeunes royaumes ont conquise sur les champs de bataille, où leurs armées ont déployé côte à côte tant de courage et d'endurance. (Applaudissements.)

Mais l'accord se fera-t-il entre eux et les plénipotentiaires ottomans ? C'est, messieurs, le secret de demain. Si, par malheur, une rupture se produisait, le rôle de l'Europe ne serait pas terminé. Elle ne pourrait assurément se montrer impassible devant une reprise des hostilités qui risquerait, cette fois, peut-être plus que jamais,

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d'élargir le champ de la conflagration. Elle reviendrait, sans doute, à ses premières idées de médiation. La France, en tout cas, continuerait à seconder de tout son pouvoir, et au besoin à provoquer les efforts des Puissances en faveur de la paix.

Mais, messieurs, autant sont sincères chez nous ces intentions pacifiques dont nous avons donné depuis l'ouverture de la crise des témoignages renouvelés, autant nous demeurons fermement déterminés à défendre sans défaillance nos intérêts et nos droits, à maintenir les grandes traditions de la France en Orient, et à sauvegarder par-dessus tout cette chose intangible et sacrée qu'est notre honneur national. (Applaudissements vifs et répétés à gauche, au centre, et à droite.—M. le Président du Conseil, de retour à son banc, reçoit les félicitations d'un grand nombre de députés.)

[54890] No. 482.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, December 23, 1912.*

THE King of the Bulgarians has addressed a congratulatory message to the army, in which he adjures them to profit by the rest now accorded to them to prepare for further efforts.

[54897] No. 483.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 732.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 23, 1912.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador made to-day to Minister for Foreign Affairs a communication to the effect that, should hostilities recommence, Russian Government would no longer be able to maintain her neutrality. While not admitting that Russia has till now strictly maintained her neutrality, Minister for Foreign Affairs is at a loss to understand the meaning of the message, which he considers as quite premature, seeing that delegates of allies have not even presented their demands, and Turkish Government have given evidence of their conciliatory attitude by continuing the negotiations in spite of Greece not having signed armistice. His Excellency asked Russian Ambassador further to explain message, but His Excellency declared that he had nothing to add to it.

[54898] No. 484.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 733. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, December 23, 1912.*

TURKEY and Bulgaria.

I am informed by the Grand Vizier that he has consented at the request of the Bulgarian Government to receive a high Bulgarian official, whose name, he says, is M. Kaltchef. This gentleman has already reached the Chatalja lines.

[54899] No. 485.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 734.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 23, 1912.*

FOLLOWING received from Beirout, dated to-day :—

"Italian ship 'Varese' arrived at Haifa on 17th December, convoying two Italian steamers carrying 3,600 Ottoman soldiers, 400 Moslem emigrants, 200 horses, and 12 guns from Tripoli. Soldiers and horses sent to Damascus."

[54896] No. 486.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 120.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, December 23, 1912.*

THE Prime Minister called upon the Austrian Minister on 21st December and spontaneously expressed regret for any irregularities of which the Servian military authorities may have been guilty towards the Austrian consuls. The Austrian Minister expressed his gratification, and said that his Government would merely request that on the return of the consuls to their posts the Austrian flag should be hoisted by a military detachment in the presence of the consuls in full uniform. To this the Prime Minister agreed.

The annoyances caused by Semlin military authorities (see my telegram No. 117 of 16th December) have now been discontinued through the intervention of the Austrian Minister.

He tells me that he thinks that demobilisation will soon commence, that Austria-Hungary does not desire to press Servia for any economic privileges, but will probably ask for certain assurances regarding the railway rates through Servia to Salonica and for revision of certain stipulations in their present treaty of commerce with Servia, though nothing that would be out of harmony with the interests of Powers.

[54895] No. 487.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 23.)

(No. 121.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, December 23, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 146 of 21st December.

The Prime Minister, not being able to find any real objection to the proposal of Powers for giving Servia commercial access to the sea, merely said that it was hard that Servia should have to surrender territory she had taken, and he feared there would still be internal trouble. He requested me to ask your advocacy of Servian interests when the limits of Albania are under discussion. The Prime Minister's ideas regarding the limits were reported in my telegram No. 118 of 20th December. I pointed out that Mirdites and Mulissoris are not Serb-speaking, but he replied that these tribes are getting up a protest against coming under a Moslem Government again, and would prefer to be under Servian rule.

[54378] No. 488.

Foreign Office to War Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 23, 1912.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state, for the information of the Army Council, that a telegram has been received from His Majesty's Minister at Cettinjé to say that the military attaché asks whether he may have leave to proceed to Valona.

Sir E. Grey sees no objection to this course, but, before replying, would be glad to be favoured with the views of the Army Council on the subject.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[55902] No. 489.

Conference of St. James.

PROTOCOLE No. 5.

Séance du 10 (23) décembre 1912.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Bulgarie :

MM. Danev, Madjarov et le Général Paprikov ;

Pour la Grèce :

MM. Vénizélos, Skouloudis, Gennadius et Streit ;

Pour le Monténégro :

MM. Miouchekovitch, le Comte de Voïnovitch et Popovitch ;

Pour la Serbie :

MM. Novakovitch, Nicolitch et Vesnitch ;

Pour la Turquie :

Réchid Pacha, Osman Nizamy Pacha et le Général Salih Pacha.

La séance est ouverte à 4 heures ½, sous la présidence de M. Novakovitch.
Le protocole de la séance précédente, lu par le secrétaire, M. Grouitch, est adopté.

Le Président demande aux délégués ottomans s'ils ont reçu de leur gouvernement les instructions qu'ils avaient promis de demander au sujet de l'admission, sans conditions, des délégués hellènes aux négociations.

Réchid Pacha répond que ces instructions ont été reçues et qu'elles autorisent les délégués ottomans à entrer en négociations aussi avec les délégués hellènes, sans insister sur la question du ravitaillement des places assiégées, sur laquelle toutefois les délégués ottomans se réservent de revenir d'une manière privée et en dehors de la conférence.

Le Président dit qu'à la suite de cette déclaration la conférence peut procéder à la discussion des propositions pour la paix. A cet effet, il donne lecture de la proposition principale des États alliés, signée par les premiers plénipotentiaires, dont le texte suit :—

"*Proposition.*

"*Au point de vue territorial* les quatre gouvernements alliés demandent :

"1°. La cession de tous les territoires de l'Empire Ottoman situés à l'ouest d'une ligne allant d'un point à l'est de Rodosto sur la mer de Marmara à la baie de Malatra à l'est de Midia sur la mer Noire, à l'exception de la presqu'île de Gallipoli.

"Dans ces territoires se trouve incluse l'Albanie, dont les limites et le statut politique seront ultérieurement déterminés.

"2°. La cession des îles de la mer Égée.

"3°. Le désistement de la Turquie de tous les droits qui lui avaient été réservés sur la Crète lors de l'organisation de l'autonomie de l'île.

"Pour les États alliés :

"ST. DANEFF.
"E. K. VENIZELOS.
"L. MIOUCHEKOVITCH.
"ST. NOVAKOVITCH.

"*23 décembre*, 1912."

Réchid Pacha demande que les délégués alliés aient la bonté de communiquer aux délégués ottomans une copie de cette proposition pour qu'ils puissent l'examiner et, le cas échéant, demander des instructions à leur gouvernement.

Cette demande est acceptée et la séance est suspendue pour la rédaction de la copie.

A la reprise de la séance,

Le Président fait remettre aux délégués une copie certifiée conforme de la proposition et demande aux délégués ottomans de combien de temps ils croient avoir besoin pour l'examiner et pour demander et recevoir éventuellement des instructions, afin de pouvoir fixer la date de la prochaine séance.

Réchid Pacha croit que le vendredi ou samedi prochain peut être désigné à cet effet, et après une courte discussion, au cours de laquelle

M. Danev fait remarquer qu'afin d'éviter l'inconvénient d'ajournements fréquents, il serait bon de choisir une date à laquelle les délégués ottomans seront sûrs d'avoir des instructions,

la prochaine séance est fixée au samedi, 15 (28) décembre, à 11 heures du matin.

M. Vénizélos desire, avant que la séance soit levée, attirer l'attention des délégués ottomans sur ce fait que la proposition déjà soumise a trait à la seule question territoriale et que les délégués alliés se réservent de présenter ultérieurement des demandes concernant d'autres questions.

La séance est levée à 5 heures.

Le Président :

ST. NOVAKOVITCH.

Les Secrétaires :

H. NORMAN.
S. TCHAPRACHIKOV.
A. C. VOUROS.
S. Y. GROUITCH.
D. NORADOUNGHIAN.

[55117] No. 490.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 269.)

Sir, *Athens, December 14*, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 202 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a continuation of the diary of the war from official bulletins from the 7th to the 14th instant.

No mention has been made of the operations in the Bay of Valona and at the island of Saseno which preceded the joint warning from Austria and Italy, reported in my despatch No. 199 of the 6th instant, but, beyond a landing on that uninhabited island and a few shots fired at the flag of Albanian autonomy at Valona, nothing appears to have been done.

The 3,000 or 4,000 men landed at Santi Quaranta were hastily re-embarked, with the loss of only a few men, on the 14th, having been driven back to their ships by a greatly superior force of Turks. The explanation given here is that the expedition was merely a feint intended to draw off a part of the defenders of Janina, and that it

succeeded, Greek troops from the south having been able to slip in behind the Turks who were detached to the west. The expeditionary force is reported by His Majesty's consul to have returned to Corfu on the 12th and to have left on the following day for Prevesa and Khimara.

The Garibaldians to the north-east of Janina under Major Romas (President of the Chamber during M. Mavromichalis' Ministry) claim a success and the capture of three guns, but General Sapountzakis' last report makes it appear to have been short-lived. Major Romas himself was slightly wounded.

I have, &c.
F ELLIOT.

P.S. *December* 15.—An Austrian Lloyd steamer which entered Santi Quaranta just after the re-embarkation of the Greek troops reports having taken on board a solitary Greek soldier who was left behind, and who stated that the Greeks were led into an ambuscade by a Christian Albanian guide, and suffered severely, especially from machine-gun fire. The village of Santi Quaranta is entirely destroyed and deserted.

F. E.

Enclosure in No. 490.

Diary of the War for December 7 to 14, 1912.

December 7.—I have the honour to inform you that Santi Quaranta was occupied at 10 A.M. to-day in the name of King George and of the Government. The Turkish authorities retired in the direction of Delvino. We immediately occupied the public buildings and placed guards. The landing of the troops is proceeding without opposition.

Dated from Corfu. SAKHTOURIS, *Consul*

December 7.—Syrrakos was occupied on the 6th by volunteers under Captain Trypogeorgos and Lieutenant Karydis. One hundred and twenty Turks barricaded in the houses were dislodged with a loss of thirty-seven prisoners and many killed and wounded. Our casualties twenty-two, including Lieutenant Karydis wounded. Besides Syrrakos, the villages of Mikhalitsi and Dovizia were taken, also Hagios, Georgios and Vyzianon.

Dated from Arta. SAPOUNTZAKIS.

December 12.—Official announcement by the Ministry of Marine :—

"Admiral Condouriottis telegraphs by wireless that he has lain off the Dardanelles all day to-day and yesterday with the 'Averoff,' 'Psara,' 'Hydra,' 'Spetsai,' 'Leon,' 'Panther,' 'Ierax,' 'Aetos,' 'Nea Genea,' 'Thyella,' 'Navkratousa,' 'Sphendoni,' 'Lonkhi,' 'Niki,' 'Doxa,' 'Aspis,' 'Velos,' and torpedo-boats 'No. 11,' 'No. 12,' 'No. 14,' 'No. 15,' 'No. 16,' and the submersible 'Delphin,' vainly awaiting the Turkish fleet.

"December 12, at 6·30 A.M.—To-day we commenced a general attack on the enemy's positions. The right wing, in spite of the incessant fire of the Turks, captured Aetorrakhi. Our artillery succeeded after four hours in silencing the Turkish batteries at Lagatora. General Sapountzakis personally superintended the movements of the troops. We lost about 200 killed and wounded. Night put a stop to the fighting."

Dated from Philippiada. [Unsigned.]

December 13.—This morning the enemy attacked the village karies from two sides and was repulsed. In the afternoon they attacked our men at St. George and were again repulsed, leaving about ten killed. At Lothe the corps of eighty-two Cretans pursued the enemy and captured the heights. In this affair about fifteen Turks were killed and the Cretan leader Kokkalas was wounded.

Dated from Chios. N. DELAGRAMMATIKAS,
Commander of the Troops of Occupation.

December 14.—Official announcement by the Ministry of Marine :—

"This morning the 'Sphendoni,' while patrolling, observed a fast vessel coming from the coast of Kum-Kalessi, where it stopped under the fort of Sedil Bahr. It was recognised as a Turkish destroyer. The 'Sphendoni,' approaching to 3,000 metres of it, fired four shots and her consort, the 'Lonkhi,' one. The forts of Kum Kaleh and Sedil Bahr and a battery fired at our vessels without result. The enemy's destroyer did not fire, but retired within the Straits."

December 14, 10·12 A.M.—To supplement my news of yesterday, I report that the capture of the heights of Aetorrakhi was effected by a heroic bayonet assault by the Evzone battalions. In their flight the Turks abandoned, besides three guns already reported, four others and a great quantity of *matériel*. To-day the Turks, having retired from Pesin and along the whole line, have retreated to their entrenchments around Janina. My army has occupied positions opposite these entrenchments. The volunteer corps in the neighbourhood of Driskos, having by their action before the entrenchments of Gastritsa drawn upon themselves superior forces of the enemy, have been compelled to retire.

Dated from Philippiada. SAPOUNTZAKIS.

[55042] No. 491.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 210.)
Sir, *Athens, December* 17, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of a despatch from the British military attaché with the Greek field forces, reporting an audience granted to him on the 10th instant at Salonica by the King of Greece.

Major Cunliffe Owen arrived in Athens yesterday morning, and left the same evening for Prevesa, having been specially authorised by the commander-in-chief to join the forces operating against Janina.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 491.

Major Cunliffe Owen to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Salonica, December* 13, 1912.

I HAVE to report that I had the honour of being accorded an interview with the King on the 10th instant, on which occasion His Majesty (as also the Crown Prince, who was likewise present) expressed some extremely open views upon the situation which has now arisen.

The King stated in emphatic terms that, after the conclusion of the march to Florina, it was desired by the Greek Government to send a part of the army to Dedeagatch, to co-operate in the attack on Chatalja, or to the Gallipoli Peninsula, to open a passage for the Greek fleet up the Dardanelles.

In His Majesty's opinion, it would have been better to arrive at some final conclusion at Constantinople before peace conditions were considered, and for this purpose he was ready to co-operate with the Bulgarians in their particular sphere of operations.

To these propositions, however, the Bulgarians would not agree, and they concluded the armistice on their own account. As for the Greeks, there was no reason why they should join in the armistice, seeing that they had ample forces for the reduction of Janina, which, in the hands of the Turks, only gave the latter an additional asset with which to bargain.

3. The King said that the Bulgarians were no doubt at the end of their resources, and, this being so, he was at a loss to understand why, except for political purposes, they had ever detached such large numbers of troops to Salonica, where the military situation did not require their presence.

4. The Greek occupation of Salonica was originally dictated by no political motives. After the Turkish defeat at Serlijeh, the General Staff decided that the next move must be regulated by the presence of the Turkish army; that is to say, that the latter should

be followed and finally dispersed. The Turkish army in front of the Greeks having retired towards Salonica and been reinforced therefrom, this direction was naturally indicated for the Greeks.

The general impression gained from the interview was one of undisguised irritation with the Bulgarians, and at the present moment there is in this town little intercourse either between the Bulgarian and Greek troops or between the Bulgarian and Greek Royal personages.

5. I should personally like to record my testimony, apart from the question of Greek methods of administration, of the good behaviour of the troops in occupied areas, both in the towns and in the country, towards inhabitants of all classes. They have regard for property, and the treatment of prisoners of war is extremely fair on all occasions.

I have, &c.
F. CUNLIFFE OWEN.

[55043] No. 492.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 211.)
Sir, *Athens, December 17, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 116 of the 21st ultimo, I have the honour to report that goods from Greece are now admitted free of duty at Salonica, it having been decided to discontinue the levy of "additional" 3 per cent. *ad valorem*.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[55044] No. 493.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 212. Confidential.)
Sir, *Athens, December 18, 1912.*

I HEAR from one of my colleagues that for the disposal of the Ægean Islands you are in favour of the adoption of one of two alternatives: either to neutralise them all (with the exception of the three nearest to the Dardanelles, which should be returned to Turkey) and to give them over to Greece; or (with the same exception) to form out of them an autonomous island State.

If I may do so without presumption, I would express a great preference for the first alternative, provided that by "neutralisation" is meant no more than has been observed in practice in the Ionian Islands, that is, that no fortifications are to be erected. But I would plead for the retention of the three islands by Greece, or at any rate of the two largest, Lemnos and Imbros, with their wholly Greek population. As strategical points the actual ownership of them appears to me to be immaterial, for if Greece retains, as she intends to do, the command of the sea as against Turkey, the seizure of those islands will again be only a matter of a few hours. As it is hardly possible to conceive of a war between Greece and any other Power, in which Turkey would remain neutral, the same would be the case in that event, whether with or without the consent of Turkey. To insist on the restoration to Turkey of Lemnos and Imbros would therefore appear to be to deprive Greece of one of the fruits of her victories without real advantage to any legitimate interest.

The other alternative, the creation of an autonomous island State or confederation, I venture to regard as one of the compromises with which diplomacy loves to foster the seeds of future trouble. I cannot contemplate without dismay the beginning of an "Ægean Islands" series of Confidential print in succession to the shortly to be abolished "Crete." Moreover, I cannot but think that to forbid Greece to make any territorial acquisitions in the waters in which her predominance in the war has been so decisive would be to excite public opinion here to a dangerous degree against M. Venizelos and the King.

The same consideration leads me to solicit the exercise of your influence in favour of the retention by Greece of Salonica, which appears likely to be seriously contested

by the Bulgarians. An argument in favour of the Greeks is the difference for the better in their treatment of the populations of the districts occupied by their troops.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT

[59411] No. 494.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 111.)
Sir, *Belgrade, December 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Vice-Consul Peckham, with further comments on the new Servian régime in his district and observations regarding the Albanians.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 494.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 15.)
Sir, *Uskub, December 14, 1912.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 9 of the 25th November, I have the honour to submit herewith further opinions on the future of Albania.

In all previous cases where a state has been carved out of the ruin of the Ottoman Empire the great bulk of the Christian inhabitants have belonged to the same "millet." And in most cases there has been some sort of common religious organisation to accustom the people to the idea of national unity (I would cite particularly the Prince-Bishops of Montenegro and the Exarchate). It is important to note that in Albania this is not so. Even supposing that the Moslem element disappears with autonomy, the Cheg will almost certainly become Catholic and the Tosk Orthodox. But this will only militate against union in a negative way, religious intolerance not being an Albanian failing.

It is hard to say to what extent the idea of national unity exists to-day in a positive form. I have been assured that the old feuds are practically things of the past, because the leaders have realised the need for union, and have sufficient influence over their followers to impose their views on them. On the one hand, there is no doubt that the influence of the leaders this summer was very great (see my despatch No. 69 of the 20th August to Salonica); on the other, I should myself imagine that Hassan Bey had lost all influence; but Albanian psychology is incalculable, and it may be that no importance is attached to his cowardice after Prishtina. In any case, there are men like Isa Bolatin and Mehmed Pasha of Kalkandelen who, while useless as statesmen, may promote the cause of union. I hear that both are making for Avlona, and that every Albanian part of Kossovo is sending delegates there.

Whether the positive feeling of union be great or small, it should not be forgotten that there is at least a fixed determination among the Albanians to work for their own policy and not for that of anyone else. The Albanian is an Albanian first; Catholic, Orthodox, or Moslem afterwards—Austrophil or Italophil never. He will take subsidies from anyone, but they will not affect his actions. I hear that in Isa Bey's "kulé" (stronghold) at Bolatin papers were found which proved that he was accepting subsidies from Turkey, Austria, Servia, and Montenegro. I cannot judge of the general truth of this, though there is nothing inherently improbable in it. But I have no doubt that it is true that this summer's insurrection was fomented with Servian arms and Servian gold with a view to enlisting the Albanians on the side of the allies. Yet they have fought hard, in their own undisciplined, nay, savage way against the hated Slav, and only by accident on the side of the not less hated Turk. Whatever might be the faults of an autonomous Albania, it would never willingly be a pawn in the politics of Austria or Italy. Although the Albanian manifesto sent me at the beginning of the war (see my despatch No. 80 of the 21st October to Salonica) seems to have expressed Albanian sentiment exactly, the fact that it was drawn up under Austrian auspices deterred Albanians of position from signing, and probably nothing but the dollars induced any Albanian to sign at all.

I gather from the press that the allies contemplate a small Albanian State with frontiers approximately from Durazzo to Ochrida, Koritza, and Chimara. This, in my

humble opinion, would be a half-measure of questionable profit for the future peace of the Balkans. One of two things would probably happen if it were formed: either there would be an enormous immigration of Chegs from New Servia, who would carry with them, in a greater degree, the hatred of the Slav caused thirty years ago by the "expropriation" of the Albanians of South Servia; the result of this would be that the infant Government would be confronted with an economic problem of the first magnitude which might well crush it; or the free Albania would become a *foyer* of irredentist ideas which would aim at the greater Albania from Scutari to Yanina. I am assured that, just as Bulgar band action will begin again on an enormous scale in South Kossovo, so Albanian bands will continually harry mid-Kossovo if it passes into Servian hands. Previous attempts to impose frontiers which ignore the ethnic distribution of the Balkan peoples have not proved ultimately successful, and the Albanian has a much better title to mid-Kossovo than the Serb.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

[54912] No. 495.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 112.)

Sir, *Belgrade, December 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of an article which appeared in the "Samouprava" of the 17th instant commenting upon the relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary, and especially upon the present attitude of the Monarchy.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 495.

Extract from the "Samouprava" (Belgrade) of December 17, 1912.

(Translation.)

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY and Servia, in view of their geographical position and nature of their products, should live in harmony. But although Servia has always done her best in this direction she has met with very little encouragement from Austria-Hungary.

Austria-Hungary has continually endeavoured to mix up commercial relations with political questions directed against the interests of Servia's freedom and independence.

In the last commercial treaty period (1906) Austria-Hungary brought in the question of Servia's armaments as a condition for the conclusion of a commercial treaty, this brought on the customs war between the two countries. The result, however, was not what Austria-Hungary hoped for. Servia succeeded in finding new outlets for her products, while Austro-Hungarian industry suffered greatly from being shut out of the Servian market.

Notwithstanding the disagreeable experiences of former years in this direction, Vienna is again to-day bringing forward questions against the interests of Servia. Servia has declared herself ready to accept, and, in fact, has stated that she accepts beforehand the verdict of the Powers with regard to her demands. The attitude of Austria-Hungary has not altered, however, and she still persists in her demands. And we are more than surprised to read in the "Fremdenblatt" that Servia refuses to meet the friendly overtures of Austria-Hungary. If the gentlemen of the "Fremdenblatt" consider as friendly the endeavours of Austria-Hungary to deprive Servia of the fruits of her successes on the battlefield, or the language of certain Austro-Hungarian papers, who openly threaten Servia with war, we must remark that these are exceedingly queer proofs of friendship.

"While the Powers are doing all they can to find means of settling the questions resulting from the Balkan war in a peaceful way, Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, is mobilising her troops. Servia, confident of not having given anyone reason to attack her, quietly awaits for the verdict of Europe, feeling sure that this is the only course she must follow under the present circumstances. Her present attitude

affords absolutely no reason for the Austro-Hungarian demonstrative military movements on her frontier.

"We do not for a moment believe that the provocative demonstrations on the part of Austro-Hungarian petty officials—such as arresting our subjects, turning search-lights on to Belgrade, and thus alarming our citizens—originate from official Austria-Hungary. We are obliged, however, to call the attention of the neighbouring Monarchy to the possible disagreeable results such demonstrations may have. Because, notwithstanding our recommendations to our subjects to keep quiet and be patient, there may be found somebody who will lose patience and commit some action which, although certainly disagreeable to the Governments of both countries, may precipitate most disagreeable results. We are certain that nobody will deny us that such demonstrations can have no serious object, while, on the other hand, they may be of serious damage.

"We therefore hope that the searchlights exercises will in future be turned in the opposite direction of Belgrade, and that the Austrian 'Monitors' on the Danube will avoid unnecessarily coming too near the Servian banks."

[54913] No. 496.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 113.)

Sir, *Belgrade, December 21, 1912.*

M. YOVANOVITCH, hitherto secretary-general at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, left Belgrade on the 16th instant to assume the post of Servian Minister at Vienna.

When I saw M. Pashitch yesterday, he had as yet only received a short telegraphic account of M. Yovanovitch's first interview with Count Berchtold, but I gathered he was satisfied M. Yovanovitch had been received in a wholly friendly manner. Count Berchtold, however, appears to have made it quite clear during the interview that he has in no way weakened in his intention not to admit Servia to the territorial possession of a port on the Adriatic, though he would be quite willing to consider any other proposition to secure commercial access for Servia to that sea.

I suggested to M. Pashitch that public opinion here seemed to be gradually reconciling itself to this idea. He admitted that this was partly true, but he never-theless feared there might be an explosion when it came to evacuating Durazzo and other places which have been occupied.

I find it very difficult to form an opinion on this point. There is, unquestionably, a strong feeling in the country in favour of resisting spoliation by force of arms and considerable agitation may be expected from the military party and a section of the press but, on the other hand, M. Pashitch knows his countrymen thoroughly, there is very great confidence in his policy, and I much doubt whether he would undertake to force through anything that was impossible. It will be remembered that when the Austrian intimation was first received M. Pashitch declared he would have to resign. This threat has not latterly been repeated and as a matter of fact both the dynasty and the Radical Government have gained so much kudos from the war that their position is now almost unassailable. So far as the Skupshtina is concerned, M. Pashitch has, to some extent, provided against attack by appointing M. Novakovitch the leader of the Progressist party to go to London as principal Servian delegate. Under the circumstances the Progressist party is practically secured to the Prime Minister.

M. Pashitch remarked to me among other things that Servia's defeat would be looked upon as a defeat of the Triple *Entente* by the Triple Alliance. I replied that I did not see how this could be. His Majesty's Government never championed Servia's claim for territorial possession of an Adriatic port, but merely a free outlet to the Adriatic for Servian commerce which there seemed to be every prospect of securing.

The chief source of the Prime Minister's anxiety now seems to be the delimitation of Albania. He considers the situation will become very serious if the Albanian frontiers are pushed far east and north. According to his ideas the eastern limit of Albania should be the watershed between Lake Ochrida and the Adriatic and the Drin and the Adriatic whilst the northern frontier should be drawn at right angles to this, to Natia on the coast. He maintains that anything east or north of this would include villages with a majority of Serb-speaking population. I enclose a map showing the

difference between M. Pashitch's proposed frontier and the one suggested by M. Sazonof to Sir G. Buchanan.*

M. Pashitch said that it was of great importance to Servia that Bulgaria should obtain Adrianople as he hoped the Bulgarian Government might make certain territorial concessions to Servia in Macedonia which would to some extent make up for the disappointment about Albania and the Adriatic port.

Of course the fact of having to give up Monastir, which cost the Servian army so many in killed and wounded, to Bulgaria rankles a good deal in the Servian mind, but my Bulgarian colleague informs me that he anticipates no difficulties as the limits between the Bulgarian and Servian spheres in Macedonia were quite clearly and definitely set down before the war, and he can scarcely suppose Servia would attempt not to honour such engagement.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[55052] No. 497.

Director of Military Operations to Foreign Office.—(Received December 24.)

THE Director of Military Operations presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to Foreign Office letter dated the 23rd instant, begs to say that it is not considered desirable that the military attaché at Cettinjé should proceed to Valona.

War Office, December 24, 1912.

[55085] No. 498.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 243.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, December 24, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 240 of 21st December.

Bulgarian Government are now sending ten trains every other day round Adrianople to Chorlu to reprovision troops. This reprovisioning will be completed within a week from now. They are making arrangements to run other trains viâ Uskub, Drama, and Dedeagatch to the same destination containing ammunition.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[55086] No. 499.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 244.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, December 24, 1912.*

THE Queen of Greece has had a conversation of some length with King Ferdinand as to the future possession of Salonica. In this connection see my telegram No. 239 of the 20th instant.

Her Majesty insisted, the King of Bulgaria has informed the Prime Minister, on the necessity of the inclusion in the Kingdom of Greece of this city.

The answer of His Majesty was to the effect that this was a question that the two Governments must settle later between themselves.

The Greek Government has, according to the Greek Minister here, made an offer to submit, to the arbitration of the Powers of the Triple *Entente*, all territorial questions that may arise between the Bulgarian and Greek Governments; his Excellency, however, fears that this is unacceptable to the Bulgarian Government, as no reply has as yet been received.

The above has been repeated to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

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* Not reproduced.

[55087] No. 500.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 245.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 24, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 217 of 6th December: Roumania.

Prime Minister tells me that he is afraid that Roumania will insist on some territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Bulgaria. In this case his own position would become untenable and he would resign, as he is known to have sympathetic feeling towards that country, in which he has large commercial interests. No Grand Sobranjé would in his opinion cede any territory to Roumania, although they would be willing to meet her on any other point.

It has been telegraphed here from London that the Roumanian Minister will be allowed to take part in the ambassadorial pourparlers when questions affecting Roumania are under consideration. This has created an unfavourable impression here, as the allies would not be represented at such pourparlers.

Precedent would also be created for minor Powers to [group omitted: ? participate in] future ambassadorial discussions.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[55088] No. 501.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 246. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 24, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 240 of 21st December: Peace negotiations.

As regards cession of territory by Turkey, I have reason to believe that Bulgaria will eventually accept the line drawn from Enos on the Ægean Sea to Midia on the Black Sea, passing south of Baba Eski and Lake Burgas.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[55096] No. 502.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 247. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 24, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 232 of 13th December.

Prime Minister believes that Servia will loyally accept any arrangement made by the Great Powers granting her access to the Adriatic. He fears, however, that she will demand some compensation from her ally as a set-off against her inability to obtain a port of her own. He told me that he thought that Servia would ask for Perlepe, which has considerable historical interest for the Servian nation.

Prime Minister added that Bulgaria would not be able to make any other concession to Servia than those contained in convention signed on 13th March last as duly reported to you.

Above may account for the information sent by Sir R. Paget to you in his telegram No. 119 of 22nd December to the effect that no trouble is anticipated respecting surrender of Durazzo and territory which may be claimed for Albania.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[55089] No. 503.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 248. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 24, 1912.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 733 of 23rd December.

M. Kaltchef is a wealthy private individual and personal friend of the Grand Vizier.

He has no mission whatever from Bulgarian Government. If he is really proceeding to Constantinople it will be entirely on his own account.

Question of sending him there officially was discussed by Bulgarian Government on the 1st December before conclusion of armistice, but has since been dropped.

I have above direct from Prime Minister.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[55061] No. 504.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, December 24, 1912.*

DURING the past few days there has been renewed talk of mobilisation. Rumours are officially denied, but the possibility of Roumania [group undecypherable] reconsidering her attitude in the event of a breakdown of the peace negotiations cannot be excluded, should Bulgaria by that time not have come to terms with her.

There are many who think that Roumania lost a good opportunity for obtaining favourable terms on the evasion [*sic*] of the war by her passive attitude, and strong pressure may be brought on the Government to repair this so-called mistake should hostilities recommence. It is therefore most important that M. Danef should prove conciliatory in his negotiations with Roumanian Minister.

[55078] No. 505.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 493.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 24, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 492 of 22nd December.

In the course of conversation this afternoon, Minister of Foreign Affairs told Austro-Hungarian Ambassador that, while not wishing to press Austro-Hungarian Government, he must again warn them that if mobilisation is maintained Russia will be obliged to take serious measures in self-defence.

He also discussed question of Scutari with Ambassador, pointing out that Russia was asking for nothing for herself, but that it was essential for a mountainous country like Montenegro to acquire some low-lying lands to support her population. He also urged that if she did not obtain Scutari the discontent which was manifesting itself against the King and Crown Prince would take a form dangerous to dynasty.

Ambassador told him that Austria-Hungary objected to Servia being allowed to import munitions of war in time of war. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he must insist on Servia having this right and contended that it would always be perfectly easy for Austria-Hungary to seize it as contraband of war at sea as entrance to Adriatic was so narrow.

On the whole his Excellency takes a hopeful view of the situation.

He has received information similar to that reported in Constantinople telegram No. 731 of 22nd December, and thinks that it might be well were the Ambassadors to consult together at one of their next meetings as to the advisability of their speaking individually but identically to Turkish Ambassador in London urging the cession of Adrianople to Bulgaria.

[54906] No. 506.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, December 24, 1912.*

POSSIBILITY exists of conflict between Greek authorities here and Ottoman Bank in regard to verification of accounts with Ottoman Government. In case of appeal being made for intervention of French and British consuls, I should be glad to know how far I am justified in treating Ottoman Bank as a British institution.

[54283] No. 507.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 316.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 24, 1912.*

YOUR despatch No. 208 and Mr. Lamb's telegram of 24th December: Ottoman Bank.

Please furnish the fullest possible information as to the books and accounts which the Greek authorities wish to verify, and also what exactly they have confiscated, i.e., ingots, gold coins, notes, bills, or securities payable to bearer.

Please consult consul-general at Salonica before replying, sending him a copy of your despatch and asking for repetition of his telegram to Foreign Office. The question raises complicated legal issues, and it is necessary to have precise information as to the facts.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 793; and Constantinople, No. 1119.)

[55052] No. 507*.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 152.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 24, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 55 of 20th December: Military attaché.
War Office object.

[54188] No. 508.

Foreign Office to Consul-General Lamb.

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 24, 1912.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence on this subject, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit herewith the accompanying copy of a letter from the Council of Foreign Bondholders in regard to the Turkish debt.*

Sir E. Grey would be glad to learn by telegraph whether the attitude of the Greek authorities is as stated in the council's letter.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[54188] No. 509.

Foreign Office to Council of Foreign Bondholders.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 24, 1912.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant on the subject of the Turkish debt, and to inform you that His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica has been instructed to report by telegraph regarding the attitude of the Greek authorities there in this matter.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[55084] No. 510.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, December 25, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 43 of 24th December.

Significant article appears this morning in M. Take Jonesco's paper. Following is a brief summary:—

Ambassadors' meeting has solved in principle the great question which threatened Europe. Balkan war, on the other hand, seems unlikely to end so quickly. Roumania

* No. 406.

has throughout done her utmost to contribute throughout to localisation of the war, but in proportion as the possibilities of a general conflagration diminish the greater is Roumania's freedom of attitude and action. So long as one is dominated by prospect of a catastrophe to European civilisation one is naturally more inclined to put one's own interests in the background; but when that prospect disappears the special interests of each one take first place and a nation must inevitably resume its liberty of action.

[55097] No. 511.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 25.)

(No. 202.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 25, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"In spite of improved situation movements of troops have not ceased. The eight regiments sent one battalion to Bosnia on 23rd December, and a further battalion left Vienna on 22nd December. Reliable reports from Hungary indicate continued concentration of 4th corps round Zombor and Marietcheresianopol. There is reason to believe that reservists have been called for Honved of the 4th, 13th, and 7th corps. My Russian colleague insists that the 1st, 10th, 11th, 7th, and 13th are at complete war strength throughout. On the other hand, many reservists are now returning both from Galicia and Bosnia apparently under no obligation to return."

[54616] No. 512.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 1123.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 25, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 731 of 22nd December: Joint advice to Turkey to make peace.

If necessary this procedure can probably be adopted. Financial position of Turkey, according to Sir R. Crawford, makes it imperative for Turkey to make peace, otherwise her financial straits may provoke interference of Great Powers, especially those most interested in the debt, to an extent that will impair Turkish sovereignty for ever, even as regards Constantinople. This seems to me strongest ground on which to use our advice.

[54617] No. 513.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1369.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 25, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 491 of 22nd December.

Immediately after first meeting of Ambassadors I informed German and Austrian Ambassadors that, after settlement agreed to respecting Servian access to Adriatic, I must support Russian Ambassador here if there was dispute as to Montenegro having Scutari. I said it was for Germany and Italy to smooth over this difficulty. They will, I trust, use their influence at Vienna before the question is discussed again.

Russian Ambassador has also stipulated that Servia should choose the Albanian port and *tracé* of the international railway thereto. This seems to me reasonable.

There are objections to maintaining any large number of Turkish troops in Albania, which might give rise to constant trouble, but question of Turkish suzerainty is one of degree and not principle, and I am hopeful of agreement. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[55090] No. 514.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 249.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 26, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 248 of 24th December.

Prime Minister asks me to inform you categorically that M. Kaltchef has no mission whatever to the Ottoman Government, neither on the part of the King of the Bulgarians nor of any member of the Cabinet. Grand Vizier must have been misled in this matter.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[55077] No. 515.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 737.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 26, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 733 of 23rd December, and Sophia telegram No. 248 of 24th December.

At M. Gueshof's request, Russian Ambassador has informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that M. Kaltchef has no authority to negotiate.

Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it had no importance, as nothing had been done.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[55083] No. 516.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, December 26, 1912.*

FOLLOWING received from Monastir, dated to-day:—

"The Servian Governor of Monastir tells me that he has received instructions to negotiate with the Greek authorities at Florina with a view to the establishment of a Servian prefect in that town. He left for Florina to-day for this purpose. This step will be bitterly resented by the Greeks, whose local relations with the Servians are far from cordial."

[55094] No. 517.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 494.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 26, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1369 of 25th December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is very grateful for your language to German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors respecting Scutari. He states that Austria-Hungary has accepted Russian stipulation as to Servia chosing the Albanian port and *tracé* of railway. In his view Austria-Hungary really desires that the port should be not Albanian but neutral, hoping thereby to obtain indirect control of it; she dare not, however, suggest this, as she knows that all Europe would be against her. He expressed his warm thanks for the language held by you to Austro-Hungarian Ambassador (your telegram No. 423 of 19th December to Berlin). From his conversation this afternoon with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador he derived the impression that Austria-Hungary's reluctance to demobilise is now entirely due to the gravity of the internal situation.

[55127] No. 518.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No 46.)

Sir, *Cettinjé, December 16, 1912.*

IN view of the refusal of the commandant to accept the communication addressed to him by the German Minister, the armistice has not yet come into operation as between the Turkish garrison of Scutari and the Montenegrin besiegers. Desultory firing continues, but the King states that in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case he has given orders that as little damage is to be done as possible, provided that the investment be maintained. Offers of help from the Servians to assist in taking the town were declined, and there may be good reason for thinking that the King has been engaged in endeavouring to ascertain on what terms the Austro-Hungarian Government would assent to his obtaining possession of it on the conclusion of peace. For the last few days there have been signs of negotiations being in progress between the palace and the Austro-Hungarian Minister, who has now left abruptly for Vienna in order, it is announced, to confer with Count Berchtold on the general situation. Should the King, in his desire to obtain Scutari on any terms, and yielding to his personal distrust and dislike of Belgrade, pursue this policy, he may soon find himself in a difficult position. Austria-Hungary would presumably be glad to detach him from Servia, and might perhaps show readiness to make a sacrifice with that object, or at least avoid giving a categorical refusal at present. But an outcry might at any moment be raised against him in the south Slav world, the consequences of which might be far-reaching. The position of the Royal family has been unfavourably affected by the failure either to prepare adequately for the war or to gain success in the field, and accusations of unpatriotic policy, if they are supported by a pro-Servian movement, might not impossibly provoke a crisis.

The Prime Minister is at present at the head of the troops operating on the west side of Tarabosh, and may not have been in close consultation with the King before making the declaration of which I enclose herewith a translation with regard to Montenegrin policy. Or it may have been deemed desirable that he should issue a statement of this kind in order to reassure public opinion here or in the other Balkan States. The views put forward by General Martinovitch with regard to the Albanian question are even more outspoken than those previously brought to your notice from this post. The Arnauts, who are asserted to have no national consciousness or conception of real freedom, are the traditional enemies of the Serbs; they are now on the beaten side, and must bear the consequences of defeat. The phrase respecting the restoration to the Serbs of what was formerly taken from them would seem to be especially unfortunate, as it might well be interpreted by an ignorant people as an excuse for seizing the much-coveted lowlands, if not other property belonging to opponents. The tone of the declaration in this respect cannot but inspire misgiving as to the result should the Montenegrins on the conclusion of peace acquire territory inhabited by a population of another race and another religion.

In the course of his journey to London M. Mijushkovitch, the chief of the Montenegrin Delegation, communicated his views to a reporter of the Paris "Temps." According to the version of the interview published in the "Times" of the 12th December, he states that Scutari belongs geographically to Montenegro, as do the regions naturally dependent on it—the plain of the Drin and the maritime outlet of San Giovanni di Medua.

There are, moreover, "historic rights of Servian civilisation" to be asserted, while the population is not refractory, as proved by Montenegro's assimilation of the Albanians of Dulcigno.

Founded according to tradition by Alexander the Great, Scutari fell into the hands of the Serbs before the end of the eleventh century. For 200 years, chiefly under the Nemanja dynasty, it formed part of the Serb Empire, on the fall of which in 1389 it became the capital of a small state formed by the Balcha dynasty, who, according to tradition, were not Slavs but descendants of the French crusading family of the Counts of Baulx. Ceded in 1394 to the Venetian Republic, it was taken by the Turks in 1479. The historical claim would not therefore appear to be of the strongest. On the far more important point of the attitude of the population, it may be noted that so far no pronouncements in favour of union with Montenegro have been reported, nor can it be anticipated that annexation, if followed by attempts at forcible assimilation in

conformity with Serb ideals, would be welcome either to the Moslems or to the Christians.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure in No. 518.

Extract from the "Glas Tzernagortza" of December 1 (14), 1912.

THE Minister President, General Mitar Martinovitch, has made the following statement to a correspondent of the Agram "Obzor," in the course of an interview at Muriehani, near Scutari:—

"For Servia an outlet to the sea is a vital question.

"With her gallant army she has won this outlet by force of arms, and understands how to maintain it. In this respect Servia will find unanimous help and support from her allies.

"Albanian autonomy is a piece of (?) sorcery, and nothing can come of it. The Arnauts show no national consciousness or conception of real freedom since they have been against us in the struggle for liberation, being eager defenders of Turkish domination, and great enemies of our race. We have gained the victory over the one and the other, and our aim is to give back to our race what has formerly been taken from it. The Arnauts, as well as the Turks, must bear the consequences of our victories and support them.

"The successes of the alliance on the field of battle prove what united forces can do, and these successes are an excellent school for diplomatists and politicians, teaching them to use all their intelligence, so that after the happy termination of the war, the Balkan States may be united in a Balkan confederation, or still better in an allied Balkan Empire, which would dispose of a single strong army of 1,000,000 bayonets, and which at the same time would be an element of peace and order, useful for the development in culture of the Balkan peoples.

"Thus the Balkans will cease to be the theatre of insatiable pretensions."

It is impossible to give stronger or clearer expression to the standpoint of the Montenegrin Government as regards the question of the Servian outlet to the Adriatic, or as regards their views on the Albanian question, and the further development on a regular basis of the relations between the allied Balkan States.

[55103] No. 519.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 1087.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 21, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I have received a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, embodying a report which had been received by him from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Chios, dated the 26th November, and giving an account of the circumstances attending the occupation of that island by the Greek troops.

On the 25th November, a Greek squadron commanded by Commodore J. Damianos, with six transports carrying 4,000 men under the command of an officer named Delagrammatica (rank not stated), arrived at Chios and demanded the surrender of the island.

The Turks having refused to surrender, the Greek troops effected a landing on the afternoon of the 24th November at Kantari, two miles from the town under cover of the fire from their ships. After a very slight resistance the Turkish troops (2,500) retreated to the hills, accompanied by the mutessarif (civil governor), and took up a position from which the Greeks have found it impossible to dislodge them. Mr. Barnham was informed on the 17th of this month by the acting vali of Smyrna that the bombardment of this position by the Greek troops was still proceeding.

After the Greek troops had occupied the town some Turkish civilians, who were armed and had occupied the fortress, fired upon the Greek soldiers; the Greek ships

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thereupon opened fire upon the fortress, two or three of the Turks were killed and the remainder (300) were arrested and sent to Greece, where they now are.

All Turkish civil employés were likewise arrested and sent to Greece, but they have since, it appears, been allowed to come to Smyrna, where they have laid before the acting vali a pitiful story of the ill-treatment of the Mohammedan women and children by the lower class of native Greeks at Chios and by the Greek troops.

These officials had been hurried away from the island after they had witnessed sufficient of the excesses of the Greeks to leave them with a haunting fear that the wives and children whom they left behind would suffer ill-treatment.

Several of these officials from Chios and Mitylene, with one or two merchants, visited Mr. Barnham at Smyrna on the 17th instant, and handed him a memorandum in which it was stated that the Turkish warehouses were looted, that the wife and daughter of a prominent local notable whom they named had been carried off by the troops, and that the houses of six other Turkish residents had been burnt. People who complained of the pillage to the Greek commander had, it was stated, been arrested and exiled.

The Mejidié mosque was converted into a barracks. The sacred objects found in the mosque were trodden under foot or broken and a mausoleum connected with the mosque was pulled down by the troops.

The Muezzin, Hikmi Effendi, was called out from the mosque and exposed to special indignities. His turban was twisted round his neck, he was severely beaten, then sent on board and exiled to Athens. His watch and chain were forcibly taken possession of by the Greek commandant, and his money was taken by the harbour-master. Such acts, if true, show that it is not only the rabble, but the Greek officials themselves who are to be feared.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[55105] No. 520.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 1089.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 21, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1054 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the acting British vice-consul at the Dardanelles on the subject of the alleged atrocities committed by Turkish troops and Bulgarian bands in the district of Keshan.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 520.

Acting Vice-Consul Harris to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 76. Confidential.)
Sir, *Dardanelles, December 18, 1912.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 16 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to inform you that I have been interviewing during the last few days many Greek and Turkish muhajjirs, and have elicited the following facts:—

No one has any complaint to make against the Bulgar soldiers; in fact, I have been told repeatedly by the Turkish muhajjirs that when the soldiers arrived they paid for any food they took, and were most humane in all their dealings with the Moslem natives. It was before the arrival of the Bulgar regulars that the damage was done by the komitajis.

At Sarijali, in the kaza of Ipsala, all the male Moslem population was wiped out; the women and children spared. At Karasati only two men escaped, the younger women were carried off. At Mulkaro the same took place. It is very improbable that massacres of Moslems should have occurred at Charkeuy and Murefté, for both of these villages are almost exclusively Greek. So at the outside there could only have been three or four killed by the bands.

Laze troops were sent to Keshan, and not only put a stop to the komitajis' activity, but avenged their co-religionists by massacres at Keshan, Almali, Magariz, and Karatzali.

Mr. Karamanli, a leading Greek inhabitant of Bulair, pretends, on the contrary, that the Laze troops started by killing a Greek bakal and his son at Evresi, after which they withdrew through Bulair and Exanil. When the komitajis heard of this they descended on Evresi and massacred all the Moslems they found. An officer was quartered on Mr. Karamanli's house at Bulair; the latter and the other leading Greek inhabitants gave this officer 100*l.* down with a promise of a further 100*l.* to spare the village; 500*l.* was also paid to officers at Exanil. Those two villages were spared, though the shepherds found in the neighbourhood were killed and their sheep stolen. Mr. Karamanli also says that he saw soldiers selling jewellery in the cafés of Gallipoli, and mentions one instance of a soldier selling silver spoons to an officer. There have also been isolated cases of murders in the immediate vicinity of Gallipoli.

To resume, I would point out to your Excellency that none of muhajjirs have any complaint to make against the Bulgar soldiery, but only against the komitajis, and that the latter spared the women and children—a moderation which the Lazes did not show in the excesses they committed. It would appear also that the Turkish officers, if not actually taking part in, at least connived at, the action of their troops.

I have, &c.
M. G. HARRIS.

[55106] No. 521.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 1090.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 20, 1912.*

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your telegram No. 1110, I to-day informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that an unfavourable impression had been made upon His Majesty's Government by the declaration of the Turkish delegates, especially in their conversations in Berlin and Paris regarding their instructions for the negotiations which had just begun, that their language implied a possibility as to a renewal of hostilities. Such would be fraught with the greatest danger to the Empire, and it was indispensable that the Turkish Government should make up its mind for great sacrifices as the result of an unsuccessful war.

I said that the main point on which the difference of views seemed to be most acute was the retention of Adrianople, which the Bulgarians seemed to regard as a *sine quâ non*, and which, in the interests of peace, the Government should make up its mind to sacrifice.

His Excellency said that Adrianople was, indeed, the difficult point for two reasons—the first one, which might be perhaps considered to have a sentimental character, namely, that His Majesty the Sultan first and foremost among his titles possessed that of the Sultan of Adrianople. I suggested that it was hardly the moment to gratify sentiment which had played a great rôle in the continuation of the war with Italy, but had nevertheless in the end been set aside.

His Excellency then said that all the military authorities were united in declaring that the strategical position of Constantinople with the Dardanelles and Gallipoli would always be at the mercy of their Bulgarian neighbour if Adrianople was in their hands. Without claiming any pretentions whatever to military knowledge I suggested that if the Bulgarian frontier in the future came, for instance, to Dedeagatch or Enos, Adrianople would surely no longer play the important rôle it had hitherto done.

I further pointed out to his Excellency the necessity of an early peace, seeing that there were already signs of some discontent in the provinces of Asia Minor, which might eventually cause preoccupation to the Ottoman Government. With this his Excellency agreed, saying that the Cabinet had already been considering the question of reforms there, and a plan had been examined by them which, however, required modification.

His Excellency then proceeded to endeavour to explain to me the difficulties in which the Government were placed, at the same time declaring that he had not told this to any of my colleagues. He said that after the first day's negotiations between Nazim Pasha, Reshid Pasha, and the Bulgarians, the former had returned with the draft of an armistice to which the latter had agreed, which contained the condition that the towns of Adrianople, Scutari, and Janina should be revictualled during the

armistice. Reshid Pasha added that the Bulgarian delegates had undertaken verbally that Adrianople and Dedeagatch should be left to Turkey in the final peace conditions. These terms were approved of by the Cabinet, and Reshid Pasha was congratulated by his colleagues. When, however, they met the Bulgarians again for the final signature, they were presented by them with a completely different text, which did not provide for the revictualling of the towns in question. Presumably the Greek delegates had brought their influence to bear and had left.

While unwilling to sign an armistice so very unfavourable to Turkey, Reshid Pasha and his colleagues, bearing in mind the assurances received from their Bulgarian colleagues, and convinced that, under these circumstances, the conclusion of a final peace would only be a matter of some days, during which Adrianople could easily hold out, decided to sign.

In the belief of the Turkish Government that Adrianople was therefore to be retained by this country they left for England, and it was an unpleasant surprise for them to hear how that the Bulgarian and other delegates had given out that this was not the case. His Excellency said that the Ambassadors of Russia and France had spoken to him in the same sense that I had. He did not mention that the German Ambassador had done so.

The matter would be again laid before the Cabinet; he did not speak of the possibility of a rupture of negotiations or of the possibility of a resumption of hostilities, but said that if the Turkish delegates could not agree with the Bulgarians on this point it might perhaps be submitted to the decision of the Ambassadors now sitting in London. I did not understand the Minister as putting this forward as an official suggestion, but as a possible eventual solution that had occurred to him personally, possibly with the idea of the Government being able thus to shelter themselves behind the plea of the pressure of Europe in accepting a condition which cannot fail to be unfavourably received by the entire population.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[55108]

No. 522.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 1092.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 21, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1071 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica reporting on Bulgarian atrocities in the district of Serres.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 522.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 175.)

Sir, *Salonica, December 13, 1912.*

IN continuation of my immediately preceding despatch of the 11th instant, I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith a further memorandum dealing with the massacres and other outrages committed by Bulgarian soldiers and irregulars in the districts of Serres, &c., after their occupation.

While unable to guarantee the complete accuracy of all these details, I have been careful not to repeat any stories that are not based on fairly reliable authority.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

P.S.—Copies of this despatch have been sent to Sophia and Belgrade.

H. H. L.

Enclosure 2 in No. 522.

Memorandum on Outrages committed by the Bulgarian Troops and Irregulars in the District of Serres.

Melnik was practically evacuated by the Turkish population, which retired on Serres, at the first Bulgarian approach, but before leaving they murdered some twenty Bulgarian notables who had previously been placed under arrest. Five hours later Sandansky entered the town, and, incensed at the massacre of his co-religionists, ordered the Mussulman quarter to be sacked and burned. Two old men and two women who were found there were murdered. A boy of 9 years of age was also discovered and handed over to some gipsies to be killed. The gipsies took him outside the town, stabbed him two or three times with their knives, and left him for dead; but he recovered and crawled back into the town, where he was seen and finally dispatched by the chief executioner of the band, an individual known as Kiosse.

Most of the Mussulman villages round Melnik were similarly sacked and destroyed by order of Sandansky, the inhabitants having almost all previously taken refuge in Serres.

Serres.—Here the heads of the Christian and Mussulman communities had signed, before the Bulgarians came into the town, a bond of mutual protection and support. On the approach of the Bulgarians the town surrendered to a band under the command of the tchetnik Tzankoff, the mutessarif, together with the kaimakams of several of the dependent kazas and many notables of the town, taking refuge with their families at the residence of the Greek archbishop. The bandits immediately set to work to plunder the Mussulman quarters, literally stripping the better-class houses and committing many acts of violence against women and girls. The arrival of regular troops failed to change the situation, and a few days later (16th November—see my despatch No. 161 of the 24th) a few shots fired by an *agent provocateur* provided the desired pretext for a general massacre of the Turks, which would almost certainly have been carried out if it had not been for the prompt intervention of Mgr. Apostolos, the Greek metropolitan, who rode at once to the Bulgarian head-quarters and pleaded the mutual undertaking above alluded to. As it was, in the space of about two hours between 150 and 200 Turks were slaughtered and nearly every Mussulman house or shop in the town was pillaged. The version of the affair that was spread abroad by the Bulgarians was that shots had been fired from a Turkish house upon their troops and officials assembled for some ceremony at the Government buildings; but it is asserted by several independent informants, who are not likely to have been prejudiced in favour of the Turks, that there was no provocation on the part of the latter, and that the shots which were to be the signal for massacre were fired in accordance with a previously concerted scheme by some of the komitajis themselves. I cannot undertake to say which version represents the truth.

Somewhat previous to this, notice had been given by means of the public criers that all the refugees from the surrounding country who had collected in the town should return freely to their villages. A large number of Turks from the Melnik district accordingly set out to return, but on arriving in the neighbourhood of Petritch they began to learn that their villages had in the meantime been destroyed as above related. They therefore halted in the town of Petritch, where, on the 14th (17th) November, the Bulgars fell upon them and massacred over 200. Twelve hundred (?) more are said to have been massacred at Orman Tchiftlik, on the banks of the Strouma Karason, into which their corpses were mostly flung. One hundred and fifty more were murdered at the village of Gjurgjevo, from which also 1,200 head of cattle and 13,000 goats were looted by the neighbouring Bulgarian villagers. Six women were forcibly converted to Christianity. On the 20th November (2nd December) a public crier invited all the Mussulmans still remaining in Petritch to assemble before the sub-governor. They accordingly presented themselves to the number of 364, who were dispatched to the barracks escorted by soldiers with fixed bayonets. One hundred and sixty of these were at once put to death, the remainder being temporarily spared, but a few days later another 100 of them were also put to death.

The villagers of Katountza, who had actually returned to their village under safe-conduct from the authorities at Serres, were first plundered of what little they had left and then massacred by a band of fifteen irregulars, after they had been three or four days in their homes.

Demir-Hissar.—When the Bulgarians entered this town they took possession of the three mosques which it contains. One of them, an old Greek church, was restored

to the Greeks; the other two were given to the Bulgarians, the minarets being demolished. So far as my information goes, there does not appear to have been any slaughter of Turks at this place. At the village of Petrovo, however, situated in the hills some 12 miles north of the town, sixty-four Turks are said to have been massacred in a café! A komitaji forced his way into a house where forty women were collected together and attempted to assault one of them, who, being armed with a revolver, is said to have shot him dead, subsequently setting fire to the building with the help of a tin of petroleum, so that she and her companions perished in the flames.

Bairakli-Djoumaa.—Here there are few Turks, but the old strife broke out between Exarchist and Patriarchist. The Bulgarian band which took possession of the place drove out the Patriarchist priests and school teachers who were installed there, and compelled the inhabitants to declare for the Exarchists. On hearing of this, the Greek Bishop of Melnik proceeded to Serres to report the matter to Mgr. Apostolos, who at once made energetic representations to the Bulgarian authorities in that town, who promised to look into it.

In this district there seems also to be a recrudescence of the latent hostility between the two Bulgarian parties themselves, *i.e.*, the Vercho-ists, who demand the incorporation of Macedonia in the Bulgarian kingdom, and the Centralist or Sandanist party, whose war-cry is "Macedonia for the Macedonians!" or, in other words, "everything for ourselves."

Dolni Poroj.—The village has been destroyed, and most of the population massacred.

Deli-Hassan.—Three Turks murdered.

Calimano.—Twelve Turks murdered.

Vaizli.—All the Mussulman population is said to have been killed.

Pobregovo.—Village sacked by Christians of Bogdantzi and Stovakovo under pretext of "disarming" the Turks; women's ornaments torn off, and some said to have been violated.

Radovishta.—I have no very detailed information from this place, but an informant who recently traversed the town states that all the Turkish houses and shops had been pillaged, and he believed most of the Mussulman male population massacred. The district comprising Radovishta, Kotchana, Kratovo, and Ishtib is that in which the most ghastly reprisals were naturally to be expected.

Osmanie (Peltchevo).—I am assured that only those Turks who allowed themselves to be ostensibly converted to Christianity were left alive. All their houses and shops were sacked, and the neighbouring Turkish villages of Bezghatch (?) and Muradovo were burned.

Tikvesh.—The kaimakam, who, unlike most of his colleagues, remained at his post until the entry of the Serbs, was beaten and shut up in a stable for the purpose of extortion. The principal notables are supposed to have been sent as prisoners to Belgrade, or else murdered *en route*, but nothing is definitely known as to their fate.

Strumnitza.—In addition to the facts narrated in the memorandum accompanying my preceding despatch I have received the following complementary details concerning the occurrences in this place:—

The first to enter the town were a band of thirty under the bandit Tchakof. On the following day, 23rd October (5th November), 15,000 Bulgarian and 2,000 Servian regulars made their entry, and their commander, Mitof or Milof, personally guaranteed the lives of all who had surrendered. But he and his men proceeded towards Doiran on the 7th, and so his guarantee was of no practical value.

The Servian Jivoin Girbitch, who was left in command of the place on the departure of Mitof, is said to have belonged to the 1st battalion of the 14th regiment.

The Bulgarian Voltchef held the rank of lieutenant in the army, and seems to have discharged the functions of chief of the police. The daughters of Sheikh Lutfi Effendi and of the juge d'instruction of Radovishta are cited as having, together with several other girls, been violated by Servian soldiers.

Amongst the 557 murdered in this town were a military doctor, two captains, and three lieutenants, and also two Ismelites. Besides these some 190 Turks were put to death in the surrounding villages by the bands of Tchakof and Hadji Manof, entrusted with the policing of the district.

The number of cart-loads of loot transported to Belgrade should have been eighty and not forty as given in my previous despatch. Amongst the loot were also the telephone apparatus and a quantity of beds.

[55109]

No. 523.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 1093.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 21, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 1063 and 1076 of the 12th and 17th instant respectively, I have the honour to forward herewith two despatches from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica reporting on Greco-Bulgarian relations in that town, and on the appointment of General Hessabdjief in place of General Andreef as administrator of the district occupied by Bulgarians.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 523.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 178.)

Sir, *Salonica, December 16, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 169 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to report that General Hessabdjief has now been appointed administrator of the districts in the occupation of the Bulgarian troops in the place of General Andreef.

The new administrator appears to be a man of superior culture to the other Bulgarian general officers who have hitherto made their appearance at Salonica, and I gather that his mission is to endeavour, while not sacrificing anything of essential importance, to establish smoother and more amicable relations between the allied troops, and at the same time to make some slight concessions to European opinion in the matter of the massacres and other outrages which are still being committed by the Bulgarian irregulars and auxiliaries throughout Macedonia.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

P.S.—Copy of this despatch has been sent to Sophia and Athens.

H. H. L.

Enclosure 2 in No. 523.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 177.)

Sir, *Salonica, December 14, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 172 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a communication which I received last night from His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Greece, as commander-in-chief of the Greek troops in occupation of Salonica, inviting me to acquaint my colleagues with the fact that he had seen fit to approve of the establishment of a Bulgarian post-office in this town. The fact of this communication having been made to me was the subject of an official communiqué which appeared in yesterday's evening papers, and there can be no doubt that the Greeks consider that they have scored a point in the game by getting it placed on record that not only was the establishment of a Bulgarian post-office in this place made dependent on the granting of permission by themselves, but also the permission so granted was merely of a limited and temporary character. The Bulgarians, indeed, would seem ostensibly to have withdrawn one step from the position which they appeared originally inclined to take up that their occupation of Salonica was on a basis of complete equality with their allies.

The relations between the two sides are nevertheless becoming from day to day increasingly strained. On the 6th instant they very nearly came to blows over the possession of a guard post at Kilometre 14 on the junction railway, where the Bulgars endeavoured unsuccessfully to crowd out a small detachment of Greeks and substitute their own guard. This morning a still more critical situation was created in the town of Salonica itself in connection with the closing of the office of a Bulgarian newspaper by the Greeks.

Shortly after the occupation of Salonica by the two armies, the Bulgarians started two new papers—the "Belomoretz," published in French, and the "Bolgario," in their own language—for the purpose of political propaganda. The articles published in the latter having given offence to the authorities, it was decided to suppress it, and gendarmes were sent this morning to the office of the paper for the purpose of carrying out the order to this effect. The measure having been anticipated, Bulgarian soldiers had been previously placed in the office, who opposed their entrance. Reinforcements were hurried up on both sides, and very shortly a full company of each were facing each other across a narrow street, their rifles loaded with ball cartridge, and only awaiting the order to fire into each other at close range. The timely arrival of the Prefect on one side and of General Andreef on the other led to a compromise being effected, and so prevented the further development of an incident which might easily have had a disastrous termination. The troops on both sides were withdrawn, leaving only pickets in front of the "Bolgario" office, which were in turn simultaneously withdrawn towards evening. The suspension of the "Bolgario" was maintained, but the Greek paper "Nea Alethia," which was declared by the Bulgarians to have written equally offensive articles against them, was similarly suspended, and the incident was declared to be closed.

The feeling between the two armies is, however, undoubtedly running very high, as is shown by an incident which occurred a few days ago on a tram-car in the Vardar Street. A Greek soldier entering the car pushed against a Bulgarian who was already installed. The Bulgar seized the other's cap, flung it on the floor and crushed it under his feet, whereon the Greek drew his bayonet and stabbed him dead.

Frequent conflicts are occurring in the districts to the north-east of Salonica, between here and Serres. The Bulgars are in effective occupation of Serres and also of the kaza of Langhaza, while the Greeks are in possession of the greater part of the Chalcidic Peninsula. Immediately to the north of the latter, and lying between the borders of Langhaza and the Strouma Kara-Sou lies the nahié of Nigrita, which is ethnologically almost purely Greek. The Greeks accordingly appointed as Mudir of Nigrita a certain Militiades Zafiropoulo of Galatista, whom they dispatched from here by way of Langhaza to take possession of his post. On arriving at Sukho, on the borders of the two districts, Zafiropoulo was arrested by the Bulgarians and sent back under escort to Langhaza. Subsequently, I am informed, a force of twelve or fifteen hundred Bulgars was despatched to occupy Nigrita.

Meanwhile a detachment of some eighty Greek soldiers, under an officer, penetrating still further north, had reached the village of Poroj, beyond the railway line, but found it already occupied by Bulgarians. The latter received them with an appearance of cordiality and billeted them in groups of four or five throughout the village; but, when they had unsuspectingly laid aside their arms, seized them and sent them back under escort to Salonica.

(Confidential).

Annexed to this despatch is a translation of a report from the Greek officer in charge of a detachment at Ligovani (also in the kaza of Langhaza) which clearly shows the delicate nature of the situation there prevailing.

In view of these facts, the news, which I have received on high authority, both Greek and Bulgarian, of the intended recall of General Todoroff's entire division (45,000 men) to Salonica is calculated to inspire considerable anxiety for the future. It is certainly not justifiable on any grounds of military necessity and will add greatly to the inconvenience and dangers arising from the serious overcrowding of the town; while the risks of conflict between the two armies will be proportionately augmented. It will also increase the already innumerable claims arising out of the constant looting, commandeering and billeting of which foreigners as well as natives are the victims, and is consequently, in my opinion, most strongly to be deprecated.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

P.S.—Copies sent to Sophia and Athens.

H. H. L.

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Enclosure 3 in No. 523.

Commander-in-chief of the Greek Forces to Consul-General Lamb.

M. le Consul général, *Salonique, le* 13 (30) *décembre*, 1912.

LE commandant des troupes bulgares de passage à Salonique ayant jugé utile l'établissement d'un bureau de poste spécial pour la Bulgarie, qui pût faciliter également les communications des civils avec Sophia, je n'ai pas vu d'inconvénient à l'établissement provisoire de ce bureau.

En portant ce qui précède à votre connaissance, M. le consul général, je vous prie d'en aviser vos collègues, car j'estime que toute facilité de communication donnée actuellement à la population de Salonique est précieuse à enregistrer.

Agréez, &c.

CONSTANTIN, Duc de Sparte.

Enclosure 4 in No. 523.

Substance of Report (confidentially communicated) from the Greek Captain commanding the Company of Occupation at the Village of Ligovani in the Kaza of Langhaza, dated November 18, 1912.

AFTER relating various incidents that had taken place at Janiki, Vissoka, and Sukho, the report goes on to say that the Bulgarian komitaji, Dumboulakof, at the head of his band and accompanied by Bulgarian regulars, was making a tour of these villages, plundering and murdering Turks and Greeks alike.

The Greek officer stationed at Sukho reported on the 17th November Dumboulakof and a Bulgarian officer, named Sisanof (?), entered the Greek Church at the head of their men, during the celebration of divine service, in the course of which the priest pronounced a prayer for the Kings of Greece and Bulgaria. Dumboulakof entered the sanctuary and compelled the officiating priest to repeat the prayer in the name of King Ferdinand only. He then addressed himself to the congregation, declaring that the Balkan Alliance was a farce, and that everything between Salonica and Constantinople must be Bulgarian. This was all done in the presence of the Bulgarian officer and his men. After the service was over the Bulgarian officer intimated to the Greek that he had come with 300 troops to take over command of the place, and that consequently the Greeks could withdraw. The Greek replied that he had similarly been instructed to occupy the place, and that he must therefore remain until he received counter-orders. He, however, complains in his report of the disagreeable situation in which he was placed, his instructions being merely to "represent the Greek occupation," while neither his orders nor the force at his disposal permitted of his doing anything to protect the villagers from pillage and murder at the hands of the Bulgars.

According to local reports Dumboulakof had already looted between 4,000 and 5,000 sheep from the villagers, and had also appointed men to collect the fishery dues from the fishermen at Beshik-gheul.

(I understand that the Greeks subsequently withdrew from Sukho, which is now administered by the band of Dumboulakof.)

At 4 P.M. on the 24th November the village was alarmed by loud and continuous rifle-fire from the heights to the east of their village. It subsequently transpired that this proceeded from a wholesale execution of Mussulman villagers undertaken by the Bulgarians. Having previously provided themselves with complete lists of the Turkish inhabitants of the neighbourhood, they had collected them together, tied them in batches of four or five, led them a short distance from the village, and set them up as targets for their rifles. One man only managed to escape, who is now in hospital in Salonica.

Whilst these people were being led out to execution, one of them, in spite of his hands being bound, succeeded in getting out a revolver and shooting one of the Bulgarian bandits in the stomach. The Greek officer expresses his apprehension that this act may merely have the effect of aggravating the fate of the surviving women and children. He adds that he his doing his best to protect them, but complains that his position is extremely difficult in view of his standing instructions to avoid in any way provoking the allies.

[55110] No. 524.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 1094.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 21, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1090 of yesterday, I have the honour to enclose a translation of an article from the "Yeni Gazeta," which may be considered as a Government organ, containing a version of the account given me by Gabriel Effendi of the negotiations regarding the revictualling of Adrianople.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 524.

Extract from the "Yeni Gazeta."

NOUS avons déjà dit que notre Gouvernement était disposé à entrer en négociations avec les délégués grecs, à certaines conditions. Aujourd'hui nous voulons expliquer en quoi consistent ces conditions.

Pendant les négociations de l'armistice avec les Bulgares, les Serbes et les Monténégrins, malheureusement, quoi qu'il en soit, une erreur a été commise.

Dans le texte du protocole d'armistice, rédigé par les conseillers légistes et approuvé par décision du Conseil des Ministres—texte sur lequel l'entente avait été obtenue avec les délégués bulgares, le premier jour des négociations à Bahchatchekeuy—la question du ravitaillement journalier, pendant la durée de l'armistice, des places fortes assiégées, comme Andrinople, Janina et Schkodra, avait été nettement définie. Pourtant, le deuxième jour des négociations, pendant les discussions qui ont eu lieu, en l'absence de nos conseillers légistes, les délégués bulgares, au lieu du premier protocole, ont présenté un second texte. Et alors, soit à cause d'une erreur momentanée, soit à cause du manque de temps nécessaire pour prolonger la discussion, ce second texte du protocole, qui ne faisait pas mention du ravitaillement des places assiégées, fut signé.

En outre, bien que le premier protocole permit aux navires de commerce d'entrer dans quelques ports de la Mer Noire, à la condition de ne pas transporter de la contrebande; dans le second protocole on a ajouté, on ne sait comment, la clause: "librement."

Pourtant, si nous n'avions à compter qu'avec les trois Gouvernements qui ont signé l'armistice, la question du ravitaillement n'aurait pas, d'après nous, une si grande importance. Parce que, en bien jugeant de la situation actuelle, nous pouvions tomber d'accord en dix ou quinze jours au moins, sur les préliminaires de paix, avec la Bulgarie et les deux autres Gouvernements. Il y a bien en effet un différend entre nous et les alliés au sujet d'Andrinople, mais on espérait que ce différend pouvait être résolu; que les Bulgares reconnaîtraient les nécessités historiques, politiques et traditionnelles du maintien d'Andrinople en la possession des Ottomans.

Pourtant le Gouvernement grec, en ne signant pas l'armistice avec ses alliés, a montré qu'il était partisan de la continuation de la guerre.

Il y a, en effet, entre le Gouvernement ottoman et le Gouvernement grec, des différends plus nombreux que ceux qui existent avec les autres États balkaniques.

Les Grecs ne manqueront pas, pendant les négociations de paix, de soulever les questions de Salonique, des îles, &c. De sorte qu'il est possible que les négociations, qu'on espérait terminer en quinze ou vingt jours, traînent peut-être un ou deux mois. Cela étant, le Gouvernement ottoman ne peut pas naturellement consentir à laisser sans ravitaillement pendant un si long temps les places assiégées. C'est pour cela que le Gouvernement Impérial, prenant en considération cette situation, a, d'après nos informations, donné des instructions à ses délégués à Londres d'accepter la participation des délégués grecs aussi, seulement à la condition que la clause du ravitaillement pendant la durée de l'armistice des places assiégées (clause contenue dans le premier texte du protocole) soit acceptée.

[55112] No. 525.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 1096.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 21, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Cavalla, reporting on the imposition of export tax on tobacco.

I have, &c.

(For His Majesty's Ambassador),

GEORGE KIDSTON.

Enclosure in No. 525.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 7/51.)

Sir, *Cavalla, December 16, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, a Bulgarian customs director having arrived here, the import and export of goods from Cavalla is now freely permitted. The tariff applied is the Turkish one. A difficulty has risen in connection with the export of tobacco. The local customs officials contend that tobacco, by Turkish law, is liable to an export tax of 1 per cent. It is true that by Turkish law an export tax of 1 per cent. is collected on most articles, but tobacco was never subjected to this tax. The only dues collected on tobacco exported were stamp dues collected by the Régie des Tabacs. The Régie still collect these dues, but the export tax of 1 per cent. is an unjustifiable innovation.

I have been in telegraphic communication with the British Légation at Sophia in connection with this matter, and representations have been made to the central authorities there. So far the matter remains in suspense. The customs authorities here, on the demand of the local merchants, have consented to accept from all exporters a letter of guarantee, to be given with every consignment of tobacco exported, engaging themselves to pay the export tax of 1 per cent. on such consignments, in case it is definitely decided at Sophia that it should be levied.

As there are at Cavalla numerous British tobacco houses whose interests are affected by the imposition of any new tax, it is to be hoped that the authorities at Sophia will see their way to allowing the export of tobacco without tax, as in the past.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

[55116] No. 526.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 378.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, December 23, 1912.*

THE announcement that the Six Powers have come to an agreement in regard to Albania and to assuring to Servia a purely commercial access to the Adriatic has been received with the utmost indignation by the "Novoe Vremya," which is publishing lengthy articles couched in the most violent terms on the subject. The "Novoe Vremya" contends that the decision arrived at by the six Powers must be regarded as a complete victory for Austria, and that it is doubtful whether the Triple *Entente* will ever achieve any success if it continues to follow its present line of policy. The effect of this quick surrender to Austria must, moreover, materially damage the interests of the Balkan States in the peace negotiations and would probably end in their deserting the Triple *Entente*. The first question which arose was how would a commercial access be guaranteed to Servia. That country had, previous to the present war, had access to the Ægean via Saloniea, and had ordered guns which now were pointing against the Bulgarians at Charatja. Further, there arose the question as to who was to obtain the territory won by the Serbs if it were taken away from Servia. The choice seemed to lie between Austria and Albania. In the first case the blood shed by the Serbs would have been for the extension of the Hapsburg possessions; in the second case, Austria would receive a new port almost on the same conditions as had been

her "administration" of Bosnia, and everyone knew how that "administration" had ended. The decision arrived at was in fact an appalling blow to Slavdom, and a Russian Ambassador had, within three days of the brave words spoken by M. Kokovtsef, given the assent of his Government to what constituted a shameful surrender to Austria.

Further articles of the "Novoe Vremya," entitled "A diplomatic Mukden" and "The London defeat," continue in the same violent strain. The present defeat of Russian foreign policy is compared to the humiliation suffered by Russia in 1909, only it is described as being if possible less excusable, for in 1909 there was the slender consolation that Russia's hands were tied by some secret obligation, which was not the case to-day. M. Neratof, the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, is taken to task for having said, in reply to a question as to whether a port on the Adriatic was not a vital necessity for Servia, that opinions as to such necessity were extremely diversified. Russia would now in all probability reap the fruits of this defeat and the Balkan States would in the future possibly look towards Austria since the London conference had clearly shown them that without her they would be robbed of the fruits of their victories, and Russia, who had such enormous interests in the Near East, would thus become isolated.

The "Sviet" of to-day's date publishes an angry article on the subject, entitled "Worse than Tsusima," in which it declares that Austrian diplomacy has without war broken the head of Russia and Slavdom. The Triple *Entente* had been beaten by the perseverance and unity of the Powers composing the Triple Alliance. Telegrams from Servia reported a marked coolness in public circles there towards Russia, and stated that the prestige of Russia had suffered severely. Naive people might say that the Russian representative at the conference was in a hopeless minority, but a sufficient reply to this was to refer M. Poincaré's last speech. But of course the French and English could not be expected to be more Russian than Russian diplomatists. The "Sviet" goes on to deplore the fact that the patriotic speeches in the Duma on the 20th and 21st instant had not been made a week sooner, when they might have exercised some influence on public opinion and on the London conference. I may here mention that M. Maklakof, one of the most prominent members of the Cadet party, delivered a highly patriotic speech in the Duma on the 20th instant as to the necessity of an energetic policy being followed by Russia. This speech met with much applause from the Right and the Nationalists, which is an almost unprecedented event. The "Sviet" concludes its article as follows:—

"Now when the voice of the Duma has been raised too late, is it not time for an organisation of Russian patriots to consider the advisability of a humble petition to the Throne on the sins of Russian diplomacy and of various officials in uniforms?"

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[55219] No. 527.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received December 27.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, December 26, 1912.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decode of a telegram, dated to-day, from the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 527.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Malta, December 26, 1912.*

NINE transports with Greek troops left Salonica 24th and 25th December.

[55218] No. 528.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, December 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *December 24, 1912.*

GREEK intercepted wireless telegram confirms surrender of 1,500 Turkish troops at Mitylene.

[55327] No. 529.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, December 27, 1912.*

M. TAKE JONESCO is leaving for London 29th December.

[55301] No. 530.

Sir H. Rex-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 250.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, December 27, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 249 of 26th December.

Reuter reports that General Savof arrived at Constantinople, having adopted pseudonym of M. Kaltchef, that he had a long interview with Grand Vizier, and that he arranged with him delimitation of new Turco-Bulgarian frontier and other important matters.

Bulgarian Government categorically deny preceding information, and state that it is mere intrigue on the part of the Ottoman Government. They wish it to be known that they have not entered into any secret negotiations whatever with Turkey.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[55302] No. 531.

Sir H. Rex-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 251.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 27, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 245 of 24th December: Roumania.

Roumanian Minister returned from Bucharest three days ago with instructions to sound Prime Minister as to what steps Bulgaria was prepared to adopt in order to conciliate Roumanian aspirations.

It appears to be the wish of the Roumanian Government to carry on these negotiations *pari passu* with those proceeding between MM. Danef and Misu in London.

I understand that Roumanian Minister informed the Prime Minister that a more reasonable attitude was noticeable both in governmental and in popular circles in Roumania.

Idea of the cession of quadrilateral to Roumania had been entirely dropped; as regards Koutzo-Vlachs, Roumanian Government only insisted that none of the towns or villages which they inhabited should come under Greek domination. The one great and important concession which Roumania still asked for was the cession of Silistria; This they considered they had a right to for reasons which Roumanian Minister discussed with Prime Minister at some length.

Prime Minister's reply was evasive and elusive; he mentioned several possible minor concessions, but his Excellency made no allusion to Silistria.

Prime Minister's views are as stated in my telegram above mentioned.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[55303] No. 532.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 252.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, December 27, 1912.*

SERVIAN Government, having failed to obtain port of their own, have suggested to the Bulgarian Government that Salonica should be constituted a condominium among allies. Although no answer has been returned, the Bulgarian Government may find this suggestion acceptable as a solution of difficulties with Greece.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[54897] No. 533.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1125.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 27, 1912.*

FINANCIAL position of Turkey.

You may speak to Minister for Foreign Affairs in sense of remarks in my telegram No. 1123 of 25th December.

[55313] No. 534.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 36.)
Sir, *Odessa, December 23, 1912.*

MILITARY preparations in South-west Russia.

It appears that horses and transport have been checked everywhere, also the papers of reservists. At Berdichev papers are retained and men warned not to leave the place. In Bessarabia billeting lists have been checked.

At Kazatin there are three Parsevals. Hangars have been built.

At Vinnitza the garrison has been augmented by detachments, not complete units, from towns in the interior, supposed to be for guarding bridges.

At Odessa meat-tinning establishments work night and day.

I have, &c.
(for Consul-General)
FREDERICK WATSON.

[55374] No. 535.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 1100.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 23, 1912.*

BEFORE replying to your despatch No. 558 of the 16th instant, calling for my observations on the suggestion of the Secretary of State for India that the time had perhaps come to press the Turkish Government for a reply to the British memorandum of the 18th July regarding the Bagdad Railway and the Persian Gulf questions, I thought it as well to approach the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a private and unofficial manner.

I asked his Excellency whether he could tell me whether the present Government had considered the matter and whether an answer could be expected shortly. His Excellency replied that he himself had examined the memorandum in a general manner, though not in great detail, but that the Cabinet had not had time to do so. He and the other members of the Cabinet were sincerely desirous of settling all outstanding points of difference that existed with His Majesty's Government, and once the serious questions, like the Balkan war, &c., which preoccupied the Government, were disposed of, he would be prepared to examine the matter and reply to His Majesty's Government.

It does not appear to me that we can further press the Government at this moment,

but if the present Government remains in power after the conclusion of peace or if it should be followed by one of moderate views, the Turkish Government should be pressed for a reply.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[55375] No. 536.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 1101.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 23, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a notice which has been circulated by the Sublime Porte to all the foreign missions, transmitting a report on the acts of cruelty which the Bulgars and Greeks are alleged to have committed at Dedeagatch and Cavalla.

It will be noticed that the report has reached the Turkish Government through General Baumann Pasha, the French inspector-general of gendarmerie, and I have reason to believe that the prominence given to his name by the Sublime Porte in their circular has not been altogether pleasing to the French Embassy.

The identity of the actual author of the report is not revealed, but, in view of the channel through which it reached the Sublime Porte, it would not seem unfair to assume that it is the commandant of the gendarmerie at Dedeagatch. It will be remembered that it was to this officer and to the mutessarif who insisted upon offering resistance to the Bulgar comitajis, that the British vice-consul at Dedeagatch ascribed the entire blame for the excesses at that place (see his despatch No. 22, enclosed in my despatch No. 1013 of the 2nd December).

An examination of the report itself reveals one or two points which, I think, are worth noting:—

1. In spite of the prominence given in the heading to Cavalla, the report, with the exception of one general phrase, makes no specific mention of atrocities committed there.

2. Practically all the acts complained of were committed by Bulgarian irregulars, and the incidents attributed to regular troops are not of a very serious nature, the only exception being the charge of violating Moslem women, which is not substantiated.

3. No mention is made of the burning, sacking, &c., of Christian villages in the neighbourhood and the massacres of Christians by the retreating Turkish troops, as reported by Mr. Vice-Consul Badetti in his above-mentioned despatch.

4. Mr. Badetti has been in frequent communication with this embassy since the occupation of the town by the Bulgars, but has never complained of any restrictions being placed upon him, as alleged in the report.

Although I am far from vouching for the innocence of the allied troops, whether regular or irregular, in this or other similar cases, it is worth noting that a determined effort is being made here, especially in the organs of the committee press, to stir up Moslem feeling by compiling catalogues of alleged atrocities committed by the allies, and more especially by the Greeks.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 536.

Circular Note.

LE Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de transmettre ci-joint à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique copie d'un document parvenu par l'entremise de Baumann Pacha sur les cruautés que les Bulgares et Hellènes ont commises à Dédéagatch et à Cavalla.

Sublime Porte, le 21 décembre, 1912.

Enclosure 2 in No. 536.

Report on Acts of Cruelty reported to have been perpetrated by Bulgarians and Greeks at Cavalla and Dedeagatch.

LE mardi, 19 novembre, vers 8 heures du soir, 150 comitadjis pénétrèrent soudainement dans la ville. Dans la journée, la petite garnison de Dédéagatch s'était battue avec ces bandes, abandonnant la ville et se retirant vers les forces de Javer Pacha aux prises, vers Goumouldjina, avec la division bulgare du Général Kovatchef.

De 8 heures du soir à minuit les comitadjis, sans chef, sans aucune discipline, en haillons, l'air farouche et sauvage, se livrèrent à un épouvantable massacre de Turcs. Ils pénétrèrent dans les maisons, pillant et tuant vieillards, femmes et enfants. La complicité des chrétiens de la ville n'est pas douteuse; nous en avons vu plusieurs conduisant ces brigands et désignant les maisons et les personnes turques. D'ailleurs, toutes les habitations des chrétiens étaient marquées d'une croix blanche.

Des réfugiés musulmans avaient cherché un abri dans une mosquée. Il y avait des vieillards, des femmes et des enfants. Les Bulgares les cernent; de la porte entr'ouverte un coup de revolver part et abat l'un des comitadjis. Aussitôt une vive fusillade est dirigée sur ces malheureux; des bombes sont lancées dans la mosquée; c'est un véritable carnage. Le lendemain quand j'ai visité ce lieu de désastre j'y ai vu plus de vingt-cinq cadavres.

Les prêtres catholiques italiens, qui ont une école, où est enseigné le français, avaient recueilli une trentaine de Turcs qui s'y étaient réfugiés. Ils furent dénoncés par des Grecs, qui ne peuvent souffrir les écoles catholiques, à qui la tolérance des Turcs a permis de prendre partout un grand développement. Les comitadjis s'y présentent et exigent la restitution des réfugiés; les pères s'y refusent. Mais l'un des principaux Turcs, nommé Riza Bey, commissaire du Gouvernement ottoman auprès de la Compagnie française des Chemins de Fer, craignant que cette hospitalité reçue chez les braves pères ne soit la cause des grands malheurs, se rend à ces forcenés. Ceux-ci l'emmènent et, à une cinquantaine de mètres de l'école italienne, je les ai vus s'arrêter, croiser la baïonnette, et demander à ce jeune homme de lui remettre son argent et de lui indiquer sa maison. Riza Bey est un garçon très instruit et d'une excellent famille, que je connais beaucoup, et qui avait une jeune femme et un enfant. La pensée du danger qu'allait courir sa famille lui a sans doute inspiré le refus d'obtempérer au désir de ces bandits, qui le transpercèrent de leurs baïonnettes. Le malheureux s'affaça, et l'un de ses assassins lui enleva ses souliers pour s'en servir. Son corps resta pendant cinq jours sur la même place, et chaque jour on lui enlevait un effet. Au dernier moment il ne lui restait que sa chemise et son caleçon. D'ailleurs, ces Bulgares replacèrent leurs haillons par les effets retirés de leurs victimes.

Les comitadjis, s'adressant aux pères italiens, les menacèrent la baïonnette au canon, de les tuer s'ils ne montraient pas leur caisse. Ceux-ci durent s'exécuter; la caisse contenait £ T. 100, qui devinrent la propriété de ces bandits.

A côté de ces brigands, qui précédaient toujours et partout l'armée bulgare, il y eut les pillards de la ville, les habitants grecs, appartenant parfois à la meilleure société, qui envahirent les maisons turques, les mosquées, les locaux du Gouvernement et emportèrent tout ce qui leur tombait sous la main: literies, fauteuils, meubles, tapis, &c. Ce spectacle était ignoble. Il dura huit jours, jusqu'au moment où le drapeau français commença à poindre à l'horizon de la mer, sous la protection des canons du "Julien de la Gravière." Alors, comme par enchantement, les comitadjis disparurent et le calme revint.

Les Grecs avaient aidé les comitadjis et avaient organisé des fêtes de réjouissances dès la nuit de l'entrée en ville de ces derniers; ils s'étaient montrés très arrogant vis-à-vis des étrangers, insultant le vice-consul d'Autriche, M. Bergoubillon, agent de la Compagnie du Lloyd, et parlant de fermer tous les établissements européens, banques, &c., pour les remplacer par des Grecs.

Il faut rendre hommage à l'évêque grec de Dédéagatch, qui employa toute son énergie et toute son autorité à protéger les Turcs contre les canons bulgares et le pillage de ses propres ouailles. Il réussit à sauver le caïmacan, des officiers, de nombreux Turcs. Mais il fut peu écouté de ses compatriotes, qu'il menaça de quitter aussitôt après la fin des hostilités, ne voulant plus rester à la tête d'une communauté aussi indigne. Aussi, ajmnt à l'arrivée du croiseur français, ce digne prélat se rendit à bord pour saluer le commandant; celui-ci lui rendit les honneurs en tirant des coups

de canon et le félicita de sa noble attitude. J'ai appris que cet officier avait signalé à notre ambassade la conduite heroïque de cet évêque en demandant une décoration pour lui.

L'armée bulgare qui restait non loin de la ville, laissait celle-ci à la merci des comitadjis bulgares, rentra à Dédéagatch dès l'arrivée du "Julien de la Gravière." Le commandant de ce bateau, voyant la ville désormais occupé par les réguliers, jugea inutile de débarquer des marins et s'en alla à Cavalla, où des horreurs pareilles à celles de Dédéagatch s'étaient commises. Les officiers français eurent le temps cependant de descendre et de se rendre compte des abominations commises. Ils prirent même quelques photographies. Ce triste spectacle avait soulevé leur indignation.

A l'arrivée de l'armée bulgare sous les ordres du Général de Division Guenef, les pères italiens se plaignirent à ce dernier de l'attitude des comitadjis à leur égard; celui-ci fit une enquête, constata les faits, et retrouva même £ T. 70 sur les £ T. 100 qui leur avaient été enlevées. "Mais," leur a dit cet officier général, "comme nous avons l'intention d'élever un monument en l'honneur des soldats bulgares morts pendant la guerre, je garde cet argent pour cette œuvre."

Le Général Guenef ayant appris que l'évêque grec avait recueilli toutes les femmes turques dans l'école grecque afin de les mettre à l'abri des mauvais traitements, réussit à décider ce prélat de les relacher, afin d'y loger ses soldats. Les malheureuses femmes durent retourner dans leurs maisons pillées et abandonnées. Dans la nuit, restées sans défense, elles furent violées par les soldats de ce général.

La deuxième nuit de leur arrivée, ces mêmes soldats pillèrent les magasins de M. Rodhe, vice-consul d'Allemagne et agent de la Compagnie de Transport de Schenker; ils enlevèrent, entre autres, 100 caisses de sardines, 100 coques de bonbons, &c. Ils brisèrent les caisses renfermant des vitres. C'est en vain que ce commerçant s'adressa au Général Guenef, qui lui répondit qu' "on se trouvait en temps de guerre et qu'il n'y avait rien à faire."

La ville fut livrée par l'armée régulière à la plus grande infection. Aucune fenillée n'était construite, les soldats salissant toutes les rues y jetaient toutes les dépouilles des animaux tués pour leur nourriture. Aucune précaution hygiénique n'était prise, et pourtant le voisinage de la mer donnait de grandes facilités sous ce rapport. Quand j'ai quitté la ville, le 2 décembre, quatre cas de typhus se sont déclarés parmi les habitants.

Les Bulgares ont placé des sentinelles devant chaque consulat, avec défense à qui que ce soit d'y pénétrer, s'il ne fait pas partie du personnel de la maison. C'est ainsi que, malgré les protestations des consuls de France et d'Allemagne, les agents consulaires sont, pour ainsi dire, prisonniers, privés de tout contact avec leurs nationaux et mis dans l'impossibilité de les protéger.

Ces consuls d'ailleurs, levantains et simples naturalisés français et allemands, n'osèrent jamais écrire toute la vérité sur ce qu'ils savent, de peur de voir leurs intérêts commerciaux compromis.

Les Bulgares se sont emparés du chemin de fer français, ont expulsé brutalement tout le personnel indigène et français, et l'ont remplacé par un personnel bulgare. Celui-ci fut tellement au-dessous de sa tâche qu'il ne put exploiter que très difficilement la ligne au milieux de nombreux déraillements, déroulement de matériel. Les autorités militaires refusèrent de délivrer aux agents français le moindre reçu ou pièce officielle de prise de possession du matériel.

Devant l'hostilité de la population grecque indigène, beaucoup de nous français s'étaient concertés pour des mesures de défense commune en cas d'attaque; heureusement, le "Julian de la Gravière" est avisé et arrivé à temps pour imposer le respect et pour nous transmettre l'ordre de l'Ambassadeur de rentrer à Constantinople. Mais ce fut au prix de mille difficultés et grâce à cet ordre écrit de l'Ambassadeur que nous pûmes nous embarquer, car les Bulgares ne laissent aucun étranger quitter la ville.

[55392] No. 537.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 114.)

Sir, *Belgrade, December 21, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith translation of an article from the Government organ the "Samouprava" of the 20th instant, containing some reflections on the obstructive attitude of Turkey in the peace negotiations.

I have, &c.

RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 537.

Extract from the "Samouprava" (Belgrade) of December 7 (20), 1912.

(Translation.)

THE conditions which Turkey, according to Reschid Pasha, as expressed by him to the correspondent of the Paris "Temps," will put forward for the conclusion of peace are what we expected, namely, the Turkish statesmen think of dragging on the negotiations, and, by putting forward conditions which the Balkan allies cannot accept, to resume and continue to defend their hopelessly lost possessions in Europe.

Even assuming as correct the statement of the Turkish delegate that Turkey has now succeeded in concentrating 350,000 fresh troops at Chatalja, and that the provisioning of the troops is perfectly organised, and that Turkey's financial conditions permit her to carry on the war for a further period, there still remain several questions to which even Reschid Pasha would find it difficult to give a satisfactory answer.

Firstly, for Turkey to remedy her present position, she must pass from the defensive to the offensive. To render this possible the allied troops must first shatter their forces by endeavouring to storm the Chatalja lines. This, however, they will certainly not do. Content with what they have so far obtained they will probably wait in their present positions for the Turks to attack, and in this case both the numerical and moral superiority would be on the side of the allies. The outlook for Turkey would therefore be fresh defeats and the aggravation of her present condition, and by the complete disorganisation of her troops and finances Turkey would be at the mercy of events.

Dare the Turkish statesmen even think of placing their country in such a position?

Secondly, has Turkey thought of the possibility that if she empties Asia the allies might, with the help of the Greek fleet, land troops in Asia and attack the Dardanelles and Constantinople from that side? Italy thought of doing this just before the conclusion of her war with Turkey. In what position would Turkey, Constantinople, and the troops at Chatalja find themselves in this event? And what demands could the allies with every right present to Turkey?

Lastly, Constantinople should know that the Balkan allies know very well what the financial situation of Turkey is to-day. The only result of Turkey's attitude would be that she would thereby strengthen the hands of the allies in their demands. It is to Turkey's interest not to provoke such a disagreeable and uncomfortable eventuality.

[55393] No. 538.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 115.)

Sir, *Belgrade, December 24, 1912.*

I HAD some conversation yesterday with M. Pasitch concerning the proposal of the Powers, as set forth in your telegram No. 146, for giving Servia a commercial access to the Adriatic Sea.

His Excellency at first appeared somewhat inclined to cavil, and said Servia would have difficulties with regard to the railway, but when I pointed out that the railway would be under European control, and protected by a special force of gendarmerie, he was forced to admit that, from the point of view of facilities for Servian commerce, he could find no valid objection at present.

He proceeded, however, to deplore the injustice of Servia being forced to surrender territory she had conquered, and dwelt, as he has several times done lately, on the probability of internal troubles, although, he said, the danger of these would very much depend on how far the Powers, in their determination of the limits of Albania, took into account Servian claims.

I am inclined to think that M. Pasitch, for my benefit, exaggerates the probabilities of popular excitement. A staff officer lately from Uskub told Colonel Thomson, our military attaché, that the army, though disappointed, was quite resigned to losing Durazzo and other territory in Albania. I cannot detect any signs of dangerous indignation in the press.

M. Pasitch begged me ask your advocacy of Servian interests when the limits of

Albania come to be discussed. I said I would transmit his request to you, but I observed to him that recently, in giving me his ideas on the limits of Albania, he had included the Mirdites and Malisoris, though not Serb-speaking, within Servian territory. This seemed scarcely justifiable. He replied that, although the Malisori and Mirdites were not Serb-speaking, they were Christians, and if they could not be independent and have local autonomy, they would rather come under Servian rule, though not themselves Orthodox, than find themselves again under a Moslem administration. They were getting up a petition to this effect.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[55394] No. 539.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 116.)

Sir, *Belgrade, December 24, 1912.*

ON several occasions during 1911 I had the honour to mention the unpopularity of the Servian Royal Family and the constant attacks to which the dynasty was subject on the part of the press.

Both the King and the Crown Prince were the most frequent objects of these attacks. The King was usually referred to with contempt as a feeble-minded sort of person altogether unfitted to rule, and the Crown Prince in his capacity as commander-in-chief was ridiculed and submitted to every sort of ignominy. On the other hand, his elder brother, Prince George, who renounced the succession, though also at times coming in for abuse, appeared to command far more sympathy with the public, and especially with the army, who were captivated by the openly hostile attitude he had adopted towards Austria in the 1909 crisis and by his generally independent demeanour and utterances.

During the course of the present war public opinion has undergone a complete change.

The Crown Prince has shown himself capable and courageous, and often by his presence at engagements, under circumstances trying to himself on account of his health, has materially contributed to the success of the Servian arms. He has won the esteem, confidence, and respect both of officers and men, and has developed into a popular hero. But Prince George, of whom so much was expected in the event of a war, appears to have been a miserable failure, anything but ready to lead into danger and more a braggart than anything else.

The Crown Prince's new-found popularity is a matter of considerable importance at the present moment when King Peter's health is fast failing. There is no reason to suppose that his death would now be followed by difficulties concerning the succession such as might have arisen before the war.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[55395] No. 540.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 117.)

Sir, *Belgrade, December 24, 1912.*

AS reported in my telegram No. 120 of the 23rd instant, M. Pasitch called upon the Austrian Minister on the 21st instant and spontaneously expressed the regrets of the Servian Government for any irregularities that might have been committed by their military authorities towards the Austrian consuls.

The irregularities for which the Austrian Government still considered some satisfaction should be given, even though it had been shown that the consuls were unscathed, were, I am told, that the correspondence from the consulates had been detained and opened, that the cavass of the consulates had been interfered with in the execution of his duties, and finally that Servian soldiers had entered a Catholic church under Austrian protection.

M. Pasitch, however, anticipated any demand for an apology that might have been meditated by enquiring whether the Servian Government could do anything in the matter as a proof of the regret he had already expressed.

The Austrian Minister, after thanking him for the courteous manner in which the Servian Government were now treating the incident, informed him that all his Government desired was that when the Austrian consuls returned to their posts at Mitrovitza and Prizrend a detachment of Servian troops should hoist the Austrian flag in the presence of the consuls in full uniform.

To this M. Pasitch at once agreed, and the incident therefore appears definitely closed.

M. d'Egron is highly gratified at the disposition the Servian Government now appear to be manifesting in their relations with the Monarchy. He told me that he thought the Servians were much hurt at being left in the lurch by Russia, and were coming to the conclusion that after all their best policy would be friendship with Austria.

I observed to him that his Government, seeing the way the Servian Government had given in about the Adriatic port and the good-will they had shown in the matter of the consuls, had kept Europe in a state of rather unnecessary and protracted anxiety. He maintained, however, that Servia would never have adopted her present reasonable tone if there had been no military demonstration on the part of the Monarchy, and also that Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina had been in too dangerous a condition to run any risks.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[55376] No. 541.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 1102.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica transmitting translation of a despatch from the acting British vice-consul at Janina on the subject of events near that place.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 541.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 176.)

Sir, *Salonica, December 14, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for purposes of record, translation of a much belated despatch which I have received from the acting vice-consul at Janina.

Communications with that place having been practically cut off immediately on the outbreak of hostilities, this is the only communication which I have received on the subsequent course of events in that district.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 541.

Acting Vice-Consul Dussap to Consul-General Lamb.

(No. 31.)

(Translation.)

Sir, *Janina, November 3, 1912.*

OWING to the interruption of postal communication via Monastir, I have been unable to correspond regularly with you. I have decided therefore to send this by sea, and hope that it will arrive safely.

Hostilities were opened in Epirus on the morning of the 19th October. The Greek troops, crossing the frontier at Arta, took up positions at Gribovo and Kordzades, whence they were dislodged two days later by the Turks, who had brought up two divisions (nizams and redifs) to the attack.

The Turkish commandant was preparing to follow up this success, when, unfortunately

for him, several Albanian battalions, who had taken part in the engagement, lagged behind for the purpose of plundering the surrounding villages. The Greeks seized this advantage, and, recovering their morale, opened a withering fire on these battalions, which immediately retreated and involved the greater part of the army in their flight.

In this way the Turkish forces abandoned the ground they had already gained and, camping nearly under the Janina fortifications, hoped to lure the Greeks on; the latter were, however, content to occupy their old positions and Louros, where the general staff took up its quarters. During the whole of the last week there has been no fighting.

The period of inaction has now come to an end, and yesterday morning the Turks reassumed the offensive. It has just been officially announced that the opposing armies met south of Pantepigadia and that the Greeks were repulsed.

There are several Greek bands in the vilayet; their chief object seems to be to foment a revolution in the Christian villages. Several of these villages are said to be occupied and administered by these bands.

Hordes of Albanians overrun the province and retaliate by committing all sorts of excesses, plundering and burning many Christian villages. Even at Janina fears are entertained that the town may suffer from these savages.

I enclose a memorandum drawn up by Dr. Recca, dragoman to the British vice-consulate. I have not, however, had an opportunity of verifying the facts, but enclose the report for information only.

I have, &c.
E. E. DUSSAP.

Enclosure 3 in No. 541.

Dr. Recca to Acting Vice-Consul Dussap.

Sir, *Janina, November 2, 1912.*

THE savage hordes of Albanians, whose help the Ottoman Government is relying on in the war in this vilayet, have inaugurated their work of destruction by burning Christian villages and massacring innocent people. Last week many villages were burnt, among others Vodoviste and Rovitjasta in the immediate environs of Janina. Among those slightly further off were Prosgoli, Petra, Liapu, and Demati: the smoke was distinctly visible from Janina itself. An Albanian band paid a visit to the village of Gotista, near Prosgoli, and carried off twenty-two people, ostensibly to serve as guides: they massacred them all during the march. I shall not mention individual murders and other atrocities, which occur daily and on all sides, when unarmed men are unlucky enough to fall into the hands of these savages. In burning the villages, the Albanians spared neither monasteries nor churches, but set them on fire, after previously profaning and plundering them. Many an eye-witness reports having seen the Albanian bandsmen selling at ridiculously low prices to the Jews of Janina market sacred objects of the Christian religion, such as silver crosses, censers, and silver-plated gospels, which they had stolen. There is no need to enlarge on the thefts of ordinary things, such as horses, which they sold for 20 fr. to 40 fr., and weapons sold for 2 fr. Deserters carry back home with them whole loads of the fruits of their theft and plunder.

I hear also that Hairi Effendi Patchanda, Mussulman notable of Janina and ex-mayor of the town, said in the presence of dragomans of the Austrian and Greek consulates that "should the Albanians enter the town for any reason, they would not differentiate between Mussulmans and Christians, would not take any account of rank, religion, sex or age, but would exterminate every thing, animate or inanimate."

In the event of a sudden irruption of these undisciplined hordes, even the consulates would be in great danger.

I have, &c.
DR. B. D. RECCA,
Dragoman to His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consulate.

[55377] No. 542.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 1103.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, reporting on the situation at Tchesmé.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 542.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 148.)

Sir, *Smyrna, December 21, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a week ago an armed Greek steamer (ex-passenger boat) appeared before the port of Tchesmé and the commander demanded the surrender of the few mustafiiz (men of the old reserve) who guarded the town. These however promptly ran away to the villages in the interior. The Greek commander then proceeded to seize the caïques which were in the port and carried them off to Chio.

As this incident, coupled with the fact that the Greeks of Tchesmé are daily deserting to join their compatriots at Chios, is calculated to irritate the Moslem population, I have suggested to the vali that a few of the redifs now at Vourla should be sent to Tchesmé for the maintenance of order. There are only eight gendarmes at Tchesmé.

There is no further news from Chios.

I have, &c.

HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[55378] No. 543.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 1104.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Mohammed Sherai Pasha, head of the Egyptian Red Crescent now at Constantinople, has, with certain other Mahommedan notables here, started an association the object of which is to raise the level of instruction among Moslems, and thus remedy the causes to which he and other thinking Mahommedans attribute the recent defeats of Islam in Morocco, Tripoli, Turkey in Europe, &c.

Attempts have been made in the press to make out that the association is of a politico-Panislamic character, but this would seem not to be the case. The pasha seems a devout Mahommedan, who has interested himself in the fate of his co-religionists in Morocco and other countries, and, in view of the failure during the last four years of the Young Turks to regenerate Islam by the rationalism divorced from religion of the French Revolution, he maintains that the better course would be to gradually modernise Islam while adhering to its religious basis. His object would thus seem laudable, and several more or less prominent Turks, including Hakki Pasha, ex-Grand Vizier, have promised their co-operation.

Mohammed Sherai Pasha seems, however, to be blessed with more wealth than brains, and given the absence of organising power in the Turk and the inveterate tendency in Constantinople to introduce faction intrigue into every association, the eventual success of this new venture would seem problematical.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Cairo.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[55381] No. 544.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 1107.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose translation of extracts from an article which has just appeared in the committee paper, the "Tasviri-Efkiar," from the pen of Hussein Jahid Bey, member of the board of the National Bank, representative of the Ottoman bondholders on the public debt, ex-deputy and nominal proprietor of the "Tanin," and fidus Achates of Djavid Bey.

It will be remembered that before the outbreak of hostilities Hussein Jahid Bey was the stoutest advocate of declaring war on the Balkan States, and talked of planting the Ottoman standard on the four Balkan capitals. His present jingo utterances would be unimportant if they did not constitute an appeal to the chauvinists in the army and the adherents of the committee in this capital to endanger the conclusion of peace by getting up an agitation to menace or overthrow the present Cabinet, should it be inclined from a spirit of patriotism to recognise the logic of the issue of the war which was not of their making, and conclude peace on the only terms compatible with the continued existence of what is left of the Ottoman State. The chauvinist activities of the committee here have recently been on the increase, and Hussein Jahid's article will certainly intensify the difficulties of the moderate elements in the Government and the public at the present critical juncture.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 544.

Extract from the "Tasviri-Efkiar."

LES NÉGOCIATIONS DE LONDRES.

HUSSEINE DJAHID BEY, directeur du "Tanine," qui se trouve à Vienne, adresse une lettre au "Tasviri-Efkiar," sur les négociations qui se poursuivent à Londres. Nous en traduisons les principaux passages :—

"Pourquoi allons-nous à Londres? Notre pays et peut-être tout le monde le sait. Mais je n'arrive pas à le comprendre. Et je crois même que les cercles où je me trouve ici n'y comprennent pas non plus grand'chose.

"On dit que l'on négociera la paix à Londres. Mais ce sera plutôt la cérémonie d'enterrement de l'Empire ottoman, comme Puissance européenne. Qui dans notre pays veut la paix à ces conditions?

"Les journaux qui ont habitué la population à des nouvelles de victoires, auront la gloire d'ajouter le qualificatif 'honorable' à ce mot de paix à conclure. Mais, je ne peut pas encore comprendre comment on peut envisager comme glorieuse cette paix quand l'Empire ottoman abandonne toute la Turquie d'Europe et se retire en Asie en gardant seulement le littoral de Constantinople. On me répondra peut-être que le Gouvernement ottoman ne consentira jamais à la paix à des conditions pareilles; la paix qu'il pourra conclure sera une paix conforme à son prestige et sa dignité, en sauvegardant ses intérêts et son honneur.

"C'est bien. Pourtant, on ne peut pas, malheureusement, demander une paix honorable alors que l'ennemi se trouve aux portes de Constantinople. Nous devons avouer—puisque, sans vaincre l'armée bulgare, nous avons frappé aux portes non seulement des Cabinets et des chefs des Grandes Puissances, mais des Gouvernements balkaniques pour obtenir la paix—que nous avons perdu le droit de parler de paix honorable.

"Il est possible que ces paroles soient amères, mais nous tromper encore nous-mêmes dans ces moments historiques si graves et si dangereux, c'est provoquer sur nous des décisions plus amères. C'est pour cela qu'il faut que nous voyions enfin la vérité, aussi dure soit-elle; et si nous en ressentons l'amertume, il faut que nous pensions à un remède.

"Qu'est devenu le grand Empire ottoman, pour subir, en une vingtaine de jours, une pareille débâcle?

"Ce pays ne produit-il plus d'enfants ayant l'amour de la patrie? Dans les

veines de tant de millions des Turcs ne coule-t-il plus aujourd'hui le sang de leurs ancêtres pour qu'ils permettent à 3,000,000 ou 4,000,000 de Bulgares de briser l'avenir d'un Empire militaire de 600 ans ; et de laisser même à un ennemi, écrasé enfin devant Tchataldja, une des premières capitales de ses Padischahs ?

"Les Bulgares n'ont su qu'ils avaient gagné la bataille de Lulé-Bourgas que seulement en recevant la nouvelle de la retraite de l'armée ottomane ; et après avoir, avec mille difficultés, réuni leurs forces devant Tchataldja, ils déclaraient hautement qu'ils prendraient Constantinople avant huit jours pour placer la Croix sur les minarets.

"Ces huit jours sont depuis longtemps passés. L'armée bulgare s'est attaquée plusieurs fois aux lignes de défense de Tchataldja ; mais, en subissant la perte cruelle de quelques milliers de ses soldats, elle a compris que l'esprit des anciens Turcs s'était ranimé.

"Tandis que tout le monde ici connait la défaite des Bulgares, l'impuissance de la Bulgarie à faire de nouveaux efforts pour attaquer Tchataldja avec ses troupes affamées, malades et exténuées, la nouvelle que Constantinople demandait la paix et consentait à l'armistice sans même obtenir le ravitaillement des places assiégées a provoqué la surprise générale. Chacun se demandait avec douleur :—

"'Qu'est-il arrivé à ces Turcs ? Est-ce possible qu'une nation soit arrivée à pareille déchéance ?

"'Pourquoi faites-vous la paix ? Vous ne comprenez donc pas que demander la paix à des conditions pareilles, c'est accepter le démembrement de votre patrie ?'

"A ces questions, j'étais obligé de courber la tête. Les journaux de Constantinople peuvent parler peut-être de paix 'honorable.' Mais, ici, il faut du courage pour prononcer ce mot.

"Les délégués du Tsar Ferdinand, qui ont eu l'habileté de profiter à temps de la demande de paix qui servait à couvrir d'un faux éclat de victoire l'impuissance et les revers de leurs armées, proclament maintenant publiquement les conditions humiliantes qu'ils vont nous proposer. Ils demanderont, disent-ils, l'abandon aux États balkaniques de toute la Roumélie, des îles de la Crète et la reddition des villes d'Andrinople, de Skodra et de Janina, qui se sont si héroïquement défendues contre l'ennemi. Ils laissent Constantinople avec des limites où on pourrait être entendu si on criait, et ils demanderont encore une indemnité de guerre.

"A les entendre parler, on croirait qu'il faut que nous considérions notre présence à Constantinople comme une marque de bienveillance de leur part.

"D'un autre côté, nous délégués déclarent qu'ils ne pourront pas abandonner Andrinople et les autres villes. Mais ici, on pense avec un peu plus de logique. On dit que pour que les délégués turcs puissent aller à la Conférence de Paix de Londres avec les propositions de l'autonomie de la Roumélie et de l'Albanie, il fallait au moins repousser d'abord les Bulgares au delà de Tchataldja.

"Je crains fort qui si nos délégués, à leur retour de Londres, apportent un traité nous abandonnant Andrinople, à condition de raser ses fortifications, il ne se trouvera des journaux qui considéreront cela comme une paix honorable et y applaudiront comme à un succès politique."

L'auteur de l'article dit :—

"La Turquie ne peut attendre aucune aide ni de la Triple Entente ni de la Triplice ; les préparatifs de guerre de l'Autriche ne tendent pas à aider la Turquie mais à menacer la Serbie pour le partage de territoires ottomans."

Djahid Bey conclut :—

"Si nous sommes allés à Londres avec l'espoir de conclure une paix 'honorable,' il faut avouer que nous sommes loin de savoir fixer ce que c'est que l''honneur.' Si nous courons à Londres avec le rêve que nous ferons quelque chose avec l'aide de l'une ou de quelques-unes des Grandes Puissances, nous devons comprendre que nous nous trompons fortement. Mais si nous sommes alliés à Londres pour signer à tout prix une paix humiliante, il eût été préférable de ne pas y aller.

"Quoi qu'on puisse dire et quel que soit notre but, on ne peut nier qu'aujourd'hui les apparences sont contre nous. Nous allons à Londres vaincus et disposés à toute bassesse. Et s'il y a quelque chose qui augmente encore la honte de ce drame c'est d'accepter la défaite sans être en réalité vaincus ; sans avoir travaillé avec tout notre cœur, avec tout notre être à sauver notre patrie et notre honneur.

"Conclure une paix à Londres, quand nous avons une ligne de défense pouvant résister à toute attaque, quand nous avons des centaines de milliers de soldats forts et prêts à tout sacrifice, quand nous avons la possibilité d'augmenter chaque jour leurs effectifs, signifient que nous avouons et que nous reconnaissons que nous n'avons pas le droit de vivre comme nation indépendante en Anatolie non plus."

[55382]

No. 545.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 1108.)

Sir,

Constantinople, December 24, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith two despatches from His Majesty's vice-consul at Dedeagatch reporting on the situation at that place.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 545.

Consul Badetti to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 26.)

Sir,

Dédéagatch, le 10 décembre, 1912.

J'AI l'honneur de vous confirmer ma dépêche précédente No. 25 du 30 de l'écoulé.

Depuis notre situation demeure la même, c'est-à-dire quasi l'anarchie. Nous avons dans nos murs deux préfets et deux commandants militaires, et ces quatre personnages se disputent entre eux pour avoir les deux postes vacants.

Les réquisitions de toutes les denrées sont à l'ordre du jour : on prend tout ce qui peut tomber sous la main en délivrant un bout de quittance, sans faire la moindre mention à quel prix sera réglée la fourniture. Certains négociants, effrayés de cette façon d'agir, ont pris le parti de ne plus ouvrir leurs magasins.

Notre ville se vide petit à petit et comme l'importation est tout à fait arrêtée nous risquons de nous trouver dans la gêne pour ce qui concerne la nourriture.

Voilà une quinzaine de jours que nous avons eu l'arrivée de l'armée régulière ; l'intendance n'a pris aucune mesure pour la fourniture du pain aux soldats. Tous les fours de la ville sont occupés militairement et ne peuvent alimenter la population civile, ce qui fait qu'il y a eu pas mal de difficultés certains jours pour se procurer du pain.

Un directeur pour la douane est arrivé de Philippople, mais jusqu'à ce jour, malgré des promesses, le fonctionnement n'a pas commencé et les marchandises attendent la décision définitive pour être livrées à leurs propriétaires.

Le capitaine de port, accompagné de quatre marins militaires, a pris possession de son poste. Il démontre une grande indécision dans l'exercice de ses fonctions ; on voit qu'il est novice, malgré ses trois étoiles. La Dette publique ottomane en son temps avait adjugé les droits des pêcheries ; mais le nouveau venu n'a rien voulu entendre. Tout poisson que l'on porte sur le marché se vend aux enchères publiques, et le 25 pour cent de droit va au profit du Fisc bulgare.

Les émigrés turcs pour la plupart sont toujours ici, et leur état fait pitié ; déjà on parle de l'existence du typhus, et comme nos moyens prophylactiques sont plus que restreints, on devrait autant que faire se peut permettre à tout le monde de partir un moment plus tôt ; mais le commandant militaire ne donne pas facilement l'autorisation de se déplacer, sauf pour Cavalla et Salonique.

L'élément grec n'a pas été précisément enchanté de la venue des Bulgares ; on remarque déjà une certaine animosité de part et d'autre.

J'ai, &c.

G. BADETTI.

Enclosure 2 in No. 515.

Consul Badetti to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 28.)

Sir, *Dédéagatch, le 17 décembre*, 1912.

J'AI l'honneur de vous confirmer ma dépêche No. 27 du 11 courant, laquelle très vraisemblablement tardera à vous parvenir, attendu que les Bulgares, ayant voulu imposer la censure, aux postes françaises et autrichiennes, les courriers au départ restent en souffrance ici et ceux à l'arrivée ne sont pas débarqués des vapeurs.

Les consuls intéressés n'ont pas manqué de protester contre cette mesure arbitraire et communication a été faite aux Ambassadeurs.

Le commandement militaire de la ville a été finalement confié au Major Servilief, qui ne connaît que sa langue maternelle, et c'est une difficulté pour les relations que l'on pourra avoir avec lui.

Actuellement la consigne est des plus sévères, personne n'a le droit de quitter la ville—voire même les sujets de nationalité étrangère. Les perquisitions demeurent à l'ordre du jour pour n'importe quelle denrée. Les dépôts sont gardés militairement; du train que cela va nous nous trouverons dans la gêne pour les approvisionnements des habitants.

Le vapeur bulgare "Varna" est arrivé sur rade avec un chargement de 2,800 tonnes environ de charbon de terre, de provenance anglaise, qu'il a reçu en transbordement au Pirée. On prétend que l'on attend un cargo avec 5,000 tonnes de farine embarquée à Fiume; un autre doit venir avec une cargaison de riz; un troisième du sucre, le tout destiné pour l'intendance militaire bulgare.

Dimanche dernier à 4 heures 40 du soir est arrivé ici le Roi Ferdinand par train spécial, accompagné de son secrétaire privé et d'une suite militaire.

Presque toute la population se porta à sa rencontre, mais l'accès de la gare et des dépendances était interdit au public.

Après un court arrêt Sa Majesté alla visiter le train du Sultan Abdul Aziz, garé ici depuis des années et qu'il avait reçu en cadeau de l'Impératrice Eugénie. L'on prétend que, sur le désir du Roi, toutes les voitures le composant prendront le chemin pour le musée de Sophia.

On quitta la gare dans trois automobiles pour venir en ville et on se rendit directement à l'église bulgare, où une courte prière a été faite et de là ce fut le tour de l'église orthodoxe. De cette dernière on alla au quartier militaire. Il faisait déjà obscure et malgré cela Sa Majesté fit une courte promenade sur le bord de la mer, acclamé toujours par la foule.

Dans cet intervalle, le train Royal de la gare des Orientaux passa sur celle de jonction Salonique–Constantinople, et c'est là que le Roi passa la nuit.

Le lendemain lundi de bonne heure Sa Majesté accompagné de sa suite fit de nouveau une promenade à pied en ville, et à 8 heures 30 du matin le train partit avec ses voyageurs dans la direction de Salonique.

J'ai, &c.
G. BADETTI.

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[172] No. 546.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, December 28, 1912.

QUESTIONS que le Gouvernement Impérial considère de première importance et pour lesquelles il espère pouvoir compter sur l'appui des Gouvernements britannique et français à la conférence des Ambassadeurs:—

1. Reconnaissance du bien-fondé du principe que Scutari soit annexé au Monténégro et que le cours du fleuve Bojana soit inclu dans son territoire, pour le cas où des difficultés s'élèveraient à ce que la frontière entre le Monténégro et l'Albanie soit tracée au sud du Drin. L'argument que le Monténégro n'a pas conquis Scutari trouverait réponse dans le fait que les forces monténégrines se sont rendues maîtres de San Giovanni de Medua et d'Alessio.

2. Frontière orientale de l'Albanie conformément à la ligne décrite dans un télégramme communiqué au Gouvernement britannique—c'est-à-dire à partir du confluent du Drin Noir avec le Drin Blanc, la frontière remonte le cours du Drin jusqu'au lac d'Okhrida, longe la rive ouest de ce lac et continue vers le sud presque en ligne droite jusqu'à un point situé à quelque distance à l'est de Konitsa.

3. Le droit pour la Serbie à une coopération égale à celle des Grandes Puissances dans la finance et le contrôle du chemin de fer et du port à laquelle cette ligne aboutira.

4. Liberté inconditionnelle pour la Serbie d'importer à travers l'Albanie tout article de guerre, non seulement en temps de paix, mais aussi en temps de guerre. Le Gouvernement Impérial ne saurait admettre sur ce point la réserve autrichienne concernant le temps de guerre—réserve qui, entre autres objections, présente celle d'une rédaction obscure, qui n'explique pas à quelle guerre, entre quelles Puissances, le Cabinet de Vienne entend se référer.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 28 décembre, 1912.

[55478] No. 547.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 123.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, December 28, 1912.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 247 of 24th December.

From a remark made to me yesterday by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, it seems as though the Servian Government may be meditating asking even more than Prilep of the Bulgarian Government. Speaking of Monastir, he said it would be very difficult to make the army understand the obligation of the Servian Government to surrender it. He hoped Bulgaria would not prove too uncompromising.

This question seems to be becoming a greater preoccupation here than the surrender of Durazzo, and remarks have already appeared in some of the newspapers to the effect that if Bulgaria wishes the solidarity of the alliance she must be complaisant towards Servia.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[55482] No. 548.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 124.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, December 28, 1912.*

FOLLOWING to-day from Monastir, No. 3:—

"With reference to my immediately preceding telegram.

"Greek authorities at Florina refused to consider proposals, and the Governor of Monastir has returned without pressing the matter.

"Since evacuating Gorcha, which was occupied by the Greeks on 20th December, about 2,000 Turkish troops and 12 officers have surrendered to the Servian outposts, fearful of falling into the hands of the Greeks. The rest of the garrison, about 4,000 strong, is reported to have retired towards Janina."

[55483] No. 549.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 125.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, December 28, 1912.*

PRIME Minister called on me this morning and appeared much perturbed at news he has received from London to the effect that Austria demands that frontier of Albania shall include Lake Ochrida and Prisrend. He says that Servia cannot give way to such a demand, that nation will not tolerate it, that it is unfair towards the Serbs whom the Servians have freed from Turkish rule, and that if the demand be persisted in Servia has no choice but to resist by force. He says that he is quite prepared himself to resign, but says that it would not help the situation, as no other Minister would take office under such conditions. He therefore earnestly begs you to intervene on behalf of Servia.

The limits he proposes were shown in map enclosed in my despatch No. 113, but the northern limit should be altered to run from Matia in a more north-easterly direction. I gather that in the worst event he would be prepared to accept limit proposed by M. Sazonof.

[55481] No. 550.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 740.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December 28, 1912.*

SOPHIA telegram No. 250 of 27th December.

M. Kalchef has left.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is somewhat surprised that it is denied that he had a mission, seeing that it was General Savof who asked the commander-in-chief for permission for M. Kalchef, "an important political personage," to pass the lines.

Minister thinks that M. Kalchef must have had a mission to sound the feeling here regarding Adrianople.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[55477] No. 551.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 203.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, December 28, 1912.*

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 494 of 26th December.

I do not believe that there is any likelihood of Austria demobilising seriously (though some reservists seem to have been sent home) before she clearly sees how and when the Servian forces will be withdrawn from the Adriatic.

The present policy of Austria-Hungary is to await the conclusion of the peace before putting forward officially her demands as to new arrangements in the Balkans. The military authorities here, I believe, are firmly convinced that had Austria not mobilised little attention would have been paid to her demands either by Servia or by the other Powers, and that to demobilise before these demands are certain to be definitely accepted and put into execution would be a mistake.

As regards the idea that the mobilisation has been made through fear of a possible rising in Croatia and Bosnia, I think that such an idea is illusory. As far as I can ascertain from unprejudiced persons there has been a little ferment expressing sympathy among southern Slavs for the Servian victories, but I am informed that this need not be taken very seriously, and I learn that the reservists in those parts have answered the call beyond all expectation. I think that to count on a serious rising of the southern Slavs against Austrian rule is as great a delusion as the idea held in many military quarters here that Russian Poland is ripe for a rebellion, and that it only needs the appearance of Austrian army there to start an insurrection.

[55487] No. 552.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 253. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, December 28, 1912*

SERVIAN Minister informed me yesterday of a telephonic communication from the Servian Prime Minister requesting him to ask me to telegraph to you to explain recent Servian attitude with regard to Austria and to solicit the good-will of His Majesty's Government in their future plans. The Servian Government, he said, have already given way on two important questions, viz., that of the Austrian consul at Prisrend and of the Servian port on the Adriatic (apart from other evidence they have opened and photographed letters from the consul to his mother stating that he fired on the Servians and expressing his hatred of them).

Ulterior motive for so yielding was to increase the force of their arguments regarding the delimitation of North Albanian frontier, which will be brought to the

notice of the Great Powers in London through the Russian Ambassador at London, who has been instructed to endeavour to limit Albania as far as possible on the north. His Excellency will be aided by M. Petraief, special agent and formerly Russian vice-consul at Prisrend.

These views have been communicated to Servian and Bulgarian delegates in London, who will assist in presenting them, through the Russian Ambassador, to the ambassadorial council by means of special Servian agent, M. Rakitch, former vice-consul at Prishtina.

The crux of the question is Dibra, to retain which Servia will, according to Servian Prime Minister's message, be prepared to go to all extremes.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[55496] No. 553.

Acting Consul-General Watson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 28.)

(Telegraphic.)
Odessa, December 28, 1912.

RUSSIAN volunteer steamer "Kieff" leaving to-day or to-morrow with sealed orders. Reason to believe that she has war materials on board.

(Addressed to Foreign Office: sent to Constantinople and St. Petersburgh.)

[54739] No. 554.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 632.)
Sir,
Foreign Office, December 28, 1912.

I HAVE received Mr. Carnegie's despatch No. 529 of the 22nd instant, forwarding a copy of a memorandum containing M. Gout's observations on the conclusions come to by the committee appointed to report on the interests of the Turkish bondholders.

I do not propose to take any steps whatever until I receive the promised official communication from the French Government, as recorded in your despatch No. 526 of the 18th December.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[55902] No. 555.

Conference of St. James.

PROTOCOLE No. 6.

Séance du 15 (28) décembre 1912.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Bulgarie :

MM. Danev, Madjarov et le Général Paprikov ;

Pour la Grèce :

MM. Vénizélos, Skoulondis, Gennadius et Streit ;

Pour le Monténégro :

MM. Miouchekovitch, le Comte de Voïnovitch et Popovitch ;

Pour la Serbie :

MM. Novakovitch, Nicolitch et Vesnitch ;

Pour la Turquie :

Réchid Pacha, Osman Nizamy Pacha et le Général Salih Pacha.

La séance est ouverte à 11 heures ½, sous la présidence de Réchid Pacha.

Le procès-verbal de la séance précédente, lu par le secrétaire, M. Grouitch, est adopté.

Réchid Pacha déclare que la délégation ottomane a transmis à la Sublime Porte la proposition faite lors de la dernière séance par les délégués des États alliés et qu'il désire aujourd'hui leur donner connaissance de la contre-proposition de son gouvernement. Il prie la haute assemblée d'examiner cette proposition et de donner sa réponse, sinon séance tenante, du moins à la séance prochaine.

Réchid Pacha lit donc, à cet effet, la contre-proposition ottomane :—

"1°. Le vilayet d'Andrinople reste, comme par le passé, sous l'administration directe du gouvernement Impérial ottoman.

"La Macédoine aura une administration autonome sous la suzeraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan et sera gouvernée par un prince—de préférence de religion protestante—lequel aura sa résidence à Salonique. Ce prince sera choisi par les États alliés parmi les princes des États neutres et sera nommé par Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan.

"2°. L'Albanie sera constituée en province autonome sous la souveraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan. Elle aura une assemblée générale. L'administration de cette province sera confiée pour une période de cinq ans à un prince de la dynastie ottomane ; le mandat de ce prince pourra être renouvelé à l'expiration de cette période.

"3°. La Crète ayant été remise en dépôt aux Grandes Puissances, toute question concernant cette île ne pourra être réglée qu'entre le gouvernement Impérial ottoman et ces Puissances.

"4°. Les îles de l'Archipel faisant partie intégrante de l'Anatolie ne pourront être cédées."

Sur la proposition de M. Danev la séance est suspendue afin de permettre aux délégués des États alliés de se concerter et de faire prendre copie de la contre-proposition ottomane.

A la reprise de la séance,

M. Danev déclare que la contre-proposition ottomane diffère si essentiellement de celle des alliés qu'il se voit obligé de demander de la part de la Bulgarie aux délégués ottomans si c'est là le dernier mot du gouvernement Impérial. Sinon, il les prie de faire une autre contre-proposition, la présente n'étant ni acceptable, ni même discutable.

Réchid Pacha fait observer que lors de la remise par les délégués alliés de leur proposition, les délégués ottomans se sont fait un devoir de l'examiner. Il pense donc que les délégués alliés peuvent également examiner la contre-proposition ottomane et formuler ensuite leurs objections, qui seront transmises à la Sublime Porte.

M. Vénizélos pense que cette contre-proposition ne peut pas servir de base à une discussion. Les alliés demandent des cessions territoriales, la Turquie répond en proposant des réformes. Il se range donc à l'avis de M. Danev et demande qu'à la prochaine séance les délégués ottomans présentent une autre contre-proposition tenant compte des réclamations des alliés.

Réchid Pacha répète que c'est aux alliés à formuler des observations sur la contre-proposition. Il dit que la note remise par les alliés à la Sublime Porte avant la guerre préconisait les réformes. Donc, cette objection ne peut avoir sa raison d'être. Aujourd'hui d'ailleurs le gouvernement ottoman fait plus que de proposer des réformes, car il offre l'autonomie de la Macédoine. Réchid Pacha prie en conséquence les délégués des États alliés d'examiner la contre-proposition point par point et de formuler leurs objections afin que les délégués ottomans puissent les transmettre à Constantinople.

M. Novakovitch, en se ralliant aux déclarations de MM. Danev et Vénizélos, constate que la contre-proposition ottomane n'est pas précise. Il désire avoir quelques explications sur les limites de la Macédoine, d'autant plus que le gouvernement ottoman n'a point employé jusqu'ici ce terme géographique. En ce qui concerne le vilayet d'Andrinople, il pense qu'on ne tient pas compte suffisamment des résultats de la guerre. Quant à la Crète, la proposition des alliés demandait le désistement des droits de la Sublime Porte sur cette île. La contre-proposition ottomane a donc une base différente et divergente de celle des alliés. Comme celle-ci est conforme aux

résultats de la guerre, il demande aux délégués ottomans de traduire la leur en termes plus précis et plus conformes à la situation de fait.

Réchid Pacha trouve que les observations de M. Novakovitch concernant la Macédoine sont justes et précises et dit qu'il va demander des éclaircissements à son gouvernement à ce sujet.

M. Mouchekovitch désire, en vue de faciliter le travail de la conférence, séparer les questions territoriales des questions juridiques, alors que dans la contre-proposition ottomane elles s'enchaînent. La délégation ottomane doit borner sa contre-proposition à la question territoriale ; en y introduisant des questions d'ordre juridique les résultats de la guerre sont anéantis. Il se rallie donc à l'opinion de M. Danev et trouve la contre-proposition de la Sublime Porte inadmissible. Il est vrai qu'avant la déclaration de guerre les alliés ont demandé des réformes, mais maintenant la situation est changée et il importe de faire entrer en ligne de compte les sacrifices des États alliés.

M. Skouloudis s'associe à M. Danev. Il pense que sans base territoriale—qui manque dans la contre-proposition ottomane—il est difficile d'entrer dans les détails. Aussi, la discussion risque-t-elle de devenir longue et peut-être oiseuse. Il prie les délégués ottomans de présenter une autre contre-proposition qui aurait comme base des concessions territoriales acceptables.

Osman Nizamy Pacha pense également qu'il serait utile d'apporter quelques précisions, ainsi que M. Novakovitch le demande, au terme "Macédoine." Passant ensuite à la question territoriale, il rappelle que les Grandes Puissances ont déclaré, au moment de l'ouverture des hostilités, qu'elles ne toléreraient pas une modification du *statu quo* territorial aux Balkans. Depuis cette déclaration, les Grandes Puissances n'en ont pas fait d'autre. Leur premier engagement demeure donc entier. D'autre part, les États balkaniques ont eux-mêmes affirmé leur désir de ne pas chercher un agrandissement de territoire, mais uniquement d'améliorer le sort des populations chrétiennes de la Roumélie. En proposant aujourd'hui la formation d'une Macédoine autonome, la Turquie dépasse les désirs des Puissances.

M. Madjarov dit que les délégués ottomans semblent oublier que les États alliés possèdent en fait le territoire qu'ils demandent et que leurs troupes se trouvent devant Tchataldja. Les alliés ne peuvent se contenter aujourd'hui de simples réformes, car jamais un État n'a émis à la fin d'une guerre les mêmes prétentions qu'à son début. Ainsi en 1877 la Russie a demandé des réformes pour les populations chrétiennes de la Turquie, mais après ses victoires elle a obtenu l'agrandissement de la Serbie, l'indépendance de la Bulgarie et des annexions de territoire en Asie.

M. Danev répète que la base proposée par la Turquie est inacceptable et ne peut même pas être mise en discussion. Si c'est là le dernier mot de la Sublime Porte on aura à aviser aux mesures à prendre, sinon il espère qu'on présentera d'autres propositions acceptables. Pour l'instant il trouve la discussion épuisée.

M. Vénizélos dit que tous les délégués désirent éviter une rupture des négociations, mais qu'il se refuse catégoriquement à entrer en discussion sur la question des réformes. Si le gouvernement ottoman ne veut point examiner les propositions territoriales des alliés, il sera difficile d'aboutir.

M. Novakovitch dit qu'il désire voir le gouvernement ottoman présenter d'autres propositions territoriales dans lesquelles on tiendrait compte des faits de la guerre.

Réchid Pacha, résumant les débats, dit qu'à la proposition du bloc balkanique les délégués ottomans ont répondu par une contre-proposition sur laquelle les délégués alliés ont délibéré et déclaré à tour de rôle qu'elle n'est pas satisfaisante. Les délégués ottomans soumettront à la Sublime Porte ces observations et donneront la réponse du gouvernement Impérial lors de la prochaine séance.

La séance est levée à midi et ½.

La prochaine séance est fixée au lundi, 17 (30) décembre, à 4 heures de l'après-midi.

Le Président :
RECHID.

Les Secrétaires :
H. NORMAN.
S. TCHAPRACHIKOV.
A. C. VOUROS.
S. Y. GROUITCH.
D. NORADOUNGHIAN.

[55484] No. 556.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 126.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, December 29, 1912.*

ALBANIAN frontier delimitation.

My immediately preceding telegram of 28th December.

Prime Minister requested my French colleague, similarly to myself, to ask his Government to support Servia against the delimitation proposed by Austria, which, he said, was a line running from Lake Ochrida past the Jana Bistra Mountains to Prisrend and thence to present frontier of Montenegro by Djakova and Ipek, leaving all three towns to Albania.

The Government organ has an article to-day declaring that the line contemplated by Austria would be a gross injustice, to which Servia cannot submit.

[55485] No. 557.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, December 29, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 27th December.

M. Take Jonesco hopes to see German Minister for Foreign Affairs at Stuttgart and M. Poincaré at Paris on his way to London, where he will arrive on Wednesday.

I understand that his visit to London was planned some time ago, and is for private reasons, though he will naturally be consulted in negotiations between MM. Danef and Misu.

He hopes to see you while in London.

He would probably be Roumania's representative at any eventual conference.

[55503] No. 558.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 380.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, December 25, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the speeches made by the French Prime Minister in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate on the 21st December have been most favourably received by the St. Petersburgh press.

The constitutional democrat "Rech" observes that, but for the excellent and outspoken pronouncements of M. Poincaré, the Balkan situation would once more have become uncertain and threatening, thanks to the attitude of the Turkish delegates in London and to the adjournment for Christmas of the Ambassadors' conference. These speeches are highly illuminating as to the present state of affairs, and, moreover, introduce a certain element of calm at the very moment when it is needed most; they supplement his former utterances with details of the utmost importance. M. Poincaré announces that Sir E. Grey has on his own initiative assured him that there is no ground whatever for the apprehensions expressed recently lest England were following a policy which is not in complete accord with that of the Russo-French alliance. He states that early in November the Austrian Government informed France that they had no territorial pretensions whatever; and in regard to the most difficult

point of all—the claims of Servia—he says that no cause for differences now exists. In his opinion there is now far less danger of Servia having to make damaging concessions; for as Albania will be under the control of all the Powers (Turkey retaining sovereignty rather than suzerainty), there is no need to fear that Austria may establish a one-sided protectorate in that quarter. Further, France will see to it that the just requirements of Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria are satisfied in the matter of determining the frontiers of Albania; the port designated for Servia on Albanian territory is to be free and neutral, the railway leading to the port will be internationalised, and the Servian right to customs free transit over it is to be guaranteed by the Powers. As regards the one black cloud on the Balkan horizon—the possibility of the negotiations between the belligerents breaking down—M. Poincaré suggests (and later telegrams bear out his view) that Europe will probably exert pressure on Turkey to give up Adrianople. All this, the journal observes, is so good that it is hard to believe it all at once; but M. Poincaré is a serious statesman and weighs his words well. "He constantly reminds us that all his action is taken only after consulting Russia, and we for our part are thoroughly convinced that his policy is Russian policy too. We regard his speeches as commentaries and supplements to the extremely jejune utterances of M. Kokovtsof."

The moderate Liberal "Bourse Gazette" describes M. Poincaré's speeches as a valuable contribution towards the elucidation of the present international situation, all the more valuable as they follow so closely on M. Kokovtsof's declaration in the Duma. They supply an answer to the question raised by M. Kokovtsof's speech as to what results could be yielded by a policy based on a union of historic tradition and actual fact, of Slavophil ideas and a practical weighing of the forces in play. Its first fruit has been the decision of the conference of Ambassadors to reject the Servian request for a direct outlet on the Adriatic, and in this the Triple Alliance has succeeded in imposing its will on the concert of Europe in the interests not of Turkey, but of Austria. "We must not minimise the importance of this victory, however galling it may be to our self-respect; but, while it is useless to pour forth torrents of abuse on our opponents, it is just as well that we should clearly recognise what has been the result of M. Kokovtsof's policy of 'discriminating moderation,' to use M. Poincaré's phrase."

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[55525] No. 559.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 1111.)
Sir; *Constantinople, December 25, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Rodosto, reporting on the taking of that town by the Bulgarians.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 559.

Vice-Consul Dussi to Consul-General Eyres.

M. le Consul général, *Rodosto, le 10 décembre, 1912.*

JE viens d'apprendre qu'une personne part pour Mirinlito et profite pour vous donner quelques détails sur notre situation.

Le 10 novembre l'armée bulgare a fait son entrée dans la ville, malgré le feu de 500 soldats turcs, appuyés par le feu des canons du Meshoudie, qui n'a eu pour effet d'effrayer la populace et de gâter deux ou trois maisons.

La ville est administrée par le Colonel Dédof, qui en a pris possession par une proclamation au nom de Sa Majesté Ferdinand I. Toute communication nous est interdite avec l'extérieur. La poste et le télégraphe sont interrompus. L'exportation, l'importation également interrompues, ni arrivée de voyageurs.

Toute habitation ou magasin que les Bulgares ont trouvé sans le propriétaire a été confisqué, les magasins vides. A la campagne tous les villages turcs ont été dévalisés par le Comité révolutionnaire. Blé, orge, avoine, épautre ont été pris ou

reunis à l'armée; mais la plus grande partie expédiée, dit-on, pour la Bulgarie, ainsi que de gros et de petit bétail. Pour tout ce que l'armée prend en farine, graine, fourrage, colonieux, elle donne des bons ou argent comptant aux prix qu'elle a indiqués. Par suite de la guerre et après par suite du blocus, les denrées manquent, charbons, bois font défaut, tout a renchéri. Les pauvres souffrent par suite de non-travail, la campagne reste inculte; pour aller aux champs ou dans les villages il faut prendre une permission, qui coûte 2 piastres pour la première et 5 piastres pour la seconde, chaque fois, et défense de retourner en arrière. Au printemps nous aurons beaucoup de misères, à moins que du travail ne s'ouvre pour gagner leur vie.

Beaucoup de personnes italiennes qui ont été expulsées par les Turcs, d'autres qui sont parties par suite de la guerre, se trouvent à Constantinople manquant de tout. Estce qu'il n'y aurait pas moyen tout en intervenant que le commandant en chef de l'armée bulgare à Tchataldja donne l'autorisation que tout ce monde rentre chez eux; ce serait un acte humanitaire des plus méritoires, et vous gagnerez encore une fois la reconnaissance de cette populace, qui a, à maintes fois, reçus les bienfaits du Gouvernement britannique.

Tels sont les faits, M. le consul général, que j'ai cru porter à votre connaissance, et veuillez m'excuser si je vous écris sur une feuille de papier pareille, car la personne est pressée pour partir.

Votre tout dévoué,
ED. DUSSI.

P.S.—Deux autres rapports je vous ai adressés par des personnes ainsi partant à la cachette. Les avez-vous reçues?

E. D.

Not received.—H. C. A. EYRES.

[55526] No. 560.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 1112.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 25, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1074 of the 17th instant I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir reporting his compliance with the instructions to inform the military authorities that the revenues assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt are under the protection of the Powers.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 560.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 84.)
Sir, *December 19, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I have complied with the instructions in your Excellency's telegram of the 8th and despatch of the 6th instant on the subject of the protection of the Ottoman Public Debt which were communicated to this vice-consulate by His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica.

The steps taken in this connection by my French colleague and myself before receipt of the instructions were reported in my despatch No. 83 of the 9th instant.

On the 3rd instant in a letter addressed by us jointly to General Yonroushitch-Sturm, then military governor of Monastir, we recapitulated the verbal representations previously on several occasions made.

The operations of the Public Debt are still suspended in the portion of this district in Servian occupation, but they have been allowed to proceed in the region occupied by the Greeks.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

[55528] No. 561.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 1114.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 25, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the acting British vice-consul at Cavalla, reporting that he has informed the Bulgarian military authorities that the revenues assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt are under the protection of the Powers.

The substance of this despatch has been communicated to the representative of the British bondholders on the Council of the Imperial Ottoman Debt.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 561.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 8/52.)
Sir, *Cavalla, December 16, 1912.*

ACTING on instructions received from His Britannic Majesty's Consulate-General in Salonica, I have informed the Bulgarian military commandant here that the revenues assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt are under the protection of the Powers.

The local offices of the Ottoman Public Debt were closed at the time of the Bulgarian occupation of the town, and sealed up by orders of Tchernopeyef. The local director and some of the officials left Cavalla at the same time. The offices have not since been reopened. The treasurer and three other clerks are still here but are not working. The archives were removed before the occupation to the village of Kuri (?), some two or three hours distant from Cavalla. Other registers and documents were deposited in the Imperial Ottoman Bank and are still there.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[55530] No. 562.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 1116.)
(Sir, *Constantinople, December 25, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith extract from a despatch which I have received from the acting British vice-consul at the Dardanelles, reporting on the behaviour of the Arab and Laze troops at Yenishehr and Nihouri.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 562.

Acting Vice-Consul, Dardanelles, to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 78.)
(Extract.) *December 23, 1912.*

AS I had heard rumours of excesses on the part of the Laze and Arab soldiers at Yenishehr and Nihouri, I rode out there on the afternoon of the 20th. The troops, though maintaining a very menacing attitude towards the Christian inhabitants of the Troad, have as yet made no attempt to put their threats into execution. On the way from Yenishehr to Tchiblak, I was stopped by soldiers, but the officer gave me leave to see the ruins of Troy. The ancient walls and ditches are now filled by Arabs and Lazes. From there I went to Tchiblak and was again taken to the officer in command of the troops. I was treated with the greatest courtesy and consideration by both soldiers and officers, though the commandant at Tchiblak told me that I had put great responsibility "on his grey hairs" by going among the troops.

This officer was himself an Arab and informed me that the Arab, Laze and Kurd

troops all got on very well together and combined in looking on the Turkish soldiers very much as English regulars would look on a detachment of territorials.

The English nation evidently enjoys a great reputation among all classes. As soon as the soldiers heard I was English, they immediately became most civil. I also spoke with several muhajjirs, one of whom, on my asking whither he was bound, said "Ingliz tarafina" meaning towards Egypt, where he hoped to find quiet under English rule. Many of them camp for a night or two on Mr. Calvert's farm and the idea is very prevalent among them that the English have or are going to occupy that part of the country. I also learnt from these muhajjirs and other sources that there was no massacre of Turks at Charkeuy (Peristasi) but that 50 or 60 Greeks were killed and their bodies left lying in the streets. Miriofito (Murefte) is threatened and everyone seems certain that disorders will take place there.

There are now 30,000 muhajjirs in the sanjak of Bigha and hundreds pass through here every week.

[55611] No. 563.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 30.)

(No. 227.)

Sir, *Vienna, December* 27, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 226 of the 21st instant, I have the honour to report that the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, yielding to the public demand for further particulars with regard to the Prochaska incident, published a further statement on Christmas Day in the columns of the semi-official press with a view to silencing the criticisms which were making themselves heard in every quarter.

In this statement the visit of the Servian Premier to the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade is again described, as well as the form of reparation which he was willing to concede to the *amour-propre* of the Dual Monarchy, namely, the hoisting of the Austro-Hungarian flag over the consulates by Servian military detachments.

After expressing satisfaction at these results, the inspired statement goes on to gratify public curiosity with regard to the reasons for demanding this action on the part of the Servian military authorities in the following words :—

"This form of satisfaction had to be selected in order to re-establish respect for our consular representatives. All the charges brought against Consul Prochaska by the Servian Government proved to be unfounded, whereas the Servian military authorities in Prisrend and Mitrovitza were found guilty of violating international rights on more than one occasion. The following can be given as examples of the conduct of Servian troops in this respect :—

"The arrest on the 24th October of a consular messenger on his way from Prisrend to Vevisovic by a Servian patrol, and the seizure of a sealed bag addressed to our consul at Uskub; the occupation of the Austro-Hungarian consulates in Prisrend and Mitrovitza by Servian troops; the arrest on the 25th November of Bekir Sami Effendi, our honorary official of the consulate in Prisrend; and the utter disregard, in spite of repeated representations, of our right of protection over the Catholic church in Prisrend and its dependencies.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government were perfectly aware of the difficulties of the Servian Government, both on account of the state of war and of the 'intransigeance' of Servian military circles, and this knowledge enabled them to deal calmly with the situation, and only to demand satisfaction after a thorough investigation into every detail of the consular incident."

I have, &c.

FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[55660] No. 564.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 30.)

TEVFIK PACHA présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey et, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, a l'honneur de porter à la haute connaissance de son Excellence la série continue de méfaits commis par des bandes de brigands grecs dans les localités de la Turquie d'Europe envahies par les armées hellènes. Ainsi tout dernièrement

PROJET

de la carte de l'Albanie.

ECHELLE 1 : 1.200,000.


ADRIATISCHES MEER
ALBANIEN
BULGAR
CRIECHEN LAND
Golf von Saloniki
Ojakova
Prizren
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Kumanovo
Skopje
Kalkandele
Scutari
Drin
Bar
Alessio
Mali
Krosa
Tivaro
Ulbra
Kiliovo
Frilja
Ribasan
Scumbi
Berat
Vojuca
Valona
Korica
Pastoria
Vodena
Salonika
Argyrocastro
Joanina
CORFU

encore des brigands, organisés en francs-tireurs, sont entrés dans un village musulman près d'Avlonia, où, malgré le bon accueil qui leur a été fait par les habitants terrorisés, ils n'ont pas hésité à exterminer impitoyablement tous les musulmans, sans distinction d'âge ni de sexe, poussant la sauvagerie jusqu'à mutiler et à brûler les agonisants et les cadavres.

Ces faits ont été portés à la connaissance du Gouvernement Impérial par le commandant même de l'armée ottomane de l'ouest; ils ne peuvent manquer de soulever l'indignation non seulement du monde islamique, mais de la conscience publique en général, car la guerre, dont toutes ces localités sont aujourd'hui le théâtre, ne peut constituer une excuse ni un prétexte pour ces meurtres odieux et ces extermination systématiques des populations paisibles qui ne prennent aucune part aux hostilités.

Déjà dans le courant du mois de novembre dernier, Tevfik Pacha avait entretenu son Excellence le Sous-Secrétaire d'État de faits plus ou moins analogues commis par les Serbes et les Grecs dans les territoires occupés, en demandant au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de prescrire une enquête sur ces actes inhumains et condamnés par les règles même du droit de la guerre moderne. En y revenant à la charge, Tevfik Pacha prie de nouveau et instamment son Excellence Sir E. Grey de bien vouloir examiner l'opportunité de l'ouverture d'une enquête internationale sur ces crimes et ces procédés barbares afin de bien établir les faits, en déterminer les responsabilités et empêcher le renouvellement.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 28 décembre, 1912.

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[174] No. 565.

Note communicated by M. Novakovitch, December 30, 1912.

CONCERNANT la formation des frontières de la nouvelle Albanie, la dernière concession que le Gouvernement Royal a pu faire est représentée par la ligne que nous avons tracée et qui passe par la crête partageant les eaux tombant d'un côté dans le lac d'Ochrida et dans le Drim Noir, et d'autre part directement dans l'Adriatique.

Si ces frontières, représentant le minimum de nos demandes, ne devaient pas être admises, aucun Gouvernement en Serbie ne sera en mesure de faire accepter par la nation ce nouvel échec à ses aspirations si légitimes, et pour la réalisation desquelles le peuple serbe a fait tous les sacrifices humainement possibles.

Légation Royale de Serbie, Londres,
le 30 décembre, 1912.

[55894] No. 566.

Telegram addressed to His Majesty the King.—(Received December 30.)

Sire, *Constantinople, le 30 décembre*, 1912.

QUOIQUE l'armistice ait été signé depuis un mois, les massacres des musulmans sans défense continuent dans les provinces ottomanes occupées par les armées balkaniques. Cette calamité prend de telles proportions que les esprits les plus calmes s'en épouvantent. Là où la guerre a cessé, les bandes agissent; ni le sexe ni l'âge ne sont respectés. C'est l'extermination des musulmans en Macédoine, qui représentent 60 pour cent de la population. L'humanité réfléchie serait reconnaissante à votre Majesté, qui compte des millions de mahométans parmi ses sujets, si le Gouvernement britannique, d'accord avec les Grands Cabinets européens, voulait bien inviter les États balkaniques à observer les principes de la morale universelle. Nous avons l'honneur d'être, Sire, de votre Majesté les très humbles and très obéissants serviteurs: Férid, président du Sénat, ex-Grand Vizir; Maréchal Phazi Mouktear, sénateur, ancien Grand Vizir; Ziaeddine, sénateur, ancien Cheik-ul-Islam; Damad Férid, sénateur; Tevfik, sénateur, ancien Ministre; Maréchal Œumer Ruchdi, sénateur, ancien Ministre; Rechid Arif, sénateur; Maréchal Ibrahim Chukri, sénateur; Chérif Haidar, vice-président du Sénat; Chérif Nazzir, sénateur, frère de l'Émir de La Mecque; Ekrem, sénateur; Riza Effendi, sénateur, chef des ulémas; Nourry, sénateur; Halem, sénateur, ancien Ministre; Amiral Arif Hikmet, sénateur; Suleïmann, sénateur; Général Alygalib, sénateur, ancien Ambassadeur.

[55734] No. 567.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, December 30, 1912.*

MY telegrams Nos. 43 and 44 of 24th and 25th December.

The atmosphere here is becoming increasingly warlike. On Saturday a deputy, during discussion on the address in reply to the King's speech, advocated the immediate occupation of Bulgarian territory. I understand that his words were greeted with general applause. Extraordinary war credit of 6,000,000*l.* has been submitted to the Chamber, and, though part of this is for orders which cannot be executed for some time, the announcement at this moment has increased the general uneasiness.

A bitter article against Bulgaria appears in a Government organ this morning.

This agitation may be intended to strengthen M. Misu's hands in his negotiations with M. Danef, or it may be designed to force the hands of the Powers in Roumania's cause. It must have a deplorable effect on the peace negotiations.

Some people here ascribe it to Austrian influence. It synchronises with the return of Austro-Hungarian military attaché from a short visit to Vienna. The Austrian Minister is in Austria on a short leave.

[55735] No. 568.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 48. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, December 30, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

Military attaché hears from a confidential source, which he believes to be reliable, that it is the present intention of the Roumanian Government to mobilise in ten days. French Minister tells me that he learns that King, on receiving the address from Parliament on Saturday, said to the bearers that his news was very bad, and that Roumania would shortly have to take a decision.

I learn from one who works for Roumanian Red Cross that preparation of first-aid bandages, which has been in progress for some time, is now proceeding with greatly increased activity.

[55619] No. 569.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 742.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 30, 1912.*

FOLLOWING for Director of Military Operations from military attaché:—

"Nazim Pasha and staff left to-day for Chatalja.

"It appears that troops are being collected at Panderma, whence they can, if hostilities are resumed, be transported to a point on the European coast to threaten lines of communication and rear of Bulgarian army. This move would be in combination with offensive at Chatalja, and troops now in Gallipoli Peninsula would take part in a combined movement on the above lines."

[55730] No. 570.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 127.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, December 30, 1912.*

DELIMITATION of Albania.

My telegram No. 125 of 28th December.

The Prime Minister tells me he dispatched one of his secretaries to London with statistics concerning the distribution of population in the disputed districts.

[55732] No. 571.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 495.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 30, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 492 of 22nd December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has warned Austrian Ambassador that if mobilisation is maintained Imperial ukase will have to be issued next week retaining reservists with the colours, as otherwise they would have to be disbanded on 13th January. This will, he is aware, create bad impression, but no other course will be open to Russian Government.

[55733] No. 572.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 496.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, December 30, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs would be very grateful if you would support him in urging that Scutari should be ceded to Montenegro in return for abandonment by her of San Giovanni di Medua, and that Albanian eastern frontier should be delimitated on lines suggested by him as compensation to Servia for giving up Durazzo.

[55653] No. 573.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 30.)

(Telegraphic.) *Odessa, December 30, 1912.*

MY telegram of 28th December.

Volunteer steamer "Kieff" sailed night of 29th December. She had very little cargo; destination still unknown.

Volunteer steamer "Kherson" left 22nd December, also sealed orders.

Russian volunteer steamer "Santov" sailed 20th December, alleged for Port Said, but it is doubtful whether she has passed out of the Black Sea.

Here it is reported that these ships are doing transport work.

(Sent to Constantinople and to embassy.)

[55901] No. 574.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1127.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December 30, 1912.*

BULGARIAN Minister at Vienna has asked the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to take the initiative in getting the Powers to exercise pressure at Constantinople in the interest of peace.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople that what he hears from London gives the impression that the Porte does not realise the danger which a continuance of the war might bring on Turkey, and the resumption of hostilities seems inevitable if the Porte stands by the present conditions, particularly concerning Adrianople. If Adrianople remained Turkish it

would preclude friendly relations with Bulgaria, and would probably mean a new war. It is just as natural for Bulgaria to aspire to possess Adrianople, which is inhabited by her compatriots, as it would be unreasonable for her to aspire to Constantinople. An early conclusion of peace would be in the interest of Turkey, as otherwise, if the war continues, the condition in the Armenian and Syrian vilayets, which are denuded of troops, might lead to complications injurious to the integrity of the Asiatic possessions of Turkey.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that it would be helpful if we spoke in the same sense.

I told the Austrian Ambassador of the substance of the telegrams sent to you last week on this subject generally. You should repeat this advice, and can reinforce it by the arguments used by the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir R. Crawford tells me that the conclusion of peace is essential to avoid financial straits, which would mean the collapse of the whole Turkish administration.

[174/13] No. 575.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 45.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 30, 1912.*

M. NOVAKOVITCH gave me to-day the enclosed paper and map,* and represented that Servia could not accept the line which Austria proposed for the eastern limit of Albania, as it would include Djakova and Prizrend in Albania. He said that he hoped that I would support the Servian view.

I said that the Austrian line and the Russian line had not yet been examined at the meetings of the Ambassadors here, and the Austrian line was at present somewhat vague. I could not pronounce a definite opinion before the subject had been examined and before it had been discussed at a meeting of Ambassadors. But it would be very useful to have the map which he had given me, because we must first ascertain on a map the differences between the Servian, Austrian, and Russian views, and then see how they could be composed.

M. Novakovitch gave me to understand that the line in his map represented the views of Greece and Montenegro as well as of Servia.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[172/13] No. 576.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 436.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 30, 1912.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF asked me to-day to go through with him the four points which he had been instructed to submit to me confidentially and on which he was to ask my support.

I then discussed textually his communication of the 28th.

On the first point, I said that I had already promised support about Scutari. If Germany and Italy used their influence at Vienna, I hoped that some arrangement might be come to, perhaps with some condition that, if Montenegro ever parted with Scutari, it should be joined to Albania under the same conditions as the rest of Albania.

Count Benckendorff saw no objection to this.

As to the Catholic difficulty, he said that Montenegro was the only Orthodox country that had a concordat with the Pope; the Catholics under Montenegrin rule

* See No. 565.

were therefore particularly well off, and had a bishop in Montenegro. Some conditions might be made as to privileges for Catholic schools in the Scutari district.

On the second point, I said that I had assumed that Prizrend, Ipek, and Djakova would eventually not be in Albania. But subject to this I thought that there must be room for give and take, and we could not draw a hard-and-fast line on the map, and might have to refer the details to a frontier commission.

The third point I agreed to, on the understanding that it meant, not that Servia should have a share equal by itself to that of all the other Powers interested, but that her share in the control of the line and the port should be equal to that of any one Great Power.

On the fourth point, I said that it was covered by the resolution already come to by the Ambassadors, and it was not for me to raise the point. But I foresaw that Austria would contend that a neutralised Albanian port, if available for Servia in time of war, would give her advantages which no territorial port could have given. For instance, if Servia had a territorial port, and the Austrian fleet was stronger than that of Servia and of any Power helping Servia, Austria could either take the port or blockade it if she was at war with Servia. But in the case of a neutralised port, the Austrian fleet, however superior, would not be able to blockade the port. The Austrian rights would be limited to seizing contraband before it reached the port, and as all goods would presumably be consigned nominally to Albania, it might be difficult for the Austrians to prevent even contraband of war from reaching Servia. They would also be quite helpless to stop Servian commerce as they could have stopped it in the case of a blockaded territorial port. I thought that M. Sazonof had to consider how these arguments were to be met if Austria put them forward; but we must of course wait till she did so.

For convenience of reference, I add a copy of Count Benckendorff's communication of the 28th.*

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[175] No. 577.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rose-Troubridge.

(No. 48.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 30, 1912.*

THE Bulgarian Minister gave me to-day the following *pro-memoria*.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 577.

Pro-Memoria communicated by Bulgarian Minister.

THE Bulgarian Minister presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour, on behalf of the Bulgarian Government, to make every reserve with regard to the validity of the prolongation or renewal by the Turkish Government of the concession to the Tobacco Régie in the territories which are no longer in the possession of Turkey.

Bulgarian Legation, London, December 30, 1912.

* No. 546.

[55731] No. 578.

Memorandum by Mr. de Bernhardt respecting the Turkish Tobacco Régie.

IN December 1881, the Porte and the delegates of the Turkish bondholders came to an arrangement with regard to the Ottoman Public Debt, which was sanctioned by the iradé of the Sultan on the 20th of that month, known as the decree of 28 Muharrem, 1209.

One of the revenues assigned for the payment of the interest on, and the amortisation of, the debt was that derived from the tobacco monopoly.

[12824/07.] This revenue was collected by means of the "banderoles" system. The "banderole" was merely a stamp duty giving the right of manufacture and sale in the Ottoman Empire, and this tax ranged from 10 to 30 piastres (according to the quality and the selling price) per ocque of manufactured tobacco.

After lengthened and protracted negotiations the Turkish Government and the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt agreed to sanction and create a Régie, provided the Government had an interest and shared in all receipts over and above £T. 800,000.

On the 10th January, 1883, a company, co-interested with the Turkish Government and of the Ottoman Public Debt, bearing the name of the Société de la Régie co-intéressée des Tabacs de l'Empire ottoman, was founded for a period of thirty years from the date of its constitution, to exploit the tobacco monopoly of the Ottoman Empire. The firman granting the concession was dated 20 Receb, 1300, corresponding with the 28th May, 1883.

The original capital was fixed at £T. 4,400,000, but was reduced in 1889 to £T. 1,760,000.

The board of directors is composed of twelve members, viz., six French, four Austrian, and two German. Six directors live abroad and six are in Constantinople.

This concession, giving the Régie the exclusive right of manufacture and sale of tobacco in the Ottoman Empire, granted in 1883, will come to an end presumably on the 10th January, 1913.

Should an extension of this monopoly not be granted, the exploitation, as well as the entire revenue, reverts to the Ottoman Debt. The Public Debt would be at liberty either to take over the Régie Company as it now stands or to institute a different system.

Sir N. O'Conor, No. 40, Commercial, Apr. 16, '07 [12824/07]. In April 1907, His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople sent home a copy of a memorandum prepared by Mr. A. Ramsay, representative in Turkey of the Imperial Tobacco Company, expressing the opinion that tobacco cultivation and the revenue from tobacco in Turkey were susceptible of large extension under different management, and the hope that British capital would participate in any new arrangement which might be made with the Turkish Government and the Public Debt in contemplation of the expiry of the Régie's concession.

Mr. Ramsay was of opinion that two courses were open by means of which British interests might be introduced so as to share in the tobacco trade of Turkey and in the official management of this important monopoly. He thought that the most feasible as well as the most advantageous combination would be to "merge" the Régie Company with the Ottoman Public Debt, a scheme which would meet with sympathetic support both from the Turkish Government and the Public Debt, and would at the same time constitute a reliable investment and a serious amelioration of the tobacco monopoly. Though a proposal of this nature would perhaps meet with the entire support of the Ottoman Government, he felt sure it would encounter serious opposition on the part of the other than the British representatives on the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt.

In the event of this proposal not being approved, Mr. Ramsay suggested that it might be to the advantage of British commercial and political interests if the Imperial Tobacco Company would take part in a loan of 3,000,000*l.* which M. Rouvier (a French

ex-Minister of Finance) and a group of financiers proposed making to the Turkish Government.

M. Rouvier, who no doubt was in accord with the French, Austrian and German groups of bondholders, had submitted a scheme dealing with the tobacco monopoly to the Turkish Government. Mr. Ramsay was not aware of the conditions or of the proposals made by M. Rouvier to the Turkish Government in his scheme, but he presumed the modifications provided for an extension of the existing concession for such a period as would both supply the necessary funds for the interest and amortisation of the loan he was disposed to make to the Turkish Government.

Mr. Ramsay considered that it was the right of Great Britain to share in this loan, should it be granted, but before taking such a share the conditions on which the loan was to be made should be submitted to the British capitalists.

On the 14th May, 1907, Lord Winterstoke wrote on behalf of the Imperial Tobacco Company and the British American Tobacco Company to ask that His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople might be instructed to watch the course of events in regard to the Régie, so that if there was any modification in the *status quo*, these companies might have the opportunity of sharing in any new arrangements. Lord Winterstoke, May 14, '07 [16083/07].

Sir N. O'Conor was requested to consider whether it would be advisable to secure for British tobacco companies a general option to share in any new arrangement which might be made with regard to the Turkish tobacco monopoly, and to state whether in his opinion British tobacco companies could best participate in any loan which was likely to be issued in return for a renewal of the concession which expired in 1913, and whether there was any lever which could be used by which participation by British firms in the Régie monopoly, which was in the hands of French, German and Austrian financiers, could be secured. To Sir N. O'Conor, No. 33, Commercial, May 30, '07.

Sir N. O'Conor reported that he was of opinion that it would not be of advantage to approach the Turkish Government with the object of securing an option for the British companies. The conditions of participation would require, doubtless, prolonged and careful study, and to apply for an option without formulating definite conditions would hardly serve any useful purpose. His Excellency pointed out that the Régie Company had "preferential rights on equal terms" in regard to any arrangement which might be proposed on the expiry of the existing concession, and that no option could be granted except contingently on the refusal of the Régie Company. To Sir N. O'Conor, No. 67, Commercial, June 5, '07 [19013/07].

He said that it was certain that the existing arrangement was very disadvantageous to the Turkish Government, and he had no doubt that on the expiration of the Régie's concession the Porte would be anxious to receive tenders from any quarter. In his opinion the most politic course for the British companies would be for their agents to approach the Régie Company in order to ascertain whether any combination was possible between them which would reconcile their interests and at the same time legitimately benefit the Turkish Government.

The substance of Sir N. O'Conor's despatch was communicated to the British tobacco companies above mentioned. To Imperial Tobacco Co. and British American Tobacco Co., June 18, '07.

In October, 1908, both Sir A. Block, the representative of the British bondholders on the Council of the Ottoman Debt and His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople sent home copies of a memorandum drawn up by the director-general of the Régie Company, which had been presented to the German Government, and was about to be presented to the French and Austro-Hungarian Governments. This document contained a suggestion that the Powers should interfere in the matter of the renewal of the concession to that company, as the existence of the Debt Administration would be threatened. Sir A. Block, Oct. 2, '08 [34873/08]. Sir G. Lowther, No. 628, Oct. 3, '08 [35253/08].

Both Sir A. Block and Sir G. Lowther considered that any steps which might be taken by the Powers would do more harm than good, and that the Public Debt Administration had nothing to fear. The only way for the Turkish Government to get rid of it would be either by paying off its debt or by risking an international financial control.

There was a strong feeling against the Tobacco Régie, due to two causes. In the first place, it was thought that the Government did not obtain the revenue it could obtain, and, secondly, that the shareholders were unduly favoured. It was believed also that the system of collecting this revenue was unsound economically, and caused friction between the Government and the people. How far this was true did not, in Sir A. Block's opinion, affect the Debt Administration at all, but it did affect the Régie

Company, and a great many persons desired the abolition of the Régie, and would prefer to see the monopoly of the tobacco pass under the *direct* administration of the Debt.

Sir A. Block observed that the Debt Council could either administer the tobacco revenue directly or, on the expiration of the present concession, continue to farm it out to the Régie Company or to any other company which might offer better terms, either on the present system, with or without modifications, or on any other system which was advantageous to the bondholders. But, he said, there must be agreement between the Debt Council and the Government.

This the Government had never denied, and he considered that to put pressure on the Government to insist on a prolongation of the Régie Company would be indefensible. It would be an *acte d'empiètement*.

Sir A. Block was, therefore, of opinion that the *démarche* by the Powers proposed in the memorandum of the director-general of the Régie Company, would be both inopportune and unjust, and might even do harm to the Debt Council.

Sir G. Lowther endorsed the opinion given by Sir A. Block and added that the Debt Council, having been instituted to protect the rights of the bondholders, it was for that council to examine all the proposals that might be submitted and accept that one which would appear to offer the best terms towards an increase of the revenue.

To Sir G. Lowther, No. 472, Nov. 12, '08.

Sir E. Grey shared these views and requested Sir G. Lowther to proceed in accordance with them if any action on his part became necessary at Constantinople.

British American Tobacco Co., Nov. 3, '09 [40558/09].

In November, 1909, the British American Tobacco Company wrote to ask that, in the event of a new Régie being formed on the expiration of the concession to the present one, the treaty rights of British subjects in regard to the tobacco trade should be maintained.

Board of Trade, Nov. 29, '09 [43816/09]. Mr. Marling, No. 957, Dec. 11, '09 [46052/09].

A copy of their letter was sent, after consultation with the Board of Trade to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, who in reply sent home a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Weakley, the commercial attaché, pointing out that the present concessionnaires had a preferential right of renewal when the Régie concession expired, of which they would almost certainly take advantage. Mr. Weakley added that the rights of foreigners to freedom of purchase of tobacco were recognised by the present administration and were conceded to British subjects by the Commercial Treaty of 1861, which was denounced and expired in 1883, but the stipulations of which continued to regulate our commercial relations with Turkey pending the conclusion of a fresh treaty.

M. Cambon, July 27, '10 [27509/10].

In July, 1910, the French Ambassador left an *aide-mémoire* with Sir E. Grey on the subject of the approaching expiration of the concession of the Tobacco Régie in Turkey, in which he enquired what modifications His Majesty's Government would think it advisable to have introduced into the concession if it were renewed. M. Cambon expressed the opinion that his Government would wish the monopoly to be continued.

Board of Trade, Aug. 18, '10 [30215/10].

The Board of Trade, to whom this memorandum was referred, replied that, in their opinion, whatever changes might be made in regard to the Régie, it was most desirable that the freedom of exportation of tobacco from Turkey to countries other than Egypt should be maintained. Beyond this the Board had no observations to offer upon the subject.

Copies of the French Ambassador's memorandum and of the Board of Trade letter were communicated to Sir G. Lowther for his observations.

Sir G. Lowther, No. 238, Oct. 25, '10 [40483/10].

In reply his Excellency sent home a memorandum by Mr. Weakley, in which he stated that a special commission, including two representatives of the Public Debt Administration, had been engaged for some time in considering the most advantageous means to be adopted by the Government for the administration of the tobacco revenue after the expiration of the Régie concession.

The result of the deliberations was not yet known. There was, however, so far as he knew, a want of unanimity amongst its members, which, he considered could not but make the question with which the Government was confronted more difficult of solution. The majority of the members had, however, declared in favour of the monopoly system, and in view of this fact, as well as of the steady progress which had been made in the cultivation of tobacco since the system of monopoly had been introduced, it was perhaps fairly safe, he thought, to believe that the true interests of the Ottoman Government would lie in the continuance of the monopoly system on lines which the experience gained by the Régie Administration would seem to indicate.

This argument advanced by Mr. Weakley for the renewal of the Régie system

appeared to Sir G. Lowther sound from the Government's point of view at any rate, and in regard to the British bondholders in the Régie, he pointed out that they had their own representative on the board to watch their interests and see that they were preserved in any arrangement arrived at for renewing the concession.

Board of Trade, Nov. 17, '10 [42029/10].

The Board of Trade had no observations to offer on the subject.

To M. Cambon, Dec. 20, '10

M. Cambon was therefore informed, in reply to his memorandum of the 27th July, 1910, that His Majesty' Government did not propose to take any action on the occasion of the expiration of the present concession, provided that the interests of the Turkish Government and the foreign bondholders were safeguarded, and that the freedom of exportation of tobacco to the British empire was maintained. On the other hand, it was always possible that some British firms might on their own account make proposals to the Turkish Government, which His Majesty's Government could not deprecate so long as the above conditions were observed. His Majesty's Government had no desire, however, to take any active diplomatic steps in regard to this question, and would prefer that the Turkish Government should be left free to make the most advantageous arrangement which it might be in their power to obtain.

[17904/11.]

In May 1911 the German chargé d'affaires called at this Office and asked what was the attitude of His Majesty's Government with regard to the Turkish tobacco monopoly. He stated that the German Government's view was that the Turks had better adhere to the monopoly system and not adopt the "banderole," and that, in the interests of the German bondholders of the Ottoman Public Debt they would advise the Turkish Government in this sense. He enquired (*a*) whether His Majesty's Government would express any opinion at all, and, if so (*b*) what it would be.

Board of Trade, May 13, '11 [18429/11]

With the concurrence of the Board of Trade a reply was returned to Herr von Kühlmann in the sense of the note to the French Ambassador above quoted.

To Herr von Kühlmann, May 16, '11.

GASTON DE BERNHARDT.

Foreign Office, December 30, 1912.

[55902]

No. 579.

Conference of St. James.

PROTOCOLE No. 7.

Séance du 17 (30) décembre 1912.

Etaient présents:

Pour la Bulgarie:

MM. Danev, Madjarov et le Général Paprikov;

Pour la Grèce:

MM. Vénizélos, Skouloudis, Geniadius et Streit;

Pour le Monténégro:

MM. Miouchekovitch, le Comte de Voïnovitch et Popovitch;

Pour la Serbie:

MM. Novakovitch, Nicolitch et Vesnitch;

Pour la Turquie:

Réchid Pacha, Osman Nizamy Pacha et le Général Salih Pacha.

La séance est ouverte à 4 heures ½, sous la présidence de M. Danev.

Le protocole de la séance précédente, lu par le secrétaire, Diran Bey Noradounghian, est adopté.

Le Président rappelle que, d'après l'ordre du jour établi à la séance précédente, les délégués ottomans devront donner communication de la nouvelle contre-proposition qu'ils auront reçue de Constantinople.

Réchid Pacha déclare qu'il a en effet reçu les instructions demandées, mais qu'il n'a pas été possible de les déchiffrer complètement; il reste certains points à éclaircir. Néanmoins, il a pu se faire une idée de la pensée directrice de la Sublime Porte et, si la haute assemblée l'accepte, il est prêt à lui faire part, de vive voix, des lignes générales de la proposition.

Le Président fait observer que, d'après une décision de la conférence, toutes les propositions faites pour y être discutées doivent être présentées par écrit. Il est indispensable en outre que les plénipotentiaires ottomans présentent leur nouvelle contre-proposition dans son ensemble au lieu d'en communiquer une partie seulement. Sans cela les questions seront embrouillées et l'on ne pourra les discuter utilement. Il propose, en conséquence, que la séance soit ajournée au lendemain, à 11 heures, pour permettre aux délégués ottomans de déchiffrer leurs instructions et de présenter dans son ensemble la nouvelle contre-proposition.

Osman Nizamy Pacha fait ressortir que les nouvelles instructions de son gouvernement contiennent une proposition qui n'est pas en relation directe avec les autres et que l'on pourrait la discuter séance tenante, avant la présentation de l'ensemble de la contre-proposition. La Sublime Porte, dans un esprit de conciliation et en vue d'aboutir plus rapidement à un résultat, propose de confier aux Grandes Puissances la tâche de résoudre celles des questions en litige entre la Turquie et les alliés auxquelles ces Puissances ont elles-mêmes un intérêt. La question cependant de la rectification de la frontière entre la Bulgarie et la Turquie du côté d'Andrinople sera traitée directement entre les deux pays. Il prie les délégués alliés de se prononcer sur cette question secondaire, comme cela s'est fait dans d'autres conférences, afin d'arriver ensuite plus rapidement à une solution des autres questions.

Le Président, en rendant justice au désir d'Osman Nizamy Pacha d'aboutir à une solution rapide, fait observer que la réunion actuelle a été fixée pour permettre aux délégués ottomans de présenter leur nouvelle contre-proposition. Or, Réchid Pacha déclare aujourd'hui que ses instructions sont incomplètes. Devant ce fait, il faut ou renvoyer la discussion au lendemain ou consulter la haute assemblée sur le point de savoir si la discussion des propositions incomplètes des délégués ottomans peut être commencée le jour même. Dans ce dernier cas, il prierait les délégués ottomans de faire une proposition par écrit sur cette nouvelle question soulevée par la Sublime Porte.

M. Miouchkovitch s'associe pleinement à la manière de voir de M. Danev.

M. Vesnitch dit que les délégués alliés ont remis aux délégués ottomans une proposition formelle de nature territoriale et qu'il est logique d'attendre que ceux-ci répondent par une contre-proposition de la même nature. Ils ont en effet présenté à la dernière séance une contre-proposition, mais elle a été jugée inacceptable. Celle qu'ils font aujourd'hui manque de clarté. En plus, au lieu de répondre aux demandes des alliés, ils introduisent une nouvelle méthode de travail. Le bloc ne peut entrer en discussion de cette proposition avant d'avoir eu la réponse à ses demandes territoriales. Les questions secondaires devront rester au second plan.

Réchid Pacha, répondant à M. Vesnitch, dit que les propositions des alliés concernaient en effet la question territoriale, mais que la nouvelle proposition de la Sublime Porte s'y rapporte également. Ainsi, le gouvernement Impérial propose de remettre à la décision des Grandes Puissances la question de l'Albanie et de son statut et celle du sandjak de Novi-Bazar, questions qui ne sont pas secondaires mais bien primordiales.

M. Vénizélos propose de suspendre la séance, afin que les délégués ottomans puissent se concerter et rédiger par écrit leur nouvelle proposition.

Le Président est aussi d'avis qu'il faut ou suspendre la séance ou la remettre au lendemain, parce qu'il est nécessaire que les délégués ottomans fassent leur contre-proposition par écrit.

Le Comte de Voinovitch fait observer que les dépêches des délégués ottomans sont en partie indéchiffrables et estime qu'il n'est pas possible dans une telle matière de commencer la discussion sur un seul point de la proposition, même s'il est présenté par écrit. D'autre part, par la nouvelle proposition que la Sublime Porte fait à présent aux alliés de remettre aux Grandes Puissances la solution des questions en litige, elle demande purement et simplement la dissolution de la conférence. Il se rallie donc à l'avis de M. Danev qu'il faut ajourner la séance pour que les délégués ottomans puissent recevoir toutes leurs instructions.

Osman Nizamy Pacha répond que dans la pensée des délégués ottomans il ne s'agit pas de dissoudre la conférence, mais bien d'arriver à une solution rapide de certaines questions territoriales. Une fois ces questions résolues, les plénipotentiaires ottomans présenteront leur contre-proposition sur toutes les autres.

Le Président observe que dans ce cas les délégués ottomans doivent faire leur contre-proposition dans une forme alternative, en indiquant en quoi consisterait leur proposition au cas où les alliés n'accepteraient pas la nouvelle suggestion de la Sublime Porte. Il vaut mieux être logique et présenter par écrit une contre-proposition en réponse à tous les points soulevés par la proposition des alliés.

Sur la demande de *M. Vénizélos*, la séance est suspendue pour permettre aux délégués ottomans de se concerter afin de formuler de suite leur proposition par écrit.

A la reprise de la séance,

Le Président annonce que, après entente avec les plénipotentiaires ottomans, la réunion est renvoyée au mercredi prochain, pour qu'ils aient la possibilité de formuler par écrit leur contre-proposition au sujet de toutes les questions soulevées par les alliés.

La prochaine séance est donc fixée au mercredi, 19 décembre (1er janvier), à 3 heures de l'après-midi.

La séance est levée à 5 heures.

Le Président :
Dr. ST. DANEFF.

Les Secrétaires :
H. Norman.
S. Tcharykow.
A. C. Vouros.
S. Y. Grouitch.
D. Noradounghian.

[55764] No. 580.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 214.)

Sir, *Athens, December 21, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 209 of the 14th instant I have the honour to transmit herewith a continuation of the diary of the war, taken from the official bulletins, from the 14th to the 21st instant.

News of the operations around Yannina is very meagre. An English officer of Garibaldians, who has returned wounded to Athens, states that in the engagements last week his force fought with great bravery (except the Italians, who bolted) and suffered much more heavily than is shown in the official returns. He has a very low opinion of General Ricciotti Garibaldi as regards both courage and capacity.

Lieutenant Montousis is reported to have made a successful aeroplane reconnaissance over Yannina and to have dropped some bombs. His machine was struck by bullets but he was unhurt.

No positive details have yet been obtainable as to the damage inflicted on the Turkish fleet in the engagement off the Dardanelles on the 16th instant, but the account

given by a British ship, which appears to have called at Lemnos for the purpose, bears an appearance of probability. It states that the "Barbarossa" was practically destroyed and the admiral and several of his staff were killed, and that two other Turkish ships were damaged. As regards the "Barbarossa," this account tallies with the fact that six 24 centim. shells were observed from the "Averoff" to strike her, and from the moment she turned round to go back into the Dardanelles she did not fire another shot. The "Trevanack," which has been sent back from Lemnos to the Piræus pending a decision as to the disposal of her, reports that the "Averoff" has a large hole in one of her funnels.

With reference to Mr. Wratislaw's despatch No. 89 of the 17th instant I have the honour to report that 1,800 (some say twice as many) Cretans arrived on the 17th and are being drilled like ordinary recruits. The inference that the dispatch of them from Crete shows that the Greek Government is hard up for men is a mistaken one, for volunteers and liability men continue to arrive almost daily from all parts of the world in hundreds, and, as already reported, the summoning of the 1913 class has been postponed.

A portion of the 1913 class of naval recruits has been summoned for the 1st (14th) January.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 580.

Diary of the War for December 15—21, 1912.

15*th December.*—Official announcement by the Ministry of War.

A band under Lieutenants Terekidis, Krommydas, and Koutoupis and the Cretan Delyannakis occupied Skala Paramythias (Epirus) yesterday. The fight was bloody and lasted all day. Besides other casualties, Koutoupis, Terekidis, and Delyannakis were wounded, the first-named seriously. The enemy fled, abandoning a number of Mauser rifles, a heliographic instrument, and much rich booty. Sixty prisoners were taken.

16*th December.*—Official announcement by the Ministry of Marine.

According to a telegram sent via Tenedos by the commander-in-chief, a naval action took place to-day at the entrance of the Dardanelles. The battle began at 9·25 A.M. and lasted an hour, the enemy's ships remaining the whole time under the protection of the forts. The enemy, whose losses are unknown as yet, re-entered the Dardanelles in disorder. Our fleet continued to manœuvre at the limit of the range of the forts until 3·30 and then left for the open sea. At 3·40 three Turkish destroyers attempted to leave the Dardanelles, but were chased back by our destroyers.

17*th December.*—Telegram despatch from Tenedos at midnight by the commander of the destroyer flotilla, in obedience to orders from the Ministry of Marine.

At 9·25 this morning our fleet, comprising the "Averoff," "Spetsai," "Hydra," "Psara," and the four scouts (*i.e.*, the late Argentine destroyers) sailed towards Sedil Bahr, on the south-western extremity of the Dardanelles. On receipt of an order I joined the admiral with nine destroyers. The armoured ships "Barbarossa," "Turgut," Messoudieh," and "Assar-i-Tewfix," under the protection of the Sedil Bahr forts, opened fire. Our fleet replied at 9,000 metres and approached within 3,000 metres. The forts took part in the action. The "Medjidieh" and the enemy's light flotilla, under the protection of the Kum Kalé fort, also fired. At 10·40 firing ceased and the enemy withdrew in disorder. According to information given by the Russian steam-ship "Jerusalem" great damage was done to the enemy. The range officer of the "Averoff" states that six shells from the 234 millim. guns struck the "Barbarossa."

17*th December.*—Yesterday morning while cruising between Cape Kephala, Imbros, and the extremity of the Gallipoli peninsula we sighted, at 8·20, the emeny's fleet coming out of the straits. At 9, at a distance of 17,000 metres, we made out the fleet to consist of the "Turgut," "Barbarossa," "Assar-i-Tewfik," "Messoudieh," a cruiser of the "Hamidieh" type, and a group of six to eight destroyers. The four armoured ships went to the right, skirting the Helle point. We at once turned to the left, advancing against them. When we had come within about 12,000 metres the enemy opened fire; soon afterwards, at 9·25, we returned it. After ten minutes the "Averoff," manœuvring independently, approached the enemy to place him between two fires. In this way we got by degrees to within 2,900 metres of the enemy's flag-ship, while the other three battle-ships, under the commodore, got within 4,100 metres.

Then, however, the enemy's flag-ship, after a heavy fire from the "Averoff," turned 180 degrees to the right and made for the straits, followed by the rest of the fleet in disorder. The "Averoff" then turned in order to get out of range of the forts. We could not pursue the enemy further, as we had come within the range of the forts, which were firing at us. At 10·30 the enemy, owing to the severity of the fire of the "Averoff" and the battle-ships, ceased firing and entered the Straits under the protection of the forts and disappeared from view. We remained outside, cruising up and down until 1·30. We do not know exactly how much damage the enemy suffered, but we surmised that it caused the cessation of their fire and their retreat. No injury was done to our ships beyond some quite insignificant damage to the upper works of the "Averoff," against which the whole fire of the enemy was directed. Our casualties: killed, one petty officer; wounded, one sub-lieutenant and seven petty officers and men in the "Averoff"; one cook wounded in the "Spetsai." The spirit and courage of all without exception were beyond description; the men cheered as they fired; the coolness and accuracy of the handling of the battle-ships were admirable.

COUNDOURIOTIS.

17*th December.*—Telegram from Philippiada, communicated to the press by the Ministry of War.

Bizani, of which the Turks said that all the armies of the Balkans could not capture it, has only a few hours' resistance left. After a stubborn fight lasting all day the batteries of this naturally strong fort were silenced by the accurate fire of our siege guns. One shell blew up the magazine, others destroyed the batteries one after another, while the right wing of the army advanced impetuously on Bizani. From the summit of the opposite mountain the enemy's position is clearly visible. A little before sunset considerable confusion was observed in it. Soldiers were dragging back guns and others were abandoning the town. General Sapountzakis personally directed all the operations.

18*th December.*—There has been no new fighting, as the enemy have not come out again. We learn from Tenedos that the enemy was damaged. We continue masters of the situation.

COUNDOURIOTIS.

18*th December.*—Official announcement by the Ministry of War.

To-day a severe duel between our artillery and that of the Turks' at Bizani took place. Lieutenant Moutousis, of the engineers, executed a successful flight over Yannina and Bizani. He was fired at and replied with bombs. The wings of the aeroplane were slightly perforated, but the machine grounded safely.

19*th December.*—The Turkish troops have been blockaded at Klapades, and their retreat entirely cut off. Their surrender is expected.

Dated from Mitylene.

COLONEL A. SYRMAKEZIS.

19*th December.*—From the Governor of Tenedos through Admiral Coundouriotis. The result of the battle was the almost entire destruction of the Turkish flag-ship "Khaireddin Barbarossa." The ship is pierced and the holes are covered with tarpaulin to hide them. During the battle a fire broke out in her, which was extinguished. The rear-admiral and four other officers were killed. There are also many killed and wounded among the crew, as a hospital ship has come down from Constantinople to take off the wounded. It is also ascertained that three other ships of the Turkish fleet suffered great damage, and three destroyers hid themselves during the action. The above details were given by various foreign vessels which passed through the Dardanelles.

20*th December.*—The Greek troops have repulsed the advanced detachments of the enemy and have occupied Akhyrona and Klapades. The pursuit of the enemy continues and their surrender is imminent.

Dated from Mitylene.

COLONEL SYRMAKEZIS.

20*th December.*—Official announcement by the Ministry of War.

The enemy, who are concentrated at Korytsa, sent a few days ago some troops towards Viglitsa. Our troops attacked these men on the 17th, and they retreated towards Tsagoni.

[55744] No. 581.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 541.)

Sir, *Paris, December 28, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you, with reference to my despatch No. 539, Confidential, of the 26th instant, that endeavours are evidently being made in some quarters to keep French public opinion interested in the Lebanon and Syria.

The "Temps" published a further leading article on the 26th instant criticising the new statute for the Lebanon, and observing that it was assumed that there was no question of appointing anyone but French officers as instructors of the Lebanon militia.

The "Matin" of yesterday's date gave prominence to an article signed "Chekri-Ganem," enumerating the grievances, past and present, of the inhabitants of the Lebanon against the Ottoman administration. England is accused of having in the past, out of jealousy of France, joined with Turkey in preventing the development of a country whose only crime was its attachment to France.

A Havas Agency telegram from Cairo is published in the "Matin" and the "Temps" to-day to the effect that, on the occasion of a ceremony at the Maronite Church, the Archbishop expressed to M. Defrance, French agent at Cairo, the gratitude of the Lebanon people for the recent declarations of M. Poincaré. The President of the Central Lebanon Committee in Egypt has, so it is stated, also given utterance to the gratitude and devotion of the inhabitants of the Lebanon towards France, and expressed the hope that France may continue to support its just claims and the development of its national existence.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[55845] No. 582.

London Chamber of Commerce to Foreign Office.—(Received December 31.)

Oxford Court, Cannon Street, London,

Sir, *December 30, 1912.*

I HAVE been requested by members of the Tobacco Trade Section of this chamber who are interested in the manipulation and importation of Turkish tobacco grown in Macedonia, and who have considerable invested capital and other interests at stake in that district, to submit for your consideration the following matter, and to express the hope that you will use your good offices to prevent any damage to their trading interests which may arise should the control of Macedonia pass from the Turkish Government to one of the Balkan States.

I am informed that at present any merchant who wishes so to do may purchase tobacco grown in Turkish territory and prepare it in that territory, and the members of the section concerned fear that if the control of Macedonia is transferred as anticipated the new Government may possibly decide to make the export of tobacco a Government monopoly, which would mean ruin to the British companies now engaged in that trade.

Having regard to circumstances which may affect the economic position in Turkey and the Balkan States, the members of this section concerned venture to hope that a means may be found by which their interests in the tobacco trade in Macedonia may be safeguarded, and it is therefore hoped that His Majesty's Government will bear the matter in mind for such action as can be properly taken on their behalf at the earliest favourable opportunity.

I am to add that, under date of the 10th December, one of the members has received a letter from his manager in Macedonia stating that the Provisional Government have sought to levy a tax on Turkish tobacco exported from Macedonia.

All the merchants represented there, British and other, protested, but in order to allow shipments to continue, have given a formal undertaking that they will pay the tax should it be subsequently imposed.

I have, &c.
CHARLES E. MUSGRAVE, *Secretary.*

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[113] No. 583.

Memorandum communicated by Greek Minister, December 31, 1912.

LE Gouvernement Royal m'a autorisé à faire et à laisser copie à votre Excellence, la communication suivante :—

Dès l'entrée des armées helléniques en territoire ennemi, les commissaires Royaux proclamèrent la décision du Gouvernement Royal de respecter et de faire appliquer, dans la mesure compatible avec les opérations militaires dans toutes les régions occupées, les lois ottomanes en vigueur, relativement aux services publiques. Par application de cette idée et conformément aux prescriptions des lois de la guerre, le 29 octobre (11 novembre), le Gouvernement Royal adressa à ses commissaires Royaux dans les provinces du continent et dans les îles occupées des instructions détaillées, accompagnées d'un aperçu sommaire de la législation ottomane relativement au système fiscal et au régime de la propriété immobilière et généralement à l'administration des intérêts locaux.

Plus spécialement, au sujet de l'Administration des Phares, l'autorité militaire de Salonique l'a invitée à reprendre le service public dont elle est chargée, service dont le fonctionnement avait été suspendu depuis plus d'un an par les autorités turques.

Et au sujet de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, le commandant en chef des armées d'occupation, dans chacune des régions intéressées, a notifié aux succursales intéressées de la Banque ottomane la note suivante :—

"Le commandant en chef de l'armée Royale d'occupation à M. le directeur de la Banque ottomane à Salonique :

"Faisant application des lois de la guerre, qui lui donnent le droit d'administrer les services publiques des pays occupés, le commandant en chef de l'armée Royale d'occupation a prescrit aux autorités placées sous ses ordres de percevoir les revenus, taxes et impôts antérieurement perçus par les autorités ottomanes.

"Toutefois, soucieux des droits des créanciers étrangers de la Turquie, malgré les précédents que pourrait fournir la pratique internationale, il n'entend pas toucher durant la guerre au fonctionnement des institutions établies pour leur sauvegarde.

"En conséquence, il a décidé que l'Administration de la Dette publique, qui, en vertu des règlements en vigueur à son égard, a été substituée à l'autorité ottomane dans la perception des revenus affectés à la dette publique, pourra, durant la guerre, continuer à assurer le service dont elle a eu jusqu'ici la charge.

"Mais afin de garantir tous les droits que l'Etat hellénique tire de l'occupation, de la guerre, et d'empêcher que l'ennemi ne profite d'aucune, ni directement ni indirectement, de l'excédent des revenus affectés, après le service de la dette la Banque Impériale ottomane ne pourra, sans l'autorisation des autorités helléniques compétentes, faire aucun emploi des fonds déposés dans ses caisses par l'Administration de la Dette publique. Au rétablissement de la paix, il sera procédé à un règlement de comptes, afin de déterminer dans les sommes perçues par l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, durant l'occupation, la part qui sera prélevée pour le service de la dette et celle dont aura à profiter le Trésor hellénique, à titre de butin de guerre."

Le Gouvernement Royal est convaincu que le Gouvernement britannique appréciera non seulement la scrupuleuse application des lois de la guerre partout où les autorités helléniques se sont substituées aux autorités ottomanes, mais aussi l'esprit très libéral qui l'a animé dans cette application, au profit des intérêts des populations civiles et des capitaux étrangers.

Légation de Grèce, Londres,
le 31 décembre, 1912.

[1/13] No. 584.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 744.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December 31, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 1127 of 30th December.

Idea of Porte in offering to allies to submit all matters outside vilayet of Adrianople to the decision of the Great Powers would seem to be that territorially

they have nothing further to lose by thus internationalising the situation, and that they may gain, on the calculation that differences of views between the Powers of the Triple Alliance and Triple *Entente*, as to the distribution of territory, may result in discord by dragging out the situation or dividing the allies.

The Porte also believes that, as Triple *Entente* is in favour of the allies not being deprived of the fruits of victory, while the Triple Alliance is in favour of the opposite course, especially in the matter of the Albanian boundaries and Salonica, interests of the latter coincide with what the Porte consider to be their own interests, and the recent repeated long interviews of my Austrian colleague here with Minister for Foreign Affairs are perhaps significant (see my telegram No. 715 of 11th December). Should the allies accept Turkish proposal to leave the decision to the Powers, the Porte would probably develop to latter its views that partition of territory should be on an ethnographical basis, which it would take a month at least to determine; that Scutari, Janina, and portions of Uskub vilayet should be included in Albania; that Salonica and the "autonomous Macedonia" should comprise all districts (most difficult to establish) where no one element has a decided majority.

The Porte reserves not only the town but also the vilayet of Adrianople, on the [group undecypherable: ? understanding] that it would concede the former if unanimously pressed by the six Great Powers to do so, but apparently counts on the absence of this unanimity. Neither financial arguments nor those of dangerous disturbances in the Anatolian provinces seem to seriously appeal to the Turkish Government.

From recent statement of Grand Vizier I gathered that Porte's intention is to remain on the defensive, and to avoid the contingency contemplated by Russian threat.

(Sent to Athens, Sophia, and Belgrade.)

[55883] No. 585.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received December* 31.)

(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, December* 31, 1912.

SERVIAN authorities are levying at Ghevgheli prohibitive import duties on goods forwarded from Salonica after paying 11 per cent. here. The immediate effect is to fetter the Salonica trade in the interests of Belgrade middle-merchants and holders of stock, but it also constitutes a serious restriction of commerce in general, and seems to be an infringement of the treaty rights of neutral Powers.

[55094] No. 586.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. E. Grant Duff.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 31, 1912.

IT is stated in some quarters that Austria-Hungary's reluctance to demobilise is due to gravity of internal situation. It would not do for you to make a personal tour at the present time, but we have little information as to what is taking place in Slav provinces, and it would be valuable if, without attracting attention, you could ascertain state of popular feeling in Croatia, and possibly Transylvania.

(Repeated to Vienna, No. 441.)

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[251] No. 587.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 634.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 31, 1912.

M CAMBON told me to-day that the Austrian Ambassador in Paris had informed M. Poincaré that instructions had been sent to the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburgh which it was hoped might lead to an arrangement with Russia. M. Cambon hoped that this might refer to the mobilisation. If an arrangement could be come to by which Russia released certain classes of reservists on the 13th January, when their release was due, and Austria took some step to mark a slackening on her part, it would help the

negotiations. Meanwhile, he thought that the negotiations about the limits of Albania, of which the question of Scutari was one part, should not be hurried.

I observed that the death of Herr von Kiderlen was a great loss at this moment and might give rise to delay. In Berlin foreign affairs had been left to him through this crisis. He had all the threads in his hands, and the materials at his disposal with which to take a decision as each development was reached. He had expressed satisfaction with the progress made at the meetings of the Ambassadors, and I felt sure that it had been his intention to promote the success of these meetings. However good might be the disposition of his successor, the latter could not have the same knowledge to enable him to take decisions quickly, or the same authority in taking a line of action.

M. Cambon agreed that the death of Herr von Kiderlen at this moment was a great loss.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[253] No. 588.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 635.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 31, 1912.

I TOOK an opportunity of saying to M. Cambon to-day that, though what M. Poincaré had said in the Chamber had repeated what I had said with regard to Syria, I was made anxious by the use to which the French press had made of this statement. My denial of intrigues and political designs on our part was being interpreted in some organs of the press as if I had given some new emphatic recognition of French interests, and as if France was going to take some step to consolidate and strengthen those interests. Anything of this sort at this moment would lead to other Powers raising questions of their own in Asia Minor. As a matter of fact, what we desired was to preserve, and not to disturb, the *status quo* there at present.

M. Cambon expressed with great emphasis the impossibility of controlling the journalists in France.

On my saying that it was presumably M. Tardieu who was the moving spirit, M. Cambon confirmed this.

I am, &c.
E. GREY

[55890] No. 589.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 432.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 31, 1912.

M. DE ETTER gave Sir A. Nicolson on the 27th December the substance of a telegram recording a conversation which Count Berchtold had held with the Russian Ambassador at Vienna in respect to Austrian military preparations.

Count Berchtold had observed that he would not admit that the term "mobilisation" should be employed in regard to the measures which Austria-Hungary had thought fit to take. Austria had merely taken certain precautionary and preparatory measures, which she could not modify at once for the following reasons:—

1. The Servian forces were still on a war footing.
2. Servia had been fomenting intrigues and agitation in Bosnia.
3. Russia had troops on the Galician frontier, and in case of hostilities would immediately advance into that province.
4. The Russian peace cadres were always stronger than the Austrian.
5. The Peace Conference was still sitting, and its results uncertain.
6. "There were certain questions pending in the Ambassadorial conversations which would require settlement."

This reason M. de Etter did not like, as it looked as if Count Berchtold wished to exercise some kind of pressure on the Ambassadorial meetings.

Count Berchtold had added that he might possibly be in a position to modify the preparations in ten days or a fortnight, though M. de Giers did not think that he really intended to do so.

M. de Fleuriau told Sir A. Nicolson that the French report of the above conversation had stated that Count Berchtold had added to the last indication of a modification of military preparation in a fortnight's time, the proviso that at the end of that period Austria-Hungary "might have obtained all the guarantees which she desired."

Count Berchtold had gone to the country for a few days, and M. de Giers would see him on his return.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[252] No. 590.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 308.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 31, 1912.*

THE Italian Ambassador told me to-day that, according to his information, the Servians attached the greatest importance to getting Prizrend and Ipek. They would be resigned to letting Dibra be included in Albania, and Russia would not press the point of Dibra. Djakova had not the same importance for Servia as Prizrend and Ipek; and, though Russia would put the suggestion forward, he personally thought that one possible arrangement in the end would be that, if Austria gave way about Scutari, Russia should give way about Djakova. He told me also that Austria wished very much to get Mount Lofchen, which dominated Cattaro, and made the Austrian fortifications there useless. But, if Austria got Mount Lofchen, she would dominate Cettinjé, and the independence of Montenegro would be gone.

I said that all these points and possibilities would have to be borne in mind. At present, what seemed to me most important was to press Turkey to conclude peace. I heard that the Roumanian mobilisation was becoming serious, and this was a most unfavourable piece of news.

The Ambassador asked me if I was quite sure that Bulgaria would insist on having Adrianople.

I replied that she had shown no sign whatever since the peace negotiations began of giving way on that point.

The Ambassador thought it was possible that Bulgaria would leave Adrianople to Turkey if the fortifications were razed, and if she could be quite sure of getting Salonica.

I remarked that it would be a somewhat invidious task for the Powers to intervene between Greece and Bulgaria about Salonica. In any case, I did not see that we could do anything until we were approached either by Turkey or Bulgaria.

The Ambassador expressed apprehension of the new points which Austria was raising. He was afraid that she might not interpret the resolution that Albania should be controlled by the six Powers in a way which really meant control by all the Powers, and he developed to me a scheme for carrying out this control.

I observed that his scheme was certainly one way of effecting control by the six Powers, and it seemed to me a scheme in accordance with the resolution of the Ambassadors. Other schemes might be suggested, and all I could say was that in my opinion the resolution come to by the Ambassadors meant control by the six Powers, and not a privileged position for two Powers, and still less for one Power in Albania.

With this the Ambassador was satisfied.

He expressed the opinion that the Servian participation in the international line to the neutral port should not be limited solely by the Servian financial contribution, but should be on a footing equal to that of any one of the other Powers represented in the control of the railway.

To this I agreed.

The Ambassador had also heard that Austria would object to Servia having the right to import munitions of war in war-time.

I observed that, in time of war, the Austrian fleet could, by seizing contraband at sea, prevent munitions of war from reaching the port.

He expressed considerable apprehension less Austria, as intimated in her press, might claim to have some compensation for recognising the terms of peace. Such a claim would start every Power on the same quest, and he suggested that some resolution might be adopted to provide against this.

I replied that the suggestion came very near to a formula of "désintéressement,"

such as had already caused some trouble; and I doubted the advisability of complicating the conversations of the Ambassadors by proposing this.

The Ambassador also remarked on the campaign which was being carried on in France about Syria, and suggested that this question might have to be discussed.

I said that all I had done was to deny that we were carrying on the intrigues or had the designs attributed to us. I had no reason to think that France was meditating any *coup*. Of course, if the Syrian question was raised, other Powers would wish to raise their own questions about Asia Minor. I thought that there was no need to discuss Syria.

The Ambassador was very anxious that the questions of Scutari and the frontiers of Albania should not be brought on prematurely at the meetings of Ambassadors.

I said that I had no intention of bringing them forward until, by ascertaining the views of the different Powers, I could see my way to a settlement.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.